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ABSTRACT 
A central concern of this thesis is the expansion, distribution and control of 'non-standard ' 
employment in Namibia since independence. The employment relationship has assumed various 
historical forms under capitalism, each of which corresponds to a specific mode of regulation 
with distinct structural dynamics. An attempt is made to extend the regulation approach 
'downwards' to account for the problem of order in the workplace and to place the employment 
relationship within its own regulatory framework. The point of departure in this study of the 
dynamics of labour regulation is the contradictory nature of labour's incorporation, allocation, 
control and reproduction within the labour market. The employment relationship is never only 
an economic exchange, but is also mediated through an institutional framework that connects the 
processes of production and social reproduction, and regulates conflicting interests inside and 
outside the workplace. This relationship, as critical realists have pointed out, is a product of the 
indeterminate intersection of several generative structures. The roots of these generative 
structures can be traced to three sets of social processes: the processes of production and the 
structuring oflabour demand; the processes of social reproduction and the structuring oflabour 
supply; and the forces of regulation. Non-standard employment is viewed as a particular social 
and spatio-temporal 'fix' for the various regulatory dilemmas generated by the standard 
employment relationship. This conception underscores the fact that a national system oflabour 
regulation decisively shapes the conditions under which employers are able to casualise a part 
of their workforce. The differential experience across national boundaries suggests that analytical 
space needs to be provided for systems oflabour market regulation which may either accentuate 
or moderate pressures for casualisation. Segmentation on the demand side of the labour market 
is explored through an analysis of the types of non-standard jobs created in different economic 
sectors. The various forms of employment 'flexibility ' tend to vary in importance according to 
the specific manner in which a firm chooses to compete. Consequently, non-standard employees 
are distributed in a complex and uneven manner across industrial sectors and the occupational 
hierarchy, and face a diverse range of possibilities and liabilities that shape their levels and forms 
of participation in the labour market. By counteracting the homogenisation effects of labour law 
and collective bargaining, the mobilisation of cheap and disposable labour through non-standard 
employment contracts allows employers much greater discretion in constructing the wage-effort 
bargain. With non-standard employment, social and statutory regulation is weak or 
underdeveloped and hence managerial control is autocratic, with a significant contractual 
component. Although the changing social composition of the workforce associated with 
employment 'flexibility' poses serious challenges to the modes of organisation that have long 
served the labour movement, trade unions in Namibia and elsewhere have been slow to respond 
to the threats of casualisation. Of concern here, is the extent to which attempts (0 promote the 
security of existing union members is compatible with attempts to organise non-standard 
employees. This thesis shows that the unions have developed a complex amalgam of strategies 
in their efforts to regulate non-standard employment relationships. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Namibia is perhaps the most under-researched country in southern Africa. In particular, there is 
a dearth of published research on changes in the labour market and labour process since 
independence. Despite the rapid rise in so-called ' flexible' employment in Namibia after 1990, 
very little is known about the various dimensions of this type of work. Since independence, 
industrial restmcturing and the transformation of the regulatory regime were driven largely by 
the deracialisation of labour market institutions and the state's efforts at attracting foreign 
investment. The form that workplace restructuring and employment 'flexibility' has assumed is 
a product of the ways in which international economic pressures are transmitted to and embedded 
in Namibian institutions and practices. The processes of labour market reform and the exposure 
of domestic markets to more intense competition have made the survival of most firms dependent 
on drastic cost-cutting. In a ' peripheral ' country such as Namibia, the dominant industries are 
mainly mature, non-science-based sectors, benefitting from either local natural resources or from 
cheap labour. The capacity to innovate and lead technological development is severely limited; 
design and production methods are standardised; productivity growth is slow; and the major form 
of competition is price competition, depending predominantly on labour costs. Since employers 
have more direct control over labour costs - as compared to capital or intermediate costs -
workers have become the prime target for ' rationalisation'. These initiatives add up to an 
emergent labour market strategy that places low-waged, poorly-regulated labour at the forefront 
of attempts to improve competitiveness and reduce costs. 
The unbridled role of market forces was stressed by the proponents of the 'new world order' at 
precisely the time that Namibia required extensive state intervention to transform its apartheid-
based mode of regulation and colonial regime of accumulation. In addition to these international 
pressures, attempts to eradicate the vestiges of institutionalised racism in post-independence 
Namibia are severely constrained by vast social inequalities and extensive economic dependence 
on South Africa. The institutional and nOlmative framework of apartheid-colonialism also 
provided fertile soi l for division, mistrust and adversarialism in Namibia' s industrial relations 
regime, thereby limiting the types workplace restructuring that are possible or feasible. The pre-
independence expectations among black people of significantly improved earnings and standards 
of living remain largely unfulfilled as the Namibian government pursues conservative fiscal 
policies and the economy fails to sustain adequate levels of growth. The legacy of colonialism, 
combined with the pressures of economic competition and the dictates of neo-liberalism, 
seriously hampered the government' s capacity to sustain a durable and redistributive trade-off 
between the imperatives of economic efficiency and the demands fo r greater social equality. In 
practice, this meant that efforts to overcome discrimination, poverty and unemployment, while 
ensuring that the economy diversifies and becomes internationally competitive, generated distinct 
sets of winners and losers. Namibia 's hard-won political emancipation and national liberation 
are bound to be a hollow victory for the bulk of the poor in the absence of a radical 
transformation of the inherited structures of economic ownership and control. 
Making sense of these developments raises the problem of the relative balance between change 
and continuity, generality and specificity. With the realisation that segmented labour market can 
sustain diverse pools of labour, came a gradual process of illuminating various forms of 
employment that had long been ' invisible '. Unfortunately, this process of illumination was often 
confused with one of discovelY. As a result, many 'flexible' or 'atypical ' forms of employment 
were presented as recent departures from a previously unfettered commitment to the 
standardisation of employment relations. The claim that the current period of heterogeneity was 
preceded by a period of labour homogenisation is contradicted by the deeply segmented labour 
markets described by labour historians. In a comprehensive study, Cohen (1987:2) shows how 
"capitalism has a/ways survived and even thrived, by deploying substantial numbers of unfree 
and semi-free labourers" (emphasis added).' A preoccupation with what is ostensibly novel , 
detracts from a consideration of the historical continuity of sectorally-specific employment 
practices. Broad generalisations also obscure the complex and contingent links between particular 
production technologies, product markets and the like on the one hand, and labour market 
conditions, available labour supplies and so forth, on the other. Each form of employment, as 
Gonos (1998: 172) points out, has "a distinctive structure and function and its own social history". 
What needs to be explained is the specific set of conditions that leads to effective resistance and 
advancement by some workers and to forced compliance and regression by others. 
PRODUCTION, REGULATION, AND SEGMENTATION 
To compete effectively in the 'new' global economy, according to a rampant neo-liberal 
orthodoxy, requires an unwavering commitment to employment ' flexibility ', an extensive 
'deregulation' of the labour market, and a cOlTesponding reduction in the capacity of the state and 
labour to regulate employment and wages. Protective employment and social policies, it is 
argued, curb competition in the labour market and create numerous 'rigidities' that stifl e market 
imperatives. As a result, employers find it increasingly difficult to adjust the quantity and the 
1 Throughout th is text, emphasis is in the origi nal unless otherwise indicated. 
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quality of labour supply to rapid and unpredictable changes in demand. In essence, these 
prescriptions amount to a call for an increase in the power of employers over the acquisition, 
deployment and disposal of labour. This is perhaps most evident in the increasing casualisation 
of employment - w1derstood in the broad sense of a spread of casual conditions of employment 
within the labour market. The employment contracts associated with casualisation (part-time, 
temporary, self-employed, subcontracted, seasonal , homework) deviate from the contract of 
pennanent, full-time employment in one or more of its defining features. This implies changes 
in some or all the attributes of the ' typical ' or 'normal' employment relationship involving 
regular (usually male) full-time, organised workers in key sectors of the economy, working 
standard hours and for an indefinite duration in a large, vertically-integrated workplace situated 
in an urban environment. The dimensions of change are therefore extremely varied and include 
racial and gender divisions; the occupational and sectoral distribution of labour; size of 
employment unit; trade union density and influence; collective and individual labour regulation; 
the location of work; duration of employment; working conditions and non-wage benefits; and 
working time and patterns. 
Research on workplace restructuring is increasingly driven by an employers' agenda, most 
notably in the studies of labour market 'flexibility' . The point of departure and the objectives of 
social inquiry are increasingly tied to the problems of management. There is a dire need to 
change the orientation of research and to expose the detrimental social consequences of 
employment 'flexibility': growing levels of risk, anxiety, marginalisation and powerlessness. A 
focus on the casualisation of employment shifts attention away from the needs of employers and 
towards a deeper understanding of the interests of employees. Revealing the ambivalence of 
recent changes when viewed from the perspective of the employee is a central contribution of this 
approach. In contrast to the veneration of 'flexibility' in the best-practice literature, the approach 
adopted here is deeply critical of the uncertainty and instability associated with current changes 
in the labour market and labour process. From the perspective of the part-time or temporary 
employee, it is vulnerability and precariousness rather than ' flexibility ' that usually characterise 
his/her experiences of work. In fact, Heery and Salmon (2000b: 1) identify an 'insecurity thesis' -
i.e. a coherent set of statements about the nature, causes and effects ofrecent changes to work 
and employment relations - in the literature on industrial restructuring. The key propositions of 
this thesis include the following: 
that economic risk is being transferred increasingly from employers to employees, through shortened job 
tenure and contingent employment and remuneration ; that insecuri ty is damaging to long-term economic 
performance, through its promotion of an employment relationship founded on opportunism, mistrust and 
low commitment; and that the emergence of an insecure workforce imposes severe costs on both individuals 
and the wider soc iety. 
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Although precarious and poorly regulated forms of employment are on the increase worldwide, 
the patterns vary significantly over time and space.' This heterogeneity has magnified the 
confusion and difficulty that surrounds the definition of these forms of employment. There is a 
need to disaggregate the various types of employment in order to reveal contrasting patterns. The 
categories that are most commonly deployed in the literature tend to combine very different types 
of work and employment relationship. They are also inclined to focus on one aspect of 
casualisation to the exclusion of others. Contingent work emphasises the unpredictable need for 
and unplanned duration of cel1ain jobs. Casual employment highlights the fact that the services 
of some employees can be readily terminated with little or no costs to the employer. Peripheral 
work signifies the jobs that are not central to the core business of an enterprise. Flexible labour 
accentuates the need of employers to make rapid short-term adjustments to the supply of labour 
in response to changes in demand. Common to many of these approaches is a tendency to view 
the different rypes of 'atypical ' employment as "effectively interchangeable in terms of their 
function for employers and the labour market disadvantages they involve" (Gallie el a1 1998: 12). 
The proliferation of concepts to refer to a variety of different types of work indicates a lack of 
both theoretical precision and conceptual clarity, which has profound implications for data 
gathering and the interpretations of trends (Felstead and Jewson 1999b). Vastly different 
numerical estimates can be derived from different operationalisations of the concepts and highly 
misleading results can flow from the lumping together of incommensurate categories of work and 
relations of employment. 
Reductionism is a common feature of the distinctions made between the various types of 
employment that do not conform to all aspects of the 'normal ' or 'typical' employment 
relationship. A less deterministic approach is centred on the distinction between 'standard ' 
(full-time, permanent) and 'non-standard' (part-time, temporary) employment relationships in 
terms of the extent to which employment conditions are regulated by labour law and collective 
bargaining (Miickenberger 1989). This allows for the organisational, political, historical and 
other dimensions of non-standard employment to be explored in a non-reductionist manner. Not 
all non-standard employees are 'peripheral ' workers, not all ' atypical ' workers are employed in 
'contingent' employment arrangements, and not all 'flexible' form of employment are similar 
in terms of levels of skill, career prospects, job security and so on (Gallie and White 1994; 
Rubery and Wilk inson 1994; Gallie e/ a11998; Felstead and Jewson I 999b). All patterns of non-
2 See: Cordova ( 1986); Beneria and Roldan (1987); Tarling (1987); Abraham (1988); Casey el al (1989); 
Chalmers (1989); Hakim (1990a); Brown and Sease (1991); Allen and Henry (1996); Oex and McCulloch ( 1997); 
Barker and Christensen (1998); Horwitz el al (1998); Mhone ( 1998); Felstead and Jewson (1999a); Kenny and 
Webster (1999); Standing (1999); HeelY and Salmon (2000a); and Campbell and Burgess (200 I). 
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standard employment share, albeit to differing degrees and in varying forms, a departure from 
one or more of the central features of the standard employment relationship (SER).3 This suggests 
that the casualisation of employment can assume many diffe rent forms that serve a myriad of 
different functions. Hence, it is best understood as a spatio-temporally specific and always 
imperfect regulatory 'fix' for (some of) the dilemmas inherent in the construction and 
maintenance of the SER. 
The establishment and growth of the SER represented a significant historical victory for 
organised labour over spot contracting and market-mediated employment relationships. However, 
the SER has both a protective and exclusionary or restrictive character (Scott 1998). Workers 
falling outside the statutory definition of an 'employee' are deprived of the protections associated 
with standard employment and exposed to the rigours of common law. This provides employers 
with an incentive to construct employment contracts in a manner that excludes the legal 
indicators of a SER. The increasing fragmentation of the workforce associated with the policies 
of employment 'flexibi lity' have lead to the weakening of the SER and to the erosion of its 
universality as a labour policy model. Paradoxically, attention was only really focused on the 
SER when it could no longer be taken for granted. That is, when it began to show "a tendency 
towards disintegration and de-standardisation, making us conscious of formerly implied 
assumptions of a standard" (Miickenberger 1989:381). With the proliferation of non-standard 
employment, lines of authority in the workplace are redrawn, new sources of tension are 
generated, the segmentation of the labour market is intensified, and access to the training and 
other rewards necessary to secure a high-skill, high-commitment workforce are increasingly 
restricted. 
The standard versus non-standard employment classification is based on a regulatory and 
entitlement nOIm. As such, 'non-standard' is a less ideologically-loaded and a more precise term 
than ' flexible ' or 'peripheral ' labour. The primary concern is not the nature or length of service, 
but rather the broader issue of lack of entitlement. Non-standard employment, according to 
Cordova (1986:656), is characterised by "a total or partial absence of regulation". That is, 
workers on non-standard employment contracts exist in "a relatively ' lawless' situation" 
(Chalmers 1989:213). Although all forms of non-standard employment suffer a deficit in 
protection, "the extent and nature of this shortfall varies according to the specific configuration 
of protective regulation .. . and the specific form of temporary employment" (Campbell and 
3 These deviations include the duration of the contract, the duration of the work, the place of the work, the 
replacement of a bi lateral by a triangular relationship, and the content of the worker's ob ligation in terms of the 
availabili ty to work (Veneziani 1993). 
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Burgess 2001: 171), The historically- and spatially-specific origins of non-standard forms of 
employment suggests that they are "social constmctions generated during particular periods and 
within specific sets of institutional stmctures" (Felstead and Jewson 1999b:3), The spread of non-
standard employment has highlighted the variegated impact of different regulatory regimes and 
accentuated the extent to which employment relationships lie along a broad spectrum of 
dependency or subordination, 
An arbitrary and simplistic dichotomy is all too often imposed on what is, in reality, a graded 
continuum, An attempt to understand labour market segmentation in terms of generalised 
concepts such as 'core ' and 'periphery' obscures as much as it reveals, The concepts of 'core' 
and 'peripheral' employment "conflate the legal and organisational dimensions of analysis, 
collapsing them into both a dual labour market and strategic management approach to 'core' 
employment and business" (Pollert 1988:297), The notion of a polarisation in employment 
conditions is a more useful analytical device than a simple dualism, It draws attention to 
variations in both the form and content of non-standard employment and the diverse levels on 
which differentiation operates, There is also greater appreciation of the contingency in 
employment outcomes of industrial restructuring on the more concrete levels of analysis, Jones 
(1996), for instance, suggests that far from a general shift towards multi-skilling, current trends 
in the workplace can best be conceptualised in terms of a polarisation between "skill dispersal" 
and "skill intensification", An important assumption in the current debate on 'flexibility' is not 
simply that of a selective return to competitive markets, but the development of "specific 
non-regulated zones on the margin of the traditional market activities, or the strengthening of the 
advantages of sectors which are already favoured, and in either case leading to a widening of 
inequality" (Michon 1987: 172), An increasing polarisation of the workforce, with its attendant 
growth in social inequality and job insecurity, has generated a complex set of opportunities and 
constraints for trade unions, managers and the state, 
Although there is now a general acceptance that the employment relationship is subject to 
considerable variation, there remains a dispute about the extent and causes of the changes that 
have occwTed, What is certain, however, is that the growth of non-standard employment poses 
significant challenges to conventional models of industrial relations insofar as it breaks the 
mould of standard full-time employment of indefinite duration, 
that meeting-ground for collective interaction which has until now been the traditional basis and natural 
environment of labour relations. Beyond this normal or traditional envirorunent has evolved a no man's 
land, untouchcd by many of the most basic conquests of labour law of the past 150 years, that does not lend 
itself to the rules of collective bargaining (Cordova 1986:653), 
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The establishment and consolidation of industrial relations as an academic discipline reflected 
and reinforced a broader public policy orientation towards the employment relationship. There 
is an implicit assumption of a SER. This model of employment permeates virtually the entire 
theoretical edifice of industrial relations. As a result, the view of the employment relationship 
which underpins conventional models of industrial relations has at least three fundamental 
weaknesses. First, non-standard employment has received scant attention. Its expanding presence 
in contemporary workplaces contradicts many of the cosy assumptions about job security, forms 
of managerial control, models of trade union action, and so on found in the mainstream 
approaches. Second, the selective functioning of labour market institutions is not a recent 
phenomenon, and is one reason why the SER was "always a normative, partly fictitious, 
reference model rather than an empirical pattern of employment" (Muckenberger 1989:390). 
Third, due to its assumptions of systems integration and stability, the orthodox approach fails to 
fully appreciate the intractabi lity of what has to be regulated (i.e. the employment relationship) . 
If conflict and cooperation, stability and instability are given equal weight and priority, these 
assrunptions become problematic. Explanations of institutional change as an automatic response 
to the demands for new forms of 'job regulation' are functionalist and deterministic. 
Non-standard employment attracted very little attention from social scientists and policy makers 
until the 1980s. Most forms of non-standard employment were commonly dismissed as relics of 
the past that were bound to decline as the SER expands. Since the first tentative explorations of 
the subject in the mid-1980s, the differentiation of the employment relationship has subsequently 
received considerable attention in the literature on employment 'flexibility'. A common 
assumption underlying much ofthis literature, however, is that ofa simple and direct relationship 
between the restructuring of work and changes in the labour market. By contrast, a broad aim of 
this research is to highlight the complex, contradictory and contingent relationship between 
restructuring in the workplace and regulatory changes in the labour market.' This will be 
accomplished though an emphasis on the "contextual interdependence of work organization and 
contro l patterns" (Whitley 1997:255) and an explicit focus on the employment outcomes of 
industrial restructuring. In particular, the research will explore the conditions that enable and/or 
constrain the demand for and supply of non-standard employment. Although changes in 
production regimes are shaped by shifts in the composition of the workforce, there is not a . 
simple, functional relationship between the structures of production or accumulation and those 
of the labour market. 
, Peck (1996: 134), among others, expl icitly highlights the need for more research on the mechanisms of 
local labour market adj ustment and their relationship with the processes of industrial restructuring. 
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Conventional approaches to industrial relations rarely consider the complex articulation between 
(a) the various levels of control and autonomy in the workplace, and (b) the processes of 
incorporation and marginalisation in the labour market. Braverman (1974) effectively discredits 
the notion of a distinct sphere of industrial relations in which an elaborate procedural and 
institutional structure of 'job regulation' can be studied without any reference to its foundation 
in the sphere of production. The links between labour market segmentation and industrial 
structure are seldom made explicit. These two bodies of theory have by and large developed in 
isolation. To explain the intricate and contradictory relationship between employment and 
industrial restructuring, we need to recognise that much of the interaction between the demands 
of the labour process and the social context occurs through the local labour market. The latter 
conditions the way in which the abstract imperatives of labour demand are translated into actual 
employment outcomes. As such, the labour market constitutes "a kind of filter between 
tendencies within the labor process and their realisation in particular (local) contexts" (Peck 
1996: 160). The two broad determinants of low pay and low status - i.e. the nature of the 
production process and the structures of the labour market - shape the specific forms that 
casualisation will assume at a particular time and place. A common failure to consider the role 
of the labour market encourages an incorrect view of workplace restructuring as solely the 
outcome of changing labour process imperatives. One reason why non-standard employment 
exists is the prior existence of a group of workers whose labour power can be deployed in a 
flexible or precarious manner. 
Social relations in the workplace are increasingly structured in a manner whereby advantage and 
disadvantage, control and autonomy are patterned by the regulatory distinction between standard 
and non-standard employment. The use of non-standard employees constitutes, in part, an 
attempt by employers to construct new zones of 'flexibility' by evading the statutory and 
collective protective measures designed to stabilise the SER. These developments are widely 
associated with the decline of the Fordist system of production and the rise of some form of 
' post-Fordist' production regime. While there is considerable debate regarding the extent to 
which the Fordist pattern of production has been abandoned and the nature of its successor; we 
need to reject both the notion of a complete break with the past and the idea of an overriding 
continuity in which no changes of significance are recognised. Moreover, far from leading to a 
greater convergence between countries as postulated by the proponents of ' flexibility ', changes 
in production and regulation are characterised by persistent national variation. The enduring 
diversity of national and regional spaces is a product of "the intricate intertwining of the effects 
of di sparate regulatory regimes and production regimes" (Waddington 1999: 14). While managers 
and trade unions in different countries may face similar challenges, the variation in regulatory 
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and production regimes compels them to develop strategies appropriate to particular national 
conditions. Employers and employees have to act in "social formations which have already 
developed distinctive ways of governing work and firms" (Kristensen 1997:6). In other words, 
economic transactions are embedded in different social relations between (as well as within) 
countries so that they find distinct trade-offs between competi tion and cooperation, efficiency 
and equity, coercion and consent. 5 
The mechanisms of labour regulation tend to endure insofar as they find a sustainable 
compromise between two conflicting demands: transforming industrial relations to enhance 
competitiveness (considerations of efficiency) and avo iding the excesses that stem from 
unconstrained competition (considerations of equity). Orthodox approaches generally regard 
employment as a largely self-contained sphere of social activity that leads to a clearly bounded 
set of industrial relations problems (Hyman 1994b:1 21). In reality, however, the expanded 
reproduction of the employment relationship is dependent on a whole ensemble of social 
structures and practices (such as the law, government policy, collective bargaining, social 
security, behavioural norms, education and training systems) to mitigate the contradictions 
inherent in capitalist accumulation and valorisation. That is, the employment relationship is a 
product of not just one overarching causal logic, but of the indeterminate intersection of several 
generative structures. The roots of these generative structures can be traced to three sets of social 
processes: the processes of production and the structuring of labour demand; the processes of 
social reproduction and the structuring of labour supply; and the forces of regulation (Pec;k 1996). 
A deeper understanding of the different ways in which the employment relationship is socially 
constructed and institutionally mediated requires a non-reductionist articulation of the micro 
processes of workplace regulation and the macro processes of economic regulation. 
THE MACRO-FOUNDATIONS OF LABOUR REGULATION 
For Marx, it is not choice but force, that is the key to understanding the processes through which 
wage labour was created. He highlights a litany of horrors associated with early industrial 
development. Capital's "vampire thirst" for the " living blood of labour" (1967:256) had to be 
"bound by the chains of legal regulation" (1967:243). The English Factory Act of 1850, for 
example, was intended to curb "the passion of capital for a limitless draining of labour-power" 
(1967:239). Left to his/her own devices, each individual capitalist is "reckless of the health or 
length oflife of the labourer, unless under compulsion from society" (1967:270). Shortening the 
5 The notion of , embedded ness' includes the ways in which economic actions are set within social relations, 
presupposes trust and inter-subjective understanding of rules among actors, and so on (Granovetter 1985). 
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lifespan of the labourer, however, increases the overall costs of reproducing labour power. The 
more rapidly a worker is worn out by over-work, the greater is the value to be reproduced every 
day. Treating labour as a simple commodity poses a serious threat to the human and material 
substance of society since its commodity status is partially fictitious.' Marx overstates the self-
destructive tendencies of capitalism and underestimates its potential to secure both the expansion 
of profits and real wage growth as a result of the emphasis that he places on the 'immerseration' 
of labour and the inevitability of a proletarian revolution. In short, he misjudges the regulatory 
functions of social institutions. As Aglietta (1998:50) argues: 
[sJince it is spurred on by the limitless desire to accumu late money, capitalist management of the production 
process can degenerate into a power capable of destroying the labour force it has subjugated, as the tragic 
history of proletarianization demonstrates. To manage an ordered productive force, namely one that is 
capable of preserving the working potential at its disposal, capitalism must be henuned in by constraining 
structures. 
Underlying most conceptions of capitalist economic development is a "postulate of homogeneity" 
- i.e. a uniform system of coordination in which individual actions are guided by some 
transcending planner such as the ' invisible hand ' of the market (Aglietta 1998:42). Evolutionary 
neo-classical economics represents the capitalist system as a ' pure' economy in a 'natural' state 
of equilibrium created by 'perfect' competition. For Aglietta (1979) the market is not the 
anonymous mechanism of the ' hidden hand' , but rather a social institution whose regulatory 
function cannot be presupposed. 7 The proponents of regulation theory reject all conceptions of 
development which posit a single, objective logic to the evolution of capitalism that transcends 
all particularities (Lipietz 1987; Boyer 1990; Jessop 200 \a). They adopt a view which stresses 
that the development of capitalism has always been mediated through historically- and spatially-
specific institutional forms, regulatory institutions, and norms of behaviour' Their research 
focuses on concrete institutional forms, societal norms, values and the patterns of strategic human 
action, which both express and regulate the conflicts unleashed by capital accumulation until the 
inevitable tensions and divergencies among these various regulatory forms reach a crisis point 
(Lipietz 1987:3 -5). A point of departure for this research is the paradox within capitalism 
between its inherent tendency towards instability, crisis and change; and its ability to coalesce 
and stabilise around a set of institutions, rules and nOims that serve to sustain periods of relative 
6 In the words of Marx: "[IJabour itself, in its immediate being, in its living existence, cannot be directly 
conceived as a commodity, but only labour-power, of wh ich labour itself is the temporary manifestation" (cited in 
Rikowski 2002: 186). 
7 The assumption of a ' perfectly competitive' product and labour market informs much of the orthodox 
approaches to industrial relat ions (Kochan et a/ 2002:74). 
8 This brief summary inevitab ly distorts some complex and detailed arguments. 
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economic stability. The essential idea behind the regulation approach, in the words of Aglietta 
(1998 :49), is that 
the dynamism of capital represents an enormous productive potential but that it is also a blind force. It does 
not contain a self-l imiting mechanism of its own, nor is it guided in a direction that would enable it to fu lfil 
the capita lists ' dream of perpetual accumulation. To put it another way, capitalism has the inherent ability 
to mobilize human energy and transform it into growth, but it does not have the capacity to convert the 
clash of individual interests in to a coherent g lobal system. 
A phase of relatively stable economic growth is the outcome of embedded social practices rather 
than the inevitable result of immutab le economic laws. As Aglietta (1979: 19) puts it: the 
regulation of capitalism "must be interpreted as a social creation". While neo-classical orthodoxy 
imposes a universal form on historically and spatially constituted social relations, the Parisian 
regulation theorists favour a view of the economic process as dependent on the structural forms 
and institutional mechanisms endemic to a specific time and place. Far from simply providing 
a context, institutional factors playa key role in shaping economic processes, especially in the 
sphere of work and employment (Michon 1992:223). Regulationists therefore reject the notion 
of an equilibrium position for a society or economy: periods of sustained or balanced growth are 
seen as "always relative, always partial and always provis ional" (Jessop 1988: l SI). Capitali sm 
generates forces opposed to its drive to accumulate, forces which find a way to channel this 
opposition into social regulation or mediation9 As a society inevitably introduces measures to 
ameliorate the consequences of a purely competitive regulation, the market mechanism is 
supplemented by collective action, expressed in institutional forms as social mediation. Such 
mediation can ensure that capital accumulation does not only enrich the capitalist but also 
improves the living conditions of workers. This conversion of technical progress into social 
progress is always merely a possibility - everything depends on the creation and maintenance of 
mediatory mechanisms that are effective regulators. According to Jessop (2001b:10-1), 
reproducing and regularising capitalism involves a 'social fix' that partially compensates for the 
incompleteness of the pure capital relation and gives it a specific dynamic through the articulation of its 
economic and extra-economic elements. This helps to secure a relatively durable pattern of structural 
coherence in the handling of the contradictions and dilemmas inherent in the capital relation. 
In contrast to the narrow and functionalist use of this concept in much of the literature on 
industrial relations, here regulation is understood as a complex, multi-lateral and provisional 
process mediated through distinct social institutions and carried out by particular social forces 
9 'Regulation' refers to "the paJtially conscious, 'strategic' use of polit ical power, economic resources, and 
cultural authority to shape co llective practices"; whereas the 'socia l' designates a "rea lm of spec ifically trans-
ind ividual structures, identit ies, culture , and social needs and risks" (Steinmetz, cited in Gottfried 2000:237). 
II 
under specific spatio-temporal conditions. 10 Underlying the concept of , regulation' in orthodox 
industrial relations theories is the notion of equilibrium: regulatory mechanisms tend to be in 
perfect hannony with their enviromnent and the process of regulation itself is predictable, stable 
and seemingly trouble-free (Dabscheck 1993). Periods of disequilibrium are simply a temporary 
deviation from the usual or normal state of equilibrium. For regulationists, by contrast, the 
processes of social regulation dampen and spread over time, rather than eliminate, the imbalances 
which pennanently arise from the processes of capital accumulation (Aglietta 1979; Boyer 1990; 
Jessop 1991 ). In short, it specifies the particular forms assumed in time and space by the 
institutionalisation of class conflict. The idea that changing systems of capital accumulation 
engender complementary institutional arrangements is of great value in making sense of the 
relative stabilisation of industrial relations in the mid-1900s and its subsequent instability and 
change (Hyman 1994c:7-10). The tendencies towards the stabilisation of industrial relations 
through the institutionalisation of conflict are thus neither unilinear nor irreversible, but rather 
historically-conditioned and contingent concomitants of a distinct phase of economic evolution. 
During the 'golden age' of Fordism, for example, economic stability was the foundation for 
stable industrial relations. 
The inherently volatile and crisis-ridden nature of capitalist accumulation has long engendered 
an academic and political interest in the concept of ' regulation'. More recently, a progressive 
move away from abstract, ahistorical concepts of regulation towards the study of more concrete, 
contextual regulatory mechanisms can be discerned (Peck 1996; Whitley and Kristensen 1997; 
Picciotto and Mayne 1999; Clarke 2000; Picciotto and Campbell 2002). Despite a long and rich 
history, the concept of regulation remains stubbornly elusive of an all-encompassing definition 
and is used as a metaphor to encapsulate a wide range of social practices. Leyshon (1992:250) 
argues that two uses of the tenn predominate over all others. First, regulation is used to describe 
the maintenance of a systemic equilibrium, analogous to processes of regulation found in many 
physical systems which are maintained at, or tend towards, some state of equilibrium. In this 
sense, regulation describes an independent dynamic (such as an economic or social system) that 
is controlled by a 'governing mechanism' which seeks to ensure the system reproduces itself. 
Second, regulation can be used to describe a framework oflegal and administrative rules. These 
two interpretations of regulation are frequently constituent of one another: the form of systemic 
equilibrium in operation at any time will influence the drafting and administration of a system 
10 Dabscheck (1993) outlines a number of distinct theories of regulation. Common to many of these 
approaches is the reduction of regulation to a purely techn ical activity divorced from wider political and social 
determinations. These conceptions of regulation are singularly unhelpful in making sense of the inherently complex, 
contradictory and contested nature of the exchange relations that constitute the employment relationship. Labour 
regulation is also not a simple command-obey relationship between an active subject and a passive object. 
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of legal rules and guidelines, which are used to define the range of pelmissible practices open to 
economic agents. 
Boyer (1990:20) differentiates these two definitions of regulation from a third interpretation 
developed in the regulation approach: "the conjunction of the mechanisms working together for 
social reproduction, with attention to the prevalent economic structures and social forms". 
Regulation in this sense refers to a set of institutional mechanisms and patterns of behaviour 
through which the economic and social system is reproduced while at the same time maintaining 
its coherence and identity (Michon 1992 :223-4). This conception of regulation will inform the 
analyses below. Most regulatory impulses have historically tended towards the imposition of 
order on what is interpreted to be an otherwise anarchic and ultimately self-destructive process 
of capitalist accumulation11 In other words, given the pursuit of individual self-interest in 
economic exchange, "normativity must be imposed by the public on the private" (Picciotto 
2002:2). Despite the regular imposition of the restraining influence of regulation, however, crises 
remain a persistent feature of capitalist economies. The reason for the perpetual occurrence of 
crisis is the inherently fragile and temporary nature of all systems of regulation within a highly 
dynamic and spatially-variegated capitalist system. "If to regulate is to intervene, establish 
authority and seek to achieve order, the potential for conflict with freedom of action is evident" 
(Clarke 2000:4-5). Even determining the most appropriate level of regulation is highly 
problematic, given that a fundamental dilemma exists within all forms of capitalist regulation. 
As Giddens argues, 
to claim that capitalist markets must be 'regulated' in order to remove their en-at ic qualities leads us to a 
dilemma. Subjecting markets to the centralised control of an all-encompassing agency is not economically 
efficient and leads to political authoritarianism. Leaving markets free to operate more or less without any 
restriction, on the other hand, produces major disparities between different groups and regions (cited in 
Leyshon 1992:250). 
This dilemma defines the polarities of the regulatory drive: the imposition of high levels of 
control and constraint on the one hand, and a permissive freedom on the other. These 
contradictory impulses reveal the dialectic at the heart of capitalist regulation which ensures that 
the durability of all regulatory forms, however restrictive or permissive, is strictly limited. 
Leyshon (1992:251) identifies two reasons that help to explain why a regulatory ' fix' for any 
regulatory 'dilemma' is necessarily temporary. First, regulatory systems can be undermined by 
a process of "systemic dislocation" - i.e. the nature of activities being regulated may change in 
11 For example: Fox and Flanders (1969: 158) argue that "an accepted normative system provides a 
framework of comparisons and constraints within which otherwise unlimited aspirations can be shaped with some 
concern for social proportion". 
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such a way as to make existing governing mechanisms redundant, as the former equilibrium of 
the system becomes disrupted by some unforeseen development. The accepted order of the 
regulatory system is undermined and a search begins for a new governing mechanism(s). Such 
systemic dislocation is a product of the inherently competitive structure of capitalist 
accumulation, and of the permanent search by economic agents for ways to surmount barriers to 
the creation of profits and value." 
Second, the spatially-bounded nature of regulation fm1her facilitates the process of regulatory 
dislocation. Most regulatory systems are tied to specific geo-political formations, typically in the 
form of the nation-state. Hence, it is possible for economic agents to move between different 
regulatory spaces in order to elude any perceived constraints associated with a particular 
regulatory regime (Leyshon 1992; Peck 1996; Gray 2002). Instances of such 'regulatory 
arbitrage' or ' regime shopping' have increased significantly in the era of globalisation as 
improvements in information technology enabled films to successfully co-ordinate their activities 
over large expanses of international space. The globalisation of markets and firms has served to 
undermine the restraining consequences of regulatory systems which are embedded within 
particular geo-pol itical jurisdictions. However, in contrast to arguments that suggest global 
economic forces are leading to increasingly homogenous national regulatory regimes, 
regulationists continue to insist on the path-dependent trajectories of institutional and normative 
changes (Boyer and Durand 1997; Whitley 1997; Elger and Edwards 2002). Since the notion of 
a single, universal dynamic in capitali st development is rejected and causal powers are allocated 
to specific cultural and political forms, the peculiarities of different national forms of capitalism 
take on a new significance. As such, interest is stimulated in 
the unequal capacities of different capitalist nat ions to generate and assimilate new techno-economic 
systems and a major concem becomes the qualitatively different impact of the same techno-economic forces 
in time and space. Although major structural crises are seen as inevitably taking on internationa l 
dimensions, it becomes of importance to track down the historically specific cond itions under which the 
detenninants of crisis have colli ded - the conjuncture of general and particular determinants of crisis and 
transfonnation (Elam 1994:57-8). 
The neo-classical conception of the market with its emphasis on equilibrium, assumes that it is 
market forces that ensure the proportionality of the various branches of production, and of 
production and consumption. This idealist conception of the market is flawed primari ly because 
it abstracts from the historical dynamics of accumulation in and through which proportionality 
12 Regulatory boundaries are frequently constituted as barriers to accumulation. and their successful 
circumnavigation can confer significant competitive advantage. This can account for, among others, the emphasis 
on the successful development of new markets through innovation and the use of part-time and temporary 
employment. 
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is constantly disrupted. The problem of proportionality, for Aglietta (1979), focuses on the 
regulation ofthe employment relationship in its dual aspect, as a cost to capital and as a source 
of purchasing power. The competitive determination of wages and prices must reconcile these 
two aspects and so pennit sustained accumulation. For the latter to occur, appropriate modes of 
regulation and norms of production and consumption must be in place. The possibility of a 
disproportionality or realisation crisis is inherent in the distribution of total income between 
wages and profits. While markets provide signals to which producers and consumers can 
respond, "there is no mechanism to reconcile the responses of people in their role as producers, 
where wages appear as a cost, and their role as consumers, where their wages appear as a source 
of revenue" (Sayer 1995:137). The focus is on the form that the necessary trade-off between 
keeping the costs of production down and keeping consumption up assumes within market 
economies, and the inadequacy of market mechanisms for resolving this tension. 
The division of the economy into two departments of production - non-wage investment 
commodities and wage commodities - underscores the fact that commodities from the two 
departments both reproduce different portions of capital as they enter production and are 
exchanged against different portions of money income. The employment relationship is regarded 
as critical: it influences levels of productivity, shapes the overall level of employment, and directs 
the distribution of capital between profits and wages. The marmer in which the employment 
relationship COlmects the spheres of production and reproduction gives a regime of accumulation 
its distinctive shape and character. The mode of regulation that sustained the Fordist system, 
through which the constraints imposed of capital corresponded to the degree of integration of the 
labour force, was "the fruit of the institutionalisation of economic relations" (Aglietta 1998 :55). 
The rights of employees at work, the collective negotiation of wage rates, social welfare, and the 
like are therefore institutionalised compromises. A mode of social regulation, then, serves to 
accommodate, mediate and diffuse the crisis tendencies inherent in capitalist accumulation which 
threaten to undennine the institutional linking of production (profits) and consumption (wages). 
The concept of regulation must be complemented by its twin: that of crisis. The symptoms of 
exhaustion of a mode of growth - heralding a period of uncertainty, crisis and change - must be 
sought in "malfunctions of the interaction between mediation mechanisms" (Aglietta 1998:56). 
Crises can be either cyclical or structural - i.e. not all economic crises are of the same magnitude 
(De Vroey 1984:53-5; Lipietz 1988:29-33; Boyer 1990:48-53; Tickell and Peck 1992: 193 -4). 
Diverse fom1s of crisis follow from the disparate nature of national modes of social regulation. 
That is, the form of crisis corresponds to the structures of the society. One of the most persuasive 
features of the regulation approach is its argument that the recurrent crises of capitalism are not 
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mere residual aberrations that can be eliminated by an appropriate mix of reforms, but are 
endemic to the very structure of capitalism. When the regulation of contradictions and struggles 
are no longer possible or manageable, regulation theorists refer to a crisis of (instead of in) a 
regime of accumulation or mode of regulation. In this regard, general references to 'class 
struggle' are not particularly useful. Jessop (1991: 165) draws a distinction between marginal 
struggles which can acquire class-relevance, struggles that are confined to and implicated in the 
reproduction of an accumulation regime, and struggles whose effect is to disrupt and transform 
such a regime. Far from being functionally determined, the transition towards a new stage of 
accumulation and regulation is characterised by struggle, ad hoc state strategies, and chance 
discoveries (Lipietz 1987; Jessop 1991; Boyer and Durand 1997; Grahl and Teague 2000). This 
theory of crisis is neither economistic nor a mechanistic account of capitalist collapse - "crisis 
is only the other side of regulation: the one expresses and the other contains the original 
conflictual nature of social relations" (Lipietz 1988: IS). There can be no objective 
'developmental logic ' or 'mission of capital' that necessarily and inevitably propels capitalism 
from one mode of regulation to the next, predetermined stage. 
A mode of regulation merely finds a partial and unstable resolution - in the shape of a particular 
constellation of organisational and institutional fol'l11s - of the contradictions inherent in capitalist 
accumulation. By the sanle token, the objects of regulation cannot be defined outside of specific 
social practices and only acquire their determinate character in conjunction with other objects 
(Jessop 1990). Different forms or sites of regulation follow different logics, draw on different 
resources, cover differing aspects of capitalist economic development, and mobilise and rely 
upon different tools of legitimation. In other words, the coherence of a mode of regulation does 
not occur automatically. This is why such coherence, when it occurs, does not confol'l11 to any 
pre-established general law - it is a historically unique entity (Aglietta 1998:56). The concept of 
regulation is thus an important mediation between the theoretical insights of an abstract analysis 
based on the law of value and a concrete empirical reality as revealed using the methods of 
historical analysis (Hirsch 1991: 18). While the context of the law of value, as formulated by 
Marx, remains the basic cause of expansion and crisis, the conditions that trigger them off and 
their forms of appearance must be sought in the historically-specific structural features of the 
Fordist social formation. 
While the regulation approach is most clearly associated with wide-ranging historical analyses 
of archetypal patterns of regulation such as Fordism, in principle it is sensitive to institutional 
variability at more concrete levels. There is a recognition of a wide variety of institutional forms 
existing within the shadow cast by the archetypal form (Jessop 1990; Michon 1992; Boyer and 
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Durand 1997). The complex dialectic between accumulation and regulation unfolds in a variety 
of different ways and is formed through indeterminate political and social struggles. Since social 
structures of accumulation and regulation are relatively autonomous, yet bound together 
dialectically in an essential or necessary relation, the causal liabilities with which they are 
endowed will be realised in different ways at different times and places, depending on contingent 
circumstances (Peck 1996). 
The regulation approach posits a strong relationship between the employment relationship 
(rapport salaria!) and the overall pattern of social regulation (Boyer 1988a; Lipietz 1988; Grahl 
and Teague 2000). As Littler (1993 :323) also notes, while there is no simple matching process, 
"there is a functional concordance between the accumulation system, the mode of social 
regulation, and the mode of labour regulation". In the analyses below, the concern is to extend 
the regulation approach 'downwards ' to account for the problem of order in the workplace. In 
fact, Michon (1992:227-8) asks whether "the tools proposed by regulation theory would be more 
useful in analysis of the firm than in that of national economies?" The employment relationship 
is never a purely economic exchange (i.e. wages for labour), but is mediated through an 
institutional framework that is more or less stable and grounded in a more or less sustainable 
compromise between social equality and economic efficiency. That is, production cannot be 
reduced to a purely economic dimension since it is "a 'base' with its own ' superstructure'" 
(Burawoy 1985:256). The ensemble of institutions that regulate the employment relationship 
produce and reproduce social relations, connect the processes of production and social 
reproduction, and mediate conflicting interests inside and outside the workplace. 13 The 
preoccupation with managerial control and deskilling in the labour process debates has deflected 
attention away from the contested and contingent reproduction of the employment relationship 
(Thompson 1989). As the analysis of Burawoy (1985) convincingly demonstrates, once a notion 
of the labour process as the unity or separation of conception and execution is replaced with a 
relational notion, the emphasis shifts from a question of domination to one of reproducing social 
relations. 
While many of the central concepts in the regulation approach were initially constructed to 
explain the crisis of the Keynesian-welfare state, they have subsequently been extended to 
account for both the processes of accumulation preceding this crisis and the various attempts at 
transcending the cun'ent disjuncture between capital accumulation and social regulation. This is 
13 In the words of Poulantzas (1978: 173): "[t]he class struggle is from the beginning lodged in the very 
heart afthe labour process ... [That is ,] economic function s are always invested in the class struggle and therefore 
have a political character and content", 
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what makes the regulation approach such an ambitious and forceful project: it is nothing less 
than "a recasting of the entire hi story of capitalist development in terms of the concepts of 
accumulation and regulation" (Ruccio 1989:36). We must, however, speak of an approach rather 
than a theory. What has gained acceptance, Aglietta (1998:42) argues, " is not a body of fully 
refined concepts but a research programme". Its diffusion as an approach has resulted in both 
considerable internal differentiation and a broadening of the base of theories it draws on. What 
unifies the seemingly disparate accounts that constitute the regulation approach are the following 
four characteristics: 
[f]irst, this programme typica lly works with a scientific real ist onto logy and epistemology; second, in line 
with this basic scientific real ism, it adopts ... the method of'3l1iculation' in building theories of regulation 
... Third, turning to the broad substantive concerns of the regulation research programme, they derive from 
the general Marxist traditions of historical materialism ... with its interest in the political economy of 
capita lism and the anatomy of bourgeo is society. And fourth , ,,' it is pal1icularly concerned with the 
changing forms and mechanisms (institutions, networks, procedures, modes of calcu lation, and norms) in 
and through which the expanded reproduction of capital as a social relation is secured (Jessop 1990: 154). 
Given its widespread influence, it is not surprising that the regulation approach has attracted 
considerable criticism. i4 To be sure, many of these critics call for an extension or refinement 
rather than the abandonment of the central concepts of this approach. Considerable diversity 
within the regulation approach, moreover, raises significant problems for a cri tical evaluation. 
Few of the critics specifY whether the criticisms they raise hold for some regulation theorists or 
is intrinsic to the regulation approach itself. For example, critics have labelled it as both too 
deterministic and too indeterminate. To criticise the regulation approach for inevitably being 
'structuralist' (the unstoppable march of objective laws) or 'voluntarist' (the unstoppable march 
of wilful social agents) is to misapprehend its emphasis on the ' double dialectic' in the 
interaction between structure and strategy. As Jessop (199 1:163) explains: 
[sJtructures condition strategies both as explicit reference points for strategic calculation and as a partly and 
paJ1ially unacknowledged set of structural constraints and conj unctura l opportunities on those strategies. 
Conversely sn'ategies transform structures both through del iberate, if often unsuccessful, attempts to mod ifY 
them and through the unantic ipated consequences of interact ion among patterns of strategic conduct with 
other obj ectives. 
The Pari sian regulation theorists adopted the realist ontology implicit in Capital and developed 
the many epistemological insights in Marx's work more generally (Jessop 1990,2001 b). A realist 
ontology conceptualises society as an ensemble of structures, practices and relations that 
necessarily pre-exist human beings (Bhaskar 1986, 1989). An attachment to reali sm, therefore, 
implies a rejection of conceptions of society as either (a) the product of conscious human 
i4 See: Williams et at (I 987); Clarke (1988) ; Sayer (I989); Brenner and Glick (1991) ; Hirst and Zeitlin 
(I 99 1); Tickell and Peck (1992); Bonefeld ( 1993); Wood (1993); and Elger and Edwards (2002). 
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activities - the error of voluntarism; or (b) as existing independently of conscious human 
activities - the error of structuralism. FUl1hermore, the notion of the social world as a complex 
combination of many determinations implies the stratification of reality into various levels or 
regions with sui generis properties. Each region, in turn, is constituted by an 'appearance' level 
(phenomenal forms) and an 'underlying' level (generative mechanisms) which necessitate 
different planes of analysis on each level. As Marx points out: "all science would be superfluous 
if the outward appearances and essences of things directly coincided" (cited in Jessop 200 I b:3). 
In other words, reality is made up of deep structures which condition and make possible the 
events we observe in everyday experience. 
The regulation approach has also been widely criticised for focusing on the question of how 
capitalism is reproduced, at the expense of a consideration of how capital secures its domination 
as a class in the face of unrelenting class struggle (Holloway 1988). Regulation is presented as 
being geared towards capitalist structures rather than towards the changing balance of forces in 
a struggle for class domination (Clarke 1988). These critics would be hard pressed to sustain 
these charges: the Parisian regulationists in particular insist that modes of regulation and regimes 
of accumulation are the product of past struggles and are always bound up with present struggles. 
There are, as Aglietta (1998 :77) notes, "coherent sets of mediation mechanisms, not a standard 
universal tuning system for all markets" . Since the regulation approach proceeds from the 
premise that regulatory practices take place on a specific terrain of class struggle, it follows that 
the objects of regulation are constituted in and through that struggle. Nowhere is it asserted that 
regulation suspends or eliminates class conflict, or even displaces the contradictions of 
capitalism. The regulationists assume that 
the fo rms of the capital relation are deeply problematic for accumulation ... [Thereby providing] ample 
theoretical scope for exploring how the very reproduction of these forms can contribute to crisis (Jessop 
1990: 190). 
Once it is accepted that there are no institutional guarantees that class struggles will be confined 
within the boundaries of a given form, it becomes possible to explore how these struggles can 
both reproduce and undermine the dominance of specific forms (Jessop 1988: 1 5 1). There can be 
no 'pure' class struggle with no mediation through social forms, apparatuses, asymmetrically 
distributed resources, specific techniques and strategies (Jessop 1991: 147). It is difficult to deny 
that the various sites and forms of struggle, the complex dynamics and cycles of capital 
accumulation, the modes of calculation and strategic orientation, and the organisational forms 
assumed by different social forces make a difference to the course and outcome of class struggle. 
If these make a difference, and class struggle is not formless, then capital accumulation is "a 
form-determined outcome of class struggle" (Jessop 1991: I 55). This implies a rejection of the 
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idea that there are pre-given, objective laws which are mediated in and through a secondary, 
subjective class struggle. Class conflict is a driving force of capitalist development only because 
it is structured by, and embedded in, the social forms of the commodity and capital. As Jessop 
(1991: 152) puts it: " the class struggle in capitalist society plays the ro le it does because that 
society is organised as it is". The real significance of class struggles lie in their impact on the 
expanded reproduction of capital, on the whole set of conditions necessary for continued 
accumulation. This view creates theoretical space for a study of the material preconditions for 
the reproduction of the circuits of capital (i.e. production-distribution-consumption). 
The expanded social reproduction of a regime of accumulation is always presented as temporary, 
partial and unstable. The comparative regularity of capitalist reproduction depends on a set of 
social nOlIDS which are institutionalised within civi l society by the state. Such regularity is always 
relative and its precise fOlID and content are constantly being remoulded by class struggle. To be 
sure, a given regime of accumulation does not have only one corresponding mode of social 
regulation. These regulatory forms are always historically- and spatially-specific in relation to 
specific national territories. The character of the institutionalised social norms is linked to the 
history of the nation-state and to the specifically national nature of the social development of 
capitalist reproduction. There are always a range of potential solutions to a crisis depending on 
historical, spatial and social conditions. The mode of regulation is crucial for the contingent 
'success' of a given model of development. That is, capitalist development should not be viewed 
as a self-contained process. Aglietta (1979:383) insists that no structural form of regulation 
can play its role ill the mitigation of social contradictions without the simultaneous operation of all others. 
But this simultaneous operation is in no way inherent in the logic of accumulation. 
Empirical evidence alone cannot settle the criticisms raised against the regulation approach. To 
simply list the nature or extent of empirical changes would not settle the issue since the 
significance of these trends is essentially a theoretical question. Economic development is a 
highly complex, institutionally mediated, uneven and inherently unstable process that defies 
simple explanations. We must therefore select a 'metaphor of progress' that can best account for 
this reality. Regulation theorists are concerned with specifying the inherently limited range of 
institutional patterns that can sustain relatively balanced capitalist economic growth (Jessop 
1991: 159-64). They attempt to periodise capitalism in terms of the serial interchange of more 
integrated phases of capital accumulation with more di sorganised transitional phases. This 
involves specifying the institutional forms and modes of struggle within a given stage of 
capitalist development. To this end, regulationists have attempted to give a determinate social 
content to the general tendencies of capital accumulation that can explain its overall dynamic and 
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directionality. In opposition to a crude functionalism, they recognise that regulated outcomes may 
be consensual as well as conflictual , supportive as well as destructive of the reproduction of the 
regulatory system itself. As such, the conceptual framework of the regulation approach can make 
a significant contribution to theory in industrial relations. 
THEORY IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
Theory construction in industrial relations has historically been dominated by inductive and 
deductive approaches. Neither offers an entirely satisfactory account of the diverse factors that 
shape the employment relationship. The latter is typically analysed as an empirical manifestation, 
thereby ignoring its underlying causal mechanisms. That is, the focus is on the management of 
the employment relationship rather than its reproduction. Under the sway of an empiricist 
methodology, the logic of both research and argument is the search for generalisations in the 
form of regular relationships that are said to exist between observable phenomena. Social and 
economic laws are conceived as deductive-nomological in nature - i.e. uruversallaws from which 
predictions of instances can be deduced. This search for measurable probabilities and regularities 
presupposes closure or the absence of extrinsic factors. Restricting one's analysis to the 
observable aspects of casualisation, for instance, will provide few insights into the conjuncture 
of processes and circumstances which generated the various non-standard employment 
relationships (NERs) . Critical reali sts such as Sayer (1984) and Bhaskar (1989) argue that 
Popperian falsificationism is impossible in the open systems of the social world. If cri tical 
realism is correct in its claim that open systems are conjuncturally determined, then an adequate 
explanation of any social phenomenon must be constructed in tem1S of many detenninations and 
cannot lay claim to any predictive powers. In other words, given the simultaneous operation of 
numerous generative mechanisms, the empirical manifestation of a particular causal power is 
always contingent. 
As social scientists were searching for altematives to positivism, they often sided with some post-
modernist or subjectivist view, which erroneously attempts to dissolve the intransitivity of social 
life altogether. This subjectivist tum is mirrored, in part, by the shift in industrial relations from 
the empiricism and determinism of 'systems' approaches to the rationalism and indeterminacy 
associated with models of 'strategic choice'. The approach that is adopted here avoids both a 
voluntaristic idealism whereby individuals create the social structure and a mechanical 
determinism whereby people are essentially the product of their situation. Bhaskar's (1989) 
model of transfOlmative social activity sustains the insight that structure and agency are distinct, 
yet highly inter-dependent, things. This model is capable of 
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accommodating the usual individualist stipulation that agency be given a nonwtrivial role without reducing 
social structure to some inadequate notion of context. Additionally the transformational conception of the 
mode of existence of social structures shou ld, in principle, be acceptable to new institutional ists in that 
social structure is not viewed as existing 'apart from' individuals ... [We] are not presented with a stark 
choice between viewing the individual as prime-mover or as passive rule-follower. Society is the skilled 
accomplishment of agents. But the social world may be opaque to social agents in several respects, in that 
[their] activities may depend upon or involve: unacknowledged condit ions; unintended consequences; the 
exercise of tacit sk ills; unconscious motivations (Lawson ef a1 1996: 148). 
In terms of the systems approach, the structures of industrial relations reflect the systemic needs 
of industrial societies (context determines strategies) ; while strategic choice models view the 
norms of industrial relations as established in a bargaining process that is determined by the 
strategies deployed by the parties (strategies determine context). The former reifies the social 
structures of accumulation, whereas the latter grants economic agents (usually employers) an 
inordinate capacity for strategic action. In an effort to ensure that neither structure nor agency is 
made redundant, a focus on labour regulation seeks to do justice to the structural features of 
employment as well as the intentional dimensions of work. That is, the reproduction of the 
employment relationship is seen as neither a fateful necessity nor a willful contingency. Social 
structures both constrain and enable human action; human agency both transforms and 
reproduces social structures. 
The perspective outlined in the chapters below deviates from that found in mainstream 
approaches; the focus is not so much on the sub-system of industrial relations in relation to other 
sub-systems, but rather on the direct relationship between employer and employee within the 
enterprise. This entails a redrawing of the boundaries of industrial relations to include the various 
forms that the employment relationship can assume and all aspects of that relationship. 
Employers and employees develop their respective industrial relations objectives in the context 
of the wider society within which they operate. Since the employment relationship under 
capital ism is structw-ed and inherently antagonistic, it is necessary for the parties to exercise 
control over it. This control is problematic and involves a contradictory fusion of cooperation and 
conflict. The latter finds expression in a complex network of regulatOlY processes through which 
the parties to the employment relationship seek to exercise their strategic choices and achieve 
their goals . This network is not restricted to the industrial relations system, but also includes the 
relations goveming the production process itself. The mainstrean1 view of industrial relations as 
a 'system of rules' or 'institutions of job regulation' tends to ignore the structures underlying 
these rules and regulations in the sphere of production. Here Burawoy (1985) provides a useful 
corrective. His approach rests on a distinction between "the labor process conceived as a 
particular organization of tasks, and the political apparatuses of production conceived as its mode 
of regulation" (1985;125). The process of production is therefore not confined to the labour 
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process since it also includes the mechanisms that regulate capitalist accumulation. 
The employment relationship is not an unmediated outcome of trans historical processes operating 
across an undifferentiated social and geographical space. It is a historically-contingent exchange 
relationship that is socially embedded and dependent on institutional regulation for its 
reproduction. Unlike other factors of production, the quantity and quality of tasks performed by 
an employee can never be specified precisely in advance by the employer. For efficient and 
continuous production to be possible, therefore, the employment relationship has to be socially 
regulated and institutionally mediated in the sense of mitigating the various regulatory dilemmas 
generated by the conversion of labour power into labour. Regulating the employment relationship 
involves not only the physical reproduction of the worker, but also the reproduction of the 
mechanisms that govern the deployment and use of his/her labour. In the ' hidden abode' of 
production, "labor and capital come together in a way that is at once a market transaction, a labor 
process, and a scene of daily life: that is the employment relation" (Storper and Walker 
1989: 168). As a set of laws, institutions, practices and customs that control the use of labour, the 
employment relationship forms an integral part of the wider mode of social regulation. The 
particular forms assumed by the underlying force for change in the workplace - i.e. the drive for 
accumulation - are conjointly determined by mediating institutions such as occupational groups, 
trade unions, employers' associations, governmental agencies and so on. As such, labour 
regulation involves the (always partial and unstable) mediation of the intractable problems of 
incorporation and marginalisation, control and autonomy, resistance and accommodation, 
efficiency and equity. Any form of stability that does arise in labour regulation is thus actively 
created and sustained. The labour exchange must in effect be renewed and re-negotiated in an 
ongoing and continuous manner. 
A necessary aspect of the social mediation that articulates the economic and extra-economic 
elements of the capital relation is the imposition of a social and spatio-temporal 'fix' on these 
elements. It achieves thi s, as Jessop (200 I b: II) explains, 
by establishing spatial and temporal boundaries within which the relative structural coherence [in the 
handling of regulatory dilemmas] is secured and by external ising certain costs of securing this coherence 
beyond these boundaries. Even within these boundaries we typically find that some classes, class fractions, 
social categories, or other social forces located within these spatio-temporal boundaries are marginal ised, 
excluded, or subject to coercion. 
Chapter I outlines an emerging approach to the study of industrial relations as labour regulation 
(Edwards 1986; Belanger et a11994; Van Ruysseveldt et a11995; Peck 1996). This approach 
allows for a more detailed exploration of the different regulatory regimes that apply to standard 
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and non-standard employment. Viewing casualisation as a particular social and spatio-temporal 
'fix' for the regulatory dilemmas generated by the SER, highlights the fact that a national system 
of labour regulation decisively shapes the conditions under which employers are able to casualise 
a part of their workforce. The overriding objective of this chapter is to place the employment 
relationship within its own regulatory framework. Since it is inherently unstable and 
contradictory, the employment relationship is dependent on regulatory mechanisms that generate 
the social rules and conventions necessary for its cohesion and durability. At the heart of the 
employment relationship is a trade-off between effort and wages, control and autonomy, 
efficiency and equality. Grounding our analysis of industrial relations in the ways in which the 
employment relationship is regulated can accommodate both sides of the 'labour problem': the 
combined achievement of social welfare and social control (Hyman 1989). This trade-off is 
crystallised in the social institutions that have evolved to regulate the employment relationship. 
Theoretically, the study of industrial relations grew out of attempts to explain the supply and sale 
of labour power. The theoretical roots of industrial relations can be traced back to the clash 
between radical political economy and the emergent neo-classical economics at the end of the 
nineteenth century (Blyton and Turnbull 1998:16-7). In the neo-classical conception of the 
economy and labour market, the employment relationship is rendered context-independent as a 
by-product of immutable economic laws. Neo-classical economic theory "separates out economy 
from society and purges economic relations of any specific social or institutional content" 
(Spencer 2000:544). An inevitable corollary is the neglect of history: the economy assumes an 
entirely determinate essence whereby economic phenomena appear to be given in time and space 
in an inevitable and universal manner. This approach takes as a given for analysis precisely what 
must be an outcome of analysis. The neo-classical theory of the firm, for example, 
abstracts from basic problems in industrial relations and work organisation by reducing the labour process 
to a set of technical relations, as sununarised by the production function .. . Since workers' co-operation is 
assured through the act of exchange, technical efficiency can simply be assumed. The problem of how to 
get work out of the worker does not even arise (Nolan, cited in Nolan and Walsh 1995:53). 
Underlying the various economic models are different conceptions of production. A guiding 
thread in much of the criticisms of neo-classical economics is that its arguments are based, not 
on an examination of how economies actually work and develop in time and space, but on 
abstract, a priori reasoning about how they should operate. As Granovetter (1985 :495) points 
out, "the anonymous market of neoclassical models is virtually nonexistent in economic life and 
.. . transactions of all kinds are rife with ... social connections". In the face of the acute and 
protracted economic adversities confronting the bulk ofthe world's population, the main advice 
of orthodox economists is for "government inaction in all things, other than to make the market 
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work more 'perfectly'" (Wilkinson 1983:4 13). Traditional versions ofneo-classical economics 
are grounded in the assumption that the employment relationship is a simple exchange of 
commodities like any other form of economic exchange and that production can be taken as a 
given datum (or 'black box') since the determination of prices and of market allocation are the 
only valid areas of economic analysis (Sayer 1995; Lawson 1997). Existing hierarchical work 
institutions are assumed to be 'efficient' in the sense that they always provide appropriate 
regulation of " the implied universal conflict between ' natural' individual self-interest and a 
collective rationality based on lower transaction costs" (Spencer 2000 :546). No general statement 
can be made as to what forms of work organisation will be efficient, as the issue is contingent 
on prevailing social relations. The quantity oflabour power purchased cannot be simply reckoned 
into the amount of labour input obtained - it reflects the effectiveness of management, as well 
as a host of industrial relations factors, which are likely to vary within and between firms . 
No employment contract can specify precisely the amount of effort to be expended and initiative 
to be displayed by the employee. The employer's requirements are rarely predictable in great 
detail and benefit from retaining a wide margin of discretion. The incompleteness of the 
employment contract is a product of the distinction between labour (a process) and labour power 
(a capacity). The detail of the wage-effort bargain that underlies the employment relationship is 
subject to on-going and usually tacit negotiation. This implies a model of the employment 
relationship as essentially a power relationship, qualitatively different from a 'pure' exchange 
relationship. Capitalist production and distribution were always closely regulated by traditional 
norms, institutions and statutory controls: "regulation and markets, in effect, grew up together" 
(Polanyi 1957:68). This symbiotic relationship between regulation and markets varies according 
to national and local context with considerable variation in the institutional embeddedness of 
markets (Edwards I 994a; Crompton et al 1996; Rubery 1996; Whitley and Kristensen 1997). 
Paradoxically, the more a market logic (i.e. a short-telm calculus of costs and benefits) pervades 
the employment relationship, "the less does this relationship accord with the conventional ideas 
of commodity transactions as precise exchanges and the less likely is it to result in productive 
efficiency" (Hyman 200 I: 11). Labour is, as Polanyi (1957) argues, a 'fictitious commodity'. The 
point of departure in a study of the dynamics of labour regulation is the contradictory nature of 
labour's incorporation, allocation, control and reproduction within the labour market (Peck 
1996). These represent the four facets of labour's fictive commodity status. 
The technical and social divisions of labour that constitute an economy presuppose, as a 
condition of their existence, modes of coordination and integration that can link up the various 
specialised activities in time and space. The effects of division of labour are always strongly 
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mediated by the social relations of production, modes of coordination, types of surplus 
appropriation, and so on. Divisions of labour may be coordinated by markets, central planning 
and various combinations of custom and tradition, authority and coercion, negotiation or 
democratic process. However, no mode of coordination is perfect or ever a neutral medium for 
the transmission of power: they can disperse or concentrate power, and amplify or reduce 
inequalities (Sayer 1995:48). At an abstract level , all capitalist labour markets have certain 
essential features. In concrete cases, they can develop in a myriad different ways and combine 
numerous modes of regulation so that behaviour and outcomes can vary significantly, depending 
on the pressures of competition, industrial structures, and the like. 
Changes in regulation play a vital role in the processes of industrial and employment 
restructuring. Of particular significance is the increase in the power of employers to use and 
dispose of the labour power of employees, as well as the decrease in their obligations to workers, 
associated with the contemporary expansion in market regulation. Contrary to the canons of neo-
classical economics, however, there are implacable limits to these reforms that stem from the fact 
that the market is not an inherently self-sufficient mode of regulation. The dilemmas of labour 
market regulation are grossly underestimated in orthodox approaches as the result of a tendency 
to give markets the credit for effects generated or co-generated by other mechanisms. The 
different material and informational coordination problems thrown up by concrete economies are 
inevitably too diverse for a purely market regulation and invariably require hybrid solutions 
(Sayer 1995: I 05-6). By the same token, labour regulation is not an all-or-nothing matter based 
on an immutable distinction between hierarchies and markets. Extra-economic forms of labour 
regulation merely limit or suppress market forces in various ways without abolishing them 
altogether. A failure to recognise that social regulation supplements, rather than simply 
eliminates or obstructs, market regulation encourages either an over-socialised or under-
socialised account of the labour market and, by extension, of the employment relationship. 
Contrary to the functionalism inherent in the systems approach to industrial relations, a focus on 
the institutional mediation of the employment relationship allows for a greater appreciation of 
the contested, contingent and incomplete processes oflabour regulation. According to Fox and 
Flanders (1969), democratic societies seek a balance in labour regulation that is notoriously 
difficult to sustain: maintaining social order (centralisation and integration) and upholding 
democratic social values (decentralisation and autonomy) without descending into social 
disorder. To the extent that the ' necessaJY' normative regulation is absent or weakened, they 
argue, disorder becomes manifest in unpattemed behaviour leading to a decline in integration and 
predictability in social action and events. Regulatory regimes are thus closely bound up with the 
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concept of social order, with the focus on the resolution of conflict rather than its generation, on 
issues of social control rather than those of social welfare. What is conventionally studied as 
industrial relations, Hyman (1989: 125) argues, may be conceived as "a fetishised presentation 
of the class struggle and the various forms in which it is (at least temporarily) contained, 
fragmented and routinised". The 'order' that exists in the workplace is in a very real sense a 
negotiated order that problematises the maintenance of managerial control. No regulatory ' fix ' 
can ever suspend or eliminate class conflict, dissolve or di splace the contradictions of capitalism. 
Moreover, there are no guarantees that economic development will be progressive, let alone 
optimal. Structural dislocation and spontaneous disorder are as likely an outcome as integration 
and spontaneous order. 
A significant source of tension in labour regulation is the uneven development of regulatory 
mechanisms within and between firms in the same industry and within and between different 
industries. For Fox and Flanders (1969: 156), the social conditions which Durkheim characterised 
as a state of 'anomie' are the product of an excessive proliferation of different normative systems 
which are urn-elated and divergent. While they tend to regard this state of affairs as an aberration 
from rather than an intrinsic characteristic of labour regulation under capitalism, Fox and 
Flanders (1969: 174) recognise the difference between a crisis in regulation and a crisis of 
regulation. What is at stake here is "whether the whole normative framework governing the 
production and distribution of wealth becomes fully fragmented and splintered in a manner which 
threatens cumulative disorder, or whether we are still capable of reconstructing larger areas of 
agreement upon which larger units of regulation can rest". The workplace is also rightly regarded 
as the primary site of regulation for the 'necessary' integration of the diverse and often 
conflicting normative aspirations of the various economic agents. Fox and Flanders (1969: 175) 
insist that no external authority can create order within the enterprise and that order at this level 
is necessary (albeit not sufficient) for order at any other level. Absent from this analysis, 
however, is an adequate explanation of the processes that constrain or facilitate a diversification 
in regulatory forms. In other words, it is not clear how micro contingency and particularity is 
translated into macro regularity and uniformity. 
Regulationists consistently stress the interwoven nature of economic and extra-economic 
relations in the institutionally embedded and socially regulated processes of capitalist 
accumulation. For capitalist development to be sustainable, a network of regulatory forms must 
be established to find a durable balance, firstly , between the various forms or levels ofregulation 
and, secondly, between social order and social welfare. While it is conceded that these 
imperatives are not necessarily or always in conflict; establishing some form of complementarity 
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between capital accumulation and social regulation always involves a complex and contradictory 
blend of opportunities and constraints. Relative stability in the expanded reproduction of a 
capitalist economy is rooted in a more or less integrated system of labour regulation in the 
workplace and beyond. As a complex and contingently realised 'fit' between social mediation 
and capital accumulation, labour regulation is inherently unstable and manifested in a myriad of 
mediation mechanisms. A fai lure to account for the various modes and levels of labour regulation 
(and their inter-connections) invariably results in an inability to fully appreciate the differences 
between the various institutional forms that the employment relationship can assume. A central 
argument in the chapters below is that the different types of employment can best be understood 
in terms of distinct regulatory regimes with different structural dynamics. 
While it is vital to acknowledge the multiple forms and sites of labour regulation, it should not 
be done in a voluntaristic fashion in which anyone can do anything in any context. If the material 
character of what is being controlled had no effect, labour regulation would be entirely random 
and arbitrary. While labour regulation can take many fom1s , it is never indifferent to the material 
properties of the activities that have to be controlled and coordinated. Each mode of labour 
regulation has its own structural dynamics, powers and liabilities, and within each mode there 
are distinct forms of regulation. The operation of the various regulatory forms is uneven, partial 
and contested, while their relative significance is contingent and non-zero-sum. Many 
contemporary industrial relations scholars tend to place an undue emphasis on the collective 
regulation of employment conditions by employers and trade unions. In underestimating the 
multitude of possible combinations of modes of regulation, they also underestimate the range of 
organisational types and behaviours that are possible in a capitalist economy. Collective 
bargaining, as a rule-making process, is not the only or necessarily the primary means of 
establishing "an adequate code of written and unwritten norms for regulating employment 
relations" (Fox and Flanders 1969: 157). The state, for example, imposes a whole array of 
normative prescriptions on most employment situations, either directly or through some 
administrative agency. Likewise, employers and trade unions impose norms on the organisation 
of work and the distIibution of rewards through unilateral regulation. Work groups are also ab le, 
through the regulating force of custom and practice, to partly control their own work behaviour 
by imposing their norms on management. The latter, in tum, organise the experience of work so 
as to generate the desired beliefs, attitudes, values and aspirations among employees and to make 
their authority appear as just, or at least inevitable, and hence as legitimate. 
The distinctive nature of a regional or national regime of labour regulation is in part a product 
of the specific relationship it establishes between the three generic forms of regulation: statutory, 
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social and market. " Statutory regulation is often regarded as the prime source of rules in the 
employment relationship. Standing (1999:41) lists a number of potential advantages of statutory 
regulation. First, it is in principle predictable, transparent and equitable. Transparency assists in 
the structuring of the wage-effort bargain since those entering an employment relationship have 
reasonable information on the basis of the bargain. Second, it provides clear monitoring 
mechanisms that are justified as a corrective for market failure, especially due to a lack of 
information among workers. Third, it may discourage short-term profit maximisation, but 
encourages longer-tern1 dynamic efficiency. Such trade-offs in forms of efficiency can often be 
secured only by statutory means. Fourth, it may prevent forms of discrimination that would not 
otherwise disappear. The potential di sadvantages of statutory regulation, according to Standing 
(1999:41), include the following: (a) an inherent tendency towards rigidity, in that no law or 
regulation can cover every contingency; (b) a tendency to excessive legalism that may intensify 
the disadvantages of those incapable of operating in that sphere; (c) a tendency to increasing 
complexity because of the numerous situations that have to be covered in any regulatory 
fran1ework; (d) the bureaucracy which comes from having to operate any such system - i.e. the 
efficacy of legal regulation presupposes an administrative apparatus with the capacity to manage 
and enforce it efficiently and equitably; and (e) it may encourage an instrumental compliance. 
A system of labour regulation that relies mainly on statutory regulation will tend to generate 
opportunism, particularly if the labour market is highly segmented, thereby undermining its 
legitimacy and encouraging avoidance, evasion or tacit compliance. 
Social regulation refers primarily to the management of the employment relationship through a 
process of (explicit or implicit) bargaining between the representatives of business and labour. 
Such collective forms of regulation are favoured as a means oflegitimising and institutional ising 
the conflicting interests of the parties to the employment relationship. To be effective, collective 
regulation requires some modicum of parity in the bargaining power of the parties that is 
sustainable over the longer-term and produces shared gains and losses. Collective regulation 
reduces the extent of unilateral managerial control; encourages dynamic efficiency; achieves 
some measure of distributive justice by limiting the scope for cost competitiveness; encourages 
investment in skills development; makes it harder for management to ignore or sideline the 
grievances of employees; introduces an element of reciprocity into the employment relationship; 
" Various taxonomies of regulatory forms have been developed by industr ial relations scholars. For 
example, Salamon (1998: 12) differentiates employment rules according to their authorship (unilateral or collective); 
their content (substantive or procedural); their source (within the organisation or externally); and their degree of 
formali ty (ranging from informal custom and practice to forma l written agreements). These classifications involve 
considerations such as the lypes of rule-making (e.g. formal , customary, adjudicative); the forms each type takes at 
different levels of industrial relations systems; the types covering different topics; and how the differenl types of rule-
making at differenllevels articulate. 
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and generates a more legitimate and hence sustainable balance between efficiency and equity. 
Significantly, collective regulation has the potential to reduce both the excesses of market 
regulation and the rigidities of statutory regulation. The disadvantages of collective regulation 
include: (a) it is time-consuming and prone to power plays; (b) it has a tendency for coordination 
failure such as an unequal distribution of information leading to a breakdown in negotiations; and 
(c) it intensifies labour market inequalities and insecurity when the institutions of collective 
regulation exclude, as they inevitably do, the interests of more vulnerable and disadvantaged 
groups. In the current climate of increased levels of global competition, collective regulation is 
increasingly hard pressed to balance representativeness with responsiveness. 
Market regulation occurs where legislation and other regulatory mechanisms are geared towards 
maximum reliance on market forces. Market regulation increases market dependency, while 
statutory regulation decreases market dependency by reducing the insecurity associated with 
participation in the labour market. Market regulation encourages and rewards risk-taking, 
involves less costly administration than statutory regulation, and lowers the transaction costs of 
most economic activities. However, it also encourages short-termism since there is no 
compulsion to be locked into a stable employment relationship; allows decision-makers to 
absolve themselves from responsibility for environmental degradation, the oppression of women, 
rising unemployment and so on; encourages opportunism as a result of the modest monitoring 
capacity; and increases social inequalities. Crucially, the socially corrosive effects of 
marketisation involve, not the disappearance of social relations, but a shift to a different kind of 
social relationship which is selective and transient. The notion of 'the market' in the singular, 
"fits better with the perspective of the buyer or investor, having money and able to spend it on 
anything, than the seller who is stuck in a particular market with the particular commodities he 
or she has to sell" (Sayer 1995: I 05). The neo-liberal tendency to see markets everywhere 
encourages the view that individual ' choice' , rather than production or social regulation, is the 
organising principle of economic behaviour. This rationalist methodology of neo-Iiberalism 
contrasts strongly with the view, associated above all with Polanyi (1957), that markets are social 
constructions whose creation and evolution are problematic and require considerable regulation 
by the state and other institutions. Far from being an unnecessary 'intervention' or 'distortion' , 
the latter are a normal feature of real markets and a precondition of their existence. 
THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF LABOUR REGULATION IN NAMIBIA 
As a newly industrialising and recently democratised country, Namibia provides an instructive 
context for the study of changes in employment practices. The first decade of independence in 
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Namibia was characterised by both a strengthening of the legal and social safety net covering 
standard employment and a proliferation of non-standard labour at the margins of this regulatory 
framework. These changes in the regulation of the labour market have created opportunities for 
advances by groups of skilled and permanent employees, while weaker groups have experienced 
a deterioration of wages and conditions of employment. On the one hand, a high rate of 
unemployment and low levels of economic growth mean that many workers have lost the 
prospect of ever finding secure employment in the formal sector. The increased uncertainty and 
volatility associated with globalisation has, to a greater or lesser extent, reduced the incentives 
to invest and innovate, and reinforced the reliance on low pay and casualised employment as a 
vital means of survival. On the other hand, unionised workers have often gained substantially 
from the restructuring of employment in key sectors of the economy. Many of these workers have 
had their skills upgraded, are more secure in their jobs, have a say in decision-making processes, 
and have earned rising real wages. 
In chapter 2, the historical changes in Namibian industrial relations are linked to shifts in the 
mechanisms that regulate the incorporation, allocation, control and reproduction of labour. An 
adequate understanding of these changes requires a theoretical approach that is sensitive to the 
concrete, multi-layered and multiply-determined character of the employment relationship. The 
regulation approach provides some of the key conceptual foundations for this analysis. This 
approach, as we noted above, seeks to combine "an appreciation of the generic features of 
capitalism (such as its appropriation of nature and human labour, its surplus-generating 
dynamics, its crisis-proneness) with an understanding of its specific (institutional) forms in time 
and space" (Peck 2000:63). In other words, the social regulation of capitalism cannot be properly 
understood without considering how modes of regulation modifY and yet remain subject to the 
generic laws of capitalist accumulation. The general dynamics of capitalism define the "basic 
tendencies and counter-tendencies, structural contradictions, strategic dilemmas, and overall 
constraints which inevitably shape modes of regulation, which find a provisional, partial and 
unstable resolution in the latter, and whose continued presence and even development eventually 
undermine any given institutional and organizational solutions" (Jessop 1992:50). Capital 
accumulation is thus never a self-sustaining process but rather depends on a specific compromise 
between contending classes and a contingent unity ofthe circuits of capital. Likewise, stability 
within a particular mode of labour regulation depends in large measure on the coherence between 
the various forms of mediation and on their efficacy in legitimising the prevailing trade-offs 
between the imperatives of capital accumulation and social reproduction. The balance between 
economic efficiency (profits) and social equality (wages) that becomes hegemonic at a particular 
time and place is therefore always grounded in specific institutions of labour regulation. 
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To uncover the essential features of labour regulation, we need to go beneath the surface 
appearances of collective bargaining, managerial decision-making, labour legislation, workplace 
custom and practice, and the like. The institutions that are designed to regulate the employment 
relationship must be linked to the context in which work is performed and to the underlying 
factors that shape this context. The processes of proletarianisation, and the attendant formation 
of a capitalist employment relationship, are the product of complex interactions between a variety 
of social practices, institutions, norms and so forth. If we are to proceed beyond a simple, 
regularity view of causation, it must be recognised that every historical event is multiply 
determined as a conjuncture of many processes. History is not simply a succession of isolated 
events. As Bhaskar (1986:221) convincingly demonstrates, if we are to have a science of history 
on which truly general, though not necessarily spatio-temporally universal, knowledge can be 
brought to bear, 
generality cannot possibly be sited at the level of events, but must instead be pitched at the level of what 
is general in the human-historical world. These are not events, but the generative structures co-producing 
them - although always complexly and mediated through intentional agency, such structures are causally 
efficacious and (relatively) enduring. 
The historical evolution of labour regulation in Namibia is analytically separated into distinct 
phases. Although there were significant continuities between these historical phases, each was 
characterised by the dominance of a palticular set of regulatory mechanisms. German colonial 
rule reflected the reactionary nature of the settler community and the expansionist interests of 
colonial-nationalist factions within the German Empire (Melber 2000a:35). Bley (1967) shows 
that the seeds of fascism can be found in the brutal military methods of the German colonial 
authority in Namibia. The settlers and the military favoured a 'final so lution' towards the 
indigenous people who resisted German rule. This proclivity is clearly reflected in the 
extermination order issued by General von Trotha against the Herero when they were already 
decisively beaten militarily: 
[t]he Herero people will have to leave the country. Otherwise I shall force them to do so by means of guns. 
Within the German boundaries, ... [all Hereros] whether found armed or unarmed, with or without cattle, 
will be shot ... These are my words to the Herero people (c ited in Hishongwa 1992:7). 
The brutality of German colonial rule was ended soon after the commencement of hostilities 
during World War J, only to be replaced by an equally invidious and more systematic regime of 
racial oppression and exploitation. Acting on British orders, South African troops under General 
Louis Botha invaded the territory in 1915, forcing the surrender of the German administration 
and its Schutztruppe. During the initial period of South African military occupation, legislation 
was liberalised and black people were again allowed to posses cattle and preliminary grazing 
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reserves were set as ide for this pw-pose, At the conclusion of hostilities in 1918, the South 
African Prime Minister, General Jan Smuts, was keen to an nex the former German colony as a 
fifth province of the Union of South Africa, A compromise mandate system was ratified in 1920 
whereby Namibia was placed under the administration of South Africa, Under the terms of the 
mandate, South Africa was not to profit from its rights of administration and had to "promote to 
the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress" of Namibia's inhabitants 
(cited in Cronje and Cronje 1979:7), Significantly, Article 2 of the mandate agreement expressly 
prohibited the use offorced labour. The interpretation and implementation of the articles in this 
'sacred trust' became a source of tension and conflict between South Africa and the international 
community almost right from its inception, The failure of the South African administration to 
abide by all the provisions of the mandate eventually led to its formal revocation by the United 
Nations several decades later. 
After the defeat of the United Party government in South Africa in 1948, the National Party took 
over the reigns of power in Namibia with apartheid explicitly becoming the cornerstone of 
official policy, The history of labour regulation in Namibia after 1950 is inextricably bound up 
with the rise of institutionalised racism in South Africa, With the consolidation of National Party 
rule, the balance of state power shifted decisively against black people, "hastening their political 
disenfranchisement and economic decay" (Fuller 1998: 196), The various fOims of discrimination 
developed by the apartheid regime in South Africa were implemented in Namibia in an 
accentuated forn1 , For example, while the cost ofliving was generally higher in Namibia than in 
South Africa, the wage rates of black Namibians were considerably lower than their South 
African counterparts (Winter 1977:95; Gottschalk 1978:98). The rural areas were particularly 
hard hit: food and other costs in the northern bantustans were estimated to be about 50% higher 
than in Windhoek (IDAFSA 1980:29), Available evidence also shows that there was an even 
wider gap between the employment and living conditions of black and white workers in Namibia 
than in South Africa (Rogaly 1967; Dekker el a11975; Cronje and Cronje 1979; Herbstein and 
Evenson 1989), 
The Commission of Inquiry into South West Africa Affairs (known as the Odendaal Report after 
its chairperson) published its recommendations in 1963, The Report provided the political and 
ideological blueprint for apartheid in Namibia and described its economy in the following terms, 
The exchange sector is represented by [aJ few mines with their high level of technical development and 
well-planned towns, the rapidly expanding fishing industry with its service industries, the commercial 
community in the larger cities and the big and efficient farms which owe their prosperity entire ly to 
seientific animal husbandry under precarious climatic and other conditions, The members of this developed 
scctor are White '" They were responsible for the creation, maintenance and development of the modern 
institutions and the organised trade sector which is founded on individual initiative, As fanners, traders and 
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industrialists they filled the important role of entrepreneurs and employers with whom the non-White 
population could find employment and eam a living ... The other sector of the economy is still rooted in 
the traditional subsistence economy, in both the physical and the psychological sense of the word ... [The] 
various non-White ethnic groups ... still lead a simp le rural life in their own areas ... Their needs are 
modest, old traditions are strong, and they have little or no knowledge of modern science or technology. 
On the whole, they have not sufficient skill and enterprise, either, to triumph over local conditions and the 
lim itations imposed by nature in their own areas (cited in Mbuende 1986:101-2). 
This crude, racist and dualistic conception of the economy mirrors the view of modernisation 
theories and was subsequently incorporated into a number of studies. The 'modern' and 
'traditional ' sectors, it was argued, evolved separately with distinctive laws of motion and 
internal dynamics. Black people are poor because of their ' backward' traditions and lack of 
knowledge and initiative; while white people are rich because of their skills, entrepreneurship 
and knowledge. Far from being two separate dynamics, however, wealth and poverty were 
created by the same processes of primitive accumulation and subsequent socio-economic 
developments. Labour from the so-called traditional sector fuelled the growth of the supposed 
modern sector. As such, political control of the black areas served the needs of the white areas. 
This duality has continued into the post-independence period. 16 As the 'formal ' sector continues 
to shrink and shed jobs under the sway of liberalisation policies, ' informal' forms of employment 
have experienced a significant increase. The casualisation of employment and the associated 
degradation of wages and working conditions is an integral part of economic restructuring and 
feeds off the more vulnerable and marginalised sectors of society. 
Central to South Africa's colonial domination of Namibia was its attempts at reviving tribalism 
and bolstering the authority of tribal leaders, whi le at the same time ruthlessly suppressing the 
national liberation movement (Simons 1967). Under the apartheid system, the power of 
traditional leaders was considerably expanded. As salaried officials, they were expected to 
maintain control over the rural population, in effect acting as functionaries of the colonial state 
(Von Kotze 1974; Moorsom 1977; Gordon 1978a). The Ovambo chiefs, in particular, become 
deeply involved in the migrant labour system and acquired a significant stake (through taxes 
imposed on contract labourers) in its continued survival." The resulting conflicts and tensions 
between the chiefs and the communities they were supposed to serve proved to be politically 
expedient for the apartheid regime: it deflected discontent from the regime and generated internal 
conflicts within the communal areas. This system of apaliheid rule, according to Mamdani 
16 The nolion of ' duality' must be contrasted with that of , dualism' with its usual connotations of complete 
separation and insulation. 
17 For example, in a lener wrinen by chief Kathikua to Ovambo workers in 1938 in an effort to quell labour 
unrest on the diamond mines, he stated that he was "tired of all this nonsense of all you people" and ordered the 
workers "to do your work and listen to what you are told" (cited in Cooper 1999: 133). 
34 
(1996:27), reflects an attempt at "refracting the impact of racial domination through a range of 
Native Authorities". Apartheid, as a form of state, involved a structure of governance that 
"fractured the ranks of the ruled along a double divide: ethnic on the one hand, rural-urban on 
the other" (Mamda.l1i 1996:27). As a system of ' indirect rule' , it tapped into local forms of social 
control and perverted their inherent checks and balances. 
There was not, however, a purely functional alliance between traditional leaders and the colonial 
authorities. As Pankhurst (1997:415) and Hayes (1998: 124) note, this relationship was fraught 
with contradictions and chiefs had to perform a difficult balancing act between the demands of 
the colonialists and those of their constituents. The result was a combined strategy of resistance 
and cooperation. An explicitly anti -colonial struggle soon gathered momentum as the 
discrimination and repression associated with the implementation of apartheid policies, combined 
with the radical ideas brought into the country by students and workers who had spent time in 
South Africa, heightened the political consciousness of black Namibians. In 1959, the first black 
nationalist political party, the South West African National Union was formed, shot11y followed 
by the Ovamboland People's Organisation, which later became the South West Africa People's 
Organisation (SW APO). 
Following the South African government's rejection of a ruling by the International Court of 
Justice and United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 in the early- I 970s, a protracted war 
between the People 's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and the South African Defence Force 
(SADF) ensued. This war, in which the guerilla tactics of the mid-1960s became increasingly 
supplemented by more conventional warfare encounters during the 1980s, culminated in the 
decisive battle of Cuito Cuanevalle in 1987. The shift in the militaty balance of power 
occasioned by this battle; the collapse of the command economies of the soviet bloc; the failure 
of numerous attempts by the South African govenunent to construct an 'internal settlement' that 
excluded SW APO; and growing internal and external pressure on the apartheid regime paved the 
way for a cease-fire agreement between Angola, Cuba, South Africa and the United States of 
America in 1989. In tenns of this agreement, Cuban and South African soldiers were withdrawn 
from Angolan and Namibian territories. At the same time, a United Nations Transitional 
Assistance Group for Namibia under the Special Representative of the Secretary General was 
deployed to prepare for independence. The elections for a Constituent Assembly that were held 
towards the end of 1989, returned 57.3% of the vote for SWAPO and 28.5% for the Democratic 
Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), with the remainder going to five smaller parties. After the drafting 
and adoption of a new Constitution, political sovereignty was bestowed on the Republic of 
Namibia on 21 March 1990. The people of Namibia thus have the distinction of being among the 
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first to resist two of the greatest abominations of the twentieth century: 
the aura of 'Gothic megalomania' surrounding the infamous' extermination order' issued by the Gennan 
Chief of Staff, Von Trotha, aga inst the Herero in 1904, and the systematic barbarity with which it was 
carr ied out, displayed a mindset which ultimate ly would lead to Nazism and the carnage of the Second 
World War. Apartheid, and the carnage it has induced both within South Africa and UlIoughout the southern 
cone of the continent, is a product of the same fundamental perversion (Leys and Saul 1995b:1). 
The history of colonialism in southern Africa shows that, despite the prominence of despotic 
manageri al practices and authoritarian state policies, the control of labour depended in important 
ways on the wider social context in which the employment relationship was embedded. 
According to Burawoy (1985), it is not the labour process that distinguishes industrial production 
under colonialism, but rather the particular mechanisms through which production relations are 
regulated. He refers to this production regime as colonial despotism: "despotic, because force 
prevails over consent; colonial, because one racial group dominates tlu'ough political , legal and 
economic rights denied to the other" (1985 :226). Racism and physical violence were the 
organising principles on which this regime was founded. White supervisors had enonnous power 
over the pay, bonuses, fines , employment conditions, job security and di scipline of black 
workers. The colonial state only played an indirect role in the regulation of expanded 
reproduction, which was primarily the responsibility of the "company state" that closely 
controlled the daily li ves of migrant workers. The colonial government maintained a largely non-
interventionist role in processes oflabour regulation in the workplace and relied on the employers 
to ensure the regular repatriation of migrants to the 'native reserves'. Highly individualistic and 
contractually-based labour laws also allowed little scope for extensive government intervention 
in workplace industrial relations. The claim that the colonial state was not primarily concerned 
with the expanded reproduction of capital , according to BUl'awoy (1985:220), should not be 
interpreted as implying that such reproduction did not take place. Rather, it highlights the 
alternative institutions (such as the company state) that took over its regulation. 
Given the absence of legitimate mechanisms of labour regulation such as trade unions, migrant 
workers invariably developed clandestine organisations, independent of the compound system 
and its network of functionaries, that were often much more difficult for managers to control 
(Van Onselen 1980:242; Burawoy 1985:230; Cohen 1991: 102). That is, the success of colonial 
despotism in suppressing the development of collective mediation by black workers precipitated 
a crisis of regulation. Despite significant differences in the pace, dynamics, and timing of its 
decline , the supremacy of the company state was eroded by rising levels of discontent and 
conflict in the workplace; a decline in the arbitrary power of white supervisors; and a relaxation 
in the regulations governing the flow of workers into the urban centres. These developments 
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clearly exposed the limitations of a reliance on the company state as a mechanism of industrial 
conciliation and social control. The decline of the company state and the subsequent rise of trade 
unions "reshaped the mechanisms through which production relations were reproduced and 
struggles were regulated" (Burawoy 1985:231). In the post-colonial period, overt physical 
violence against black workers was largely eliminated; personnel departments were established 
to control black labour; the job colour-bar was shifted up the occupational hierarchy; and the 
power of white supervisors was drastically curtailed. While racial discrimination was sti ll 
evident, the increasing bureaucratisation of labour regulation introduced a greater measure of 
administration by rules into the employment relationship and shifted managerial decision-making 
into the higher reaches of the enterprise. Burawoy (1985:214-5) summarises his argument as 
fo llows: 
[t]he colonial state was ... concerned with primitive accumu lation in two senses: the separation of direct 
producers from the means of production in generating labour supplies for industrial capital, and the 
extraction of surplus from pre-capitalist modes of production by merchant capital. The relative importance 
and precise articulation of these two forms of primitive accumulation varied from colony to colony and, 
over time, within each colony ... Once the dominance of the capitalist mode of production has been 
established ... [a post-colonial) state emerges, concerned with the expanded rather than the primitive 
accumulation of capital, with the extraction of relative surplus value from production rather than of specific 
surplus labour through exchange, and with the production of spec ific types of labour power rather than the 
generation oflabour supplies. 
Post-colonial production politics increasingly divided racial groups along class lines and 
insulated the real centres of power in the workplace from direct challenge by the workers. The 
dissolution of the production regime associated with colonial despotism faci litated a growing 
intervention of the state apparatuses in the processes oflabour regulation. In particular, the post-
colonial state endeavours to make the ex-colony attractive to foreign investment by investing in 
its physical and human infrastructure, and actively managing its labour market. As a result, trade 
unions and personnel officers intervened less and less in the direct regulation of the labour 
process, although their very presence acted as a deterrent to the restoration of colonial production 
relations (Burawoy J 985:234). With political independence and majority rule, surplus was 
"transferred back to the metropolis via economic mechanisms, while external political constraints 
became internalized as class forces" (1985:245). The rise of the post-colonial state was therefore 
accompanied by a greater interpenetration of production and state apparatuses. That is, since "the 
company state was fragmented and the new production apparatuses were weaker, less extensive, 
and more autonomous from management, the state itself intervened to narrow the scope of purely 
industrial struggle ... [by introducing mechanisms 1 for the regulation and absorption of class 
struggle at the level of the firm" (J 985:245). 
Although he acknowledges the existence of significant geographic variations in both despotic and 
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hegemonic labour regimes, for Burawoy it is the relationship between social reproduction and 
economic production (unified under despotism, separated under hegemonism) that is decisive in 
this shift in the mechanisms oflabour control. This concern with an archetypal periodisation need 
not obscure the fact that the shift from despotic to hegemonic control (where consent prevails 
over coercion) at more concrete levels of abstraction is seldom if ever an all-encompassing, 
undifferentiated, or linear process. In developing countries such as Namibia, colonial and post-
colonial systems of labour regulation are characterised by distinct combinations of economic and 
extra-economic forms of compulsion. Since no ideal type is ever found in a 'pure' form, it is 
necessary to move down a level of abstraction in order to consider the evolution of labour 
regulation at a particular time and place. Descending from the abstract level of analysis means 
coming to grips with the complexity and indeterminacy of policy change and institutional 
restructuring (Peck 1996). With the dramatic increase in involuntary forms of non-standard 
employment in post-independence Namibia, for example, the perpetuation of a despotic labour 
regime coincides with an expanding hegemonic regime for standard employees. The processes 
that structure the supply of and demand for non-standard employees are central to the uneven and 
contradictory evolution of a concrete mode of labour regulation. 
LABOUR MARKET REGULATION, WORKPLACE RESTRUCTURING, 
AND NON-STANDARD EMPLOYMENT 
Chapter 3 outlines the role oflabour market institutions in regulating the supply of non-standard 
employees. The modalities of labour market regulation have a profound influence on the nature 
and extent of non-standard employment across time and space. Regulatory structures in the 
labour market are either fixed by autonomous collective bargaining, processes of political 
exchange or by state intervention through legislative action and administrative mechanisms. An 
important assumption in the current debate on ' flexibility', as we noted above, is the 
development of specific poorly-regulated zones on the margin of traditional regulatory 
frameworks. There is a clear trend in many countries towards allowing employers greater latitude 
in constructing the form in which labour is contracted. The rise of a ' flexible' workforce in 
countries such as England, Australia, New Zealand and the USA, it is commonly argued, is a 
product of the policies of labour market deregulation pursued by their respective governments. 
These policies are premised on the idea that rolling back the protective elements of institutional 
mediation would set market forces 'free' and eliminate the 'rigidities' of prevailing modes of 
labour regulation. Labour market ' flexibility' is therefore equated with a liberalisation of the 
statutory and collective regulation of employment. In other words, measures which were initially 
designed to protect workers are now viewed as the primary obstacles to economic growth. Labour 
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regulation no longer functions as a mechanism for generalising advances in collective bargaining 
to the majority of employees, but rather as a tattered and contracting' safety net'. These policies 
are generally associated with a shift away from centralised regulation towards greater 
decentralisation; a reduction in the degree of state intervention in the labour market; a relaxation 
in the regulations govel11ing the right of employers to hire and fire ; and a decline in collective 
employee representation at the levels of the workplace and national policy-making forums. 
It is widely accepted that there has been a shift from a dominant pattel11 in which intel11al labour 
markets shielded workers from market forces, to a 'new' employment relationship where 
pressures from product and labour markets are intel11alised within the enterprise as a means to 
mediate industrial relations (Cordova 1986; Lane 1989; Hakim 1990a; Cappelli 1995; Abraham 
and Taylor 1996; Campbell and Burgess 2001). By reducing the protective elements of labour 
regulation and/or the likelihood of compliance with regulatory conditions, as well as expanding 
the sphere of poorly-regulated employment govel11ed primarily by common law, these policies 
have widened the gaps in protective regulation within which NERs can expand. In short, they 
open up more opportunities for the designation of an employment relationship as 'non-standard ' 
and hence ineligible for the protections associated with the SER. On this view, there exists a 
simple, inverse relationship between degrees of labour market regulation and the incidence of 
'market-mediated' forms of non-standard employment. 
Labour markets exist only as a set of social practices characterised by social networks, collective 
norms, socially-constructed identities and accepted forms of social interaction. The normative 
framework which gives particular markets their coherence and their functionality, and tempers 
the outright exercise of economic power, is best viewed as "a form of micro-political regulation, 
as a social constitution" (Jones 1996: 127). This approach views all labour markets as arenas of 
political action. Recruitment on purely market criteria is infused with considerations of social 
eligibility, obligations offair treatment, trust relations, the legal framework, normative codes and 
standards, occupational qualifications, standards of 'fair' wages and 'equal' treatment, and the 
power of collectives such as trade unions. In other words, the market is a social and not 
exclusively economic institution. As a social institution, the labour market is dependent on state 
intervention; is differentially organised, regulated, embedded and influenced by contextual 
factors ; is characterised by an uneven distribution of information and power; and it can 
disempower as well as empower people. The key question for labour market analysis is not how 
far it departs from price-competitive rules, but rather which social processes make different kinds 
of markets possible. The central concern is not the extension or limitation of markets (due to their 
inherent efficiency or inequity respectively), but rather the identification of the underlying 
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mechanisms which give rise to varying degrees of cooperation and resistance, incorporation and 
marginalisation, standardisation and differentiation. 
'Deregulation' is a misnomer since the current changes in regulatory frameworks do not result 
in a 'free' market unconstrained by social rules. Exposing the labour supply to the naked 
discipline of the market would precipitate social destruction. Some formes) of social regulation 
is therefore necessary to ensure the social reproduction of labour. Hence, the pervasive 
importance of notions such as 'fairness ' and 'equity' in the employment relationship can only be 
adequately accounted for in a conception of the labour market as a socially-constructed, 
institutionally-governed and politically-mediated structure of conflict and accommodation. 
Wages, for instances, are complex composites of output and time rates, custom, conventions, 
national standards and incentives. Understanding the expansion of casualised employment in an 
increasingly regulated labour market (as in Namibia) calls for a much clearer articulation of 
changes in the form or level oflabour regulation. Changes in the regulatory regime of the labour 
market can very rarely be understood as simply a restriction or extension of the role of statutory 
and collective regulation to the benefit or detriment of market mechanisms (Esping-Anderson 
and Regini 2000b). In practice, deregulation usually denotes a change in the regulatory 
mechanisms (i.e reregulation) rather than simply an attempt to achieve a 'pure' market 
regulation. 
The conjunction of an expanded regulation of the SER and an increase in the use of poorly-
regulated forms of non-standard employment in Namibia presupposes a segmented labour market 
and the selective coverage of labour market institutions. Institutions in the labour market protect 
workers from destructive cost-cutting competition by providing a coordinating role that 
establishes labour standards, checks trends towards heterogeneity, introduces uniform rules and 
prices, and guarantees the social reproduction of labour. Institutional regulation may, however, 
be facilitative and/or restrictive in nature: the social institutions that create shelters and enclaves 
for some workers almost invariably expose others to poorly-regulated conditions (Rubery 1996). 
Variations from the SER can be explained by the fact that NERs tend to flourish within the gaps 
left by the limits in regulatory coverage. Certain disadvantaged groups have become in effect 
structurally excluded from the labour market. However, it is only on the basis of the delineation 
of a specific ensemble of institutional structures that we can explain why particular types of 
NERs flourish in some places rather than others. Employment practices and industrial relations 
fostered by firms are often highly internally-related to the local environment, and in particular 
to the opportunities, skills and perceptions of the local labour supply. The differential experience 
across national boundaries suggests that analytical space needs to be provided for systems of 
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labour market regulation which may either accentuate or moderate pressures for casualisation. 
The lack of convergence in the evolution of national labour market structures underscores the 
micro-foundations of social diversity, accentuates the importance of the choices that are made 
as to how employment is regulated, and refutes the idea that current restructuring is inexorably 
driven by immutable market forces. A growing body of empirical evidence also suggests that the 
correlation between employment costs, labour market regulation and economic competitiveness 
is far less clear than implied by the proponents of labour market flexibility . There is thus 
considerable doubt as to whether the notion of 'flexibility' adequately captures the direction and 
dynamics of current changes in the labour market. 
A study of the (often maligned and secretive) temporary employment industry sheds light on 
some of the central dynamics of labour market ' flexibility'. Labour brokers produce a secure 
labour supply for insecure work. By mobilising workers for low-waged work, labour 
subcontracting maximises participation in non-standard employment at the bottom of the labour 
market. However, labour brokers do not only exploit conditions found in secondary job markets 
(i.e. market-following), but also contribute to the reproduction and transformation of these job 
markets (i.e. market-changing). With the former, the focus is on channelling subcontracted 
workers into available jobs usually at or near minimum wage. The latter is most apparent in the 
extent to which subcontracted workers constitute a continuously job-ready, pre-processed and 
'voluntary' labour supply for the lower end of the job market (Peck and Theodore 1998,2002). 
The casualisation of unskilled work draws on the labour of people with little or no prospects of 
gaining full-time employment. As such, it represents the mobilisation of cheap sources oflabour 
that would otherwise not have been readily available for employment. With skilled workers, by 
contrast, casualisation involves the exploitation of skill shortages rather than the exploitation of 
surplus labour supplies. These interventions in the labour market constitute an emergent strategy 
for the social reproduction of a non-standard labour supply (Peck 1996). By absorbing some of 
the social reproduction costs ofNERs - costs that employers of non-standard labour seek to avoid 
- labour brokers guarantee and even subsidise non-standard work. 
Chapter 4 outlines the ways in which the restructuring of production shapes the demand for non-
standard employment. Attention is focused on the development of the ' flexible' firm and its role 
in the segmentation of labour demand. The latter is situated in the context of the limits to and 
possibilities of restructuring in the Namibian economy since independence. The wider economic 
context in which the workplace is embedded is increasingly confining the search for 
competitiveness to considerations of price rather than quality. The use of non-standard labour 
41 
must also be seen in the light of the fact that a continuous introduction of new technology is very 
costly to sustain. Many firms in developing countries cannot afford to expand output through a 
continuous re-tooling and increased productivity has to be achieved with existing technologies . 
This reduces the scope for the restructuring and compels management to seek for solutions to the 
growing pressures of competition in the recomposition of the workforce. In fact, many of the 
factors that contribute to the growing stratification of the workforce have less to do with 
productive efficiency and more with the prevailing costs and methods of control over the 
workforce. Segmentation on the demand side of the labour market is explored through an 
analysis of the types of non-standard jobs created in different economic sectors. The largely 
distinct regulatory dilemmas that are identified with the various industries explain the search for 
different regulatory 'fixes'. The concentration of non-standard workers in specific industries and 
occupations is highlighted as a major cause of labour market segmentation. 
Some form of ' flexible' employment as a desired and/or inevitable trend 111 industrial 
restructuring has been put forward from a number of different theoretical perspectives. The 
current debates on employment 'flexibi lity' are palily about the different ways in which the 
employment relationship may be organised and regulated. A very real consequence of flexibility 
strategies is the increasing fragmentation of labour both within and between industries. An 
expanded and more strategic use of non-standard employment contracts is a central assumption 
in the arguments of the proponents of labour market 'flexibility'. The growth of a 'numerically 
flexible ' labour force plays a key role in the postulated decline of the vertically-integrated 
production methods associated with Fordism. An inherent, if sometimes unintended, 
consequence of the ' flexibility' debate has been the reduction of complex socio-economic 
problems to technical and/or organisational obstacles. Current industrial restructuring is far more 
problematic for both capital and labour than these purely technical-organisation discourses 
suggest. The central concepts of 'core' and 'periphery' in the debates surrounding employment 
flexibility need to be re-examined and more closely linked to the dynamics of distinct forms of 
mechanisation and local labour market conditions. The intemallabour market and the regulation 
of employment conditions within the firm has a major bearing on the extent of and motivations 
behind the casualisation of labour. 
A neglected dimension of non-standard employment in 'flexibility' theories is the sectoral 
dynamics of restructuring. The proponents of employment ' flexibility ' have been quick to 
generalise their findings across a number of industries, thereby ignoring the constraints and 
opportwlities created by particular fOlms of mechanisation. In practice, the form and distribution 
of NERs reflect considerable inter-sectoral variation. The largely abstract debate on labour 
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market 'rigidities' generally fails to shed light on the reasons why particular types of non-
standard employment flourish in some industries rather than others. Since certain industries may 
be more susceptible or receptive to casualisation, it is important to unravel the different 
motivations and benefits behind such decisions. The use of non-standard employment is often 
more a response to the dictates of a particular production process than the product of an 
overriding managerial commitment to employment 'flexibility' . Determining the relative costs 
of internal (qualitative adjustment of labour within the internal labour market) and external 
(quantitative adjustment oflabour affected on extemallabour markets) solutions to the dilemmas 
of profitability and labour control raises problems of contingency and particularity. That is, the 
choice between these two methods of procuring and deploying labour power is contingent and 
depends upon the specific configuration of costs for particular industries. 
The concept of a 'mechanisation regime ' is intended to place the issue of sectoral variations in 
employment restructuring at the centre of industrial relations research. Since technological and 
organisational changes affect industries with varying degrees and at different times, it is 
reasonable to expect that the demand for non-standard labour would be uneven and sectorally-
detelmined. In contrast to the emphasis of flexibility theories on broad managerial strategies, the 
focus on a specific mechanisation regime proceeds from the limits and possibilities created by 
the material structure of specific productive technologies and prevai ling product market 
conditions. In other words, different capitals need different types of flexibility at different points 
in time. The various types of employment flexibility will therefore tend to vary in importance 
according to product market strategy, i.e. according to the specific manner in which a firm 
chooses to compete. 
l Insights into the composition and distribution of NERs accentuate the need for a greater 
appreciation of the open-ended and complex nature of changes in the workplace. In particular, 
a more adequate understanding of the employment po licies of firms demands the consideration 
of a wider range of strategic options than has typically been the case. Boyer (l988b) draws a 
broad distinction between defensive and offensive forms of flexibi lity. While the former is 
associated with selective deregulation of the labour market, the establishment of more 
individualised employment relations and rising inequality; the latter represents a more organised, 
regulated and collectivised labour market. At a more concrete level, Standing et al (1996:6-7) 
identify various forms and levels of flexibility: (a) employment flexibility - the ability to change 
employment levels quickly and easily; (b) wage flexibility - rapidly changing absolute and 
relative wage levels with the possibility of wide wage gaps between sectors and occupations; and 
(c) work process flexibility - the easy and low-cost alteration of work tasks, times and practices. 
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Each form of flexibility has its advantages, but each also has inherent costs if taken too far. For 
example, if hiring and firing are too easily accomplished - a case of excessive employment 
flexibility - it may discourage firms and workers from investing in firm-specific, 
productivity-enhancing skills, and may lead to short-sighted physical investment decisions by 
firms. There are also qualitative differences among the various types of 'rigidity' (Crouch 
1998:143). Different countries display different balances between internal and external rigidities. 
Different regions and industries focus on some aspects more than others depending on the nature 
of existing regulatory systems and production structures. 
Standing et al (1996:8-9) also detail different forms of security: (a) labour market security -
widespread opportunities for employment; (b) employment security - protection from arbitrary 
loss of employment; (c)job security - protection against arbitrary transfer between sets of work 
tasks and loss of job-based rights; (d) work security - health and safety protection in employment; 
(e) income security - protection against arbitrary reduction in incomes; and (f) representation 
security - secure capacity to bargain and influence the character and terms of employment. The 
complex interaction between the various types of flexibility and security means that the labour 
market does not have a single institutional dynamic but is a composite of several such dynamics. 
At best, therefore, flexibility is merely "one dimension of adjustment" (Meulders and Wilkin 
1987:16). It is necessary to examine the particular socio-economic and political context in which 
flexibility policies are implemented to understand their specific functions and limitations. The 
effects generated by regulatory mechanisms in the labour market depend on the contingent local 
conditions in which they are embedded. This might be best understood as "rooted regulation" 
(Peck 1996: 147), generating security for some workers and insecurity for others, leading to the 
incorporation of some workers and the marginalisation of others. 
The path dependency of changes in regulatory systems means that regulatory solutions that are 
effective in one context may not be readily supplanted into others (Storper and Scott 1990; 
Rogowski and Schomann 1996; Deakin 200 I; Cook 2002). Establishing a durable fOlm of labour 
regulation is a contingent process dependent on experimentation and chance discoveries. The 
relative importance of the different forms of regulation varies with the object of regulation in 
question and the degree of resistance encountered by particular interventions. Although a basic 
distinction can be made between cost-competitive and quality-competitive approaches to 
restructuring, there is no 'one best' response to increased competition. Labour market actors 
always transform existing structures and there are significant differences in employment relations 
and practices between and within countries and economic sectors. The different forms of non-
standard employment, for example, are subject to greater or lesser degrees of institutional 
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regulation and yield variable patterns of flexibility. The strategies of management and trade 
unions are decisive determinants of the pace, form and direction of changes in work and 
employment at a particular time and place. 
MANAGEMENT, TRADE UNIONS, AND THE NON-STANDARD WORKFORCE 
Managers and trade unionists are key actors in the institutional practices that shape the supply 
of and demand for non-standard employment. In chapter 5, we consider the ways in which 
employers structure and regulate the wage-effol1 bargain of non-standard employees. Common 
to much of the literature on 'flexibility' is the idea that employers are pursuing a 'core-periphery ' 
model of employment practices in a highly strategic manner. Managers are said to distinguish 
between 'core' and ' peripheral' workers in terms of how crucial their skills are to securing high, 
long-term profits. This division between core and peripheral workers, it is argued, gives 
employers a measure of ' flexibility ' in that they can apply different strategies to different sectors 
of the workforce. Core workers are incorporated into semi-autonomous work groups, total quality 
management and so on; while the expendability of peripheral workers makes them vulnerable 
to control through market and contractual means. The goal is to reduce or eliminate some of the 
guarantees and protections governing specific aspects of the SER. By counteracting the 
homogenisation effects of labour law and collective bargaining, the mobilisation of cheap and 
disposable labour through NERs allows employers much greater discretion in constructing 
individual employment relationships. These strategies have struck a sympathetic chord with 
employers given the context of an economic recession. Such are the times when cost-cutting is 
prioritised, the scope for compromise is reduced, and the unions are generally on the defensive. 
Whether or not employers act strategically in their deployment of non-standard labour is perhaps 
best judged in telms of the extent to which they pursue a 'core-periphery' strategy, as suggested 
by the flexible-firm model. Research shows that workforce restructuring is generally understood 
and justified by employers in terms of conventional staffing policies and not in grand terms of 
new 'flexible' strategies. The bulk of employers lack a coherent and long-term employment 
strategy, hiring workers on an ad hoc basis and in response to particular problems and 
circumstances as they arise (Hakim 1990: 184; Rubery and Wilkinson 1994: 18; Barker and 
Christensen 1998:312). There is a perpetual tension under capitalism between treating workers 
as commodities to be hired and fired, and harnessing their ingenuity and cooperativeness (i.e. the 
control-autonomy dialectic). For the employment relationship to provide a stable framework for 
collaboration in the workplace, it must protect against opportunism and satisfY both the 
employer's need for flexibility/efficiency and the employee 's need for security/equity. Achieving 
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a sustainable trade-off between the needs of employers and employees involves a complex 
process of social and political mediation. In the fl exible-firm model, by contrast, explanations 
of management' s behaviour are constructed largely in terms of the demands imposed by market 
forces. In other words, employers essentially act as cyphers of market imperatives. Such 
functionalist, overly-rational assumptions serve to obscure "the truly political choices involved 
in management control" (Storey 1985:285). Moreover, the 'market' does not provide an 
unambiguous message - its meanings are socially constructed and interpreted. There is thus a 
need to identify the actual processes through which market exigencies are translated into labour 
control. 
Managers face the general problem of converting the purchase of labour power as a commodity 
into actual work performance. The spread of 'flexible' labour has greatly increased employers' 
freedom over the financial costs of employment and, insofar as it supplants union regulation, over 
the disposition of labour in the workplace. The competing claims of management's interest in 
preserving the flexibility to hire and fire and the trade unions's interest in preserving the jobs of 
the existing permanent workforce are all too often resolved at the expense of workers in the 
secondary labour market. A secondary labour market of casual, temporary and part-time workers 
reflects a response by employers to the prevailing incentives to reduce labour costs by degrading 
wages, diluting worker rights and differentiating employment conditions. That is, market-
mediated fonns of non-standard employment presuppose alternative means of managing labour. 
A useful way of distinguishing between the management of standard and non-standard 
employment is to consider the balance between ex ante and ex post regulation of employers' and 
employees' mutual obl igations (Marsden 1999). Non-standard labour (especially the unskilled) 
have little traditional standards for levels of work-effort and it is instituted almost unilaterally by 
management. In other words, employers specify the work to be carried out and the time allotted 
for its completion prior to the commencement of work, thereby subverting any existing 
effort-nonns. Insofar as the wages of non-standard workers are linked to a definite expenditure 
of effort, the generation of consent is less necessary than in the case of the day-to-day dealings 
with employees, who can shape their effort-levels through struggle. 
The various systems of labour regulation are differentiated in terms of the different ways in 
which the limits to management's authority are established. Besides the spatial barriers to 
increased flexibility in employment, there are several other factors which impinge (to varying 
degrees) on capital' s ability to employ labour strictly in accordance with demand and to pay 
market-detem1ined wages. The institutional constraints on the elasticity of unit labour costs, for 
instance, are associated with the variegated processes of labour regulation which set minimum 
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conditions, staffing levels, number of working hours, demarcation between skills, and so on. The 
impact of these processes amounts to a restriction on capital's ability to reduce labour costs and 
extend the flexib ility of labour beyond certain limits. These restrictions do not, however, apply 
in an undifferentiated manner to all sectors of the labour market. With non-standard employment, 
social constitution is weak or underdeveloped and hence power is exercised autocratically. 
Consequently, non-standard work corresponds more closely to neo-classical conceptions of the 
labour market (Jones 1996: 119) and its regulation has a significant contractual component. The 
use of non-standard labourers allows employers to take them out of the statutory and social 
protection of employee status and collective agreements witll trade unions. The more 'casualised ' 
an industry becomes, in terms of variation in job opportunities and payments, the greater the 
relevance of neo-classical, competitive labour market. Poorly regulated labour markets ' freed ' 
from social constraints and governed primari ly by cost and price criteria presuppose the erosion 
of restrictions on buying and selling labour. Even here, however, commodity processes are 
structured by social norms and a power imbalance in favour of the employer. A truly casual 
labour market simply represents a kind of "autocratic social constitution" (Jones 1996: 119). 
Many temporary and part-time workers in Namibia obtain work in the context of unspecified 
terms and conditions of employment. This regulatory 'vacuum' grants employers an almost 
unbridled capacity to construct the detail ofNERs. 
' Free market' solutions to the restructuring of the labour market are premised on the idea that 
market and contractual relations between individuals are the most efficient mechanisms for the 
allocation of the rational preferences of utility-seeking individuals. The proper object of public 
policy in this schema is the protection and enhancement of market imperatives. In practice, 
however, employers cannot and do not pursue market-based strategies in equal measure for all 
categories of employees. Managerial strategies must therefore be distinguished in terms of the 
relative balance between market-mediated and bureaucratically-governed modes of labour 
regulation. Whi le the latter are central to the management of the SER, the law of contract plays 
a pivotal role in the management of non-standard employment. The balance between social and 
market regulation of the employment relationship is thus in pati a reflection of the differential 
power resources at the disposal of employees. Being essentially 'outsiders' means that the control 
enforced over less skilled part-time atld temporary workers differs greatly from the hegemonic 
systems incorporating the permanent employees of the firms in which they are employed. The 
control of non-standard labour is facilitated by (a) the contractual regime govern ing the supply 
and utilisation of their labour power; and (b) their exclusion from the organisational structures 
of the firm, which translates into an inability to directly shape wage relations in the workplace. 
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Workplace rules are applied in different ways to different workers. Shifts in the forms of 
employment have not only been uneven between industries, but have also been assimilated into 
pre-existing patterns of occupational segregation within industries. The occupational dimensions 
of casualisation is a sorely neglected aspect in the literature on employment 'flexibility '. Non-
standard employees are distributed in a complex and uneven manner across the various positions 
in the occupational hierarchy and face a diverse range of possibilities and liabilities that shape 
their levels and forms of participation in the labour market. The literature on the 'flexible' 
workforce tends to treat the various forms of non-standard employment as largely homogenous 
and interchangeable, thereby failing to account for the significant difference between them. The 
various types of non-standard employment generate distinct types of flexibility, involve different 
implications for job security, and experience a differentiated degree and type of disadvantage. 
The concentration of non-standard labour within a narrow range of occupations also means that 
under certain conditions these workers neither supplement nor displace permanent employees. 
The different experiences of advantaged versus disadvantaged, short-term versus long-term, 
skilled versus unskilled temporary and part-time workers highlight the heterogeneity of the 
' peripheral' workforce. In particular, non-standard employment should not be associated 
exclusively with work that is low in pay, skill, discretion, job satisfaction and security; 
transparent and readily monitored; easy to replace or peripheral to the establishment's long-term 
success. 
Chapter 6 outlines the trade union responses to the proliferation of non-standard employment. 
The growing proportion of workers falling outside the structures of collective representation in 
the workplace represents a significant threat to the influence of organised labour. Together with 
labour law, trade unions are the principal mechanisms for regulating the unfettered exercise of 
employer power in both market and authority relations. Union-negotiated employment conditions 
act as a system of protection against the untrammelled operation of the market, supplementing 
the more partial protections offered by labour legislation. For example, collective agreements 
concern (among others) the distribution of income, and the more effective the organisation of a 
particular segment of the labour market, the greater is the fixity of its labour costs and vice versa. 
Hence, the collective regulation of work rules operates like high wages to raise labour costs, 
giving unionised employers a stronger incentive to outsource than otherwise similar non-union 
employers. While collective bargaining has certainly improved the lot of organised workers in 
Namibia's manufacturing and mining sectors, these gains were made largely at the expense of 
other (especially non-standard) workers rather than profits. The concessions extracted from 
capital by the labour movement have exacerbated the social distance between unionised workers 
and those trapped in precarious and poorly-regulated jobs. In other words, the increasing 
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polarisation between 'insiders' and ' outsiders ' reflects, in part, the extent to which the risks of 
rising level of economic uncertainty are borne by the weakest sectors at the bottom end of the 
labour market. With the proliferation of non-standard employment, Namibia's integration into 
the global economy will most likely involve the increasing dislocation and exclusion from the 
formal economy of the least skilled and most economically vulnerable workers. 
The spread of non-standard employment and the increasing differentiation in employee interests 
raise numerous difficulties for trade union representation. The multiplicity of interest groups in 
the labour market will inevitably be neglected if attention is focused solely on the 'vertical' 
relations in the workplace between capital and labour. The distribution of power in capitalist 
societies is characterised not only by the 'vertical ' relationships of class, but also by the 
'horizontal' relationships across the division of labour (Sayer 1995). The regulatory systems 
governing employment relationships have never determined only the distribution of rewards and 
privileges as between capital and labour. The distribution of power and resources necessarily 
impacts on the comparative fortunes of different groups of employees. Advantages secured by 
powerful groups may be at the absolute or relative expense of weaker groups. The changing 
social composition of the workforce associated with employment 'flexibility' poses serious 
challenges to the modes of organisation that have long served the labour movement. Few trade 
unions have managed to sustain a systematic and coherent response to the plight of non-standard 
employees. These problems of representation are, of course, not new. Historically, trade unions 
have pursued solidaristic goals as often as sectionalist ones. As Hyman (2001 :36) argues, 
[tlhe 'one big union ' rallying workers ofevelY kind within its ranks was never more than a dream; actually 
existing unions divide at the same time as they unite. And whi le unions may engage in struggle, they also 
regu late and normalize the employment relationship. 
If they are to succeed, the strategies developed by trade unions to overcome the crisis in 
representation must be informed by an understanding of the factors that reinforce employers' 
reliance on non-standard employment as well as those that undermine it. That is, the labour 
movement needs to tackle the causes and not merely the symptoms of casualisation. The unions 
need to address the conditions that encourage employers to resort to casualisation and 
outsourcing, bolster those that limit the use of such strategies of labour utilisation, and minimise 
the benefits to employers that stem from employing non-standard workers. The use of non-
standard employees allows employers to, among others, respond to volatility and uncertainty in 
product markets; reduce the need for managing labour; extemalise the risks of fluctuating 
demand ; and concentrate areas of competitive advantage. The social costs of these benefits to 
employers can be seen in the extent to which instability, insecurity and vulnerability have become 
permanent features of employment for the 'working poor' at the bottom end of the occupational 
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hierarchy. 
In the analysis of the strategies developed by trade unions to deal with the growing presence of 
non-standard employees in the workplace, a basic distinction is drawn between strategies that aim 
to incorporate these workers and those that exclude them. Available evidence suggests 
considerable variation in the nature and efficacy of trade union responses to the casualisation of 
employment. This heterogeneity highlights the extent to which choices are structurally 
determined and underscores the tensions that can arise between different union strategies. The 
' identity' of a trade union is detelmined in large measure by the strategies and tactics it deploys 
to regulate the employment relationship. The prevailing 'job-control ' model of union 
organisation in the Namibian workplace is grounded in a narrow and decentralised bargaining 
structure centred around wage determination. There are strong links between the various trade 
union ' identities ' and the strategies of representation that they can and do pursue. By linking the 
various responses to specific trade union identities and highlighting the limiting factors which 
serve to constrain choice, we are able to proceed beyond mere taxonomies of trade unionism and 
to explore their conditions of possibility, reproduction, and propensity for transformation. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
A key tenet of critical realism is the integration of abstract and concrete explanations. This 
involves sustained empirical and theoretical work. There is, however, an urgent need to 
operationalise critical realism by bringing together its critique of science and its critique of social 
ontology in a specific research programme. In this regard, Pratt (1994:63-70) makes the 
following observations. First, considerable emphasis is placed on the abstraction and 
conceptualisation of the subject under investigation. Secondly, the importance of both extensive 
or quantitative and intensive or qualitative information-gathering techniques is stressed. Thirdly, 
there is an iterative approach to analysis, a deeper understanding being developed on each 
reconceptualisation. In other words, explanations of causal mechanisms are continuously refined 
in an on-going process. Fourthly, stress is placed on the need to consider the causal efficacy of 
common-sense categorisations and to link concepts between the micro- and macro-scale. The 
significance of an adequate conception of the mediating concepts is crucial if determinism and 
voluntarism are to be avoided. Finally, a crucial di stinction is made between internaiist 
(interview data expresses either interpretative procedures or conversational practices in a 
positivist sense) and externalist (interview data is simply a presentation of facts about the world 
in an ethnomethodological sense) positions. Critical reali sts admit both the internalist concern 
with form and universality and the externalist commitment to content and variability. 
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The exact set of techniques applied should vary less with the theoretical approach adopted than 
with the nature of the particular research topic under investigation. While there is some 
quantitative data available on non-standard employment in Namibia, there is an almost complete 
lack of qualitative information on the motivations, opinions and beliefs of employers and 
employees involved in these arrangements. The quantitative methodologies on which most 
'flexibility' studies are based is prone towards broad generalisations and seldom canvasses the 
opinions of employees. As such, they provide very little insight into the actual dynamics of the 
employment relationship as it is conducted in a particular workplace. Intensive research, by 
contrast, explores the causal mechanisms at work in a particular industry and can therefore 
construct explanations for industrial change. Survey research can only establish certain 
correlations between variables, thereby providing at best a description of these changes. A less 
formal or structured and more interactive kind of interview facilitates "a meaningful type of 
communication which maximises the information flow by making use of communicative and 
social skills, by being willing to adapt preconceived questions and ideas in the course of the 
interview" (Sayer 1984:223). Such intensive research techniques emphasise rather suppress the 
differences between subjects. The rationale for sampling fo llows on from thi s: "the individuals 
need not be typical and they may be selected one by one as the research proceeds and as an 
understanding of the membership of a causal group is built up" (Sayer 1984:221-2). While 
extensive research techniques elicit the views of a large number of respondents (quantity), 
intensive research methods generate a more nuanced account of the views of key players 
(quality). In other words, these techniques produce different kinds of knowledge: extensive 
research prioritises information about patterns and intensive research priOl·itises information 
about processes. 
The large amount of detailed information collected via intensive research methods raises the 
problem of how to link categorisation and conceptualisation. The aim of bridging the gap 
between empirically-uninformed theory and theoretically-uninformed research is achieved by 
grounding theory in data. Categories are informed by the abstract theoretical analysis of causal 
mechanisms. Open-ended research techniques allow the data from intensive research to be fed 
back into the theoretical understanding, fac ilitating a more adequate choice of categories, and 
hence a more adequate conceptualisation of the object of interest. The insights gained from 
qualitative methodologies allow for a more in-depth study of the patterns of use and change in 
non-standard employment as well as the reasons underlying these changes. 
The generalisations produced by quantitative research provide insufficient detail of the generative 
structures or causal powers for explaining any concrete form of human activity they govern. 
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These generalisations are so devoid of substantive content that they need to be supplemented by 
a range of assumptions (often in the form of ceteris paribus clauses) in order to have any 
analytical value. The clauses aimed at 'strengthening' empirical generalisations, Lawson 
(1997:233) argues, are usually designed to "achieve mathematical tractability, system closure and 
completeness, or some such thing, rather than an understanding of the real causal mechanisms 
at work". Surveys may identify correlations, 
but to establish causation, it is necessary to understand exactly why the correlation exists. Surveys indicate 
general tendencies, but in the social world these are not iron laws. [Intensive research techniques] indicate 
the conditions under which a tendency operates ... [as well as] the conditions that counteract the general 
tendency, and thereby enrich understanding of the causal mechanisms involved (Edwards et a/1994:9). 
In addition to a documentary study of publications emanating from government, trade unions and 
employers' associations as well as direct observations of the labour process; a total of 82 
managers, trade union officials and employees were interviewed. Guaranteeing the anonymity 
of managerial respondents proved to be an essential precondition for candid responses to what 
was viewed by many as a 'controversial ' topic. In the interest of uniformity, it was decided to 
refer to all respondents by their status or designation. Interviews were conducted during the 
following periods: October-November 1998, July 2000 and June-July 2002 . Some of the key 
respondents were interviewed more than once during the period of research. Where more than 
one respondent of the same designation was interviewed, the number is indicated in brackets. 
Recorded, semi-structured interviews were conducted with the following respondents. 
o President, Namibian Employers' Federation. 
o President, Construction Industries Federation. 
o Permanent secretary, Ministry of Labour. 
o General secretary, National Union of Nam ibian Workers. 
o General secretary, Metal and Allied Namibian Workers ' Union. 
o General secretary, Mineworkers' Union of Namibia. 
o General secretary, Namibian Food and Allied Union. 
o General secretary, Namibian Transport and Allied Workers' Union. 
o General secretary, Namibian Public Workers' Union. 
o Education officers, Metal and Allied Namibian Workers' Union and Namibian Food and 
Allied Union (2). 
o National organiser, Namibian People 's Social Movement. 
o Regional organisers, Metal and Allied Namibian Workers' Union (5) . 
o Regional organisers, Mineworkers' Union of Namibia (4). 
o Regional organisers, Namibian Food and Allied Union (6). 
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o General manager, chocolate manufacturer. 
o General manager, paint manufacturer. 
o General manager, automotive component manufacturer. 
o General manager, information technology consultancy. 
o General manager, pasta and biscuit manufacturer. 
o General managers, furniture manufacturer (3). 
o Group human resource managers, retai l (2). 
o Human resource manager, construction. 
o Human resource manager, clothing manufacturer. 
o Human resource manager, mining. 
o Human resource manager, medical supplies manufacturer. 
o Human resource managers, fish processing (2). 
o Human resource managers, brewery and beverage manufacturer (2). 
o Human resource managers, meat processing (3) . 
o Human resource managers, mechanical and electrical engineering (4). 
o Store managers, retail (2). 
o Management consultants (2) . 
o Researchers, labour and economic research services (3) . 
o Labour brokers and temporary employment agency managers (5). 
o Part-time and temporary workers (18). 
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1 
REGULATING THE EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONSHIP: A CONCEPTUAL AND 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
A great deal of research in industrial relations is devoid of an integrated and coherent theoretical 
framework. This research typically takes the form of a regression analysis that neither seeks to 
test an existing theory nor endeavours to develop hypotheses for a new theory, but instead simply 
reports statistical correlations between (often remote) variables. Cox, among others, argues that 
the dominant strands of industrial relations research are "problem-solving in intent, positivist in 
epistemology, and functionalist in method" (cited in Shalev 1980:26). This orientation has 
encouraged an aversion to theoretical discussion and a concomitant affinity for dealing merely 
with 'facts' and 'practical concerns '. The analytical debate that has taken place centres largely 
around the need to establish a conceptual framework for the predominantly pragmatic and 
empirical concerns of industrial relations, to clarify the boundaries of teaching and research, and 
to establish some degree of intellectual respectability vis-a-vis other applied fields of study and 
social science disciplines. However, as Hyman (1989: 120-1) points out, "the theoretical sterility 
of much academic work in other disciplines ensured that a new and unashamedly atheoretical 
subject [i.e. industrial relations] would not appear out of place". An inadequate or poorly 
developed theoretical framework has, ironically, contributed significantly towards the 
intractability of many problems in industrial relations research. A theoretical framework informs 
the questions we pose, the structure of our analysis, the inferences we draw, and the conclusions 
we reach. While descriptive measures such as aggregate patterns and trends of trade union 
membership, number of strikes, and so forth are important, they cannot explain the social 
relations between individuals and groups of individuals that generate these phenomena. 
Historically, the bulk of industrial relations research concentrated on the form of institutions and 
ignored the processes through which they are reproduced. The focus was on the status of 
institutions rather than the maintenance of relations. An inevitable result was the failure to 
penetrate beneath the day-to-day activities and conflicts that are the practice of industrial 
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relations. The notion of industrial relations as a system of 'job regulation ' is grounded in a 
number of problematic assumptions: "that processes are naturally at work to maintain stability 
and equilibriwn; that the various institutions and procedures are compatible and well integrated; 
and that conflict is therefore largely self-correcting" (Hyman 1975: 11). Research in industrial 
relations needs to go beyond a largely functionalist description of the institutions and processes 
of 'job regulation' to a theoretically-informed analysis of the expanded reproduction of the 
inherently unstable and conflict-ridden relationship between capital and labour. What is needed 
is a central focus arowld which to organise ideas, present data, and construct explanations. The 
fundamental object of inquiry that defines the field of industrial relations is not trade unions, 
management or industrial conflict, but the relationship that generates these phenomena - i.e. the 
employment relationship (Littler 1993; Cappelli 1995; Edwards 1995; Huiskamp 1995; Kelly 
2002). It is the conflict of interests at the heart of the employment relationship which generates 
the phenomena that comprise industrial relations, such as collective bargaining, employee 
participation and dispute-resolution procedures. 
In its most basic form, every employment relationship is an economic exchange (an agreement 
to exchange wages for work) and a power relation (the employee 'agrees' to submit to the 
authority of the employer). The employment relationship can be defined as "the set of conditions 
determining the exchange, use and reproduction of the labour force" (Michon 1992:224). In other 
words, it contains far more than a simple agreement to buy and sell labour. This focus on the 
employment relationship clearly goes beyond the traditional concerns of industrial relations 
research such as trade unions and collective bargaining. It is possible to discern, Blyton and 
Turnbull (1998:28) argue, a growing tendency 
to focus on and define the distinctive characteristics of the employment relationship; to locate that 
relationship within the broader nature 0/ economic activity; to analyse the structural bases of conflict and 
accommodation between employer and employee; to consider the influence of the wider SOCiety; and to 
develop an inlerdisciplinmy approach using concepts and ideas derived from sociology) econom ics, 
psychology, history and political science. 
The employment relationship increasingly serves as the central concept and as the prime focus 
of analysis in industrial relations research. This relationship is one in which the employee sells 
hislher capacity to work in exchange for a wage and other benefits. The employer hires workers 
in order to have them produce goods or services that can be sold at a profit. As such, the 
employment relationship is not an abstract notion, but one of "practical significance, being the 
basis of the parties' own interactions and the relationship upon which all other aspects of 
employee relations develop" (Blyton and Turnbull 1998:5). It encapsulates the processes through 
which employees are recruited, rewarded, motivated and disciplined, together with the influence 
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over these processes wielded by key actors in the labour market (e.g. management, trade unions, 
the state). This implies not only that the employment relationship is multi-dimensional, but also 
that it is socially embedded. On the one hand, developments in the employment relationsh ip can 
only be adequately understood when viewed in the context of the organisation in which labour 
is deployed, the markets in which the enterprise competes, the institutions that mediate and 
represent the interests of the parties, and so on. On the other hand, the employment relationship 
is a product of economic, social, political and technological developments, as well as the way in 
which the various actors respond to these developments. That is, it is a composite of the 
interactions between changes in markets, organisations and institutions. 
The overriding objective of this chapter is to place the employment relationship within its own 
regulatory framework. Since it is inherently open-ended, contested and contradictory, the 
employment relationship is dependent on regulatory mechanisms capable of generating the social 
rules and conventions necessary for its cohesion and durability. At the heart of the employment 
relationship is a trade-off between effort and wages, control and autonomy, efficiency and equity. 
This trade-off is, however, realised and reproduced in a differentiated manner across time, space 
and the occupational hierarchy. The various historical and institutional forms of the employment 
relationship presuppose distinct, corresponding modes of social regulation. The competitive 
capitalism of the nineteenth century was associated with an employment relationship 
characterised by the primacy of price and market mechanisms. The subsequent development of 
a monopolistic regulation, based on mass production and consumption, is associated with the 
stabilisation of earnings, state intervention and close ties between production and consumption 
norms (Michon 1992:224-5). The regulatory functions of the institutions associated with 
permanent, full-time employment have come under considerable strain with the deepening of the 
crisis of Fordism and the proliferation of employment forms that depart from the standard 
employment relationship. The changes in regulatory mechanisms associated with these 
developments are not simply the outcome of deregulation - i.e. the substitution of social 
regulation with market regulation and the replacement of employment contracts by commercial 
contracts - as implied by the debates on labour market ' flexibility' . The regulatory regimes 
associated with standard and non-standard employment relationships are a complex amalgam of 
distinct forms and levels of mediation, and reflect different ways of mobilising and deploying a 
workforce. For example, as Rubery and Wi lkinson (1994: 15-6) note, far from being subject to 
mutually reinforcing advantage or disadvantage, different types of employment reveal different 
types of advantages and disadvantages. An explanation of standard and non-standard 
employment relationships in terms of distinct mechanisms and layers of labour regulation 
highlights the varying degrees of institutional regulation and the variable patterns of social 
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integration. 
1.2 THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP: AN ASYMMETRICAL RECIPROCITY 
Industrial relations is concerned with the relationship between employer and employee in paid 
employment. The focus is not so much on the system or sub-system of industrial relations in 
relation to other sub-systems, but rather on the maintenance of the social relations between 
employer and employee within the workplace and beyond. The subject is therefore focused on 
the ways in which the employment relationship is regulated. In its most general sense, 
'regulation' refers to the means by which "any activity, person, organism or institution is guided 
to behave in a regular fashion, or according to rule" (Picciotto 2002:1). Similarly, Clarke 
(2000:3) notes that regulation is a continuous and dynamic political process involving "the 
constitution of a form of authority, whether internal or external , to achieve ordering in an area 
of life ... showing tendencies to disorder, perversity or excess". In principle, reference may be 
made to the regulation of any kind of social behaviour, giving the term an extensive reach and 
an inherent ambiguity. The sites and patterns of regulation are also characterised by considerable 
diversity and contingency. In the regulation approach, as Peck (2000:68) notes, there is "nothing 
theoretically pre-ordained or fixed ... about the scale at which regulatory functions are sited". 
Labour regulation can take place at more or less mutually coordinated levels (national, sectoral, 
workplace and occupational group) and is comprised of more or less mutually integrated forms 
(market, social and statutory). 
Contrasting national regimes of industrial relations can be grasped in large measure as the 
outcome of differences in the processes and institutions of labour regulation. The social and other 
means of channelling, containing and absorbing the affects of class struggles and sustaining the 
processes of capital accumulation vary not only over time but also across space. Trade union and 
managerial strategies and practices, for example, are decisively shaped by the prevailing national 
and local institutions of labour regulation. The latter engender distinct opportunities and 
constraints for employers, employees and their representatives. 
Given the interdependence between firms' choices and the support and stability provided by 
intra- and inter-firm institutions, the employment relationship must be treated as part of a more 
widely embracing 'employment system' (Michon 1992; Rubery 1994; Cappelli 1995; Whitley 
and Kristensen 1997; Marsden 1999). Such regulatory systems - involving both the basic rules 
limiting management's authority and the supporting institutions that assist in their enforcement-
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are differentiated in terms of the manner in which the limits of managerial authority are 
established. J The type of employment relationship that is adopted and its suppOlting institutional 
framework shape a whole range ofhwnan resource policies within the firm (e.g. job classification 
systems, performance management, pay and incentive systems, skills development and labour-
deployment policies). While a particular type of employment relationship may not be the ideal 
form of contracting for a particular type of firm or service, the more widely it is adopted, the 
more effective it becomes both to constrain and to enable, and so the more likely it is to be 
chosen by others (Marsden 1999:5). It is adopted because everyone knows how it works, and is 
confident it will provide a stable framework for collaboration in the workplace. This level of 
institutionalisation is often used to account for the relative uniformity of organisations within 
particular societies. A second level is provided by the integration of the employment relationship 
into national employment systems that vary with regard to the extent and reach of 
institutionalisation. These institutional patterns or degrees of embeddedness provide the key to 
explaining the significant international variations in the way the employment relationship is 
organised. Streeck (1992:37) draws a basic distinction between 
institutionally 'thinner' societies allowing a comparatively large space for free contract and individual 
choice In relatively unregulated markets and hierarchies, and insti tutionally 'th icker' societies subjecting 
the actions of rational individuals to a richer set of regulations and constraints. 
The approach to labour regulation adopted here underscores the material basis of the interaction 
between employer and employee from which all other aspects of industrial relations flow. A 
focus on "systems of rules" (Dunlop 1958) or "institutions of job regulation" (Flanders 1965), 
by contrast, tends to disregard the multi-layered generative mechanisms underlying such rules 
and regulations. The institutional and normative framework or 'context' of the employment 
relationship is taken as a given and not exogenously explained. As a result, the emphasis on 'job 
regulation' contains implicit ontological assumptions about the nature of society and the 
workplace which are rarely formulated in a consistent and coherent manner (Hill 1974; Hill and 
Thurley 1974). This failure to ground the employment relationship in the antagonistic social 
relations of capitalist societies encourages the likes of Dunlop and Flanders to view conflict and 
instability as aberrations from, rather than central attributes of, the employment relationship. In 
practice, however, labour regulation is a dialectical and continuous process of challenge and 
response, cooperation and conflict, control and autonomy (Edwards 1986). In other words, labour 
regulation plays the role that it does because the employment relationship is structured in the way 
J [t bears repeating that these institutional forms can never comprise a stable, unified, functionally-
integrated totality but must always reflect the provisional, antagonistic and contradictory logic of the capital-labour 
relation (Jessop 199 [: 157). 
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that it is. Moreover, what is conventionally accepted as 'industrial relations' is only one of the 
areas in which capital is in conflict with labour. Although conflict between capital and labour 
explains the generic existence of industrial relations, it is more plausible to consider industrial relations as 
an expression of conflict than a location: that is, the conflict is expressed as and not within industrial 
relations. Unions, employers and state agencies have myriad ways of affecting the conduct of industrial 
relations, but they are not confined to 'industrial relations' in their eff0l1s to affect material standards 
(Gui lle 1984:491). 
The starting point in discussing variations and changes in labour regulation is a conception of 
such regulation in terms of "the rules and expectations governing employment which develop 
from the interaction between states, employers, unions and workers" (Edwards et aI1994:3). 
Underlying this conception of regulation, according to Elger and Edwards (2002: 185), are a 
series of analytical arguments which can be summarised as follows. First, the capitalist 
employment relationship is structured as an antagonistic relationship with a perennial potential 
to generate conflict. The structured antagonism between employer and employee is built into 
their relationship and goes beyond a simple conflict of interests. Second, capitalist development 
is premised on the more or less successful management of this antagonism through a variegated 
combination of domination and accommodation, control and autonomy, freedom and 
compulsion. Third, labour regulation most directly involves the institutional structuring of the 
labour process, the labour market, collective representation within and beyond the workplace, 
and the political representation of labour. In this view, 'market relations' are only a single 
dimension of such regulative forms. Fourth, the state is implicated in most forms of regulation, 
not as a neutral agency or the successful agent of the 'needs' of capitalists, but as a more or less 
adequate manager of the processes of capitalist accumulation. The state retains an essentially 
capitalist character by virtue of its active development in relation to the capitalist system of 
production. Finally, labour regulation remains persistently incomplete and recurrently contested, 
and emphasises the complex, varied and contingent character oflabour utilisation and managerial 
control. 
This conception draws on the regulation approach which, according to Elger and Edwards 
(2002: 185), represents the "most sophisticated contemporary research programme for 
investigating the evolving relationship between national regulatory regimes and the development 
of capitalism on a global scale, involving an extensive and systematic analysis ofthe interlocking 
character of the social forms of organization of production, consumption, investment and credit 
in recent phases of capitalist development". Hyman (1 994a: 170) similarly notes that the 
regulation approach has become "a particularly influential source of innovation in industrial 
relations analysis in recent years" . The central insight of this approach - that a discernable 
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coherence in capitalist economic development is not simply the outcome of self-equilibrating 
market mechanisms but the product of a specific mode of social regulation - highl ights the 
recurring instabili ties in the processes of valorisation, rooted in antagonistic features of the 
employment relationship and expressed in imbalances between investment, production and 
consumption. Orthodox approaches, by contrast, tend to conceptualise industrial relations as a 
largely separate, autonomous area of social and economic life with its own internal laws of 
motion (Hyman 1975). The relative stability of specific cycles of capitalist accumulation is only 
secured through the interplay of a whole series of regulatory mechanisms (such as government 
policies, management strategies, bargaining processes and consumption norms) that yields a 
variety of different propensities and casual liabilities. 
Within industrial relations we can discern a basic contrast between (a) systems approaches (e.g. 
Dunlop 1958) that give precedence to information about patterns and entail an almost exclusive 
concem with fom1 and universality; and (b) behavioural approaches (e.g. Walton and McKersie 
1965) that prioritise information about processes and embody an overriding commitment to 
content and variability (Hameed 1967; Margerison 1969; Blain and Gennard 1970; Bain and 
Clegg 1974). The conception of industrial relations as a study of the ways in which the 
employment relationship is regulated is both a welcome departure from the structural-
functionalism of 'systems' approaches and a useful corrective to the voluntaristic overtones in 
behavioural approaches. A consistent explanation of the co-existence of the individual or 
strategic and collective or structural aspects of the employment relationship demands a rejection 
of the determinism of systems approaches that does not succumb to the indeterminism of 
behavioural and more recent 'strategic choice' models (Larouche and Audet 1993). A focus on 
the regulation of the employment relationship, which can do justice to both the systemic nature 
of employment and the strategic dimensions of work, is most compatible with the stratified 
ontology of critical realism. In terms of the latter, as we noted above, human agents never create 
society ex nihilo and therefore always reproduce and/or transform already existing social 
structures. Moreover, in its transcendental moment, the process of retroduction facilitates a 
greater appreciation of the necessary preconditions for specific forms of industrial restructuring 
and organisational change.' 
2 In contrast to induction and deduction, retroduction proceeds through a process of rational inference from 
some aspect of the empirical or actual, back to one or more generat ive mechanisms which must exist for the latter 
to be possible. Since these mechanisms are only tcndential , in the sense that their causal powers may not always be 
manifested or in the same manner and events, it is necessary to specify the circumstances (such as counter-tendencies 
or facilitating conditions) under which they produce their contingently necessary effects (Ackroyd and Fleetwood 
2000; Jessop 2001 b). 
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While we cannot accept structural and behavioural approaches equally without contradiction, 
there is room for combining some of their insights.' A coherent theoretical synthesis involves not 
the simple 'joining' of conflicting approaches, but rather their transcendence into a new approach 
in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. On the one hand, an empiricist conception 
of the employment relationship that is derived through deductive methods would reduce it to a 
descriptive construct rather than an analytical device. In these accounts, the (usually implicit) 
social landscape is marked by "detenninism instead of trans formative intentional agency, stasis 
rather than change, extensionalism ". rather than internal relationality, actualism rather than 
openness, depth and emergence, and monovalence to the exclusion negativity" (Lawson 
1997:65). On the other hand, action theories cannot adequately explain how the strategic choices 
that shape the employment relationship are constrained and enabled by the social structures of 
the workplace.' Human agency almost always has a material or external dimension irreducible 
to its intentional or subjective dimension. The task at hand, therefore, is a dialectical synthesis 
which confronts these opposing conceptions and transcends their shortcomings while retaining 
their major insights. 
Bhaskar's (1989) transfonnative model of social activity constitutes such a synthesis. Grounding 
an analysis of labour regulation in this model yields a more convincing conception of the 
relationship between human agency (regulatory practices) and social institutions (regulatory 
structures). By drawing on this model, we can conceive the drive for accumulation as the 
underlying force for change in the workplace while recognising that it may assume particular 
forms depending on the impact of mediating institutions such as occupational groups, trade 
unions, employers' associations, regulatory agencies and so on. In other words, actors in the 
labour market regulate the employment relationship in ways constrained but not determined by 
the fundamental features of a capitalist society. The critical realist underpinnings of the 
regulation approach, alluded to above, allow us to avoid the errors of determinism and 
voluntarism by situating the processes oflabour regulation in the context of the constraining and 
enabling capacities of social structures as well as the transfonnative and reproductive powers of 
3 The dominant view that structural and behavioural approaches are simply different or incommensurable 
discourses implies a relativist view of social theories. Where the proponents of different discourses contradict one 
another they must have something in common, over which they contradict, otherwise they are merely at cross 
purposes (Bhaskar 1989). 
4 Here we are referring to the fact that the "work context involves an economic dimension (production of 
things), a political dimension (production of social relations), and an ideological dimension (production of an 
experience of those relations). These three dimensions are inseparable " . [and) 'objective' in as much as they are 
independent of the particular people who come to work" (Burawoy 1978:274). 
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hwnan agency.' This approach also encourages a greater sensitivity to the intractability of what 
has to be regulated. Durable regulation, in the form of an inherently stable employment 
relationship, is unattainable since industrial conflict can never be 'resolved' in any final or 
absolute sense. 
The employment relationship is one of the great innovations that lie behind the ri se of the modem 
business enterprise. It revolutionised the organisation of work, providing managers and workers 
with a very flexible method of coordination and a basis for investing in skills (Marsden 1999). 
The employment relationship has assumed various historical forms under capitalism, each of 
which corresponds to a specific mode of regulation. That is, the observable variability of the 
employment relationship over time and space is mediated by distinct institutional forms. The 
employment relationship is linked, on the one hand, to the position of employers and employees 
in the product and labour market, and on the other hand, to the division of labour within the 
workplace and to the control systems which govern their behaviour. In other words, it is situated 
between the market and the organisation. In some instances the market-determined aspects of the 
employment relationship may dominate - for example, where an employee is taken on 
temporarily to perfonn a specified task. In the most extreme case, the employment relationship 
is played out entirely outside the company, as is the case when the employer contracts out work 
to small independent businesses or subcontractors. Conversely, the organisation-determined side 
of the exchange may be predominant. This is the case when the employment relationship 
involves a permanent, full-time job. Here the employment relationship is enveloped by the 
company and institutionalised in the internal labour market. 
The distinctive subject-matter of industrial relations is the employment relationship, not the 
institutions of trade unions, employers' associations or government agencies (Fells 1989:471; 
Larouche and Audet 1993:268; Blyton and Turnbull 1998:32). The activities of institutions such 
as collective bargaining and other rule-making processes are generated by an underlying social 
relationship and cannot be understood in isolation from it. For exan1ple, trade union activity is 
ultimately the organised expression of the grievances, deprivations and wider interests of 
employees that ru·ise from their subordinate position within the employment relationship. Rather 
than attempt the impossible task of showing all possible influences on the employment 
relationship, it is more appropriate to di stinguish this wide range of factors in terms of essential 
5 At an abstract level, the transformative model of social activity bears some resemblance to Giddens' 
'structuration' mode l. However, Bhaskar is critical of Giddens for failing to give structures a firm ontological 
grounding and for under-emphasising the pre-existence of soc ial forms. "It is because social structure is always a 
given that I prefer to talk of reproduction and transformation, rather than structuration, which, I think, still retains 
voluntaristic connotations. For me, structuration is always, so to speak, restructuration" (1986:213). 
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and non-essential relations. This involves separating out different levels of analysis by 
"excavating the necessary inter-connections between dual relations of consent and conflict at 
work and the essential underlying forces of alienation and exploitation specific to capitalism" 
(Spence 2000:559). The extraction of surplus value, the coexistence of conflict and cooperation, 
the indeterminate nature of the exchange relationship, and an asymmetry of power underpin the 
fundamental rules of the employment relationship under capitalism. 
The employment relationship under capitalism is an unequal power relationship, qualitatively 
different from a 'pure' exchange relationship.' Neo-classical economic theory views 
responsiveness to price signals as the sole mechanism governing economic behaviour and 
assumes that legal and statutory regulation can enforce complete contracts costlessly (Sayer 1995; 
Peck 1996; Lawson 1997). The assumption that labour contracts are 'complete' means that in the 
competitive model, as Samuelson so memorably put it, "it makes no difference whether capital 
hires labour or the other way round" (cited in Standing 1999:44). While 'complete' contracts may 
not be in need of any social regulation, real employment contracts are intrinsically open-ended 
and, to varying degrees, subject to continuous renegotiation. The contract of employment is thus 
a social contract, endowed with tacit expectations and embedded in relations of trust and 
reciprocity (Fox 1974; Wedderburn 1986; Betten 1995). In contrast to a contract of sale, an 
employment contract cannot stipulate the totality of relations that arise between the parties 
(Turnbull 1988). That is, the employment contract is necessarily ' incomplete' because it does not 
and cannot stipulate all the conditions of the exchange or modalities of its implementation. This 
indeterminacy provides the formal conditions under which employers hire and utilise labour 
power and, as we shall see below, is crucial for an adequate understanding of both the dynamics 
and the limits of labour regulation. 
The employee's claim to wages and the employer's claim to performance involves an 
asymmetrical reciprocity. Unlike other factors of production, the quantity and quality of tasks 
performed by the worker can seldom be specified precisely in advance by the employer. While 
wages may be agreed in advance, effort is not and cannot be specified exactly. In fact, we can 
distinguish between an ' explicit' and an 'implicit' employment contract (Watson 1995). While 
the former only covers certain rights and obligations on matters such as wages and working 
hours, the latter is less subject to formal negotiations and concerns levels of autonomy in the 
workplace, deference to the employer's decision-making authority, job security and status, and 
6 Marx described the originality of his work in terms of discovering the "specific economic [onn, in which 
unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of the direct producers" (cited in Jessop 1991:148). This discovery provides 
the real secret of capitalist production, the hidden basis of the social structure, and the key to understanding the 
anatomy of civil society and the fOlm of the state. 
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career advancement. Many of these aims and expectations are not laid down In a formal 
employment contract. 
A key issue here is the indeterminate or open-ended nature of employment contracts. The latter 
pelmit the employer to utilise a worker's capacity for a specified period of time and typically also 
in a specified range of tasks, but the precise content and pace of work cannot be predetermined 
contractually (Wedderburn 1986; Erbes-Seguin 1989; Edwards 1995). Baldamus (1961) views 
the relationship between compensation and performance as the core of the employment 
relationship, expressed as the 'wage-effort bargain'. The employment relationship is shaped by 
a permanent system of (often tacit) negotiation necessitated by the inability of a formal 
employment contract to define the relationship between wages and perfornlance in detail and by 
the fact that cost control must be continuously emphasised and achieved (Barbash 1984; Storper 
and Walker 1989; Ram 1991). These regulatory gaps in the employment contract must be filled 
by managerial, collective and others forms of labour regulation. The employment contract is 
therefore dependent on "a fund of extra-contractual 'goodwill' and diffuse mutual loyalty" 
(Streeck 1992:46). As such, the procurement and productive use oflabour involve much more 
than the simple 'exchange of equivalents ' as dictated by the law of contract. Perfectly efficient 
employment contracts are not achievable, as Deakin and Reed (2000 : 11 ) argue, 
because of the costs and complexity of bargaining under conditions of radical uncertainty. Regulation 
compensates for, or offsets, the inadequacies of private bargaining. 
The "definitive problem" of the capitalist labour process is "the translation of labour power into 
labour" (Burawoy 1978:248). The distinction between labour and labour power goes to the heart 
of the social nature of the employment relationship and the corresponding need for labour 
regulation.' To make sense of Marx's claim that the exchange of labour power at its value is 
exploitation of the worker, we must accept that there is an underlying structure to capitalist 
economic relations which explains the surface-structure of the labour market within which the 
7 The claim that the labour theory of value can be disproved by showing that it is contradicted by 
empirically observable events is grounded in an actualism that collapses the ontological distinction between the 
empirical and the real (Bhaskar 1989). In the open systems of an economy, generative mechanisms do not operate 
unimpeded or in isolation. Marx analysed capitalism's 'laws of motion' as "tendential causal mechanisms whose 
outcome depends on specific initial conditions as well as on the contingent interaction among tendencies and 
counter-tendencies" (Jessop 200 I b:S). A statement of a tendency is not a conditional statement about something 
empirical, but an uncondit ional statement about something reaL A statement such as 'bodies tend to persist in a state 
of rest or unifonn motion in a straight line ' has str ict universality, even ifno body has ever so persisted. That is, the 
power of things can be exercised but unrea lised . Nobody with any sense would infer from the peculiar movements 
of a falling leaf that the law of gravity does not exist or is suspended . The latter is still operative, but it does not 
always manifest itself directly because of other countervailing mechanisms such as aerodynamic or thermal forces. 
What is at stake is merely a lack of synchrony between the empirical level of experiences and the underlying level 
of generative mechanisms. 
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labour contract appears 'fair' (i.e . an exchange of equivalents). In effect, labour bears no market 
price because it is labour time (the capacity to work) and not work itself (the performance of 
work) that is purchased. This distinction depends on the identification of a potential even where 
it is not exercised (Sayer 1995:220). Wages are therefore a payment for workers' labour power 
rather than for their labour. In other words, paid working time is not necessarily equivalent to 
time worked. This discrepancy arises, Turnbull (1988: II 0) suggests, because 
although workers surrender legal control over their labour power, this cannot bc physically separated /Tom 
them ... [The worker is both] object and subjcct of the exchange relation. 
In order to realise the capacity or potential of labour power, the employer must erect structures 
of control to harness the cooperation, initiative and effort of the workforce (Thompson 1989; 
Boyer 1994; Brown 2002; Rikowski 2002). The contradictory imperative oflabour control lies 
at the heart of the employment relationship. Since the employment relationshlp is structured and 
inherently antagonistic, this control is problematic and involves a combination of cooperation 
and conflict, resistance and accommodation, and a commitment to the goals of equity and 
fairness as well as the virtues of industrial stability and efficiency. To be sure, management 
cannot directly control the labour process as such since "the organisation of production inevitably 
leaves the quality and efficiency of its performance dependent on the exercise of constructive 
initiative on the part of the workforce" (Cressey e/ al 1985 : 154). This applies even to the most 
deskilled assembly jobs (Salaman 1989 :87). Ethnographic research clearly demonstrates that 
employee commitment and cooperation need to be actively 'manufactured' rather than passively 
assumed (Burawoy 1979; Ram 1991 ; Moule 1998). The exercise of managerial power and its 
conversion into legitimate authority is thus always paltial, unstable and never given once-and-for-
all. 
The employment relationship is a classic example of a conjunctural causal structure: it is the 
product of not just one overarching causal logic, but of the indeterminate intersection of several 
generative structures. The outcome of this interaction is the many and varied employment 
relationships that we observe in the real world . The roots of these generative structures are traced 
to three sets of social processes: (a) production imperatives and the associated design of jobs and 
structuring of labour demand which follows from them; (b) the processes of social reproduction 
and the structuring oflabour supply; and (c) the forces of regulation (Peck 1996). Each of these 
generative structures exerts a particular and relatively autonomous influence on the ways in 
which employment relationships are structured. That is, although they are complexly and 
dialectically inter-related, each has distinct laws of motion in the sense of possessing independent 
propensities and causal liabilities. In line with the commitment to critical reali sm, the processes 
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of labour regulation are viewed as tendencies that may be realised in a variety of ways in different 
concrete situations, adding another layer of determination to the idea of the employment 
relationship as a 'synthesis of multiple determinations' '" 
In most industrial ised and industrialising countries, as recently as the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, other ways of organising the sale of labour services predominated, the most 
common being some variant of the labour contract system. For example, Pollard (1965) describes 
in detail the gradual emergence of employees and professional managers out of the complex 
system of subcontracting. Historically, managers have consistently evaded the responsibilities 
for the control and direction of labour through strategies of insulation that involve the use of 
intermediaries such as labour brokers (Clawson 1980). Research by Littler (1982:46) 
demonstrates that early capitalist industrialisation was 
based on the avoidance of direct employer/employee relationships and the rel iance on existing patterns of 
subordination ... In many ways the difference between direct and indirect employment and control is more 
fundamental than the bureaucratic/non-bureaucratic division in organisational soc iology. 
Streeck (1992), Marsden (1999) and Deakin (200 I) show how many of the key advantages of the 
employment relationship contributed to its gradual displacement of alternative forms of 
transaction9 At one extreme was the use of ' inside contracting' whereby the entrepreneur 
provided tools, materials and money, and the contractor dealt with labour and arranged to deliver 
the product or service at a specified time and cost. Here the firm exists primarily as a business 
rather than an organisation. With the transition from competitive to monopoly capitali sm, 
however, the market became increasingly ineffective as the primary mechanism for "regulating 
relations among capitalists, between capital and labour, and among different segments of the 
labour force" (BUl'awoy 1978:280). At the other extreme was a collective contract whereby the 
skilled workers contracted directly with the entrepreneur. In a diluted form of the labour contract 
system - the so-called 'drive system' - the foremen retained many of the powers of contractors, 
notably hiring, firing, pay fixing and organisation of specific areas of work, but their income 
derived from a salary rather than the surplus of the contract price over the money paid to their 
helpers (Marsden \999:24). 
8 It is axiomatic for critical realists that the temporal and spatial context affects the ways in which causal 
powers are real ised in concrete circumstances (Bhaskar 1989; Coll ier 1994; Rubery 1994; Sayer 1995; Peck 1996; 
Lawson 1997; Ackroyd and Fleetwood 2000 ; Jessop 200 I a) . This is especially true of conjunctural structures like 
the employment relationship. 
9 Although subcontracting continued to playa critical role in certain sectors and has seen a resurgence in 
recent years, as we shall see, this does not fundamentally affect the argument. 
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Although the labour contract system gradually declined in significance relative to the 
employment relationship, it was efficient in its context. The advantages of subcontracting include 
the fact that the system was flexible in that it enabled rapid labour force adjustments to cope with 
fluctuating markets and alleviated skill shortages. It was efficient in providing the contractor with 
incentives for effective supervision, thereby externalising the managerial problem of control. It 
was also a mechanism for distributing commercial risk between the entrepreneur (financial risk) 
and the subcontractor (production risks). In an age of rudimentary cost control, it provided an 
element of certainty and fixity in co stings (Marsden 1999:25). Developments in the size, scale 
and complexity of production eroded many of these advantages and generated new 
disadvantages. In other words, greater attention must be focussed on the conditions presupposed 
by the domination of capital over labour (Burawoy 1978 :252). 
The reasons for the decline of the contract system reflect some of the advantages of the 
employment contract over the contract of sale. In particular, problems of predictability and 
quality of labour supply assumed increasing importance with the changing nature of 
industrialisation in the twentieth century. Marsden (1999:25-7) identifies four major 
disadvantages or failings of the subcontracting system. First, the labour contract proved incapable 
of ensuring the availability of labour when employers needed it. Problems of labour turn-over, 
absenteeism and general instability were common, especially during periods of strong labour 
demand. A second major flaw in the subcontracting system was the lack of incentives to develop 
skills in response to the needs of individual employers. There were powerful incentives for the 
subcontractor to withhold information about production methods and the extent of improvements 
from the firm. A third problem was the difficulty of controlling certain kinds of opportunism, 
notably among contractors in relation to the firm and to workers. Contractors would typically 
spend little on maintenance and undermine quality standards in an effort to maximise short-term 
output. This became a greater obstacle as the level of capital intensity and demands for quality 
increased. A fourth problem was that of social order. Haphazard earnings differentials among 
workers, hard bargaining by contractors or foremen, unstable and short-term employment, and 
frequent interruptions in earnings meant that resentment and conflict were endemic. 
Marsden (1999) argues that firms and workers face a restricted range of options as far as viable 
rules, capable of limiting managerial authority to the satisfaction of both parties, are concerned. 
In other words, not everything is possible, not every innovation is viable, and not every 
configuration of social relations is stable. This becomes clear when we contrast the employment 
relationship with alternative ways of organising workplace relations. Under what conditions 
would freely choosing agents opt for one form of employment over another? The most common 
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alternatives are (a) the contract of service to provide a specified service or contract of sale to 
provide a specified product, and (b) some kind of contingency contract in which terms may be 
adjusted under certain circumstances. Drawing on the arguments of Coase, Marsden (1999:8) 
suggests that each type of transaction involves different kinds of costs. The contract of sale 
involves, among others, costs of discovering the relevant market prices and the difficulty of 
knowing in advance exactly what services will be required and when. Unceltainty is the deciding 
factor: it is advantageous for the employer to offer an employment contract if, at the time of 
agreement, it is not known precisely which tasks will be required. Here the employment 
relationship has an inherent flexibility : a single contract is substituted for a series of contracts 
related to each operation. Consequently, entrepreneurs wi ll assume the function of employer for 
those tasks where the transaction is more cheaply organised by an employment contract than by 
a contract of sale or service. to 
The key to the adaptability of the employment relationship, as we noted above, is that it enables 
management to decide detailed work assignments after workers have been hired. Given the 
enormous difficulty in antic ipating all the problems that may arise in providing customers with 
the goods and services they desire, the flexibility of the employment relationship which builds 
on workers' agreement to be available to undertake certain types of work as and when their 
employer directs, is a great advantage. However, few workers would agree to giving thei r 
employers unlimited powers over work assignments. The rise of the employment relationship 
owes much to "the development of job rules that square the apparent circle of providing 
employers with flexible job allocations and employees with limited liability to follow their 
employer's instructions" (Marsden 1999:3-4). For the employment relationship to provide a 
stable framework for collaboration in the workplace, it must protect against opportunism and 
satisfy both the employer's need for flexib ility and the employee's need for protection. The 
employment relationship is thus a composite structure reflecting the struggles over forms and 
degrees of control and the nature and extent of autonomy under which people work. 
Defining the limits within which management may determine the tasks to be assigned IS 
problematic. If we assume that the parties are pursuing their own (partially divergent) goals, that 
information is asymmetrically distributed, and that for both firms and workers it is costly to find 
alternative labour and jobs respectively, then we must accept that the conditions for opportunism 
are ripe (Marsden 1999: 12). Managerial authority is thus likely to be problematic both in its 
application by managers and in its subsequent acceptance by workers. Opportunism can be 
to As we shall see below, costs are not the only consideration. 
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restrained by factors such as loyalty and commitment, but they are inherently unstable and never 
given once-and-for-all. Given high replacement costs, individual workers or firms may have to 
tolerate quite wide margins in cooperation before quitting or firing becomes a viable option, 
especially for workers with extensive experience and company-specific skills (Ram 1991; Moule 
1998; Grimshaw et at 2001). The problems of opportunism are intensified by a lack of clear 
definition of the range of tasks over which the employer's authority extends, and over the tasks 
on which the employee will agree to work. Such problems can potentially undermine the 
advantages of the employment relationship. Faced with a restrictive attitude from employees, the 
employer would lose the inherent flexibility of the employment relationship; faced with demands 
for flexibility beyond the bounds of agreement, workers may prefer the additional bargaining 
power that they would acquire when they can quit easily (Marsden 1999:13). The resulting 
conflict is likely to reduce the gains to either paJiy from combining work tasks into a single 
transaction, i.e. the employment relationship. Unless a solution can be found to the problem of 
regulating the bounds of the employment transaction, it is much less likely to be preferred to the 
sales transaction. 
The increasing use of non-standard employment is in part a response to the regulatory dilemmas 
surrounding the establishment of parameters within which management may determine the tasks 
to be assigned to specific employees. The standard versus non-standard employment 
classification, as we noted above, is based on a regulatory and entitlement norm. The primary 
concern is not the nature or length of service, but rather the broader issue of a lack of institutional 
mediation. A central feature of the standard employment relationship (SER) is the growing 
collectivisation and institutionalisation of the employment relationship, as reflected in the 
increasing homogenisation of employment terms (Muckenberger 1989; Collins 1990; Van 
Ruysseveldt 1995). In general, variation in terms of employment based on company size, 
occupational category and so on was tolerated only within narrow sectoral or nationally agreed 
limits. The SER came to dominate the labour market in the advanced capitalist economies under 
relatively favourable economic conditions of continuous growth and full employment during the 
post-war era. The SER is characterised by (among others) a permanent, full-time job; wage 
increases based on experience and training; regular working hours and a negotiated working 
week; paid holidays and sick leave; comprehensive protections against dismissal; rights to 
collective representation; and varying degrees of indirect participation in specified areas of 
managerial decision-making. 
From the mid-1970s, the SER came under increasing pressure as institutionalised industrial 
relations faced unprecedented challenges and drastic changes unfolded in the regulatory 
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framework of the labour market. The employment relationship in the 1990s increasingly 
manifested the signs of the growing internationalisation and volatility of economic activity. 
Changes in the way that production is organised ruptured existing arrangements in labour 
regulation by shifting the competitive position of the firm, altering the types of skills and 
aptitudes required, changing the bargaining power of the parties, and so on. These changes can 
in large measure be explained as involving a shift in the extent to which the market mediates 
employment relationships. As Streeck (1992:66-7) argues : 
[t]he decomposition of the pluralist-corporatist regulation of industrial re lations can be interpreted as a 
decay of the specific balance between status and contract that had underlain the Fordist-Keynesian mode 
of regulation ... [This entails] a polarization in two opposite directions ... within national societies between 
industries, within industries between enterprises, and within enterprises between groups of employees, with 
the emergence of 'good', that is, status-secured, jobs coinciding with growing disparities with a secondary 
labour market for 'poor', marginal and uncertain employment re lat ionships ... [T]he status-lype 
safeguarding of 'core workforces' not only does not rule out the marginalization of a fringe workforce kept 
disposable through short-term contracts, but indeed economically presupposes it. 
The employment relationship can no longer be studied as if it is largely insulated from changes 
in the market. Increasing competition between firms, the relative shift from macro-economic 
demand management to supply-side economic policies, and from institutionalised practices to 
management strategies have had a profound impact on the employment relationship. This is 
evident in the mass redundancies associated with industrial restructuring; a generalised decline 
in job security, stable jobs and career prospects; the polarisation of the workforce into 'insiders' 
and ' outsiders' associated with the outsourcing of 'non-core' activities; increasing pressure on 
core employees to intensify effort levels; attacks on traditional job demarcations and skill 
boundaries; the growing variability of earnings as wages are linked more closely to individual 
performance; and the consolidation of 'flexible' wage systems tied to the decentralisation of 
collective bargaining and the dilution of minimum wage standards (Crompton et al 1996; Gallie 
et a11998; Felstead and Jewson I 999a; Standing 1999; Heery and Salmon 2000a). The rise of 
non-standard employment relationships (NERs) is thus part of a wider process of de-
collectivisation and fragmentation in industrial relations. In part, therefore, NERs 'externalise' 
the costs that the SER had sought to 'internalise'. 
1.3 RESTRUCTURING THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP: REGULATORY 
CHANGE AND LABOUR MARKET SEGMENTATION 
There is an emerging trend in many countries towards allowing employers greater latitude in 
constructing the form of the employment relationship. As Hakim (1990a: 167) notes in her 
extensive review of workforce restructuring, strategies varied from one country to the next and 
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followed different paths, "but all pointed in the same general direction of increasing ... 
segmentation of the labour market and exploring new forms of differentiating wage/labour 
relations". The latter, according to flexibility theories, is the product of a search for more 
'flexible' employment systems aimed at overcoming the 'rigidities' associated with vertically-
integrated production (Piore and Sable 1984; Atkinson 1985; Cave 1994). The rise of a so-called 
' flexible' workforce - i.e. part-time, temporary and a variety of self-employed workers - is viewed 
as the outcome of attempts by employers to establish a ' periphery' of numerically flexible 
workers to complement a 'core' of functionally flexible employees (see chapter 5). 'Flexible' 
employment policies are premised on a reduction in the protective elements of labour regulation 
and/or the likelihood of compliance with regulatory conditions and usually have the implicit aim 
of diluting employment stability, undermining minimum conditions, reducing the collective 
regulation of employment, and differentiating access to social security (Erbes-Seguin 1989; 
Salaman 1989; Rubery and Wilkinson 1994; Betten 1995; Peck and Theodore 2000; Gray 2002). 
Far from simply being a rational response to changing economic imperatives, the decisions 
concerning the restructuring of the employment relationship are political in origin and in 
outcome. 
While changes in the form of the employment relationship are widely noted, there is considerable 
disagreement about their relative significance, their extent, and the nature of their impact. For 
some, these developments constitute a fundamental departure from the employment practices 
associated with Taylorism and Fordism (Piore and Sabel 1984; Womack e/ a11990; Cave 1994). 
According to these authors, the employment relationship is increasingly based on high levels of 
discretion and participation by employees, polyvalent skills, and functional adaptability. For 
others, these changes are the product of attempts by employers to reassert their control and to 
intensifY the work process in the context of trade union weakness, rising unemployment, and the 
rapid spread of micro-electronic technology. According to Williams et al (1987), Pollert (1988) 
and Hyman (1991) these changes merely consolidate or extend the core principles of the 
traditional patterns of industrial relations. What is certain, however, is that "speculation far 
outran the availability of rigorous empirical evidence" (Gallie et alI998:2). For example, despite 
the rapid growth in NERs, there is no convincing evidence that the SER is about to lose its 
preeminence. As Rubery (1994) argues, most firms still benefit from continuous, open-ended and 
stable employment relationships with ' committed' workers. 
It is more plausible to look at the different constraints and opportunities that firms face in 
developing policies which suit their needs than to seek to divide the industrial structure into a 
' core' sector where continuity and commitment matter and a 'peripheral' sector where 
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employment is casualised and unskilled. The 'core-periphery' model - central to much of the 
literature on labour market 'flexibility' - is based on a flawed assumption that (a) the diversity 
of capitalist production, and (b) the complex interaction between the labour market and the 
labour process can be encapsulated in a single dichotomy (Lever-Tracy 1984). In this model, 
there is little consideration of the necessary preconditions for different types of change. Here a 
key factor is the nature of existing employment relationships. The historical configuration of the 
capital-labour relationship, according to Boyer, is structured by "the means of production and the 
form taken by the social and technical division of labour; the ways in which wage earners are 
mobilised and attached to firms; the determinants of direct or indirect wage income; and lastly, 
the wage-earner's way of life, which is more or less linked to the acquisition of goods and the 
use of non-market collective services" (cited in Michon 1992:224). A more thorough 
investigation of the constraints on new employment strategies, imposed by existing structural 
configurations, is therefore essential (Pollert 1988; Hyman 1994c; Whitley 1997). In practice, the 
rise of 'flexible' employment patterns is decisively shaped by the distinct institutional and 
normative framework associated with the various types of Fordist coupling of accumulation and 
regulation. 
While 'flexible' labour market policies open up more opportunities for the designation of 
employment relationships as non-standard and hence ineligible for the protections associated 
with standard employment, this process is not without contradiction or uniform across time and 
space (Rubery 1996; Felstead and Jewson 1999a; Esping-Andersen and Regini 2000a). 
Contemporary changes in the regulation of the employment relationship have created 
opportunities for advance by groups of ski lled and permanent employees, while weaker groups 
are more likely to experience a (differentiated) deterioration of wages and conditions of 
employment. In his review of industrial restructuring, Sengenberger (1992: 139) notes that there 
are "new opportunities for participation and a social dialogue, but there is also the spectre of new 
forn1s of dependency, hierarchization and unilateral decision-making". This implies the existence 
of varying contractual and regulatory forms of the employment relationship that are likely to yield 
variegated patterns of opportunities and constraints. Segmentation in the labour market is 
therefore both the outcome of and a basis for the differentiation in the sites and forms of labour 
regulation. Moreover, within the unstable institutional compromise that represents a mode of 
social regulation "there are typically many irrelevant, residual, marginal, secondary, and even 
potentially contradictory elements; and even the unity of more central elements typically involves 
gaps, redundancies, tensions, and contradictions" (Jessop 2001 b: 10). This creates opportunities 
for a variety of different trajectories in labour market development and for multiple strategies of 
labour regulation. 
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Orthodox approaches to industrial relations are tied to the regulation of the SER. The latter was 
consolidated at a time when industry commanded the greatest share of overall employment; 
industry-wide bargaining was sustained by a strong labour movement; governments were 
committed to a corporatist governance of macro-economic policies; industrial organisation was 
based on more or less stable, predictable and protected domestic markets; and the nation-state 
enj oyed considerable autonomy in national economic and fiscal policies. The SER is not only 
rooted in the industrial relations regimes of post-war Europe and North America, but is also 
linked to the Taylorist-Fordist organisation of production that prevailed in this period (Storper 
and Walker 1989; Michon 1992; Cappelli 1995). The mass production of standardised, price-
competitive goods for protected domestic markets was characterised by high degrees of capital 
intensity; the detailed demarcation of jobs and competencies; the vertical integration of 
production; the centralisation of management; and the bureaucratisation of the organisation. 
Employees were bound to the enterprise through the development of internal labour markets 
which led to greater job security, favourable career prospects, and increasing rewards for 
seniority. The utility, efficiency and adaptability of this employment pattern are increasingly 
questioned. 
Measures that were designed to protect domestic markets are gradually being dismantled by the 
progressive liberalisation of the global economy. The restructuring of work and employment 
must therefore be situated within the broader impact of globalisation on the national regime of 
labour regulation. Increasing levels of competition and unceliainty make it both necessary and 
possible for management to restructure production and employment. We need to understand the 
local specificities and regulation of national markets as well as the increasing prominence of 
international institutions associated with globalisation. As Hyman (I 994c:3-4) notes: 
industrial relations analysts have become fluent in the discourse of strategic choice; but the choices appear 
increasingly bounded by the constraints of global competitive forces. The Weberian nightmare seems 
realized as options narrow; freedom consists in adapting to external coercive laws ... Weber was wrong only 
in failing to emphasize the national variability of the iron cage. 
The persisting divergence in national experiences of and responses to globalisation suggest that 
global trends are reinforced, modified, obstructed and diffused differently according to 
established institutional and normative practices (Edwards 1994a; Crompton et al 1996; Peck 
1996; Whitley and Kristensen 1997). Distinct national systems of regulation refute the idea of 
a standard set of solutions that can be applied independently of local contexts. The market does 
not provide unambiguous signals to aid management in the attainment of higher levels of 
profitability. The latter can only be sought in the context of prevailing socio-economic and 
political relations. Low levels of job and employment security, for example, means that 
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employers face relatively few constraints on their ability to exploit the flexibility associated with 
hiring and firing strictly in accordance with demand. That is, the way in which companies 
respond to changes in product markets and the effects of such responses are conditioned by the 
regime oflabour regulation specific to a country. The institutional framework of the employment 
relationship is an important determinant of the way in which companies respond to competitive 
pressures (Salaman 1989; Gallie et a11998; Peck and Theodore 2000). Indeed, current attempts 
at reducing 'rigidity' in employment by fostering greater labour market 'flexibility' are concerned 
precisely with the reconstitution and/or circumvention of this institutional framework. This may 
take the form of a specific social and spatio-temporal 'fix' such as the mobilisation and 
deployment of precarious and poorly regulated pools of labour. In establishing a regulatory 'fix', 
according to Jessop (2001 b: II), 
accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects typically displace and defer their material and social costs 
beyond the social, spatial, and temporal boundaries of [an institutionalised class] compromise. This can 
involve super~exploitation of internal or external spaces outside the compromise, super-exploitation of 
nature or inherited social resources, deferral of problems into an indefinite future, and, of course, the 
exploitation and/or oppression of specific classes or other social categories. 
Employers are adopting an expanding (albeit finite) range of employment options. Several 
complex processes underlie this growing diversity, which is giving rise to an increasing degree 
of heterogeneity in labour markets on both the supply- and demand-side (Harrison 1994; Van 
Ruysseveldt 1995; Peck 1996; Callaghan 1997). Governments and trade unions are often guilty 
of paying insufficient attention to the crucial role of supply-side factors in shaping the 
increasingly diverse nature of the labour force. Labour movements that were historically 
organised around the SER are ill-equipped to deal with the increasingly differentiated nature of 
labour supply, resulting from both the changing employment policies of firms and growing levels 
of social disadvantage. Trade union focus was traditionally on representing the collective 
interests of a large, relatively homogenous segment of the workforce. The mass collective worker 
is, however, a historically contingent development embedded in a particular balance of class 
forces. The proliferation of different forms of employment rai ses formidable challenges for 
established systems of interest aggregation and articulation within the labour movement (see 
chapter 6). Labour legislation and labour market policies geared towards the regulation of SERs 
have also proved to be largely ineffective in governing the supply of non-standard employment 
(see chapter 3). The demand side of the labour market has likewise experienced considerable 
heterogeneity as a result of the different ways in which companies have responded to changes in 
the market and utilised the potential of new technologies (see chapter 4) . Product markets have 
not only become less stable, but also less predictable. 
74 
The growing uncertainty in the managerial function cannot be remedied by 'one-best-way' 
so lutions: current industrial and employment restructuring proceed from radically different 
patterns of work organisation and governance. We are witnessing neither the ubiquitous 
expansion of hegemonic rule nor a simple return to market despotism, but rather the 
establishment of a more selective balance between social welfare and social control (see chapter 
5). Differences in the regulation of standard versus non-standard employment are all too often 
presented in terms of a binary contrast between social regulation and unregulated market forces. 
While the relative influence of market imperatives in regulating different forms of employment 
is an important criteria of classification, emphasis must be placed on the varying impact and 
differential coverage of mUltiple (economic and extra-economic) regulatory mechanisms. This 
involves, among others, exploring the different conditions under which these mechanisms may 
be activated to regulate struggles in the workplace. Here the work of Burawoy (1979, 1985) is 
particularly useful. He highlights labour control in its broadest, integral sense in an attempt to 
link power relations in the workplace to those outside it, and to connect the spheres of production 
and reproduction. On this view, the state is always present in the constitution of capitalist 
relations of production and social norms are essential to the institutionalisation of a regulatory 
regime. 
As we noted above, Burawoy (1985: 125) draws a crucial distinction between the labour process 
(a particular organisation of tasks) and the political apparatuses of production (a mode of 
regulation). The process of production is therefore not confi ned to the labour process; it also 
includes "the mechanisms that stabilize, contain, control , absorb, [and] cushion" the crisis 
tendencies and contradictions of capitalist accwnulation (Burawoy 1978:305). These mechanisms 
are analytically distinct and causally independent of the labour process. They also provide a basis 
for the periodisation of capitalist production, constituting one of the central dynamics of 
restructuring. As Burawoy (1985: 126) explains: 
[t]he generic character of the factory reg;me;s therefore detennmed mdependently of the form of the labour 
process and competitive pressures among firms. It is determined by the dependence of the workers' 
livelihood on wage employment and the ty;ng of the latter to performance ;n the workplace. State social 
;nsurance reduces the first dependence, while labour legis lat ion reduces the second. 
The problems of labour control are thus not only generated within the nan'ow parameters of the 
labour process, but also relate to the broader processes of social reproduction. By focussing on 
production-reproduction relationship and the wider politics of production in which it is 
embedded, Bw"awoy (1985) charts an uneven transition in labour regulation from despotic 
regimes (patriarchal, paternalistic and market despotism) to hegemonic regimes, the dominant 
pattern in the post-war period now giving way to a new "hegemonic despotism". Despite 
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significant vaJiations among these regimes, the decisive basis for periodisation remains the unity 
or separation of the reproduction of labour power and capitalist production. The consolidation 
of social insurance and legal protection against arbitrary managerial domination, according to 
Burawoy (1985 :261), compelled employers to seek "the regulation of the labour market through 
its internalization and of class conflict through its institutionalization". The proliferation of non-
standard employment has, in some respects, reversed these processes: labour market regulation 
is largely externalised and the boundaries of institutional compromises are more narrowly 
circumscribed. 
1.4 REGULATING THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP: SOCIAL 
EMBEDDEDNESS AND INSTITUTIONAL MEDIATION 
The absence of trade unions, collective bargaining, standard employment contracts and statutory 
protections leave mainstream industrial relations scholars with very few conceptual tools to 
explain the control of unorganised and poorly regulated fOnTIS of employment. The contemporary 
restructuring of the employment relationship highlights the need to liberate the concept of 
'regulation' from its deterministic origins in systems approaches and from its subsequent 
appropriation by the voluntaristic model of strategic choice. According to Fox and Flanders 
(1969: 180), the goal of industrial relations is "orderly regulation" through "agreed procedural 
norn1s". This reified conception offofI11al or official institutions engenders a one-sided focus on 
industrial relations "solely in terms of relationships between agencies and organisations, rather 
than between people" (Hyman 1975: 13). Custom and practice, for example, is seen as providing 
no grounds for constructive resistance and as effectively subordinate to more formal forms of 
regulation (Fox and Flanders 1969:169). Following Durkheim, these authors (1969:161-3) 
postulate the "absence of regulation" and hence the lack of "any restraint on normative 
aspirations" with regard to certain issues. This only follows where regulation is too closely 
associated with formal rules. That is, the breakdown of institutional regulation is equated with 
the lack of regulation. In the broader sense of the term, no employment relationship can be 
unregulated or deregulated. For example, the significance of the contemporary decline in 
collective bargaining as the principal means of regulating the employment relationship " lies not 
so much in the reduction of regulatory influence on employment, but rather in a shift in the mode 
ofregulation from the collective towards the individual level" (Brown et aI2000:20). The fact 
that wages and working hours were not collectively regulated in the nineteenth century does not 
mean the absence of regulation per se as Fox and Flanders (1969: 198) suggest; it merely 
highlights sources ofregulation other than trade unions such as statutory and market regulation 
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or unilateral regulation by employers and occupational groups. 
Like the systems approach, action theories place the collective regulation of industrial labour at 
the centre of analysis. The principal determining factors in this process are the value systems and 
behavioural patterns of the contending parties (Kochan et aI2002). That is, wage regulation is 
ultimately explicable by way of an analysis of the behaviour of the various actors. On this view, 
the structures of industrial relations are essentially malleable and hence the focus should be on 
the objectives pursued by the parties. This emphasis on the behavioural or process aspect is 
incapable of sustaining the "causal relationships between contextual conditions, regulation 
processes and regulation itself" (Schienstock 1981: 172). An important insight from the research 
on the institutions of 'job regulation' is the idea that rules are "the only generic description that 
can be given to [the] various instruments of regulation" (Flanders 1965:10). To ensure a measure 
of stability in the employment relationship, the parties develop objective rules and regulations 
to govern the workplace (Fox and Flanders 1969; Goodman et al 1975; Wood et aI1975). The 
employment relationship is a regulated relationship in the sense that rules govern how the 
exchange should take place and what the substance of the exchange should be. However, 
although these rules provide structure and continuity to the employment relationship, they are 
themselves subject to a contextualised process of dynamic change. Action theorists stress the fact 
that interpretation of the expectations, conventions and rules governing the employment 
relationship is a permanent and interactive process. Their view of organisations as 'negotiated 
orders' is a reaction to the reified conception of systems theories, which neglects the role of 
human action and interpretation: 
[a] recurring theme was that controls exercised through rules in formal organisations were inevitably 
incomplete and unsuccessful. Any degree of effective co· ordination and co-operation is dependent on 
constant reworking of rules and goals, and forma l and informal negotiation processes involving all 
participants. The subsequent customs and practices in any workplace act as a constraint on management 
(Thompson and McHugh 1990:35-6). 
The predominant role ascribed to individual values and beliefs invariably means that the strategic 
dimensions of industrial relations are granted more autonomy. This emphasis on 'behavioural 
regulation' as the driving force of industrial conflict marginalises the underlying structural 
determinations of conflict. The assumption is that management simply chooses between clearly 
marked solutions to the problems of labour regulation. Social structures tend to be viewed "at 
best as temporary patterns created by interpersonal action and based on available stocks of 
knowledge" (Thompson and McHugh 1990:36). By neglecting the material basis of labour 
regulation and adopting a voluntaristic model of social action, strategic choice models cannot 
account for wider structural determinations and hence fail to reveal the complexities, tensions 
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and uncertainties of choice. The focus of analysis is the institutionalisation of industrial conflict 
rather than the conditions that generate this conflict in the first place. The strategic choice model, 
in short, amounts to "industrial relations with much of the politics removed" (Edwards 1995:20). 
What is needed is a broader, materially-grounded conception of regulation that is consistent with 
both the emphasis on rule-guided behaviour in systems theories and the stress placed on the role 
of human agency in strategic choice approaches." 
The notion of labour regulation that is defended here presupposes that an industrial relations 
regime capable of maintaining a relatively enduring balance between social equity and economic 
efficiency is rooted in a particular constellation of institutional and organisational fOlms. In other 
words, regulation is viewed as "a method for embedding the economy in society" (Standing 
1999:40). While employers face the general problem of managing labour, their responses are 
shaped by the specific circumstances in which they find themselves. Human agency is, in effect, 
embedded intentional causality: "strategic choice exists, not because of the absence or weakness 
of structural determinations, but because these determinations are themselves contradictory" 
(Hyman 1987:30). In line with the regulation approach, the focus is on the dialectical relationship 
between structures and strategies. 12 On this view, society is not the creation of unconditional 
human agency, nor does it exist independently of it; and human action neither completely 
detemlines, nor is it completely determined by, social structures. In the immortal words of Marx, 
people make their own history but not in the conditions of their choosing. If we are to avoid both 
reified and voluntaristic accounts of labour regulation, it must be recognised that 
[b loth the structural and strategic moments are complex and changeable: the boundaries and articulation 
of structural ensembles are unstable, the world of strategies is pluralistic and conjunctura!. Their dialectic 
is nothing more (and nothing less) ... than the structural conditioning of strategies ... and the strategic 
transformation of structural ensembles (Jessop 1988: 157-8). 
Attempts at deriving structural concepts from strategic categories or extrapolating a single 
strategy from a given structure must be rejected (Jessop 1990: 194-6). The relative success or 
failure of the diverse strategies and structures that sustain a patiicular regime oflabour regulation 
usually depends on the unacknowledged structural consequences and conditions of human 
actions, the shifting balance of class forces, and so on. The ' disorder' identified by systems 
I I In their attempt to "complete the systems framework", Kochan et at (2002:74) tend to reity the economic 
structures of society and to endow management with an inordinate capacity for strategic action. As such, they end 
up combining, rather than transcending, the errors of determinism and voluntarism. 
12 This finds expression in the structural and strategic concepts of regulation theory: regimes of 
accumulation and accumulation strategies; hegemonic blocs and hegemonic projects; and modes of regulation and 
regulatory strategies. 
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theories is therefore the product of deeper, underlying structures and not simply the outcome of 
weaknesses in prevailing institutions. While the network of institutional forms that regulates the 
employment relationship is reproduced through human agency, it is also beyond the control of 
human agents: "at any given moment, the capital relation pre-exists these actions as their 
unacknowledged or fetishistically perceived condition of existence and action" (.Jessop 
1991: 149). Structures are thus viewed as both the result of past struggles and as always 
susceptible to change by present struggles. What is important here is that, while a regulatory 
regime is the product of class struggle, the latter can never be fully confined within a given mode 
of regulation. J3 In his analysis of the relationship between power and social institutions, 
Poulantzas (1978:45) stresses the fact that "[sJtruggles always have primacy over, and constantly 
go beyond, the apparatuses and institutions" of society. Hence the variety of structures and 
processes implicated in the regulation of the wage-effort bargain that underpins the employment 
relationship. 
There are numerous institutional and normative mechanisms that govern the employment 
relationship, ranging from social custom and moral codes to labour legislation and collective 
bargaining. Labour regulation therefore involves both 'formal' and 'informal' mechanisms of 
coordination. While modes of labour regulation are often closely associated with the former, the 
latter are frequently viewed in static and undifferentiated terms. Important aspects of labour 
regulation are shaped tlu'ough informal work group relations, unofficial custom and practice, and 
tacit negotiations. As such, informal employment relations are dynamic and highly context-
dependent. The distinction between the so-called formal and informal aspects of work is best 
understood in terms of different sites and forms or methods of labour regulation that will, by 
virtue of their respective structures and objects, vary in the extent to which they are based on 
coercion or consent, are resisted or accepted, and so on. Far from demonstrating the unmediated 
power of market forces, informal practices such as individualised pay bargaining "underline the 
pervasiveness of custom and indeterminacy within the employment relationship" (Ram et al 
2001 :847). The research conducted by these authors shows that all firms combine formality and 
informality just as they combine control and consent, with the balance varying as conditions 
differ (2001: 859). In other words, labour regulation is characterised by a complex amalgam of 
regulatory mechanisms geared towards the mediation of conflicting objectives and the 
management of antagonistic social forces. 
Some of the key features of/abour regulation include the following. First, it involves the creation 
IJ As Aglietta (! 979:67) puts it: "if the class struggle produces norms and laws which form the object of 
a theory of social regulation, it is itself beyond any ' law"'. 
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and maintenance of mechanisms or institutional processes that limit the power of some groups 
(by mediating unequal power relations) in the interests of enhancing the autonomy of others. The 
regulation of the employment relationship both extends and restricts freedom: some forms of 
regulation enhance control while others secure greater autonomy. Just like regulation cannot 
simply be juxtaposed to ' freedom ' , so too can it not be reduced to 'control ' . Second, neo-
liberalism incorrectly equates regulation with protective and redistributive interventions 
(Dabscheck 1993; Deakin and Reed 2000). Labour regulation is not, however, simply protective 
in nature. It may assist one vulnerable group at the expense of others, but it may also sanction or 
reinforce forms of discrimination and disadvantage. We should also not assume that regulation 
always has a redistributive effect, even if that is the stated aim. Labour regulation serves a 
number of functions that include protection against oppression and discrimination; attributing 
responsibility; enhancing productive efficiency; expanding social security and welfare; 
consolidating a sustainable distribution of the costs and benefits flowing from capitalist economic 
development; legitimating the production and distribution of economic and other resources; 
decreasing transaction costs through a reduction in employer and employee opportunism; and 
encouraging specific behavioural patterns through the imposition of costs and rewards. 
Third, each mode of regulation has its own structural dynamics, powers and liabilities and within 
each mode there are distinct forms of regulation. The dominant regulatory forms do, however, 
place limits on the patterns of the employment relationship (Peck 1996; Whitley and Kristensen 
1997). As Edwards (1994a:24) argues, "there are certain national characteristics that limit the 
degree of variation possible: there are national systems of regulation". The notion of regulation 
implies the setting of boundaries or limits and the exercise of pressure, " inducing a constrained 
range of reactions rather than a prefigured pattern of behaviour" (Standing 1999: 3 5). Fourth, the 
coverage or reach of specific regulatory forms is uneven and partial, while the relative balance 
between the various forms of regulation is contingent and non-zero-sum. A decline in the 
significance of one form of regulation may occasion an opposing increase or a corresponding 
decline in other forms. Fifth, the different forms of regulation can have a significant effect on the 
behaviour of the parties, the scope for long-term planning, the prevailing levels of trust and 
reciprocity, and the degrees of efficiency and equity in the workplace. As a result, regulatory 
forms can themselves become a lever in the power struggles·within and between enterprises. 
Sixth, labour regulation is mediated, in large measure, by the technical and social divisions of 
labour. Given different levels of technical skill and varying occupational dynamics, not all 
employment relationships are amenable to similar types or degrees of regulation. Likewise, given 
different product market conditions and margins for strategic action, firms possess differential 
capacities to construct redistributive forms of regulation. 
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Finally, the possibility of establishing regulatory mechanisms depends partly on the material 
properties of the objects or activities to be regulated. A regulatory framework that is appropriate 
for the production and distribution of jewellery may be highly destructive and socially divisive 
for the delivery of health services. As Sayer (1995 : 145-6) argues, since economic activities are 
not infinitely malleable, and differ considerably in their material and informational properties, 
the various forms of regulation yield different degrees and kinds of power according to the types 
of objects or services concerned. In other words, economic operations vary in their scale, 
divisibility, reproducibility and cost, and hence in their amenability to different forms and 
degrees of social regulation. For example, regulations that are effective in combatting tardiness 
among less skilled workers may be unsuitable for monitoring the working hours of professional 
employees. The relative efficacy of different forms of labour regulation is shaped by the spatio-
temporal context in which they are embedded as well as the nature of the object of regulation. 
The interaction between employer and employee is aimed largely at regulating the employment 
relationship. In this sense, labour regulation hinges on what can be called the control-autonomy 
dialectic (Storey 1983; Edwards 1986; Thompson 1989). The managerial control necessary to 
regulate the employment relationship and to establish order in the workplace creates a force over 
and against the employees.14 However, there are practical limits to how far the employer can 
subordinate the employee, as well as definite disadvantages in the form of potentially reduced 
levels of worker creativity and cooperation. A system of labour regulation reflects the specific 
compromise made between control and autonomy and highlights the need to maintain an 
institutional fran1ework capable of sustaining that compromise. While it is possible to diminish 
economic externalities and free-rider problems through regulation, what happens in practice 
depends on the effectiveness of systems of social values and norms in influencing individual 
behaviour (Sayer 1995 : 163). Such is the intractability of the diverse interests and practices 
associated with labour regulation , that no matter how many managers are appointed, how many 
rules are formulated, and how many organisational changes are made, the problems of productive 
labour deployment and utilisation will remain. 
1.4.1 Micro- and Macro-Regulation 
How do we reconcile local, regional and national modes of labour regulation? Many of the 
14 Control may compel a subject to carry out a specific task, ra ise the costs of doing or not doing something, 
preventing an agent fTom doing something that helshe might prefer to do, or penalise an agent for doing or failing 
to do something. Control is not always or necessarily coterminous with subordination. Social agents may see control 
as an inevitability, as 'natural' . and it may induce accommodation, deference, fear, resistance, fli ght, acquiescence 
andlor resignation (Standing 1999:35). 
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problems that beset the development of theory in industrial relations are, at least in part, 
"problems of integrating different levels of generality" (Hyman 1989: 135). A mode of regulation 
is typically reduced to various national configurations. This has encouraged a tendency to reduce 
intra-national variability (i.e. the socio-economic dynamics and forms of regulation associated 
with particular industries or regions) to a contingent variability around dominant historical-
national models. There is a need to bring sub-national regulation out of the shadows, "not in 
ritual celebration of diversity and difference but in order to understand of what national systems 
are constituted" (Peck 1996:99). To strike a balance between micro- or meso-institutional 
analysis and the macro-economic focus of the regulation approach, labour regulation at regional 
or industrial level should be understood not only on its own terms, but also in terms of its 
articulation with broader national and global regulatory structures. Regional and local systems 
of regulation cannot be understood simply as derivations from a dominant national model: the 
latter is itself constituted of a series of regional systems. The overall coherence of a social and 
economic system, as we noted above, takes on a variety of different institutional forms and 
spatial modalities. As Michon (1992:227) puts it: "[tJhe societal variability of the forms taken 
by the wage-employment relationship follows the mUltiple levels that playa significant role in 
the structuring of the system and that reflect the heterogeneity of economic and social space". 
Hence, to avoid an eclectic combination of analyses, we must recognise the complementarities 
as well as the tensions and conflicts between micro and macro approaches. 
There are essentially two answers within the regulation approach to the question: how is micro 
diversity and contingency translated into macro uniformity and regularity? First, Aglietta 
(1982:6) and Lipietz (1987: 19-20) argue that we should privilege the micro level and proceed 
from the diversity of local and regional formations to account for how macro order emerges. 
Second, one could deny the existence of a simple macro-micro divide and argue that they are just 
so many different sites of regulation which can be a.t1iculated in a variety of different ways. This 
approach is preferred since it recognises the contingent interaction between different forms and 
sites of regulation without attaching a necessary determinant role to anyone form or site. The 
issue is therefore not simply which levels of regulation are becoming more or less significant, but 
changing relations within and between levels. Despite his prioritisation of the micro sphere, 
Lipietz (I 986b:22) is compelled to concede that, as in "the wave-pa.t1icle duality, they [macro-
micro] are two aspects of the same thing depending on the perspective we take". The distinction 
between macro and micro levels does not, in fact, involve an absolute ontological difference 
embodied in social relations (Jessop 1990:191). Instead it is a theoretical construct whose 
reference to scale is always relative. To be sure, there is no macro necessity in social regulation. 
As Jessop (I 990: 193-4) explains: 
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[a]t most there are attempts to constitute contingently necessary regulatory systems on different sites and 
in relation to different sets of smaller, more partial regulatory practices ... [This implies] a plurality of 
possible regulatory strategies even within the framework of one nation-state, whose precise character, social 
boundaries, cohesive capacities, and dynamics will differ according to which global strategy (if any) 
becomes dominant. 
Some regulationists tend to regard sub-national levels of institutional mediation as simply 
reinforcing the integrity of the archetypal model and its national variants. Conversely, both 
convention theory and socio-institutionalist theories are adept at plant- , industry- and even 
regional-level analysis, but remain critical about what they view as over-generalised national 
models (Michon 1992; Peck 1996). Most regulationists readily concede that Fordism in different 
national contexts is not a clone ofthe American ideal-type, but "different combinations of Fordist 
and non-Fordist features" (Nielsen 1991 :23) leading to distinct national growth paths. There is 
thus considerable scope for discongruence between the structural fonns of Ford ism as well as for 
significant regional and national variations (Jessop 1994:254). Local institutional variability 
should not be dismissed as mere derivations of a basic national model , nor used as evidence of 
the redundancy of national models. Rather, it should be understood as "part and parcel of a wider 
process of spatially uneven development" (Peck 1996:102). Given the complex relationship 
between regulation and uneven development, there can be no universal functions and effects of 
labour regulation. The latter inevitably vary from place to place. This is not to argue that all 
regulatory institutions are locally based. Rather, it highlights the need to study the ways in which 
the processes and institutions of labour regulation are locally ru1iculated. The local configuration 
of opportunities and constraints for regulatory functions , according to Peck (1996: 1 09), should 
be conceived not so much as a locally organised regime or system, but more as a set of local 
"regulatory dialectics". 
By combining a critical realist interpretation of the relationship between labour market processes 
and space with a regulationist interpretation of the distinctive ways in which labour markets and 
their regulatory institutions interrelate at the local level, Peck (1996) demonstrates how local 
labour markets are both constructed (in terms of the concrete working out of generative 
mechanisms underpinning them) and socially regulated (in terms of the distinctive 'regulatory 
milieux' formed in and around them) in locally-specific ways. This is also implied in the 
distinction drawn by French regulation theorists between: (a) the rapport salarial - the general 
configuration of the employment relationship in relation to the exchange, utilisation and 
reproduction of the labour force; and (b) the fait salarial - the specific institutional form 
exhibited by the employment relationship in particular industries, regions and countries. Concrete 
research on local forms of labour regulation must therefore consider the intersection of a 
localised fail salarial with the broader processes of uneven development in the rapport salarial. 
83 
If each local labour market represents a unique geographic conjuncture of regulatory processes, 
it follows that the institutional form of the employment relationship (the fait sa/aria!) will also 
take on a locally-distinctive character. A meso-level theorisation of the local labour market - the 
lived experience of most actors - is an indispensable component of any explanation of the 
disjuncture between general processes of labour regulation and the variety of local outcomes. 
Labour regulation, as the mediation of power relations, takes place at multiple levels and each 
dimension of the employment relationship can be regulated at one or more of these levels or 
scales. As Bowles and Gintis argue: "power is heterogeneous, wielding a variety of weapons, 
yielding to a host of counterpressures, and obeying no single logic" (cited in Spencer 2000:556). 
By paraphrasing Marx 's analysis of the relationship between production-in-general and capitalist 
production, we could assel1 that there is neither regulation-in-general nor general regulation, only 
conjuncturally-specific forms of regulation and the totality of regulation (Jessop 1990). While 
we could legitimately speculate on the problems of regulation in general , in the real world there 
are only definite objects of regulation constituted in and through definite modes of regulation. 
This implies that 
there is no single and unamb iguous 'logic of capital' but, rather, a number of such logics. Each of these 
logics will be detennined through the dynamic interaction of the value form (as the invariant element) and 
specific modes of regulation and accumulation strategies (as the invariant element) (Jessop 1990: 187). 
At the most basic level, we can distinguish between two different planes: the internal and 
external regulation of the employment relationship. 15 The former takes place within the 
workplace, involving a single employer, and establishes rules that shape the conduct and 
conditions of employees in specific occupational groups or production wlits of the enterprise. The 
latter takes place beyond the workplace at levels such as the region or industrial sector. Here the 
rules are derived from centralised bargaining, corporatist structures and labour legislation, and 
apply to more than one employer. That is, the parties follow rules other than those directly 
involved in the wage-labour exchange. There is a persistent tension between the 
institutionalisation of the employment relationship through collective regulation and the 
continuous process of negotiating order within the workplace. Many of the contemporary changes 
15 Rai rmie (1989) emphasises the significance of exogenous factors such as product market competition 
and views labour regulat ion as a function of external pressures as opposed to internal managerial choice. Ram (1991) 
and Harris (2002), by contrast, stress the role of endogenous factors and present the approach to labour regulat ion 
adopted by management as largely firm -specific and grounded in the individual organisational context. The 
reductionism in these opposing conceptions can be avoided once it is recognised that there can be no a priori 
prioritisation of one level at the expense of the other. Whether exogenous or endogenous factors predominate is 
contingent on a whole host of factors that include the varying degrees to which different regulatory regimes are 
socially embedded and institu tionally mediated. 
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in the workplace can be understood as a shift in the balance between external and internal 
regulation of the employment relationship. The lack of collective regulation by non-standard 
employees, for example, means that local labour market conditions become more important in 
regulating their terms and conditions of employment. 
The dividing line between internal and external regulation is often blurred. For example, wages 
may be determined by an industry-level collective agreement, a performance pay system may be 
part of a firnl's internal regulations or may be Palt of an infOimal arrangement in the workplace. 
Moreover, finns may rely on a mix of regulatory models consisting of varying degrees ofintemal 
and external regulation. Some decisions may be made unilaterally by management within the 
confines of minimum statutory rules, others may be subject to legislative rules and industry-wide 
agreements, yet others may be decided through a balance of internal and external forms of 
regulation, in a broad range of combinations. Trade unions, employers and the state therefore 
have distinct limitations to their regulatory power. 
In concrete reseal'ch, it is often difficult to distinguish the object of regulation (a labour market 
problem or regulatory dilemma) from the means of regulation (particular institutional and other 
responses). Regulationists differ in their interpretation of the key sites of regulation and the 
nature of the mechanisms involved in the process of regulation. For some regulationists it is the 
wage relation, for some it is the articulation between the law of accumulation and the law of 
competition, for others it is the relations between different national or regional economies within 
an international regime of accumulation that require regulation. This disagreement does not 
necessarily vitiate the claims of the regulation approach once it is accepted that all these 
processes are potential levels/objects of regulation. The objects of regulation can only ever be 
said to exist in a fragi le, conflictual, provisional and unstable sense (Lipietz 1988: 16). The point 
is that not only must specific social relations be regulated, but there also needs to be some degree 
of cohesion between the different forms of regulation concerned with the various objects of 
regulation. In this sense, regulation is "a process and a result - it is not a specific site or object 
of regulation" (Jessop 1990: 178). 
If we are to move away from a simplistic or functionalist notion of ' context', it is crucial to 
account for the interconnections between macro levels of social regulation and the firm's internal 
regulatory systems. Following Bhaskar (1989), the different levels of regulation are conceived 
in terms of relations of emergence - i.e. as a relationship between two aspects such that one arises 
out of the other and yet, while being capable of reacting back on it, remains causally irreducible 
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to it. 16 In a similar vein, Hyman (1994a: 172) argues that the relationship between abstract and 
concrete explanations is "interactive and dialectical, not linear and hierarchical". In general, a 
regulatory mechanism at one level presupposes other, more foundational levels. The regulation 
of the employment relationship would be impossible in the absence of wider processes and 
structures of societal regulation such as the state, the family, schools and the courts. As a site of 
regulation, however, the workplace is onto logically constituted by sets of relations that caJmot 
simply be reduced to these wider processes of regulation. 
1.4.2 The Micro-Foundations of Labour Regulation 
As we noted above, labour's fictive commodity status and the inherently open-ended nature of 
the employment contract provide the basic impulse for labour regulation. That is, the 
indeterminacy of labour potential compels management to construct appropriate regulatory 
mechanisms for the translation of labour power into actual labour. An important consequence of 
this open-ended character of the employment contract is that the shaping of the labour market is 
itself a part of the process of cultivating labour productivity (Brown and Nolan 1988; Boyer 
1994). The terms of an employment contract cannot be reduced simply to the dictates of supply 
and demand. Even in circumstances in which market forces might appear to reign supreme, 
employment contracts are inherently social and institutionally mediated. Human beings do not 
enter the employment and other economic relationships as random, atomised individuals, but 
rather act in accordance with a series of tacit understandings and cultural assumptions, linkages 
to other social networks, and so on (Granovetter 1985). The notion of an ' incomplete contract' 
presupposes the need for a process of regulation grounded in the transfactual efficacy of the 
social structures that shape economic institutions. Since labour power is not a true commodity, 
the self-regulating mechanisms associated with conventional commodity markets cannot be 
expected to regulate its deployment and utilisation. According to Polanyi (1957:73), 
the alleged commodity 'labour power' cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused, 
without affecting also the human individual who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity ... 
Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would die as the victims of acute 
social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime, and starvation. 
This 'protective covering' of social institutions that mediates the impact and operation of market 
16 At the level of ontological analysis there are no a priori reasons to follow either the Humean path of 
assuming all relations are external (atomism) or the Hegelian route of insisting that all are internal (holism). Both 
these approaches are reductive, denying the autonomy of one or the other level. As against atomism and holism, 
Bhaskar's (1989) theory of emergence allows us to conceive of real, irreducible totalities which are both composed 
of parts that are themselves real irreducible totalities, and are in turn parts of larger totalities, with each level of this 
hierarchy of composition having its own peculiar mechanisms and emergent powers. 
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forces is what defines a specific regime oflabour regulation. It shapes the blend of collective and 
individual regulation, voluntarism and compulsion, and the trade-off between social equality and 
economic efficiency, wages and profits. Labour regulation is both a condition of possibility for 
and a necessary outcome of the structural characteristics of the employment relationship. The 
nature of labour power is such that the market for labour is shot through with contradictions, 
conflict and dilemmas of regulation. Self-regulating labour markets are a myth because labour 
is a fictitious commodity: it is not produced for sale, it cannot be stored, and it crumot be 
separated from its owner. To treat labour as a commodity and the labour mru·ket as a commodity 
market is to "desocialise" labour (Peck 1996:40). [n capitalist societies, labour regulation and 
labour markets have historically tended to develop in unison since the latter "cannot rely on any 
automatic or endogenous mechanisms of adjustment" (Picchio 1992:72). In other words, the 
labour market is incapable of achieving self-closure in the sense of securing its expanded 
reproduction wholly through market relations or commodity forms. 
The need for labour regulation is established retTOductively: what must be the case for the 
regularities of behaviour involved in the employment relationship to be possible? The 
intelligibility of the situation presupposes, among others, the existence of widely shared social 
rules. These rules, Lawson (1997: 160-3) argues, must be conceived of as something different not 
only from human beings, but also from the actions in which they engage. That is, although rules 
are a condition of routinised behaviour they are not the same (sort oj) thing. Rules, as an aspect 
of social regulation more generally, cannot be adequately conceived of as merely the structured 
aspects of routines or generalised fomls of behaviour." Knowledge of a particular rule is just as 
pertinent to (intentional) rebellion as it is to (intentional) confonnity. Rules as resources are also 
not equally available, or do not apply equally, to each member of the population at large. Society 
is constituted in part by a set of positions - each associated with numerous obligations, rights and 
duties - into which social agents as it were 'slot' (Bhaskar 1989). Employers, for example, are 
allowed and expected to follow different practices from employees. Equally, these obligations 
and prerogatives exist independently of the particular individuals who happen, cUlTently, to be 
employers or employees. The social rules associated with specific positions ru·e thus not only 
differentiated in terms of variation in the opportunities, power, rights, and the like attached to 
different positions; but are also not merely reproduced or transformed by the immediate 
occupants of the positions in question but by the actions, interactions and inactions of all those 
"This fo llows, in part, from the fact that the laws of human behaviour and of social processes are distinct, 
and it is impossible to reduce one to, or to predict one from, the other. Each level is autonomous in the sense of 
having its own irreducible set of generative mechanisms. According to Bhaskar (1989), society is both the ever-
present condition and the continually reproduced outcome of human agency, and praxis is both consc ious production 
and (usually unconscious) reproduction of society. 
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in a position to influence them. Furthermore, the content of many formal rules are more readily 
susceptible to transformation by collective actors than are the conventions by which they are 
generated. 
Orthodox approaches to industrial relations tend to focus on procedures and not on the 
substantive rules that the procedures are intended to enforce. These approaches tend to emphasise 
"the relatively defined, stable and regular aspects of employer-worker and management-union 
relationships; ... [and] to play down the significance of conflicts of control in the labour market 
and over the labour process as manifestations of a fundamental and continuous antagonism of 
interest" (Hyman 1989:85). The workplace is a contested terrain: employers attempt to extract 
the maximum effort from employees, while employees necessarily resist such impositions." As 
a result, the construction of discipline in the workplace depends on a day-to-day negotiation of 
order. The meaning of control on the shopfloor turns on "the wider form of order which is 
negotiated, not the rule-book" (Edwards 1994b:582). That is, the manner in which people behave 
depends as much on day-to-day understandings as on formal rules. When management grants 
concessions to workers in an effort to gain their co-operation in meeting production demands, 
these can rapidly evolve into precedents and then into relatively well-established custom and 
practice rules. In this way, informal rules may interpret the silences and smooth over any 
inconsistencies of the fOlmal rules or even supplant them. The former will more accurately reflect 
the reality of bargaining power in the workplace, and attempts to codify and formalise procedures 
may have little impact on concrete worker behaviour. 
Even fIrms with sophisticated personnel policies rely on negotiation to establish what the rules 
actually mean and managers depend on workers to interpret their instructions intelligently 
(Cressey et a11985; Edwards 1994b; Marsden 1999). The negotiability of order in the workplace 
depends, therefore, on the willingness of workers to interpret the intent of managerial 
instructions. Work-to-rule as the withdrawal of a willingness to bend and interpret the rules can 
and does lead to disorder. Consequently, the maintenance of discipline in the workplace is part 
of a continual negotiation of order and not merely a technical activity. Given the indeterminacy 
of the employment contract and the lack of precision in collective agreements, dispute procedures 
are not simply a matter of contract or rule interpretation but rather form an integral part of rule-
making. An analysis of the structuring of the mechanisms of rule-application and enforcement, 
18 Orthodox approaches to industrial relations may recognise the existence of an inherent conflict of interest 
between capital and labour, but they do so without locating the source of such conflict at a level beyond workers' 
subjective preferences. Conflict appears to reside with the assumed subjective aversion of workers to hard work. The 
assumption is that, if only workers co-operated, production would be an unproblematic process. 
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according to Wood et al (1975:304) , involves considerations such as the types of rule-making 
(e.g. formal, customary, adjudicative); the forms each type takes at different levels of the 
industrial relations system; the types of rules covering different issues; and how the different 
types of rule-making at different levels articulate. Rules, as well as the sanctions that accompany 
their breach, are thus part of wider relations of conflict and accommodation, control and 
autonomy within the workplace (i.e. a specific regime of labour regulation). The successful 
application of rules will reflect organisational imperatives and the demands and interests of 
different groups within management, as well as the reactions of workers on the shopfloor (Hyman 
1987). A regulatOlY policy which attempts to ride roughshod over these realities is likely to fail 
due to resistance or will simply be ignored. 
1.4.3 The Anatomy of Labour Regulation 
The point of departure in outlining the anatomy or architecture of labour regulation is the 
contradictory nature of labour's incorporation, allocation, control and reproduction within the 
labour market (Peck 1996). These represent the four facets of labour's fictive commodity status. 19 
The first set of contradictions follows from the problem of incorporating labour into the labour 
market (Peck 1996:26-9). Unlike true commodities, the supply oflabour is significantly, though 
not entirely, autonomous from demand conditions on the labour market. In other words, labour 
is not produced for the market: its supply is relatively autonomous from the level and 
composition oflabour demand as expressed in the market. Contrary to the canons of neo-c1assical 
economics, the supply of labour is not simply regulated by the market, rather it is shaped by 
relatively autonomous social forces sllch as demographic conditions, state policies, ideological 
norms, family structures and other social and institutional rules governing labour market 
participation for different groups (Picchio 1992; Sayer 1995; Peck 1996). This lack of effective 
control over the conditions and volume of its own supply places labour at a distinct disadvantage 
in the labour market in relation to capital. Since labour is dependent on waged employment as 
a means of subsistence, it is effectively thrown onto the labour market and must adjust its 
expectations to the prevailing local conditions. As Clark et al point out, the geographical division 
oflabour into distinct local labour markets is designed to "organize and exploit discrete sets of 
localized expectations" (cited in Storper and Walker 1989: 177). Insofar as it cannot be left to the 
19 Storper and Walker (1989: 155) also note that labour is "a pseudo-commodity with four distinct 
dimensions: conditions of purchase; performance capacity; actual perfonnance; and reproduction in place". 
Likewise, Huiskamp (1995) argues that the employment relationship refers to the conditions under which -the 
employer decides to hire labour and the employee decides to se ll hislher labour. These conditions are re lated to the 
specific characteristics whieh distinguish exchange on the labour market from that which occurs on other markets 
in terms of the following: the nature of the exchange; the position of the parties to the exchange; and the regulation 
of the exchange. 
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market, the problem of governing the flow of workers onto the market presents itself as an 
intractable regulatory dilemma. 
Secondly, the social or non-commodity status of labour is also reflected in the patterns of job 
allocation (Peck 1996:30-2). The social distribution of unemployment and socially undesirable 
or physically hazardous jobs reveals: (a) whatever the measure chosen, the same social groups 
tend to bear the brunt of labour market disadvantage; and (b) labour market disadvantage tends 
to be distributed in accordance with ascribed rather than achieved characteristics of workers, 
varying more closely with ethnicity, gender, age, and so on than with education, training, skill , 
and the like. As a result, disadvantage in the labour market is more strongly related to social 
characteristics such as gender than to investments in human capital (Storper and Walker 
1989: 169-72; Rubery and Wilkinson 1994:7-8). For example, it is seen as both normal and 
legitimate for disadvantaged social groups to participate in the labour market on a discontinuous 
basis. Irrespective of their individual situation, members of these groups are treated by 
employers, unions, and state agencies as if they have a weak attachment to the labour market. 
Their access to stable, primary sector jobs is effectively denied: 
[e]xpectations of irregular work behaviour among supposedly marginal groups, which affect hiring 
decisions and welfare entitlements, reinforce those selfsame behaviour patterns, with the result that certain 
groups are socially constructed as contingent workers. While social divisions within the work force are not 
created by capital or the state, they are nevertheless exploited in the allocation of labor and regulation of 
the labor supply (Peck 1996:3 1). 
Non-standard or contingent employees tend to be defined by ascribed status and by their 
relationship to " institutions located on the outer limits of the labour market" dominated by 
"relations of force and control which deprive people of the resources for collective action and 
thus prevent them from realizing their economic interests" (Offe and Hinrichs, cited in Peck 
1996:31). The functioning of these institutions (e.g. the family , schools, social security) is 
underpinned by state action and cultural norms, and has an important influence on the structure 
and dynamics of the labour market, despite being located on its 'outer limits '. They play an 
important pM " in defining the social limits of wage-labor: not only do they define and regulate 
the contingent work force, but also help to maintain a social balance between the crosscutting 
processes of inclusion and exclusion in the labor market" (Peck 1996:31). The institutional 
formation of a non-standard workforce helps to resolve the problems surrounding the social 
distribution of primary and secondary jobs as well as those relating to the adjustment of the 
labour supply to fluctuations in aggregate employment levels (see chapter 3). Institutions like the 
family and the educational system perform a pivotal role in stratifying the labour supply and 
structuring the labour market. The latter, in turn, playa significant part in regulating the labour 
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market as a whole. 
Thirdly, moving beyond the regulatory dilemmas surrounding the point of entry to the labour 
market, brings us to the problem of controlling labour (Peck 1996:32-6). Once a worker enters 
the ' hidden abode ' of production, Marx (1967) argues, the social nature of work is revealed in 
different ways. The maintenance of labour control represents perhaps the most intractable 
regulatory dilemma in the labour market. Employers are confronted with, among others, the 
difficult and on-going task of managing the porosity of the working day (see chapter 5). Contracts 
and markets alone cannot perform this complex and essentially social task, and there can be no 
stable solution when the interests of capital and labour are fundamentally at odds. The extra-
economic factors that are necessary to 'resolve ' this regulatory dilemma contribute to the 
irreducibly politicised nature oflabour market structures and strategies (Jones 1996). Capitalist 
production contains a basic tension between the need for labour control and the need for creative 
participation (Cressey et al 1985: 154; Salaman 1989:87; Storper and Walker 1989: 156). 
' Solving' problems of control aggravate problems of consent and vice versa. Salaman (1989:89) 
argues that, far from representing a radical break with earlier patterns of compromise and 
concession at work, the current process of industrial restructuring "simply articulates the hi storic 
pattern of osci llation from coercion to consent, with all the inherent problems of each form, or 
combination of fo rms, of control". Like other social relations, attempts to regulate and control 
the employment relationship have unintended consequences, which may conflict with employers' 
original intentions. These are derived from an essential feature of the employment relationship: 
the employer can only purchase the employee's capacity to work and has to ensure that this 
capacity is realised. Hence, there can be no fu lly-determinate ex ante model of labour regulation. 
For individual capitalists as for capital in general, according to Hyman (1987:30), there is no 'one 
best way' of managing the contradictions of capitalist production, only "different routes to partial 
failure". 
The fourth way in which the social character oflabour is revealed is in the reproduction oflabour 
power (Peck 1996:36-40). When it enters production, as Wilkinson (1983:420) points out, labour 
power is itself the end product of a process of social (re)production which shapes its quantity, 
quality and the ease with which it can be used in production. The availability of alternative forms 
of subsistence and social organisation infl uence the number of individuals from a given 
population that may be available for employment. In the newly industrialising countries, the 
potential labour force maintained a substantial agrarian interest until very recently. That is, labour 
was not completely separated from forms of subsistence other than wage labour and this was 
fundamental in affecting the pattern of proletarianisation and labour organisation (Sandbrook and 
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Cohen 1975; Munck 1988; Brande1l1991; Kuruvilla and Mundell 1999). The supply of labour 
and its availability for waged employment are detelmined by, among others, the extent of social 
security systems, family organisation and income, social values, and levels of access to non-wage 
subsistence. Terms and conditions of employment are shaped by the customary standards of 
living of a patticular working class which, in turn, are based on complex social and historical 
forces and power relations. 
In contrast to the slave owner (who buys labour), the capitalist employer (who buys labour 
power) need not carry the full costs of the reproduction of labour. The family structure and 
unpaid domestic labour absorb some of the costs of reproducing labour power and decisively 
shape the supply-side ofthe labour market (Picchio del Mercato 1981: 194-8; Picchio 1992:96-8). 
The organisation of domestic labour (i.e. the production of labour) both conditions and is 
conditioned by the organisation of wage-labour (i.e. the exchange oflabour). As Massey notes, 
the way in which the jobs done by men are constructed "requires that the people who fill them 
have someone else to look after them" (cited in Peck 1996:37). Consequently, the social nature 
of reproduction sets up divisions between workers based on their position within the household 
and gendered divisions of labour. This forms the basis for a hierarchy of exploitation and 
subordination within the labour market. 
Social reproduction and the processes of capital accumulation are not only analytically distinct 
but also contradictory (Picchio 1992: I 08). The processes of social reproduction are responsible 
for a variety of (social) functions which may not always and everywhere produce results 
functional for the increased accumulation of capital. Reproducing labour involves a vast array 
of processes - from biological procreation to education, from food to clothing - which tend to be 
anchored not only in the labour market but in the family, the community, the state, and so forth. 
These sites of social reproduction "are neither organized exclusively in the interests of the labor 
market nor are they insulated from it" (Peck 1996:38). This means that the boundaries between 
the spheres of production and reproduction are not impem1eable. Women's subordinate position 
within the fan1ily and the spheres of reproduction, for example, is both cause and effect of their 
constitution as a cheap, contingent labour supply. The extra-market processes rooted in the 
sphere of social reproduction, both structure and at'e structured by the wage-labour sphere. The 
spheres of production and social reproduction are therefore both separate and connected: they are 
separate "in the sense that they each have their own structures of dominance, along with their 
own distinctive rhythms and tendencies, but they are also related in the sense that each conditions 
and interacts with the other" (Peck 1996:39). 
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A recognition of the relative autonomy of the sphere of social reproduction contradicts the neo-
classical assumption of a wage-coordinated labour market. Equilibrium is constantly undermined 
because the supply of labour is not regulated solely by the wage mechanism. The weakness of 
wage labour derives not only from its lack of ownership of means of production, but also from 
the fact that people do not produce children with the future sale of their labour power in mind 
(Sayer 1995 :9 1). Labour is socially rather than capitalistically produced. The relationship 
between the supply (social reproduction) and demand sides (production) of the labour market is 
not one functional alignment. The intersection of social structures of production (demand) and 
reproduction (supply) - i.e. the "production-reproduction dialectic" (Peck 1996:96) - occurs in 
different ways in different places, shaping the operation of the labour markets in different ways 
in different places. Moreover, labour's relative immobility gives an irreducible role to the place-
bound processes of social reproduction. As StOl·per and Walker (1989: 157) note: 
[b]ecause industries offer very different conditions of employment, workforces build up diverse historical 
standards of living, skills, nonns, and work experience. This differentiation has a powerful impact on social 
reproduction in local communities ... The result is a fabric of distinctive, lasting local communities and 
cultures woven into the landscape of labour ... As such, communities form a landscape of varied possibility 
for capi talists seeking labour. 
Here the regulatory dilemma relates to the manner in which social reproduction is effectively 
coordinated, given that market forces are incapable of carrying out this function. This is not 
simply a problem of ensuring that the correct number of workers is 'thrown' onto the labour 
market; it also raises the wider question of how the' social bases of obedience' are constructed 
and maintained. As Poulantzas (1978: 186) points out, the actions of the state with respect to "the 
reproduction of labour power and the field of collective consumption are at the same time geared 
to police-political management and control oflabour power". Social reproduction is an area of 
concetted and tendentially expanding state intervention. There is, however, "nothing inevitable 
or inexorable about these state interventions; nothing guarantees the success or even the 
activation of the appropriate mechanisms" (Burawoy 1985: 128). Since there is no definitive 
policy solution to the regulatory dilemmas of the labour market, state intervention may solve 
certain problems whi le creating others. Moreover, a reduction in state intervention does not 
automatically and inexorably lead to a corresponding expansion in market regulation (Sayer 
1995: I 02). Where neo-liberal states have rolled back the social regulation of employment by, for 
example, reducing the scope of welfare entitlements, they are not so much exposing the process 
of reproduction to market forces as forcing it back into the domestic sphere by enlarging the 
scope of women's domestic responsibilities. 
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1.5 CONCLUSION 
Like the processes of accwnulation and valorisation, the employment relationship stands in need 
of social regulation by virtue of its structural characteristics. The means through which this social 
regulation is realised, or partially reali sed, include a whole range of institutional forms and 
regulatory mediations. The variety of ways in which the state alone exerts an influence on the 
labour market - ranging from employment legislation to the structure of welfare and education 
systems and skills development - represent just one (albeit crucial) way in which the actions, 
structures and capabilities of social institutions shape the dynamics of labour regulation. The 
approach advanced here highlights the contradictory impact of socio-political structures and 
processes on economic activities. [n contrast to the functionalist implications of systems 
approaches, regulated outcomes are conceived as being supportive as well as destructive of the 
reproduction of the regulatory system itself. In contrast to the voluntaristic undertones of strategic 
choice theories, the emphasis on the structural determination of choice accentuates the need to 
explore the conditions of possibility for different types of change. The intention is not, however, 
to substitute Weber's 'iron cage' of bureaucracy with a 'prison' ofregulation. Not only are there 
inconsistencies and contradictions in the processes of regulation, but tensions between different 
forms and sites of regulation also provide scope for strategic choice and purposive human 
agency. There are clear limits to what regulation can achieve that inhere in the means, fOlms and 
objects of regulation. There are also no a priori rules dictating how diverse regulatory 
mechanisms will be coordinated in a specific empirical context because the causal processes 
associated with production, reproduction and social regulation interact in different ways at 
different times and in different places. In short, regulation is not viewed as self-contained or all-
encompassing. 
Jessop (1990) argues that it is possible to expose regulatory dilemmas through a process of 
abstraction, establishing at an abstract level the links between the underlying social nature of 
labour and the regulatory imperatives of the labour market. This does not imply that the 
institutional underpinnings of the employment relationship are functionally determined. 
Identifying an object of regulation is not a precursor to postulating its corresponding mode of 
regulation since " the genesis of specific modes of regulation [are] historically contingent rather 
than capitalistically pre-ordained ... [and] the objects of regulation do not, and cannot, pre-date 
regulation in their full historically constituted identity" (Jessop 1990: 186). Functionalism is thus 
avoided by acknowledging, first, that there are a host of potential institutional responses to the 
same regulatory dilemma. Some may involve state action, others may not. Some may be the 
result of purposive action on the part of labour market actors, others may not. Second, the form 
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that regulation assumes and the dynamics that it displays are determined in large measure by the 
structures and propensities of the object that is to be regulated. 20 The contradictions of the 
employment relationship under capitalism are systemic and ultimately ' resolvable' only in terms 
of temporary institutional containment. That is, the institutional framework of the employment 
relationship, while necessary for its continued reproduction, does not fully resolve its underlying 
contradictions, which are logically (though not temporally) prior to institutional responses. As 
Peck (1996:26) explains: 
[i]nstitutional response are just that: responses. Rarely if ever do they provide absolute solutions to 
regulatory di lemmas. Rather, the process of labor regulation is continuous and imperfect ... [The] 'free ' 
labor market was not an historical predecessor to the regulated labor market: instead labor market problems 
and their putative regulatory solutions evolved together through a process of iterative and dynamic 
development. 
The claim that the capitalist labour market's inherent and systematic capacity for self-destruction 
necessitates state or more broadly social regulation - so crucial to the arguments above - should 
not be confused with a crude functionalism in which effective institutional responses are 
somehow always materialised. Nor are the dilemmas of labour regulation somehow soluble in 
an absolute sense once an 'appropriate' institutional and policy framework is established. The 
regulatory dilemmas of the labour market are intractable. Pressures for regulation do not 
necessarily result in effective regulation: the effects of institutional interventions simply cannot 
be guaranteed. As the history ofKeynesian-Fordist regulation shows, the very success ofa regime 
of labour regulation may playa part its crisis. 
While the systematic failure of labour markets implies the necessity for social regulation, the 
condition of necessity does not establish a particular institutional response. This approach -
which Peck (1996:42) aptly describes as "regulatory necessity but institutional indeterminacy" -
is not rooted in a naive faith in the efficacy and rationality of state intervention, but rather in the 
strength of the case for systemic labour market failure. The regulatory dilemmas arising from the 
incorporation, allocation, control and reproduction of labour cannot be resolved by the market 
or the state . State intervention, for example, invariably produces unanticipated and unintended 
consequences as the behaviour of labour market actors is adjusted in complex, dynamic and 
contradictory ways to the changing regulatory framework. Moreover, the precise form of state 
intervention is itself subject to struggle between capital and labour, between fractions of capital 
and sections of labour. The condition of institutional indeterminacy applies to the chosen means 
of intervention as well as to their unpredictable effects. Once established, labour market 
20 For example, the employer-employee relationship cannot be regulated in exactly the same way as 
teacher-pupil , parent-child or customer-supplier relationships. 
95 
institutions acquire their own bureaucratic and political momentum, which will only fortuitously 
happen to coincide with the shifting regulatory requirements of the labour market. That is, the 
"labor market cannot survive without regulation, but neither, apparently, does it 
unproblematically thrive with it" (Peck 1996:43). Although the labour market requires some kind 
of social regulation for its reproduction, any regulatory 'fix' is always inherently unstable, partial 
and contingent on the simultaneous operation of a range of other mediation mechanisms. 
A labour regulation approach, in contrast to the detem1inism of orthodox approaches to industrial 
relations, places a great deal of emphasis on the contingent, partial and unstable nature of socio-
economic reproduction. It provides a methodological footing for industrial relations that avoids 
the twin errors of voluntarism versus reification and an abstract determinism versus an ever-
contingent empiricism. This conception of regulation yields many advantages. Among others, 
it enables us to : (a) appreciate more fully the complex and cyclical nature of accumulation by 
combining the openness and contingency of capitalist development with a continuing stress on 
the systemic nature of capitalism as a mode of production; (b) uncover the multiple social 
relations that sustain different regimes of accumulation while retaining the centrality of class 
struggle in their development; (c) examine the reproduction of the capital-labour relation from 
the standpoint of production, consumption and exchange; and (d) formulate a non-deterministic 
account of phases of capitalist development which leaves considerable scope for historical 
vaTiation and geographical diversity. The regulation approach is therefore able to explore the 
conjunctural determination of capitalist development without capitulating to the vehement anti-
essentialism of post-modernism. 21 Regulation theorists are concerned with specifying the 
inherently limited range of institutional patterns which can sustain relatively balanced capitalist 
economic growth (Jessop 1991:159-64). Viable regulatory mechanisms are those that weave 
together economic efficiency and social equity in a cohesive social fabric (Aglietta 1998:53). 
Many of the regularities, patterns and relationships currently emerging are consistent with the 
neo- and/or post-Fordist elements catalogued in the literature. Their prevalence stems not from 
their functionality, but from the fact that they represent typical responses to an enduring crisis. 
After all, which country does not have some programme of 'employment flexibility'? These 
developments are, however, best viewed as tendencies rather tl1an achievements, occurring within 
a context of change and continuity. The same, largely indisputable evidence of their spread could 
just as plausibly be deployed in support of an argument for a deepening crisis, as for the claim 
21 As Burawoy argues, by "exploring changes in the labour process either over time or between places, we 
are simply trying to approach the limits of variation of the capitalist labour process, that is, its capitalist essence" 
(cited in Edwards I 994a:24). 
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that a new regulatory solution is unfolding (Lever-Tracy 1984). The realignment of the local and 
the global, the shifting balance between incorporation and marginalisation in the labour market, 
and the changing links between capital accumulation and social regulation are all beset with 
contradictions. In the sphere of labour regulation, despite considerable policy innovation and 
institutional restructuring, there seems to be some way to go before a relatively durable resolution 
of the demands for social equity and the imperatives of economic efficiency can be found. 
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2 
THE RISE AND FALL OF COLONIAL DESPOTISM: 
LABOUR REGULATION IN NAMIBIA BEFORE 
INDEPENDENCE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The maimer in which colonial despotism was consolidated and subsequently dismantled has had 
a profound impact on labour regulation in contemporary Namibia. By virtue of the fact that 
labour regulation is always embedded in a particular socio-economic and political environment, 
it is constrained and enabled by this wider context. A central characteristic of colonial Namibia 
was the deep interpenetration of state and markets. The evolution of settler-colonialism in 
Namibia was premised on the exclusion of its black population from the rights and privileges 
accorded to the white community. With its monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, the 
colonial state played a pivotal role in social control by safeguarding the privileges of white 
people and securing the oppression of black people. As in many other countries on the sub-
continent, apartheid policies created highly adversarial industrial relations and a labour market 
deeply segmented on race, gender and occupational lines. Industrial relations in colonial Namibia 
have been described as "primitive in the extreme" (SALB 1978:31). At the risk of 
oversimplification, passive white trade unions were incorporated into an institutionalised system 
of labour regulation at a relatively early period of industrialisation. Black workers, by contrast, 
were denied collective bargaining rights and subjected to despotic forms of labour regulation 
until a relatively late stage in the process of industriali sation . This resulted in different types of 
trade unionism and collective action among white and black workers, and involved extensive 
variation in the degrees of state and market regulation of the labour market. The various fractions 
of capital also had different employment requirements and the dominance of a particular fraction 
was revealed by the extent to which it could secure the forms of labour regulation best suited to 
its requirements. 
This chapter traces the historical evolution of labour regulation in Namibia. I Although there were 
I It must be noted, at the outset, that the historical record is simply not comprehensive enough to provide 
definitive answers to all the questions raised by an analysis of changes in labour regulation over time. 
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significant continuities between the different historical phases demarcated below, each was 
characterised by the dominance of a particular set of regulatory mechanisms. These include the 
unrnediated control and arbitrary violence of employers under German colonial rule, the growing 
prominence of contractual regulation and racial segregation during the first period of South 
African colonial occupation, and the processes of repression and resistance, reform and 
accommodation that moulded the institutionalisation and subsequent decline of the migrant 
labour system under apartheid-colonialism. The relations of production associated with a system 
of oscillating migration served to sustain the grip of migrant workers on the land as a means of 
subsistence, thereby delaying the full-blown commodification of labour power on a large scale. 
Extra-economic mechanisms were initially introduced by the colonial governments to 
subordinate the peasantry to the requirements of capital accumulation. Market mechanisms 
became increasingly important in accelerating the demise of the peasantry as taxes, 
overcrowding, soil erosion, over-grazing, and the like in the rural reserves made it increasingly 
difficult to produce a surplus and compelled black people to enter the labour market. Crucially, 
black Namibians experienced colonialism most directly through the efforts of the state and 
employers at regulating the conditions in which their labour was incorporated, allocated, 
controlled and reproduced in the labour market. 
2.2 NAMIBIA UNDER GERMAN RULE: 1884 - 1915 
Despite its brevity, the German colonial era wrought major changes to the pastoral and nomadic 
way of life that had endured for centuries among the people of Namibia. The political institutions 
and socio-economic fabric of the pre-colonial societies in the central and southern part of 
Namibia were systematically uprooted and virtually decimated in just over three decades. While 
the structures of these pre-colonial societies will not be considered here, it must be noted that 
they were far more complex and differentiated than is generally assumed and decisively 
influenced the pace and dynamics of the subsequent processes of colonialisation2 At first, the 
imperial authorities left Namibia entirely in the hands of a monopoly company, the Deutsche 
Kolonialgesellschaft fur Sudwestafrika. The inactivity of this company and the host of 
speculative concession companies led to the German administration itselftaking the leading role 
in creating a colonial economy (SW APO 1981: 16; Melber 2000a:29). The geographical mobility 
associated with black pastoralism, in particular, "became the threatening antithesis of attempts 
to stabilise and regulate farm labour" (Silvester 1998: 1 00). In a series of military campaigns 
2 See: Goldblatt (1971); Clarence-Smith and Moorsom (1977); SWAPO (1980); Mbuende (1986); Ka~avivi 
(1988); Williams (1994); Peltola (1995); Van Rooyen (1996); Bollig (1998); and Melber (2000a). 
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between 1890 and 1896 the colonial authority established a network of military posts throughout 
the south and centre of the country; expropriated vast tracts of land for settler farmers; enforced 
land and trade agreements that were often fraudulently obtained; prohibited all forms of 
traditional self-rule; and developed a transport and communication infrastructure (Bley 1967; 
Goldblatt 1971; Mbuende 1986; Hishongwa 1992; Peltola 1995; Van Rooyen 1996). 
During the 1890s economic activity had expanded to such an extent that the colonial authorities 
were compelled to proclaim legislation aimed specifically at regulating the employment 
relationship. The Regional Police Enactment Regarding the Relationship of Employers with 
Employees in South West Africa, promulgated in 1894, provided the foundation for subsequent 
legislative enactments aimed at mobilising, allocating and controlling the black labour force. The 
central stipulations of this enactment included: (a) employment contracts were not to exceed a 
period of one year and the local police authority was granted the power to resolve any differences 
that may arise between the parties; (b) the police had a duty to punish any breaches of contract 
and to return absconded employees to their employers; (c) employers had the right to exercise 
paternal chastisement in respect of workers under the age of nineteen years; and (d) indigenes 
apprehended by the police who were unable to prove self-support or gainful employment could 
be detained and compelled to work forrations, clothing and a cash wage (Van Rooyen 1996: 117; 
Melber 2000a:38; Winterfeldt 2002:50). 
Subsequent legal enactments provided for the punishment of employees for transgressions such 
the dereliction of duty, indolence, insubordination, desertion and any other breach of contract. 
In terms of the Zuchtigungsrecht, a white employer could at any time send a black employee to 
a police station to be flogged with a sjambok for laziness or disobedience (Peltola 1995:63). 
Municipal authorities were empowered to impose a curfew on all black people, and to supervise 
and control the inhabitants of the urban 'locations'. All black people over the age of seven years 
were compelled to carry a pass that had to be presented on demand, and required a travel permit 
from their employer before leaving a particular district. Penalties for any infringement of these 
regulations included corporal punishment and imprisonment. 
These laws set the tone for labour regulation in colonial Namibia for decades to come and 
corresponded in large measure with the provisions of the Master and Servant laws enacted in the 
Cape Colony from 1841 onwards 3 Under these laws, the employee was almost totally 
3 Proclamations dating back to 1872 and 1895, designed in part to establish the conditions necessary for 
governing the recruitment and retention of labour in South Africa's diamond mines, already contained many of the 
principal features oflhc infamous system of influx control (Miles 1987: 128-32). 
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defenceless while the power of the employer was largely unconstrained (Deakin 200 J). This 
authoritarian use of the law was designed to "artificially stabilise situations of dependency, 
inequality and injustice" (Melber 2000a:4I). Initially, these legal stipulations and the system of 
forced labour they created only applied to indigenes in the central and southern regions of 
Namibia, the so-called Police Zone. They did not apply to white employees nor to the inhabitants 
of the northern regions - principally, the Ovambo and Kavango - that were largely beyond the 
reach of the colonial administration's oppressive labour regulations. Even after 1907, when the 
colonial economy became heavily dependent on Ovambo migrant labour for its mines and 
constlUction work, the colonial authority limited its contacts with the Ovambo kings strictly to 
'protection' treaties and diplomatic 'persuasion' (SWAPO 1981: 14-5). As Mamdani notes, there 
was a distinct difference between settler and non-settler colonies: 
[in] the terr itories that capitalism populated, the sett ler colonies, ... the primary process was that of the 
destruction ofexisting modes of production and the prevalence of the capita list mode ... [In] the territories 
that capitalism dominoted; here it neither simply or primarily destroyed the pre-capitalist modes by 
appropriating the producers and making wage labourers of them, but rather restructured and conserved them 
in dependent relation (cited in Mbuende 1986:56). 
The burgeoning labour requirements of the colonial economy forced the authorities to initiate 
various measures, rather than simply relying on market forces, in order to mobilise an adequate 
supply of temporary contract workers. The nature and impact of these provisions were 
significantly dependent on the destruction ofthe autonomous, pre-colonial economies of Namibia 
- i.e. the process of 'primitive accumulation' described by Marx and Engels. The three key 
elements of German colonial rule in Namibia - the expropriation of land, the destruction of 
traditional social structures, and the system of forced labour - unfolded in a highly differentiated 
maimer. The strategy of mi litary invasion and subjugation pursued in the Police Zone contrasted 
sharply with the policies of 'indirect rule' pursued by the colonial authority in the northern 
regions of Namibia (where more than two-thirds of the national population resided). Here 
peasants were forced into the emerging colonial-capitalist structures by integrating individual 
chiefs into the system and offering them rewards for facilitating and controlling the supply of 
OVainbo labourers ' 
Sporadic resistance to German occupation by the indigenous people of Namibia and its ruthless 
containment run like a constant thread throughout this period (Prein 1994). At the heart of this 
seething discontent lay the expropriation of land and livestock; the destruction of traditional 
authority structures and their replacement by colonial rule; the appalling terms and conditions 
4 See: Mbuende (1986 :50); Katjavivi (1988: II); Hishongwa (1992 :52-3); Peltola (1995:55); Pankhurst 
( 1996:406); and Melber (2000a:38) . 
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of employment; the widespread use of corporal punishment; and a host of other injustices 
perpetrated against black people. The desperate effort to defend themselves and regain the 
autonomy of self-rule is clearly reflected in the rallying call of chief Samuel Maharero: "[lJet us 
die fighting rather than die as a result of maltreatment, imprisonment or some other calamity" 
(cited in Drechsler 1980: 143). The ensuing rebellion by the Herero and Nama against German 
occupation in 1904 resulted in brutal suppression of genocidal proportions. This rebellion was 
of such character and intensity that it has been described as one of the five great revolts against 
early colonial rule in Africa (Mbuende 1986:60). The Herero, in particular, had virtually ceased 
to exist as a tribal entity after the war and their numbers had decreased from an estimated 80 000 
to approximately 20 000. 
After the war, virtually all tribal lands were confiscated, strict pass regulations were enforced, 
tribal chieftainships were prohibited, the ownership of large stock and firearms was outlawed, 
the indigenous people in the southern and central regions were interned in concentration camps 
and subjected to a system of forced labour akin to slavery (Mbuende 1986:62; van Rooyen 
1996:4; Melber 2000a:37). By 1912, only about 200 Herero and Nama men were reported not 
to be in employment (IDAFSA 1980:9). This brutal transformation of the pastoral economies in 
the Police Zone operated on the levels of production (peasants are drawn into wage labour); 
distribution (peasants produce commodities for capitalist markets); and exchange and 
consumption (peasants become reliant upon credit, money capital, commodities, and so on from 
the capitalist sector).' 
The serious shortage of labour that followed the wars of extermination against the Herero and 
Nama were exacerbated by the economic expansion experienced during this period. At the outset, 
the Gennan colony experienced sluggish economic growth, with economic activity concentrated 
around trade, small-scale mining and agriculture. With the development of mining and the 
introduction of Karakul breeding to augment cattle ranching as the dominant farming activity, 
the economy expanded rapidly, stimulating the influx of white settlers and improvements in 
infrastructure. The discovery of diamonds in 1908 near Uideritz, and subsequently also further 
south at Elizabethbucht, Pomona, Bogenfels and Oranjemund, drastically increased the demand 
for labour. Impoverished by their kings' cattle taxation to meet trading debts and the devastating 
impact of the rinderpest epidemic in 1896, Ovambo men had already taken up short-term labour 
contracts on the farms and construction sites in the Police Zone. By 1910, some 10 000 Ovambo 
workers were travelling south each year to the mines and railways on contracts lasting six months 
5 Although there was some scholarly resistance to the use of concepts such as 'peasant' and 'worker' in the 
African context, this is "now largely a dead issue" (Cohen 1991 :73). 
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or more (SW APO 1981: 19). This slow and largely voluntary trickle of Ovambo work-seekers 
into the southern regions provided a woefully inadequate supply of labour. Moreover, these 
workers travelled long distances on foot and often fell prey to the unscrupulous actions of private 
labour recruiters (Cooper 1999). The colonial authority was compelled to address this dilemma 
by playing an increasing active role in regulating the recruitment and allocation of migrant labour 
from the northern regions. 
The Decree by the Imperial Governor of German South West Africa Pertaining to the 
Recruitment and Conditions of Employment of Native Workers , which came into operation in 
1912, consolidated earlier legislation and expanded the ambit of their application and 
enforcement (van Rooyen 1996: 121-3). This decree replaced the informal migratory system, 
whereby workers travelled south to seek work of their own accord or were recruited by private 
agents, with a formal state-controlled mechanism underpinned by statutory regulations. All 
recruiting activities of Ovambo workers were dealt with exclusively by a recruiting agency 
operating under government supervision. A recruitment fee was payable to the recruitment 
agency for each employee that it supplied to an employer. The recruiting agency was empowered 
to enter into an employment contract with the prospective employee on behalf of the employer. 
Hence, there was no direct contractual relationship between employer and employee. This means 
that "politico-legal relations directly determine the distribution of labour-power", with the 
consequence that the state plays "an unmediated role" in establishing and maintaining the labour 
market (Miles 1987:33-4). 
Despite the general increase in the recruitment of Ovambo migrant workers occasioned by the 
new regulatory regime, the demand for such labour consistently outstripped the available supply. 
The flow of migrant workers was erratic and highly sensitive to factors such as the cycle of 
planting and harvesting and recurring droughts. That is, the extent to which the subsistence 
economies remained viable and productive entities decisively influenced the flow of migrant 
workers onto the labour market. A fluctuating supply of migrant workers, as well as a steady 
source of prison labourers derived from frequent military expeditions, did not alleviate the labour 
shortages and compelled the German colonial authority to explore foreign sources of indentured 
labour (Hishongwa 1992:52). Given its notorious reputation for brutality and the inhuman 
treatment of workers, even fellow German colonies refused to oblige. The mortality rate on the 
diamond fields, for example, rose to an incredible 149.6 per 1000 in 1911 (Peltola 1995:64). 
Only the South African authorities came to its assistance by sanctioning, in the face of 
considerable opposition from local mining companies, the deployment of large numbers of 
African and Coloured workers from the Cape Colony on construction sites (such as the harbour 
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in Swakopmund and a railway line into the interior). 
Although they received higher wages and were afforded greater autonomy at work, the South 
African migrant workers, like their Namibian counterparts, found employment and living 
conditions oppressive and barbaric (Moorsom 1978: 11 0; Hishongwa 1992:55; van Rooyen 
1996: 128). However, as Beinart (1987: 172) observes, "the greatest threat to [these] workers was 
undoubtedly from their own employers". The German military officers who were in ultimate 
control of the workers, as well as the immediate supervisors (usually Afrikaners), used a 
considerable degree of violence to maintain control. Not only did the military prevent any forms 
of collective labour regulation by the South African migrant workers, there was also little 
opportunity to abscond or switch jobs in the barren, sparsely-populated expanses of the interior 
of Namibia. The complaints of the Xhosa migrant workers 
touched on almost every aspect of life and work: food was inadequate and sometimes bad; not even tents 
were provided, nor time given for workers to build their own shelters; supervisors were armed - 'the 
schachlmeisler threatens to shoot us if we do not do what he tells us'; dynamite was exploded close to 
groups of workers; hospitals were [grossly inadequate] ... [and] there were serious disputes over wages, 
methods of payment and deductions (BeinaJ1 1987: 180). 
Widespread use of physical violence by employers and the absence of a legal structure through 
which they could claim redress were repeatedly raised in letters written by the workers (Beinart 
1987: 183). Labour regulation throughout the period of German rule was based almost exclusively 
on the individual employment contract which, in turn, was grounded in a rigid , hierarchical and 
highly coercive master-and-servant relationship. As Van Rooyen (1996:128) notes: 
[n]either the law, official policy or institut ions, nor any workplace customs or practices countenanced, or 
even remotely tolerated, anything resembling collective relations. The only labour related occurrences 
bearing a collective character were confmed to sporadic outbursts of spontaneous industrial action in a few 
isolated instances. 
In spite of the highly individualistic and authoritarian nature of this system of labour regulation, 
rudimentary forms of collective action inevitably began to take hold. New forms of leadership 
and solidarity emerged: each gang of workers had their own interpreter and go-between who was 
known to the authorities, but who was controlled by the workers (Moorsom 1978: Ill; Beinart 
1987: 185; Peltola 1995 :70). Although there were no conscious attempts to fonn trade unions, the 
form of worker organisation that did emerge seems to have been related to rural networks and 
the groups which solidified in batches of recruits. Individual action and passive resistance 
nevertheless remained the dominant forms of worker opposition to labour regulation in the 
workplace. These limited forms of organisation, resistance and consciousness among migrant 
workers were a product of the repressive forms of control associated with their status as 
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indentured labourers. The few instances of organised, collective industrial action by black 
migrant workers - notably the strike by mine workers at Gross Otavi in 1893 over poor wages and 
the go-slow by migrant Xhosa railway workers at Wilhelmsthal over unspecified wage 
deductions in 1910 - were quickly put down by employers. Typically, striking workers were 
deprived of food and water, their leaders were evicted £i·om accommodation provided by the 
employer, and the intervention of German soldiers invariably resulted in the killing and 
wow1ding of striking workers (Gordon 1975:8; Cronje and Cronje 1979:77; Beinart 1987: 181). 
The proletarianisation of Namibia's indigenous population in the Police Zone was largely 
accomplished in little over a decade. The early colonial state relied almost exclusively on 
physical violence and extermination to enforce compliance with its rule - it did not offer "any 
ways or means for negotiation, mitigation or compromise between the coloniser and the 
colonised" (Melber 2000a:37). Since the social controls of the German authority were never 
totally effective, local officials compensated for this bureaucratic incapacity with arbitrary 
violence 6 German colonial rule was premised on the narrow defence of the minority's interests 
and the denial of citizen rights to the majority, without even a pretence of representivity or 
legitimacy. Racial differences formed the basis for colonial class antagonisms and the criteria for 
strict social segregation and political disempowerment. Black workers were denied freedom of 
movement, freedom of contract, and freedom of association. In particular, the denial of freedom 
of choice in employment and the absence of any institutionalised influence on terms and 
conditions of employment were central components of this regime of labour regulation. 
Moreover, contract migrant labour could be expended almost at will in production. One reason 
for the proneness to crisis of despotic regimes is the tendency to W1dercut labour's ability to 
reproduce itself to the point of destruction. 
The first attempt at a more institutionalised form of labour regulation was the introduction, in 
1913, of a separate administrative structure for black people based on the British system of 
Native Commissioners as deployed in the Union of South Africa. The extensive administrative 
and judicial powers of the Commissioners included the supervision of conditions of employment, 
regulating the conclusion of service contracts, and investigating complaints by employers and 
employees. Van Rooyen (1996: 126) concludes that, despite the persistence of many injustices, 
the system of Native Commissioners definitely improved the wages, conditions of employment, 
food rations, and accommodation of migrant workers. Given the patchy historical record and the 
ubiquitous rhetoric of employers and the state, one would be hard pressed to find reliable 
6 As Marx (1967:751) notes: "[florce is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one. It is itself 
an economic power". 
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evidence of any meaningful improvement in terms and conditions of employment. A study of 
conditions at the Rossing mine in the 1970s - then regarded as 'one of the best ' employers in 
Namibia - found an enormous gulf between the public pronouncements of Rio Tinto Zinc and 
the daily realities of low wages, long working hours, overcrowded workers' quarters, poor diets, 
and discriminatory health care (Rogers 1978). Adequate compensation, collective bargaining and 
economic incentives - some of the basic preconditions for the integration of the black majority 
into the structures of the new colonial society - were incompatible with the consolidation and 
reproduction of colonial despotism. 
Over time, the creation of a despotic labour regime characterised by harsh forms of extra-
economic coercion delivered generous rewards. In 1913, the mining companies exported one and 
a half million carats of diamonds, with one company selling its diamonds at fifteen times what 
it cost to recover them. Some investors were paid dividends as high as 2 500% (SW APO 
1981:18). In the same year, the wage-bill ofOvarnbo contract workers, earning as little as R2.50 
per month, amounted to about RIIO 000, a mere 2% of the value of diamond sales. The 
combination of rich mineral resources, authoritarian control and low labour costs continued to 
provide spectacular returns on investment under South African colonial rule . Total dividends 
paid to its shareholders from 1952 to 1970 by one of the American corporations (Newmont) with 
a stake in the Tsumeb mine amounted to $85 737 676. With an original investment of$1 lSI 
400, this yielded an average annual return of372% (Winter 1977:200). The Tsumeb Corporation 
returned an average profit on total investment of 31 % annually in the 1960s, while paying an 
incredibly low $28 monthly average wage for Africans (Minter 1986:200). The black wage bill 
on the Tsumeb mine, described as one of the richest base-metal mines in the world, amounted 
to only three percent of revenues. During the early periods of colonial rule, in particular, very 
little of their paltry wages ever reached the families of contract workers in Ovamboland. As 
Governor Seitz noted in a report to the Imperial Colonial Office in Berlin in 1911: 
Ovambos who set out from LUdertizbucht on homeward journey ... die on the way trom shortage of 
provisions and most of them are exploited by traders on the way from Swakopmund to Okaukuejo in such 
a way they merely bring home scurvy and other diseases with them as a result of their work on the diamond 
fields (cited in Melber 2000a:39). 
The regime of labour regulation associated with the hegemonic position of mining capital within 
the German colonial state was rooted in the processes that transformed pre-colonial social 
relations from 'formal' to 'real' subsumption to the capitalist mode of production. In his study 
of the impact of migrant labour on social relations in Ovamboland, Moorsom (1989) observes 
a general transition from rural production supplementing wages to wages subsidising rural 
production. Although the period from about 1884 to 1915 was characterised primarily by the 
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transition from self-sufficient, pastoral economies to subsistence production crucially dependent 
upon the inputs from the 'white' capitalist sector; it was marked by an uneven degree of 
adaptation by the peasantry to commodity production, and patterned by the stratification of the 
rural population and the contingent processes of conservation and dissolution in the pre-capitalist 
modes of production. Dreschler (1980:231) notes that the period from 1907 to 1914 - which he 
describes as the "peace of the graveyard" - was one of difficult yet determined pastoral recovery. 
The thin spread of German occupation left significant pastoral opportunities for black stock-
owners and local variation in the enforcement of pass laws allowed for considerable internal 
migration by black people (Hayes e/ af 1998). Hence, there was more opportunity for black 
pastoral mobility and bargaining than the martial nature of the German regime might have 
implied. 
Soon after the commencement of World War I, German rule in the territory was abruptly ended. 
Its institutional and normative legacy, however, was to endure for much of the colonial era. The 
maj or statutes aimed at labour regulation that were decreed during the latter stages of German 
colonial rule "constituted a matrix of rules aimed at securing maximal utilisation of available 
human resources with a minimum of reciprocity upon the part of either the state or employers" 
(Van Rooyen 1996:123). These statutory provisions provided the template for subsequent labour 
market policies and practices. While the South African administration passed several 
amendments to these provisions, their salient features remained in place until the early-1970s. 
The emerging settler economy was fundamentally driven by an externally imposed demand for 
cheap black labour. By 191 5, as Melber (2000a:40) points out, "an 'apartheid' society had 
already been firmly established under a German flag". In particular, the historical roots of what 
was to become the infamous contract labour system are firmly embedded in the era of German 
colonial rule. 
2.3 NAMIBIA UNDER SOUTH AFRICAN RULE 
South Africa's colonial rule in Namibia revo lved fundamentally around the consolidation of its 
economic dominance and the expansion of its political philosophy of racial segregation. The 
South African state acted swiftly to transfer control of the diamond industry to the Anglo 
American Corporation and to fac ilitate the expansion of settler farming and white ownership of 
the fishing industry (Innes 1981). As early as 1923, Gijsbert Hofmeyer, the first South African 
civilian Administrator, noted that "native policy in South West Africa .. . is part and parcel of the 
native policy of .. . South Africa" (cited in Gottschalk 1983 :71). This policy, Hofmeyer explained 
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in 1925, means that 
[tlhe Natives ... will in future have centres where they can develop on their own lines, from where they can 
go freely in search of work in European centres, and to wh ich they can return to their families. At the same 
time the foundation has been laid forthe building of self-contained Native communities developing on the ir 
own lines under the supervision of selected Native Affairs officials (cited in Gottschalk 1983:71). 
The South African administration in Namibia drastically intensified and institutionalised the 
recruitment of migrant workers from the bantustans. At the end of 1963, the South African 
government published the controversial findings ofthe Odendaal Report on the ' native question ' . 
This Report explicitly excluded all alternatives other than 'separate development' from 
consideration; formed the blueprint of subsequent political , economic and social developments 
in Namibia; and reinforced white privilege and dominance (Gordon 1963; Rogaly 1967; IDAFSA 
1980: 15-7; Du Pisani 2000:64-6). In line with developments in South Africa, it proposed the 
establishment of separate 'homelands' or bantustans for the main ethnic groups of Namibia to 
be governed by separate legislative councils and executive committees. This system of apartheid-
capitalism exacerbated the uneven patterns of development between 'white' and ' black' areas; 
consolidated discriminatory policies and legislation; reinforced the low levels of labour market 
mobility for black employees; and formalised the occupational 'colour bar' that reserved all 
skilled jobs for white people (First 1963; Segal and First 1967; Vigne 1975; Green et a1 1981; 
SWAPO 198 1). 
A system of contract migrant labour was established through stringent influx control measures, 
which restricted access to the 'white ' urban areas to black people who were born there or had 
lived or worked continuously in the area for ten or more years. This system of labour regulation 
was dependent on the reproduction of a complex set of relationships between the tribal 
authorities, migrant workers, the colonial government and its agencies, and employers. Migrant 
workers were treated as casual labourers and had to return to the bantustans at the end of their 
term of service. The majority of the black labour force lived involuntarily in single-sex 
compounds while their wives and children remained in the bantustans, ostensibly subsisting on 
small-scale agriculture.' That is, black migrant workers were merely temporary sojourners in the 
'white ' urban areas. If these workers attempted to bring their families with them on contract, they 
not only ri sked imprisonment for contravening the provisions of the pass laws, but also faced a 
lack of accommodation and jeopardised their rights to cultivate land and livestock in the 
, Studies by Moorsom ( 1979), Voipio (J 981) and Cleaver and Wallace (1990) show that women bore the 
brunt of the burdens imposed by influ x control: increased workload in the fields, primary responsibi li ty for feeding 
the family, almost tota l dependence on their husbands, and tighter social controls imposed on women alone at home. 
108 
bantustans.s On the one hand, these controls effectively prevented large-scale black urbanisation 
by limiting the expansion of an urban population with an economic base independent of 
subsistence agriculture. On the other hand, the spatial confinement of the black population 
removed the mobility so necessary for the survival of livestock in the enatic and random rainfall 
patterns of Namibia. 
2.3.1 Masters, Servants, and the Contract of Employment: 1915 - 1950 
The first period of South African colonial rule in Namibia covers the period from its military 
conquest of GeTI'l1an South West Africa to the assumption of power by the National Party. Barely 
six months after assuming office as Administrator, E.H. Gorges proclaimed the first of a series 
of Master and Servant statutes designed to rigorously enforce the canons of Roman-Dutch law 
of contract. The employment relationship was reduced to a rigid paternalistic relationship of 
command and obedience with virtually no provision for collective regulation and minimal 
mediation of market forces in the interests of social equity and justice.9 As South African 
confidence in their possession of the tenitory grew, "policy soon hardened beyond keeping the 
peace and maintenance of essential services to backing white employers against black workers 
in a South Africanised version of the Slatus ante bellum"(Gottschalk 1978:76). However, South 
Africa's colonial authority over Namibia required a moral justification that would satisfy the 
League of Nations. As Hartmann (\ 998:271) observes: " [wJhereas Germany's policy in the 
tenitory had been aimed at the complete destruction of indigenous economic, social and political 
structures ... South Africa had to be more careful". Drawing on the Protestant ethic of 'hard 
work', the administration repeatedly contrasted the 'idle and disorderly' lifestyle of the 'native' 
with the development and progress inherent in the ' law and order' imposed by the settlers . In its 
Annual Report of 1926, for example, the colonial administration noted: 
[c]ivilisation will never be developed on idleness ... Left to himself [the 'native ' ] will simply sit in the sun 
and dream about women and cattle. A good harvest results in liberal brewing of beer, heavy drinking and 
tribal disorders. Work brings him in contact with civilisation and therefore necessarily assists the process 
of civilising him (cited in Gordon 1998:70). 
In an official memorandum promulgated by the Office of the Administrator in 1916, it was noted 
8 As we shall see below, a major demand of striking workers during the nat ional strike of 1971-72 was the 
worker's right to have his family with him, and to visit and be visited by his family. Despite the scale and intensity 
of this strike, however, workers fai led to achieve these rights. 
9 According to Van Rooyen (1996: 139), "[t]he German colonial government's preoccupation seems to have 
centred on obtaining and retaining as much labour as possible ... whereas evidently the South AtTican colonial 
authorities' priorities lay first and foremost in the domain of segregationist objectives". 
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that, while German laws were "largely satisfactory", they had led to a situation where "[t]he 
master regards the servant as a slave, without rights, amenable only to the lash and various other 
clUelties ... [and the] servant regards his master as his inveterate enemy from whom there is no 
escape" (cited in Van Rooyen 1996: 141). Despite the new regime's stated intentions to improve 
industrial relations, the same memorandum insisted that "[t]he two main principles of the 
German law - (a) that every native must carry a pass and (b) that every native must be in 
employment unless he has visible means of support - remain in force" (cited in Van Rooyen 
1996:141). Likewise, while the introduction of Roman-Dutch law enhanced the significance of 
common law contractual principles in labour regulation, observance of these principles was, as 
in the past, secured through criminal liability enforced by the criminal courts and the police. As 
Wedderburn (\ 986: 141) points out, it is "impossible to over-emphasize [the] criminal origins of 
the law attaching to the employment relationship". It was to take several decades before labour 
regulation was finally divorced from the criminal process and brought firmly into the domain of 
civil administration. 
A central concern of the South African colonial regime between 1915 and 1930 was to bolster 
the weak mechanisms of labour supply in Ovamboland in an effort to increase the rate of 
migration. Initially, the regime relied on statutory measures to achieve these ends. This 
"legislative obliteration of the black pastoral economy", according to Silvester (\ 998:98), was 
aimed at "removing the threat of competition for white settlers and creating a malleable labour 
force". The statutory and bureaucratic methods used to pressurise peasant-workers into the labour 
market were soon reinforced by economic pressures such as the prohibition on hunting, the 
imposition of taxes, extensive restrictions on trade, and the stimulation of consumer demand 
through the establishment of shops in the bantustans. The sheer scale of land appropriation and 
the corresponding rise in poverty and population density were, however, soon to be sufficient to 
compel many individuals to leave their homes and seek employment in the 'white ' areas. The 
primary motivation for the majority of Ovambos to engage in migrant labour was to acquire 
capital to purchase cattle, escape poverty, and obtain European goods. 'O By the 1980s, white 
people (a mere fi ve percent ofthe population) owned almost two-thirds of the land in the fertile 
south and centre of the country. 
After 1930, the emphasis shifted towards a greater systematisation of the migrant labour system 
in an effort to regulate the flow of workers onto the labour market. Through the imposition of a 
standard one-year employment contract for migrants, the colonial authorities managed to 
10 See: Cronje and Cronje (1 979:20-1); SWAPO (1981 :57); Herbstein and Evenson (1989: 183-4); KrUger 
and Henrichsen (1998: ISS) ; McKittrick (1998:247); and Silvester e l al ( 1998:32) . 
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"dampen down the often extreme clashes between the cycles of peasant and capitalist production 
... thereby robbing the labour mi grant of the oppo!1unity to articulate wage-labour with 
subsistence production" (Moorsom 1978: 114). The majority of laws applicable to black people 
were designed to regulate their terms and conditions of employment and the central institutional 
presence of the colonial regime in the no!1hern bantustans was the administration concerned with 
the recruitment and allocation of migrant workers. In other words, the experience of colonialism 
was largely mediated through the employment relationship. Indeed, the Administrator's repo!1 
in 1920 declared unequivocally that "the native question ... is synonymous with the labour 
question" (cited in Cronje and Cronje 1979:7). Black people therefore experienced the colonial 
state most directly in its effo!1s at regulating the labour market conditions under which they sold 
their labour power. 
The Master and Servant Proclamations of 1916, 1918 and 1920 attempted to ameliorate some 
of the more extreme excesses of German colonial legislation, while ensuring the continued 
submission of black employees to the authority of their white employers (IDAFSA 1980: I 0; Van 
Rooyen 1996: 133-7; Gordon 1998:55). These proclamations reduced workplace industrial 
relations to a 'contractual' regime of specified rights and obligations. Beneath this veneer of 
reciprocity, however, lurked a military-style authority by the employer. The Oshivambo word for 
'contract' - oda/ate - means 'wire' and reflects the indentured nature of migrant labour that 
li terally bound the worker to his employer. Master and Servant laws made it a criminal offence 
for a worker to change employers, to leave a job without his employer's pennission, to be absent 
from work or arrive at work drwlk, and to be negligent or insolent. To all intents and purposes, 
collective regulation by black workers was outlawed. Hence, the South African administration 
perceived its role as being "not merely the gendarmerie state, but also the foreman's regime" 
(Gottschalk 1978:81). The proclamation of 1920 re-introduced corporal punishment as the 
penalty for certain repeated 'offences' committed by employees. This allowed the weak colonial 
state to survive by "franchising the legal use of violence by its settlers" (Gordon 1998:75). 
Infringements by employers, in contrast, were dealt with through normal contractual remedies. 
An employer convicted of assaulting an employee, for example, was simply compelled to cancel 
the contract of service at the request of the employee concerned. 
The Vagrancy Proclamation of 1920 was aimed at, among others, securing black labour for the 
settler economy by creating a mechanism of forced labour in the Police Zone. A primary 
objective of the proclamation was to compel black workers to place their labour at the disposal 
of white employers or public enterprises. In tenus of provisions in this proclamation, any person 
apprehended for trespassing on private agricultural land or within an urban area without a visible, 
III 
lawful 'means of support', would be deemed to be guilty of an offence (Kane-Berman 1972: II ; 
Cronje and Cronje 1979:31; Mbuende 1986 :82; Bauer 1997:59). The courts were empowered to 
sentence a convicted person to a compulsory term of service in lieu of prison. The vagrancy 
proclamation was widely enforced to protect 'white ' property rights and to supplement the pass 
laws (SW APO 1981 :71-2). This proclamation was thus aimed at suppressing both trespass and 
idleness. Mizruchi argues that the key to regulating society is the "abeyance process" that arises 
out of the mismatch between labour supply and demand (cited in Gordon 1998:53). Vagrancy 
laws therefore constituted an important social safety valve by confining and mobilising surplus 
labour. In reality, however, workers who were allocated work under the vagrancy laws often 
deserted again. The colonial administration simply lacked the capacity to secure the optimum 
benefits from a law so clearly loaded against black people. 
The Native Administration Proclamation of 1922 provided that' all male natives over fourteen 
years' were required to carry passes when travelling beyond the location or reserve where they 
resided. Black women were thus explicitly excluded from the provisions of this proclamation. 
The pass laws regarded black males as those whose labour was required and whose movements 
had to be regulated. Far from implying greater female autonomy, the exclusion of women from 
the ambit of these regulatory forces generally increased men's rights over them and made them 
more vulnerable to exploitation. "Even slaves have legal rights but to be defined as non-existent 
legally meant that one had no recourse to (potential) legal remedy" (Gordon 1998 :56). Being 
beyond the realm of the law is thus the ultimate legal punishment and allows for the imposition 
of more arbitrary and invidious forms of control largely unconstrained by social norms and 
bureaucratic regulations. In practice, black females in the inter-war years were largely subject to 
the personal discretion of Native Affairs officials who had considerable informal power 
(Gottschalk 1978:78; Gordon 1998:60). 
Separate legal provisions - such as those related to the compensation for occupational injuries 
and access to training through apprenticeships - were promulgated to incorporate and protect 
white workers. In fact, 'civilised ' labour standards with a modicum of concern for social equity 
and human rights applied exclusively to the white settler community. Using Standing'S (1999:41) 
classification of the five distinct forms of statutory regulation, we can appreciate more fully the 
discriminatory impact of the laws promulgated during this period. First, protective regulations 
comprise rules and procedures to protect workers and/or to prevent the more powerful from 
abusing the less powerful. Second, fi scal regulations include taxes and subsidies to encourage 
certain forms of activity and/or discourage other forms. Third, repressive regulations consist of 
rules and mechanisms to prevent something that the state or a dominant interest does not wish 
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to occur. Fourth, promotional regulations comprise those rules and mechanisms (other than taxes) 
designed to promote certain developments. Finally, facilitating regulations are the rules and 
procedures that permit certain activities to take place, if there is a desire to do so. The laws that 
regulated the employment of black workers were largely devoid of protective, promotional and 
facilitating regulations; whi le the predominance of fiscal and repressive regulations reinforced 
an extensive managerial prerogative. Legal prescriptions on the content, rather than the form, of 
their employment relationship amounted to a voluntaristic minimum. Legislative provisions 
therefore had a negligible impact on the important regulatory sphere of substantive conditions 
of employment such as wage levels and other benefits. 
Statutory regulation, as extensive and austere as it was, could not secure the desired levels of 
incorporation and allocation of black labour - it had to be augmented by institutional and 
administrative mechanisms. In an attempt to ensure that the scarce labour supply within the 
Police Zone was allocated in an optimal fashion, the colonial government attempted to segment 
the labour sources into four distinct categories: (a) rural workers residing on settler farms and 
immobilised by the pass laws were to meet the labour demands of commercial agriculture; (b) 
urban workers residing in locations and prohibited from owning fixed property were to serve the 
needs of settler towns; (c) migrant workers from the northern regions were reserved for the larger 
employers such as the mines and the administration; and (d) strategically located reserves were 
to replenish the supply of labour to the surrounding areas and to absorb surplus workers who had 
become redundant through old age, ill health, or any other disability (Moorsom 1979:207). 
Buoyant economic conditions by the end of the 1940s, however, forced the colonial authority to 
revise this policy of labour market segmentation. In an effort to address persistent labour 
shortages, Ovambo workers were increasingly allocated to virtually all sectors of the economy. 
To take advantage of the increasingly competitive market for labour, black workers established 
networks of communication to distribute comparative details about the terms and conditions of 
employment in different sectors and regions. The continuing shortages of labour, especially on 
the farms, demonstrate the fact that migrant workers were always able to exert some degree of 
control over the allocation of their labour. The appalling conditions on the farms - extremely low 
wages, long working hours, regular assaults by farmers, and living conditions barely suitable for 
animals - led migrant workers to effectively boycott agricultural work right from outset of 
colonial rule (Moorsom 1978: I 09). It was mainly adolescent males, who were too young to work 
on the mines, that were sent to work on the farms (Gebhardt 1978: 1 5 1). Farmers also employed 
casual and seasonal workers on piece-rates to meet fluctuations in labour demand. During the 
late-I 930s and early-1940s, however, a fundamental shift in the flow of migrant labour was 
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achieved as a growing number of workers were directed from the mines to the farms (Bauer 
1997:58; Silvester 1998: 115-6; Silvester el al 1998:28). Given the long-standing reluctance by 
migrants to work on the settler farms, this shift highlights the essentially coercive nature of 
labour allocation. 
Continued dissatisfaction by employers with the insufficient quantities of migrant workers 
procured through existing channels led, in the mid-I920s, to the establishment of two labour 
recruiting organisations along similar lines to that which existed in South Africa." The Northern 
Labour Organisation recruited migrants in the Okavango region to cater for the needs of mines 
and farms in the central and northern parts of Namibia, while the Southern Labour Organisation 
recruited in Ovamboland to supply the diamond mines in the south. These two agencies 
continued to function separately until 1943, when they were amalgamated to rationalise and 
expand their services to all sectors of the economy (Mbuende 1986:83-4; Cooper 1999: 137). The 
new amalgamated labour recruitment agency, the South West Africa Native Labour Association 
(SW ANLA), tended to exclusively serve the interests of employers and showed callous disregard 
for the needs of the employees (First 1963; Bradford 1967; Vigne 1975). Its primary objective 
was to maximise the number of recruits at the lowest possible cost to itself and its industry 
clients. Since real wages remained fairly constant from 1914 to the 1950s, the figures for average 
consumption in the late-I920s are likely to be applicable to the whole period: 
[aJn average yearly wage was 30 pounds. Out of it £5 was consumed at work; £4 went to 'gifts' or taxes 
to the king; £4 to clothes; £10 was used for purchases and the rest £4-5 was expended in Ovamboland 
(Moorsom 1989:9 1). 
As an monopsonistic wage-fixing mechanism, premised on the prohibition on employers to 
recruit labour for themselves, SW ANLA not only abolished free choice in the labour market, but 
also effectively eliminated wage competition for migrant labour. Migrant workers recruited by 
SW ANLA generally did not know for whom or where they would be working until they reached 
their destination. By regulating the incorporation and allocation of labour, the colonial state 
prevented a bidding up of wages despite recurring labour shortages. The result, as Rex notes, is 
that the "great irrationality with which capitalist enterprises have to cope, namely the labour 
market, is excluded" (cited in Gordon 1978: 117). By maintaining control over the supply and 
II In South Africa, recruitment agencies constantly tried to undercut each other to secure increased orders 
from the mining industry, thereby contributing to the unreliable and fluctuating nature of labour flows, wage levels 
and transport costs. To overcome these problems, the Chamber of Mines created the Witwatersrand Native Labour 
Association. The latter gave the Chamber some inst itutional control of the labour market by es tablishing a 
monopsony over the recru itment of labour in the sub~continent, in the process undermining both the operations of 
private labour recruiters and the supply of labour to smaller industries (Jeeves 1985). 
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cost of black labour, SW ANLA constituted a central component of South Africa's colonial 
domination ofNarnibia. The fOlmation of SWANLA was, therefore, partly a result of successful 
resistance by black people against attempts by the state to mobilise and allocate their labour 
largely on its own terms. Widespread complaints by workers, centred on the abuses they had to 
endure and the inhumane treatment they suffered as a result of the migrant labour system, led 
ultimately to the formation of S W APO and a mass strike in the early-I 970s. 
In 1945, the Administrator appointed a commission of inquiry to investigated the activities of 
SW ANLA and the employment conditions of migrant workers. Some of the more pertinent 
findings of the South West Africa Native Labourers Commission include the following (Van 
Rooyen 1996: 144-5). First, commercial farmers preferred Ovarnbo migrant workers because they 
purportedly did not object to monotonous duties, could be remunerated at significantly lower 
rates than local employees, and were indentured for longer periods. The idea that Ovambos were 
'superior' workers, and hence more highly valued, has a long history. In his report to the League 
of Nations in 1922, the Administrator of the territory described non-Ovambos as "poor workers 
and stupid ... [who 1 prefer to be idle" (cited in Cooper 1999: 130). Second, of the 52 103 workers 
in employment in 1946, approximately 20 000 originated from the northern areas, the vast 
majority of whom were contract workers. Third, while mine workers were allegedly satisfied 
with the wages, food and housing they received, other employees (especially those on the farms) 
expressed considerable dissatisfaction about physical abuse, low wages, meagre rations, and 
unsatisfactory accommodation. Fourth, migrant labourers displayed a high degree of solidarity 
as workers regularly absconded when an individual suffered ill-treatment at the hands of his 
employer. 
Finally, the Commission noted that "northern natives in general have no confidence that justice 
will be meted out to them" when lodging complaints in respect of offences committed against 
them by their employers (cited in Van Rooyen 1996:145). Black workers were largely 
defenceless against the mutually-reinforcing policies and practices of employers and the colonial 
state. The findings of the Commission did not result in any meaningful changes to the prevailing 
system of labour regulation. Since labour laws only applied to a small group of white workers, 
the Commission found it prudent to task the police and magistrates, rather than a separate system 
of labour administration, with the responsibility of regulating the recruitment, distribution and 
repatriation of migrant workers. In carrying out these tasks, the law enforcement agencies were 
amply assisted by employers, the officials of SW ANLA, and the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development. 
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Although "a spirit of defiance, resistance and revolt" (Hartmann 1998:273) prevailed in both the 
urban areas and the countryside, there is very little evidence of organised, collective opposition 
by workers in this period of Namibia's history. Besides the fact that existing legislation did not 
provide for collective industrial relations, the socio-economic and political conditions were not 
conducive to such forms of labour regulation. The transitory nature of migrant labour and the low 
rate of return to the same employer precluded the development oflong-term worker leadership 
and institutionalised opposition in the workplace. Collective resistance was highly vu lnerable to 
repression and intimidation from the state and employers. There were also no officially-
recognised institutions for collective interest representation, such as employers' associations or 
trade unions, during this period. The Bantu Administration Department claimed that its 
commissioners and labour officers protected the interests of black workers to an extent that made 
trade unions redundant. Trade unionism was always an improbable strategy under these 
conditions of totalitarian labour control in Namibia. 
In the event of 'trouble' at the workplace, employers and the colonial authority sought to 
reinforce the idea of the 'happy native' by seeking to remove the 'contamination' by 'outside 
agitators ' (Gordon 1998:71). Since the identification of 'agitators' was largely arbitrary and 
' repatriation' often spelled the end offormal employment opportunities, this strategy proved to 
be an effective means of intimidation. The absence of formal dispute-resolution mechanisms 
meant that industrial action was usually followed by suspensions, fines and the arrest of 
' ringleaders'. In short, industrial conflicts were never actually ' resolved'. Furthermore, few 
employers took their contractual obligations towards their employees seriously and most 
continued to pursue the ante bellum methods of maintaining discipline in the workplace by 
meting out harsh punishment to their employees (Van Rooyen 1996:142). Not surprisingly, 
therefore, only nine strikes explicitly related to employment conditions have been identified in 
the period from 191 6 to 1948 (Gottschalk 1978 :90). These strikes revolved around wages and 
the issue of working clothes, the assault and murder of fellow employees, and protests against 
the compulsory X-raying of departing migrant workers to detect pilfered diamonds. 
More common and viable forms of worker opposition included individual defiance, go-slows, 
desertion, and the deliberate sabotage of production. Not only were these informal and 
unorganised responses by workers more effective and more difficult to suppress, they also shed 
light on the day-to-day functioning of labour regulation in the workplace and beyond (Cohen 
1991). 'Hidden' or 'covert' forms of struggle expose "the complex mediations of the dichotomy 
accommodation/resistance accomplished by workers in the workplace and the myriad tactics of 
survival that refuse assimi lation, incorporation or inculcation" (Gottfried 1994: 1 06). These 
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strategies, in addition to "the well-founded tradition of go ld-bricking and quota restriction, 
require considerable organization ". [and] transcend the narrow realm of the workplace" (Gordon 
1982: 141). Although the "totalitarian regime of labour regulation" seemed complete, migrant 
workers exploited its weaknesses and manipulated its apparent inflexibilities to the fu ll 
(MoQl'som 1977:75-6). For example, workers reached the urban centres in Namibia by using false 
or borrowed passes, by deserting, by obtaining illegal employment, and by evading the worst 
employers (Katjavivi 1988: 19-21 ). 
Gordon (1977) argues that the totalitarian nature of authority in the workplace generated an 
occupationally-based code of "brotherhood" as the key mechanism of solidarity among contract 
mine workers. The code of brotherhood developed solidarity among individual workers, facing 
similar employment and living conditions, by using loopholes and gaps in the oppressive system 
for mainly individual gain (i.e. ' beating the system ' ). This code carried intrinsic rewards for 
compliance with its rules of behaviour as well as penalties for any contravention of these rules. 
The ethos of brotherhood provided the primary organisational framework for the 'underground' 
or informal resistance network developed by migrant workers. As Gordon (1982:141) explains: 
[bJrotherhood serves to delineate a distinct moral universe which specifically excludes all whites. It 
provides a screen behind which the workers have developed a ' private culture' in which they can be 
' themselves ' and a point from which they can explo it the white imposed system ." Brotherhood stresses 
helping one's fellow brother particularly in the face of white oppression and above all never in fann ing on 
one' s brothers. 
Expectations about acceptable standards of performance, gIven the indeterminacy of the 
employment contract, can only be constructed during the process of production. The actual 
operation of rules in the workplace depends on the power, knowledge, organisation and resources 
of the parties, their beliefs and ideologies, as well as the formal provision of rights and 
obligations through legislation. Different types of rules may apply to any given situation and rules 
have to be interpreted in action for them to have any practical significance and meaning. All 
forms of labour regulation rely (to varying degrees) on wider processes and relationships such 
as formal and tacit rules, social conventions and nonns as a condition of their possibility. A focus 
on the ' informal ' aspects of labour regulation is vital to an understanding of the social 
organisation of work. I' A range of plant studies has revealed that the real order concerning how 
12 'Formal' rules are generally understood as being conta ined in written fanTI, while 'informal' rules are 
not. Dunlop (1958: 16) lists several fonns in which rules may be expressed: agreements, statutes, orders, decrees, 
regulations, awards, policies, custom and traditions of the workplace. Flanders ( 1965: I 0) also states that rules 
"appear in different guises" which include social conventions, managerial decisions and workplace custom and 
practice. I-Ie recognises that these regulatory types "easi ly shade into each other at the margins" ( 1965:22). For both 
Dunlop and Flanders, however, the different forms in which rules appear do not detract from the fact that they all 
serve to regulate the employment relationship. 
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and at what pace work is to be perfonned usually arises from infOlmal agreements and practices. 
There is also considerable evidence to show that piece rates are generally set according to 
informal understandings and not managerial whim. Consequently, informal practices contribute 
significantly towards the path-dependent nature of regulatory change. 
Infonnal rules in the workplace are multiple and differentiated; lack the intention, planning and 
rational calculation associated with other rules ; are often a product of unintended consequences 
rather than conscious decisions; are a form of collective regulation in the sense that they will 
normally depend on acceptability, not only by workers, but also by managers; do not emerge 
from any formal negotiation, but rather through a process in which workers utilise the gaps or 
inconsistencies in regulation to their advantage; are not part of, or are relatively autonomous 
from, the fornlal institutions of labour regulation; and are transactional in the sense of arising out 
of interactions between the rule-making activities of work groups and management (Goodman 
et aI1975:27). Informal and loosely structured relationships in the workplace tend to qualify, 
supplement and even subvert the decisions taken within the official institutions. Although there 
are limits to the practices that management can or will tolerate, the status of an informal rule may 
evolve from a loose understanding with little force to custom and practice rules that carry 
considerable weight in the negotiation of order in the workplace. In other words, rules are 
variable and negotiable. However, while rules may change over time, the processes of rule-
making (such as a particular form of collective bargaining or tacit negotiation) tend to remain 
relatively unchanged. To understand the dynamics of change and continuity in industrial 
relations, a distinction must be made between the relatively enduring rules that regulate the rule-
making process and the relatively transitory rules that result from this process. 
Informal practices in the workplace, according to Burawoy (1979:171-6), may assist in the 
achievement of management's substantive goals and contribute to the maintenance of order in 
the workplace even when formal rules are breached. There are inherent limits to the extent of 
capitalist control and the image of managerial autocracy is constrained in a number of ways. 
First, rules are applied in very different ways to different workers. More skilled, experienced or 
strategically placed workers are less amenable to a coercive discipline and invariably have 
considerable leverage over their supervisors. Second, a breach of the rules that does not impose 
direct costs on employers is less likely to be punished. Tolerating fiddles may mean that more 
costly and unpredictable behaviour, like absenteeism and tum-over, is avoided. Third, there is 
usually an implicit bargain within the employment relationship, with line managers being careful 
to maintain some acceptable standard of 'fairness' and 'reciprocity' for fear of losing workers 
and then being unable to meet peaks in demand. Despite significant variation in its nature and 
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impact over time and space, there is considerable informality 111 the processes of labour 
regulation at the workplace. 
A system oflabour regulation cannot be simply read off legislative provisions, but needs to be 
related to the day-to-day interactions in the workplace and the activities of institutions set up to 
enforce compliance with the law. Labour policies during this period, especially in the northern 
areas, more often revealed the absence or limits of colonial control. This "colonial 
ineffectiveness" (Silvester el aI1998:32) is revealed by the largely uncontrolled movement of 
many black people; the consistent inability of recruiting agencies in the north to satisfy labour 
demand in the south; the regular challenges posed by migrant workers to the allocation and 
deployment of their labour through various forms of informal resistance; and the poor track-
record of the police in apprehending ' deserters ' .13 Divisions within the settler community, a weak 
colonial state subservient to Pretoria, the sheer size of Namibia, and inadequate financial and 
human resources constituted formidable obstacles to the authorities' stated goal of 'complete 
control' over the black population. Labour regulation, like the social order on which it is 
founded, is "fi'agile, impermanent, full of unexpected loopholes and in need of constant repair" 
(Gordon 1998:73). The shift from segregation to apartheid in the following period must be 
viewed in this context. The period between 1915 and 1950 was not simply a functional precursor 
to apartheid or a blank slate on which National Party policies could be inscribed. 
2.3.2 Apartheid and the Migrant Labour System: 1950 - 1977 
The second period of South African rule commenced with the electoral victory of the National 
Party in Namibia and ended with the appointment of an Administrator-General following an 
agreement between the South African government and members of the United Nations Security 
Council. The shift in political power in both the metropolitan country and its mandate meant that 
Namibia came to be increasingly administered as a de faCIO part of South Africa. As a result, the 
regulatory measures that applied to black employees in Namibia increasingly resembled the 
apartheid labour market and 'native administration ' in South Africa (Bradford 1967; Kuraisa 
1967; Voipio 1981 ; Hishongwa 1992; Hayes el aI1998). The balkanisation of Namibia and the 
associated system of labour migration assumed an increasingly pivotal role in mobilising, 
allocating, controlling and reproducing black labour. Two-thirds of the labour force in Namibia 
were migrants in the 1970s - a higher proportion than almost anywhere else in the world, 
II For example: despite the circulation of their names to the ' traditional authorities', only 33 of the I 174 
Ovambo workers who were reported for desertion in the fU'st eight months of 1926 were apprehended by the poliee 
(Gordon 1998:63). 
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including South Africa itself (Cronje and Cronje 1979:6). By 1980, migrant workers dominated 
all three major economic sectors, comprising over 95% of black workers in mining, 65% in 
fishing and 50% in agriculture (SW APO 1981 :68). The migrant labour system was both a vital 
component of South Africa's occupation of Namibia and a source of deep resentment among 
black workers. '4 
The migrant labour system, introduced tluoughout the settler colonies of southern Africa, 
effectively subsidised colonial capital by displacing the social costs of reproduction from the 
commercial sector to the bantustans (Burawoy 1985; Cohen 1987; Miles 1987). Firstly, the 
apartheid authorities were absolved from the need to provide housing, water, electricity, roads, 
schools, and other infrastructural services that would be required by a permanent labour force. 
Secondly, the sick, injured, disabled and elderly were simply 'repatriated' to the bantustans when 
their labour became dispensable to the economy (KrUger and Henrichsen 1998: 152). Thirdly, the 
wages of contract workers were conveniently conceived as being 'supplemented ' by the income 
which they were supposedly generating from their access to land in the bantustans (Dekker et al 
1975:227; Moorsom 1977:68). In other words, migrant workers were paid a wage barely 
appropriate for the reproduction of a single male. As Moorsom (1979:206) points out with regard 
to Namibia: 
each major producing sector of capital ... [was] interested in the local population solely as producers and 
not as consumers, and even then, not as producers of goods but as sellers or reproducers of labour-power. 
This simp licity of interest ... [allowed for] a straightforward concentration on maximising profits and 
output, and an uncomplicated relationship with the colonial state. 
Much has been written about the contract migrant labour system in Namibia. 15 These studies 
highlight the many hardships faced by migrant workers, their formal and informal struggles in 
the workplace, the forms of control over their labour exercised by employers and the colonial 
authorities, and the impact of migrancy on class consciousness. In this system of retrogressive 
migration the demand for labour was decisively shaped by the structure of the colonial economy; 
whi le the supply of labour was strongly influenced by the cycles of planting and harvesting, 
annual rainfall and food security, degrees of dependence on wage labour, levels of cash trading 
14 Sam Nujoma, in a speech to migrant workers in Walvis Bay in 1959, contrasted the "slavery" inherent 
in apartheid labour policies with a future in which they "will work as free men, each and every one choosing his work 
according to his desire and needs, without force" (cited in Peltola 1995:103). 
15 See: First (1963); Kane-Berman (1972); Clarence-Smith and Moorsom (1975); Dekker e/ at (1975); 
Gordon (1977); Moorsom (1977); Winter (1977); Gottschalk (1978); Cronje and Cronje (1979); SW APO (1981); 
Voipio (1981); Ndadi (1989); Hishongwa (1992); Peltola (1995); Van Rooyen (1996); Hayes e/ at (1998); and 
Cooper (1999). 
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in the sending areas, and established patterns of household resource distribution that consistently 
favoured older males (Gordon 1978a; Moorsom 1978; Hishongwa 1992; Hayes et al 1998). 
Increasing poverty and stratification in the rural areas generated a new social stratum with few 
options other than migrant labour: young men without cattle. 
The northern territories, in particular, continued to serve primarily as reservoirs of labour for 
industries in the south. I6 Migrants from Ovamboland were employed on contracts of up to thirty 
months; while those originating from reserves within the Police Zone were known as 'short-
terms' and fulfilled contracts of six to twelve months on average. Migrant workers from the 
northern bantustans were paid lower wages and were substantially worse off than local black 
workers from within the Police Zone. The latter were in tum paid less than Coloured workers, 
who earned considerably less than white employees in terms of both cash wages and non-wage 
benefits. Female and chi ld labourers and workers recruited among the San consistently received 
the lowest wages across all economic sectors. At the bottom of the pile were those without work 
or any means of subsistence. It has been estimated that 13.2% of the black labour force fell into 
the category 'unemployed/unspecified' , while 91000 were 'employed' in subsistence farming 
in 1977 (Cronje and Cronje 1979:28). Gender inequalities in the bantustans were also heightened 
by the intersection of colonial policies and customary rule, and the confinement of labour 
migration to males with a corresponding lack of mobility by females (Allison and Green 1986; 
Cleaver and Wallace 1990; Hishongwa 1992; Hayes 1998; Winterfeldt 2002). 
The recruitment, allocation, control and repatriation of migrant workers constituted the primary 
functions of labour regulation during much of the colonial period. The labour recruitment 
agencies determined, by means of a crude and degrading medical examination, which of three 
broad grades of physical fitness a recruit belonged to. The strong and healthy were reserved 
almost exclusively for the mines, while the weak and frail usually ended up working on the 
farms. A key objective of the migrant labour system was to insulate farmers and small employers 
from wage competition with the mines and urban enterprises. The wages of migrant workers 
were unilaterally fixed by SW ANLA at a unifOlmly low level for all economic sectors. This not 
only ensured that migrant workers earned consistently lower wages than the urbanised black 
labour force, but also that the labour supply to traditionally lower paying sectors such as 
agriculture was guaranteed. Crucially, the use of cheap, unorganised migrant labour has enabled 
16 According to Clarence-Smith and Moorsom (1977), pre-colonial contact with industrial cap italism 
through European traders generated class divisions in the social structure of Ovambo society that rendered it more 
vulnerable to incorporation into the colonial system through labour migration. This internal differentiation was also 
crucial in the variety of responses against colonial rule and capitalism. 
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some sectors of industry to delay investments in more capital-intensive technologies and reduced 
the pressures to upgrade jobs in the more developed sectors of the economy. The presence of 
low-paid migrant workers without a collective voice in most sectors ofthe economy, therefore, 
served to weaken the working class as a whole. 
The attempts by employers to reduce the costs of labour extended to the accommodation offered 
to migrant workers. Living conditions in the labour compounds were appalling: a concrete slab 
for a bed, overcrowded rooms crawling with lice and vermin, poor quality food served on 
shovels, sanitation of the most primitive kind, and regular police raids. 17 Besides a reduction in 
the costs of labour, closed compounds also served to control desertion and facil itated the 
monitoring of pass laws. The company state - personified by the compound manager -
increasingly tied survival outside work to subordination at work. Migrant workers automatically 
lost the 'right' to reside in the urban areas, and hence to earn a living, when they were fired. 
Migrant workers very seldom entered into employment contracts 'willingly' - several coercive 
measures had to be established in order to secure this oscillation of labour power. Five types of 
police force controlled black workers in Namibia: (a) the ' Ovambo Police' of the Bantu 
Administration Department in the bantustans; (b) a private security force in SW ANLA's labour-
recruiting depots ; (c) the South African Railway Police checked travel passes en route; (d) 
municipal police enforced pass laws in the townships and company police controlled the urban 
labour compounds; and (e) the South African Police enforced labour-repressive legislation in 
their own right and assisted the other police forces in containing worker resistance (Gottschalk 
1978:87). The official institutions of labour regulation were underwritten and reinforced by 
widespread illegal floggings and assaults of workers by supervisors and members of the various 
police and security forces. 
Perhaps the most traumatic consequence of the migrant labour system was the breakdown of the 
family structure and the social division oflabour in the subsistence and pastoral economies. An 
Ovambo migrant worker typically spent as much as three-quarters of his married life away from 
his wife and children (Gordon 1977:219; Winter 1977:96). The dramatic changes in traditional 
values, the role of women, the nature of social institutions and the like brought on by influx 
control were compounded by the nature of colonial rule . Given their role as suppliers of labour, 
the bantustans were intentionally designed to be economically unviable rural slums characterised 
by low levels of infrastructural development and the virtual absence of social services and 
17 See: Gordon (1977); Winter (1977); Rogers (1978); SWAPO (198 1); Andersson and Marks (1987); 
Ndadi (1989); and Hishongwa (1992). 
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commercial trade. Confining the bulk of the population to these areas led to severe over-grazing 
and pressures on the land that it could not sustain. IS Large-scale labour migration, increasing 
poverty and expanding social differentiation in the bantustans effectively undermined the 
reproduction of pre-colonial socio-economic relations. Although labour migration was merely 
one 'survival strategy' that a household (as the central unit of production and reproduction) could 
adopt, its choice depended on the relative success or failure of other strategies (Siiskonen 
1998:220). By the late-1970s, the production of food and shelter by black Namibians - as the 
basic requirements for the reproduction of a household - amounted at most to four percent ofthe 
territory's gross production as compared to an average of 15 to 25% in sub-Saharan Africa (CIIR 
and BCC 1981: 16). The 'subsistence' household was therefore incapable of surviving on its own 
production alone.19 1ncreasingly, the only source of money entering the local economy was the 
earnings of migrant workers. MOOl'som (1977 : 55) and McKittrick (1998:250-1) convincingly 
argue that the critical point at which the balance of objective class interests passed from peasant 
to proletarian status came in the 1950s when the migrant's family was absolutely dependent on 
his wages for daily living costs such as food. 
A complex web of statutory regulations that permeated almost every aspect of the working and 
domestic lives of black people in Namibia was introduced in this period to consolidate an 
apartheid-based labour market. The Natives (Urban Areas) Proclamation of 1951 provided for, 
among others, the establishment and administration of locations in proclaimed urban areas for 
exclusive occupation by authorised black inhabitants; restrictions on the rights of black people 
to enter the urban areas; the registration of all contracts of service entered into with black male 
employees by employers; the prohibition of unauthorised black females entering a proclaimed 
area; and the removal of redundant, "idle, dissolute or disorderly" black persons from the urban 
areas (Van Rooyen 1996: 152-3). Regulations issued in terms of section 32 of the Proclamation 
included the imposition of forced labour, dismissal or imprisonment of employees who were 
found guilty of a refusal to obey an employer's instruction or being disrespectful to an employer; 
being negligent in the performance of their duties; being absent from work or fail ing to report for 
work on time; being absent from work with the intent to abscond or entering the service of 
another employer. 
18 For example: in 1952 it was noted that every family at Otjimbingwe only had access to two percent of 
the land recommended for an economic farming un it in that part of the Karibib District by the Minimum Size of 
Farms Commission of 1946 (Fuller 1998:202). 
19 Urban black households were scarcely belter off. An austere Poverty Datum Line for Windhoek estimated 
a minimum of R50.82 as necessary in 1967 for a family of five to live on per month. A survey in the same year 
revealed that on ly 13% of the city's black workers earned more than R50 a month, on ly 5% earned over R60, while 
80% earned between R20-49, 63% under R40 and 7% under R20 (SWAPO 198 1 :74). 
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This network of statutory regulations allowed for the maximum utilisation of black labour 
without conceding any effective means of social and political mediation. A letter signed by a 
group ofOvambo contract workers in the early-1970s clearly reveals that, for migrant workers, 
"there are no means of self-protection" (cited in Cronje and Cronje 1979:33). The lack of control 
by migrant workers over the disposition and deployment of their labour not only deprived them 
of bargaining power, but also effectively undermined the acquisition of cumulative skills and 
experience, regular wage increases, pensions and other non-wage benefits. As Gottschalk 
(1978:88) points out: 
[sjtatutOIY indenture placed African workers under an industrial disc ipline akin to mal1ial law .. . Namibian 
migrant workers were not hired, but 'recruited' at a ' depot'. As 'recruits' they did not choose their 
employer, but a 'master' sent a 'requisition order' for 'recruits ' to be 'drafted' to him. 
As the struggle for national liberation gathered momentum, a range of draconian security laws 
passed by the South African government after 1948 were extended to Namibia.20 In the eyes of 
the South African government, industrial action by black workers was an integral part of 
resistance to its policies and had to be suppressed along with SW APO's other activities. The 
banning of persons and publications; the harassment, detention and torture of political activists; 
the prohibition on public meetings; and the general suppression of oppositional activity 
authorised by these laws had deleterious consequences for the normal activities associated with 
trade unionism (Simons 1967; Gottschalk 1978; IDAFSA 1980; Konig 1983). Provisions in the 
Regulations for the Administration of the District of Ova mba land of 1972, for example, declared 
any unauthorised meeting of more than five people unlawful , and stipulated that any individual 
who made a statement or committed any act that could be deemed 'subversive', or who took part 
in any boycott with the objective of causing another individual loss or disadvantage, was guilty 
of an offence. Likewise, the Terrorism Act of 1967 defined 'terrorism' in such broad terms as to 
include 'prejudicing any industry or undertaking' or ' causing financial loss to any person or the 
state'. Under the General Law (Amendment) Act of 1962, the definition of ' sabotage' included 
actions calculated to disrupt power supplies, communications, the distribution of food, and other 
public services. 21 
The Wage and Industrial Conciliation Ordinance of 1952 constituted the statutory framework 
of collective labour regulation in Namibia until the promulgation of the post-independence 
Labour Act in 1992. The Ordinance provided for a system of wage determination through the 
20 These laws included the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Suppression a/Communism Act of 1951, the 
Public Safety Act of 1953, the Ri%us Assemblies Ac/ of 1956, and the Terrorism Act of 1967. 
21 Both 'sabotage' and 'terrorism' as defmed in these laws carried a maximum penalty ofa death sentence. 
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investigative mechanism of a Wage Board; the registration and regulation of trade unions and 
employers' associations; and the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes through 
Conciliation Boards (lDAFSA 1980:30; Van Rooyen 1996: 154-6). Until 1978, farm and 
domestic workers, the bulk of public sector employees, and all black workers were excluded from 
key provisions such as the right to register a trade union, access dispute resolution mechanisms, 
and engage in a lawful strike. Where the law did not explicitly discriminate against black 
workers, administrative action readily achieved the same effect. While trade unions organised 
by and for African workers were not unlawful, they were assigned to "an institutional vacuum" 
(Dekker et aI1975:211). Since wages were supposedly set in tem1S of investigations by the Wage 
Board and black workers were reliant on the police as arbiters in disputes with their employers, 
the capacity of workers and their unions to jointly regulate terms and conditions of employment 
was effectively el iminated. This meant that the employment relationship of black workers 
continued to be governed primarily by common law, leaving considerable scope for unilateral 
managerial regulation and encouraging \'arious forms of informal or hidden resistance. 
A lack of statutory protection - compounded by other racially discriminatory measures, low levels 
of formal education and training, the workplace practi ces of white employers, and the 
exclusionary tactics by white trade unions - confined black workers to the most menial and 
unskilled jobs. The black labour force showed remarkably little differentiation in terms of wages, 
skills and status. Employers also tended to treat their black employees as a largely uniform and 
undifferentiated grouping. The control of employers over migrant workers was further enhanced 
by the use of numerous subcontracting companies, especially on the mines (Rogers 1978: 140). 
Renewed efforts at forming trade unions during the 1950s were quickly suppressed by the police 
and generally did little to improve conditions of employment for migrant workers (First 
1963 :197). Moreover, workers' struggles were effectively subordinated to the struggle for 
national liberation as SW APO sought a political solution to problems in the workplace. Enduring 
trade unions for black workers would not emerge until the mid-1980s. 
The occupational structure of most enterprises in Namibia reflected a systematic racial 
discrimination: a majority of unskilled, largely manual, jobs filled almost exclusively by black 
workers, and a predominantly white administrative, technical , supervisory and managerial 
hierarchy. By the late-1 970s, whites held over 90% of senior supervisory, professional and 
technical jobs whi le 85% of black workers were employed as 'general labourers' (SWAPO 
1981 :66). From the 1960s onwards, a rudimentary system of centralised labour inspection and 
administration was developed primarily to regulate the employment conditions of white workers. 
The latter were the only beneficiaries of advances made in collective representation, the 
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conciliation of industrial disputes, social security, health and safety in the workplace, and 
occupational training. For example, compensation for injuries sustained by black workers was 
either non-existent or substantially lower than that received by white workers (Andersson and 
Marks 1987:277). The small white workforce Crable 2.1) enjoyed the benefits of extensive job 
security, comparatively high wages, trade union representation, labour market mobility, and 
institutionalised collective bargaining. Until 1972, the system of contract migrant labour bound 
black workers to jobs with wages worth about five per cent of white wages (Leys and Saul 
1995b: I 0) . The manufacturing sector was to remain relatively weak and without a decisive role 
in the structuring of labour supplies up to the 1970s. The labour market conditions necessary to 
sati sfy its labour needs - a settled, semi-skilled urban proletariat - were strenuously resisted by 
the authorities and conflicted with the powerful interests of mining capital whose prime concern 
was the preservation of the migrant labour system. The latter, as we noted above, presupposes 
the denial of urban residence and acquired skill s. 
Table 2.1 Employment Structure by Economic Sector: 1977 
SECTOR WHITE BLACK TOTAL 
Number (%) Number (%) Number (%) 
White-owned Agriculture 6500 (17.8) 50000 (20.7) 56500 (20.3) 
Fishing 500 (1.4) 7000 (2.9) 7500 (2.7) 
Minin g & Quarrying 3 500 (9.6) 19000 (7.9) 22500(8.1) 
Ma nu fact urin g, Electricity & Water 2750 (7.5) 10250 (4.2) 13000 (4.7) 
Construction I 750 (4.8) 13 250 (5.5) 15000 (5.4) 
Transport & Communication I 000 (2.7) II 500 (4 .8) 12500 (4.5) 
Commerce & Finance 5000 (13.7) 20 000 (8.3) 25000 (9.0) 
Government & Other 15500 (42.5) 18 000 (7.5) 33500 (12.1) 
Domestic Se rvice .. _-- 75 000 (31.1) 75000 (27.0) 
Unemployed ----- 17500 (7.2) 17 500 (6.3) 
TOTAL 36500 241 500 278 000 
(Source: Cronje and Cronje 1979:23). 
Working conditions were uniformly harsh and often dangerous, subject to crude forms of 
managerial control ranging from "the regimented discipline of the big mines to the arbitrary 
vio lence of many small employers in the towns and on the ranches" (SWAPO 1981:78). Many 
employers were a law unto themselves and workers faced automatic reprisals if they aspired to 
any meaningful levels of collective influence on their conditions of employment. The power of 
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employers rested on victimisation, harassment, fear of job loss and repatriation, discriminatory 
laws, and an extensive system of state repression 22 An overriding emphasis on cost-cutting 
meant that the provision of safety equipment, training and the like was regarded as an 
unwarranted expense23 This almost unmediated search for higher profits was reflected in a 
system oflabom regulation in which the productivity oflabour was made directly dependent on 
the coercive powers of the supervisor. As Gordon's (1982:138) research shows, white 
supervisors regarded black workers as "indolent, irresponsible, primitive, impulsive and dirty, 
[lacking] honesty, drive and ambition" and acted accordingly. 
In order to get the work done, however, both supervisors and workers had to subvert the system 
to some extent. An informal system of labour regulation with its own rules, punishments, 
privileges, and rewards constituted the dominant social characteristic of the workplace (Gordon 
1982:139).lt is this informal system that determined how workers were treated on a day-to-day 
basis and that shaped the manner in which workers conducted a struggle over the organisation 
of work. This ' unofficial' system of rights and responsibilities in the workplace was, however, 
highly dependent on managerial acquiescence and strictly subservient to the demands of profit 
maximisation. As Hyman (1989:85) argues, "if such 'social regulation' erodes the control of 
management over the labour process it can be characterised not as workers' control but as 
anarchy and disorder", thereby providing a basis for the reassertion of managerial prerogatives. 
Colonial despotism presupposed a ready supply of cheap black labour and mechanisms of 
managerial control capable of enforcing coercive production relations. The compound system, 
as the distinctive institution of labour regulation under colonialism, facilitated "almost 
totalitarian swveillance" of the workforce (Burawoy 1985:228). However, as Beinart (1987: 186) 
notes, migrants were not atomised labour units but remained "locked into constantly reshaped 
groups born out of specific interactions between their life in the rural areas and at labom centres". 
A classic example of oral history graphically shows that, while contract labourers experienced 
considerable oppression and exploitation in the workplace, they also fought back against this 
system (Ndadi 1989). Pilfering, deliberate damage to employers' property, acting excessively 
'stupid', desertion, and go-slows continued to be the most common responses to colonial 
22 It is misleading, however, to talk of management having "total control over the labour force" (SWAPO 
1981 :85 . emphasis added). A labour process can rare ly. if ever. be designed to entirely eliminate the need for 
initiative and cooperation from workers. 
23 Following the belated introduction of legislation aimed at minimising work-related injuries and diseases 
during the 1980s. the state increasingly called for the financial burden for occupational health and safety to be carried 
by "the very employers who have shown such scant regard for workers' health in the past" (Andersson and Marks 
1987:292). 
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despotism in the workplace.24 The very institutionalisation of labour controls, according to 
Moorsom (1977 :76), "induced the verbal transmission of common tactics and accepted standards 
of reciprocity". Examples of this emergent solidarity include the refusal by contract workers to 
work in certain districts (Gottschalk 1978:89) and the regular exchange of infonnation on labour 
market conditions such as wages, working conditions, and the attitudes of employers (Moorsom 
1978: 109-1 0; Gebhardt 1978: 156-7; Gordon 1978b: 121; Peltola 1995:76-7). The despotic nature 
of labour regulation was therefore decisive in eliminating forms of struggle between informal 
resistance and an attack on the colonial regime itself. The high costs of striking or open defiance 
compelled black workers to avoid organised, collective forms of struggle and to protect the 
identity of their leaders. In addition to being vulnerable to suppression and isolation, collective 
resistance in the workplace had rarely secured any meaningful victories. 
The maintenance of the migrant labour system depended, therefore, on the suppression of the 
ability of migrants to influence the institutions that subordinate them to capital and other sectors 
of the working class. On the political level, it is more difficult for migrants to establish and 
sustain trade union structures. They are, by definition, a highly substitutable labour force. In 
contrast, the black workers who resided in the urban townships constituted a far more solid 
material basis for continuous and effective trade union control over conditions of employment. 
Moreover, the mediating role oflabour-supplying insti tutions on the employment relationship 
provided an institutional support for the despotic forms of control exercised over migrant 
workers in the workplace. Labour migration should thus be analysed 
in terms of specific (economic) sites of incorporation of migrant labour and specific (political) modes of 
control over incorporation ... [That is, in terms of] its attractiveness, at certain points in the history of 
capitalist development, to particular sectors of economic activity under particular conditions of political 
control (Gibson and Graham 1986: 134). 
Although black workers were explicitly prohibited from engaging in industrial action under threat 
of severe penalties, strikes and other forms of labour protest did occur sporadically throughout 
this period (Gordon 1975). In this regard, the compound system proved to be both a source of 
solidarity and collective consciousness for migrant workers and a basis for enhanced control and 
surveillance by employers. While it was susceptible to the monitoring and divisive practices by 
the authorities, a compound is a "breeding ground for strikes and all kinds of protests ... [through 
which] tribal identities were relatively easily overcome" (Peltola 1995:76-7). Gottschalk's 
24 For examp le: a memorandum submitted to the Executive Committee of South West Africa in 1964 
revealed that 4 817 workers absconded between 1961 and 1963, and cited bad food, poor accommodation, regular 
assaults by employers, and arbitrary job placements as the main reasons for this form of resistance (Van Rooyen 
1996: 175). 
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(1978:90-1) study of archival material reveals 24 overt public strikes from 1916 to 1972, 11 of 
which occurred between 1952 and 1968. This low level of organised and collective industrial 
action reflects "the totalitarian character of repression ... [that] compelled the workers to 
concentrate on informal acts of resistance and protest, often as the only possibility left for 
counteraction" (Melber 1983: 154). Other factors that may have contributed to the low levels of 
strike activity include the relatively small size of the formal economy; the dispersed nature of 
employment and the corresponding lack of large concentrations of workers; the high labour turn-
over and precarious nature of employment associated with the contract labour system. As Cronje 
and Cronje (1979:78) point out, however, employers had no desire to publicise poor industrial 
relations and the colonial authorities were anxious to avoid international attention being focussed 
on the disputed territory. Hence, official and other records may significantly under-report the 
actual incidence of industrial action. 
A resurgence of confidence and militancy found expression in the first national strike in Namibia 
- involving 15 000 to 20 000 workers - that paralysed key sectors of the economy from December 
1971 to January 1972.25 [( took employers and the state completely by surprise. The main reasons 
for this unprecedented industrial action revolved primarily around the contract labour system as 
administered by SW ANLA26 The widespread support and successful organisation of the strike, 
given the absence of trade unions, suggests an appeal to grievances shared by the black 
popUlation as a whole. The call, odalate naiteke (break the wire), reverberated throughout the 
territory. Striking workers demanded a 'free' labour market - in effect, demanding the abolition 
of a central pi llar of apartheid-colonial domination (Kooy 1971; Kane-Berman 1972; Gottschalk 
1978; Moorsom 1979; Hishongwa 1992). The manifestly political objectives of the strike 
reflected the fact that workers regarded their employment conditions as a form of' slavery' in 
which they were literally bought and sold (Dekker et aI1975:229; Kane-Berman 1972:24; Cronje 
and Cronje 1979:80). Given the reinforcing nature of economic and political grievances, 
workplace struggles were inextricably inteltwined with those of national liberation and freedom 
from racial oppression. 
As the largest and longest strike in Namibia's history, the mass action of 1971-72 played a 
profound role in eroding the credibility of South Africa's newly created tribal authorities; 
heightening the political consciousness and co llective confidence of workers; and undermining 
25 More than 13 000 of those who actively participated in the strike were migrant workers. 
26 The number of SWANLA recruits increased from 13 424 in 1946 to 22 752 in 1955, and by 1971 this 
figure had reached approximately 40 000 (Van Rooyen 1996: 174). 
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the stability of the apartheid-based mode oflabour regulation. The strike was coordinated through 
a strike conuniltee whose members were elected on a regional basis, thereby incorporating clear 
democratic governing principles into the structure of the nascent labour movementY This wide-
spread resistance to the migrant labour system provided the spark that re-ignited the struggle for 
national liberation as it broadened into a generalised opposition to South Africa's occupation of 
Nanlibia. SWAPO's national organisation and branch structures proved to be pivotal in the scale 
and efficacy of the general strike (Moorsom 1978: 129). The links it established between 
economic and political issues strengthened the bonds between worker action and political action. 
To be sure, SW APO was closely linked to the aspirations and grievances of migrant workers and 
had its historical roots "deep in the contract labour system which forms the economic core of 
apattheid in Namibia" (Cronje and Cronje 1979: I 02). Although migrant workers constituted the 
most oppressed part of the labour force, they proved to be the backbone of both the liberation 
movement and militant trade unionism (Kane-Berman 1972; Moorsom 1977; Cullinan 1982; 
Herbstein and Evenson 1989). Moorsom (1979 :21 0) shows that migrant workers developed a 
perception of the need for collective action and political struggle that went beyond the 
occupational consciousness entailed by Gordon's notion of 'brotherhood' .28 
The response by the colonial authorities and white employers to the mass strike was as extreme 
as it was predictable. Negotiation with strike leaders was never an option. The strike was publicly 
denounced as the work of 'agitators' and ' intimidators' , striking workers were dismissed, food 
rations were withheld from workers living in labour compounds, many of their leaders were 
detained, and the threat of heavy fines and prison sentences hung like a sword over the necks of 
all those participating in the strike. Many of the striking workers demanded to be repatriated to 
Ovamboland in a bid to demonstrate their rejection of the 'slavery' implicit in the migrant labour 
system (Von Kotze 1974:45; Dekker et at 1975 :228; Cronje and Cronje 1979:82; Minter 
1986:243). The strike committee had agreed that prior to any negotiations with the authorities, 
"the men should go back to the land to raise as big a crop as possible to make Ovambo 
independent of contract labour" (cited in Kane-Berman 1972:32). This strategy by the strikers 
was designed to "exploit tactically the duality of their class position" (Moorsom 1977:84). 
Ironically, this suited the authorities since it ensured the dispersal and removal of striking 
27 There has been some debate on whether the strike was organised or spontaneous, and whether the 
organisers of the strike operated independently of SW APO and without a formal organ isational structure (compare 
Moorsom 1977:82; SWAPO 1981:192; Wood 1987b:92; Peltola 1995:110-4; and Bauer 1997:62). 
28 It should be noted, however, that not all migrant workers supported the mass strike. Production workers 
at Consolidated Diamond Mines decided not to engage in an indefinite strike, fearing that it would jeopardise their 
high wages, good compound conditions, virtually permanent employment, and the conciliatory attitude of 
management (Moorsom 1977:83). 
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workers from the 'white' industrial and residential areas. 
As the struggle broadened and spilled over into Ovamboland, the colonial regime unleashed a 
reign oftelTor: a state of emergency was declared that banned all public gatherings, concentration 
camps were erected to hold detainees, and people who gathered in groups were shot at and killed. 
Ultimately, the workers could not escape a major contradiction in their strategy: "although access 
to peasant resources considerably expanded their power to prolong resistance, they could no 
longer, as a matter of inescapable necessity, opt out of wage-labour indefinitely" (MoOl'som 
1977:86). The limits to mass collective action by black workers under apartheid-colonialism were 
starkly revealed by the subsequent consolidation of job discrimination and influx control. The 
mass strike did, however, signal to the colonial authority and employers that the prevailing 
system of labour regulation was no longer capable of containing the aspirations and militancy of 
black workers. 
Under the combination of worker demands for employment reforms and pressure fi-om prominent 
element in the business sector to have the flow of labour 'normalised', the colonial authority 
finally relented and agreed to dissolve SW ANLA and to ameliorate the harsher aspects of the 
migrant labour system. 29 However, the proclamations of 1972 and 1973 that established tribal 
labour bureaux and repealed statutes such as the Master and Servant Proclamation of 1920, 
clearly highlighted the narrow parameters of the state's 'reform' process. The stipulations for the 
functioning of the labour bureaux were symptomatic of an unwillingness by the colonial power 
to depart, in any meaningful sense, from its underlying oppressive and segregationist objectives 
(Kane-Benuan 1972:3; Cronje and Cronje 1979:38-41 ; Van Rooyen 1996: 159-63). A vast system 
of labour bureaux recruited, classified and enforced the temporary employment contracts of 
migrant workers. These workers were rigidly classified in terms of specified categories of 
employment30 Such classification was not easily changed and therefore allowed the bureaux to 
structure the secondary labour markets according to the specific types of labour needed by the 
different economic sectors. As a result, annual indenture to an individual employer was replaced 
by lifetime indenture to a particular occupation. 
29 A report by the Director of Bantu Labour in 1961 observed that SWANLA had become ensconced "as 
a powerful, virtually autonomous body in an economically sensitive, strategic sphere" (cited in Van Rooyen 
1996: 174). The recruiting organisation's position was further bolstered by the fact that it operated, at a considerable 
profit, an extensive trading network and retail monopoly in the communal areas (Moorsom 1977:65) . 
JO After 1972, all migrants seeking employment were confined to one of the fo llowing economic sectors : 
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, trading, central and local government, domestic service, and other 
(Gottschalk 1978:96). 
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Although they were no longer obliged to carry passes, black workers still required permission to 
enter the urban areas and Native Commissioners were empowered to set aside employment 
contracts and have any worker removed from a proclaimed area if found guilty of misconduct, 
unsatisfactory service, a refusal to obey instructions, or any other action regarded as "detrimental 
to the employer's interests" (cited in Van Rooyen 1996 : 160). The abolition in 1975 of penal 
sanctions fo r breaches of contract and other oppressive clauses in the Master and Servant laws 
were effectively nullified by provisions in other laws that contained similar measures. For 
example, administrative controls of 'deserters' were made much more rigorous and imposed fines 
on the relevant tribal authority. The attitudes of most white employers towards thei r black 
employees also remained largely unchanged and the new identity documents could potentially 
serve as another form of pass book. Furthermore, qualifYing thresholds in social security 
legislation - demanding 'continuous' employment with one employer - effectively excluded most 
migrant workers from pensions and other welfare provisions. Findings by a committee of the 
Turnhalle Constitutional Conference in 1975 showed that only 11.6% of the labour force was 
eligible for pension schemes (IDAFSA 1980:2 1). Finally, emergency proclamations applicable 
to the northern areas of Namibia, covering more than half of the population, continued to render 
these no-go areas for anyone without an official permit. In the words of Gottschalk (1978:94): 
while there was much cosmetic tinkering (,masters' and 'servants' became 'employers' and 'employees', 
'compounds' were renamed 'hostels', 'deseI1ers' were mitigated into merely 'absconders', and the 'Ovambo 
native tribes ' and 'Okavango native tribes' were constitutionally transmigrated into the 'Ovambo' and 
' Kavango Bantu nations') migrant workers were not pennitted to settle permanently at their places of 
employment, could still not be accompan ied by their wives and families, and still had to live in ' men-only' 
compounds ... In short, there was no abolition of the migrant labour system, merely an updating of it and 
a 'new name for wire'. 
Police raids, control gates in the compounds, the black-listing of 'agitators' and ' deserters', and 
other racially-based measures proved to be an effective means of perpetuating the contract labour 
system and confining 'trouble-makers' to the bantustans (Gordon 1977:20). A white personnel 
officer noted that a 'black-list' was one of the more effective informal rules at the di sposal of 
Labour Officers - 'listed' people "simply find that there is no work available for them" (cited in 
SWAPO 1981:85). It is also virtually impossible for a worker to appeal against his listing since 
the Labour Officer would deny the existence of a black-list. Hence, the 'reform' process simply 
reconfigured the controls established over the incorporation, allocation, control and reproduction 
of the black labour force , leaving pre-1972 apartheid labour market policies fundamentally intact. 
The reaction of employers to the potential threat of a relaxation in labour regulations in the wake 
ofthe general strike was to form associations aimed at minimising the competition for labour and 
establishing some uniformity in wage rates. White farmers, in particular, expressed deep concern 
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at the prospect of competing with the mines and industry for labour. The Divisional Inspector of 
Labour played an active part in encouraging employers to form associations, to eliminate wage 
competition, and to oppose a basic recruiting wage on the grounds that "the Ovambos would see 
the extra one or two cents as a sign of weakness and agitate for more" (cited in Kane-Berman 
1972: 1 0). The rigid segmentation of the labour market by the labour bureaux was aimed at 
restricting inter-sectoral wage competition for migrant workers; whereas the formation of 
oligopsonistic wage-fixing cartels by employers in each economic sector was geared towards 
limiting intra-sectoral wage competition. Although these interventions played a significant role 
in structuring the nature and levels of competition for migrant labour, they did not succeed in 
eliminating the often substantial variation in wage levels between industries and occupations. 
Although the wages of black workers increased (often significantly) after the mass strike, some 
black workers still received a cash wage of only R4.50 per month; while skilled and semi-ski lled 
Coloured workers, who were less restricted in their choice of occupation, earned upwards of 
R150 per month (Gottschalk 1978:93 ; Cronje and Cronje 1979:44; Minter 1986:243 ; Peltola 
1995:269). In 1977, whites were earning on average R3 000 per annum, while the average annual 
wage for black Namibians was Rl25 (CIIR and BCC 1981:31). Despite the wages of black mine 
workers moving ahead of those in other sectors, they still only amounted to half of the average 
white miner's salary. The appallingly low cash wages of most black workers were often justified 
by the provision offood, accommodation and other 'fringe benefits' by employers. Workers had 
no say in the range of deductions made from their wages, and the payments in kind that were 
received in lieu of cash were generally of poor quality.31 Wage levels also continued to vary 
significantly between and within the different economic sectors. In the 1976, unskilled and semi-
skilled workers earned between R70-1 00 per month on the mines and fishing vessels; R40-60 in 
state employment, factories and urban commerce; R30-40 in catering and hospitality; and Rl 0-20 
in agriculture and domestic service (SWAPO 1981 :76-7). 
After the mass strike, some employers' organisations issued a public acknowledgement that 
racial discrimination in the workplace must be el iminated, conflict between management and 
labour must be minimised, and black workers should be allowed to legally join trade unions 
(Bauer 1997:66-7). From the late-1970s onwards a number of larger employers, mostly 
international companies in the mining and industrial sectors, noted that the contract labour 
system did not actually suit their operational needs. As MacFarlane notes, a highly sophisticated, 
capital-intensive production process such as that found at Rossing Uranium, "did not lend itself 
31 The abolition of this paternalistic system of <fi'inge beneAts' was one of the demands made by migrant 
workers during the mass strike. 
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to operation by an unskilled, semi-proletarianised and transient workforce" (cited in Bauer 
1997:66). A fully proletarianised, settled and trained workforce was required. A general advance 
in technology during this period meant that more and more jobs demanded skills, experience, and 
the ini tiative that comes with more hegemonic forms of labour regulation. After 1972, an 
increasing number of farmers also displayed a dislike fo r migrant workers: they apparently lacked 
efficiency, come on contract fo r short periods only, were 'disloyal' and had a tendency to 'desert' 
without giving notice (Gebhardt 1978: 151) . 
Not all employers in Namibia shared these sentiments and there were widespread calls for the 
reintroduction of the criminal sanctions attached to a breach of contract in the master and servant 
laws. Some employers also introduced 'works' or ' liaison' committees - modelled on those found 
in South Afi·ica - as a means of circumventing the demands for trade union representation. These 
committees were a poor substitute fo r independent trade union action and lacked credibility 
among black workers. Since they were organised along ethnic lines and could only make 
' recommendations' to employers, the committees were generally regarded as subservient and 
effectively powerless to influence managerial decisions. Due to the absence of formal collective 
representation in the workplace, workers often turned to community-based organisations and 
churches with problems relating to wages, accommodation, and the like. 
Strike activity showed a marked rise during the early-1 970s, with 36 strikes occurring in the 
critical period of 1970 to 1972. The strikes were concentrated in the mining, construction, fishing 
and manufacturing industries. The main causes of industrial action from 1969 to 1977 revolved 
around wages (about 50%), with more than 70% of the participants being contract migrant 
workers (Van Rooyen 1996:174). Given the regular recourse to summary 'repatriation' and the 
arrest of striking workers, these figures clearly highlight the deep-seated resentment of the 
oppressive and exploi tative conditions in the workplace by the migrants. Reflecting the size of 
firms and the economy, 58.3% of strikes involved less than 100 workers, with only four strikes 
involving more than 500 employees (Van Rooyen 1996: 174). The national strike of 1971 -72 was 
therefore exceptional in terms of both its scale and scope. 
2.3.3 Reform and Repression in the Transition to Independence: 1977 - 1989 
The third period of South African rule commenced with the accession to office of Justice M.T. 
Steyn as Administrator-General of Namibia and concluded with the elections for a constituent 
assembly under United Nations supervision. This period witnessed the gradual loosening of 
Namibia's political ties with South Africa by successive semi-autonomous administrations, and 
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the preparation for the passage to political sovereignty and national independence. In other 
words, the policy of incorporation was superseded by a policy of creating a dependent Namibian 
economy under neo-colonial rule . Statutory reforms were aimed at unravelling and partially 
amending - through a process of "controlled change" (Du Pisani 1982) - the plethora of 
discriminatory laws promulgated in the preceding decades. Although the bulk of these legislative 
changes did not target the labour market specificall y, they nevertheless had a notable impact on 
the lives of many black workers. The abolition of some explicitly discriminatory policies and the 
introduction of limited political reforms were, however, accompanied by an intensification of 
repressive measures to counteract the challenges posed to South African hegemony by the 
escalating war of liberation. In Namibia during the 1980s, as in South Africa, the state pursued 
a policy framework with a contradictory combination of reform and repression. This was the 
product of both popular resistance and struggles for dominance within the power bloc (Leys and 
Saul 1995a). 
This period of South African rule saw some significant changes on the macro level of labour 
regulation when compared to the previous periods. The processes of deracialisation became 
particularly pronounced from 1985 onwards when it becan1e increasingly evident that Namibia's 
independence from South Africa was imminent. This found expression in the increasingly 
reformist policies of the interim Transitional Government of National Unity and the resurgent 
activism of the SW APO-aligned trade union movement, the National Union of Namibian 
Workers (NUNW). On the micro level, by contrast, changes were less forthcoming. In general, 
employers retained their conservative, paternalistic orientation towards their employees and clung 
stubbornly to established workplace structures and practices (Van Rooyen 1996: 194). In 1986, 
Ben Ulenga (then secretary general of the Mineworkers' Union of Namibia) described the "social 
and economic misery" of Namibian workers : starvation wages; 18-hour working day (in a 
Windhoek brickyard); lack of transport; brutal treatment; bad food and housing; if it was granted 
at all, leave was unpaid; workers were dismissed without notice or reason; and pregnant women 
were compelled to work until confinement and then dismissed (cited in ILO 1989:83). 
The growing importance attached to ' normalised ' industrial relations in official policy and 
legislation, as well as the rapidly changing socio-economic and political environment, 
encouraged some of the larger (mostly foreign-owned) enterprises to reassess and transform their 
employment practices. Coupled with the need for a more skilled and stable workforce, big 
business in Namibia desperately sought to secure more orderly and predictable behaviour from 
its employees. Moorsom (1980) highlights the tensions that arose between the multi-national 
corporations, which attempted to secure their long-term interests by accommodating to a post-
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colonial regime, and the farmers and local business sector who would not concede or could not 
afford even minimal concessions. The statement issued by the Namibian Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (NCCI) in 1989, in which it belatedly committed itself to fair and just employment 
practices, did not carry widespread support among employers. Moreover, as we shall see in the 
chapters below, even those employers that supp0l1ed a more hegemonic form oflabour regulation 
were eager to confine it to as small a group of employees as possible. 
The General Law Amendment Proclamation of 1977, the Wage and Industrial Conciliation 
Amendment Proclamation of 1978, the National Labour Council Act of 1986, and the Conditions 
of Employment Act of 1986 seemed to herald a significant departure from previous patterns of 
labour regulation. Key components in this policy shift, reflecting similar trends in South Africa, 
were the introduction of certain fundamental human rights into the industrial relations system, 
the elimination of overtly discriminatory provisions in employment laws, and the establishment 
of a tripartite consultative forum on labour-related matters. More specifically, these legislative 
changes removed some restrictions on the spatial mobility of black labour; curtailed some of the 
more extensive powers of officials in the labour bureaux with regard to the placement of migrant 
workers; allowed black workers to form and join trade unions and to avail themselves of the 
statutory dispute-resolution mechanisms; and established minimum statutory conditions of 
employment with regard to matters such as working hours, annual and sick leave, meal intervals, 
and the termination of employment. While these statutOlY provisions clearly signalled a shift in 
the substance and direction oflabour regulation , they were often superficial in nature and their 
impact was severely constrained by other legislative and institutional factors. Entrenched 
apartheid policies and an inadequate institutional framework, according to a report by the ILO 
(1989 :77), "considerably weakened the impact of this legislation". 
Some of the factors that combined to dilute or subvert the impact of these statutory provisions 
include the following. First, the Conditions of Employment Act only regulated individual 
employment relations and many employers blatantly circumvented its provisions. In many 
respects, these provisions merely reflected established practice in some of the larger films (Bauer 
1997:72). Second, the continued dominance of common law principles in the interpretation and 
application of employment contracts reinforced the individualistic and authoritarian employment 
relationship rooted in the master and servant imagery of earlier forms of labour regulation. Third, 
existing restrictions on the rights of employees in the agricultural, domestic service and public 
sectors to par1icipate in the statutory industrial relations system remained unaltered. Fourth, trade 
unions and employers' organisations were still prohibited from affil iating to , and granting or 
receiving any financial assistance from, a political party. Fifth, racial discrimination in the access 
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to skilled, high-wage occupations continued largely unchecked. The sheer scale of racial 
differentiation in the labour market is perhaps most clearly revealed by the fact that more than 
90% of the unemployed were black (Thomas I 983b:50- I). Paid employment covered less than 
hal f of the black labour force. 
Sixth, the limited financial and human resources at the disposal of the Directorate of Manpower 
in Windhoek meant that the administration of the country's employment statutes remained 
woefully inadequate . Labour inspections, for example, were sporadic, limited to certain regions 
and sectors of the economy, and hence largely ineffective. Finally, the tripartite National Labour 
Council, established in an attempt to institutionalise labour regulation at a macro level, excluded 
the majority unions affiliated to the NUNW and suffered from a serious lack of resources and 
expertise. As a result, it languished at the margins of policy formulation, devoid of any 
meaningful credibility. 
Of particular significance in constraining the pace and scope of the reform process, were the 
numerous statutory provisions designed to suppress the forces of national liberation and to 
prevent the politicisation of black trade unions. These draconian security measures, like those of 
the preceding period, placed severe restrictions on the freedom of movement and assembly; 
granted extraordinary powers of interrogation, search and detention to the security forces ; and 
seriously undermined the credibility and efficacy of reform initiatives undertaken in other areas. 
The SADF was a dominant part of the machinery of repression, terrorising the general population 
and actively enforcing the exploitative economic structures and discriminatory racial policies 
(Konig 1983; Cawthra 1986; Herbstein and Evenson 1989; Weaver 1989). The foreign 
corporations that operated illegally in Namibia played an important role in the ' militarisation' 
of its economy through payments to state revenues, by accepting contracts for military 
infrastructure, and by arming and training their staff (Wood 1984). 
With the abolition of influx control, the enhanced geographical mobility of work-seekers led to 
rapidly rising levels of unemployment, poverty and informal housing in the urban areas. Since 
the pass laws had kept unemployment and poverty 'hidden' in the bantustans, freedom of 
mobility and the subsequent rise in the rate of urbanisation convelied a regional problem into a 
national problem. To compound matters, higher wages (especially in mining and manufacturing) 
led to more capital-intensive production at a time when no sector of the economy was able to 
absorb surplus labour (see chapter 4). By 1978, the municipal authorities were counting the costs 
of rapidly rising levels of unemployment, deteriorating economic conditions, a steady decline in 
business confidence, and large-scale retrenchments. The latter was in part a product of attempts 
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by employers to reduce their wage bill by replacing permanent township residents with migrant 
workers who were 'willing' to work for much lower wages. The drastic increase in female 
migration to the urban areas provided employers with a further source of cheap and disposable 
labour (Winterfeldt 2002). A circular sent to local employers by the Swakopmund Municipality 
in 1978 exhorted them to register all their workers, including casual labourers, to report all 
vacancies, and at all costs to reduce the temptation to "cut costs by sacking workers and 
employing others at lower rates" (cited in Cronje and Cronje 1979:97). For many individual 
capitalists, however, the advantages of such cheap labour policies consistently outweighed their 
disadvantages. 
The colonial character of the economy meant that the bulk of production was for export. This, 
in turn, meant that businesses did not rely on the local market and it therefore did not matter if 
most Namibians could not afford to buy their products. A report by the United Nations Institute 
for Namibia in 1977 describes Namibia as a "classic case of an economy which, in respect of 
goods, produces what it does not consume, and consumes what it does not produce" (cited in 
Herbstein and Evenson 1989: 132). So, for example, Namibia's entire supply of canned meat was 
imported because its own production was exported; and it re-imported from South Africa the 
very same canned pilchards which its factories produced for export. MOOl·som estimates that 90% 
of foreign company profits were expatriated in 1980 and describes how the distribution of 
national income exposed the "devastating impact of foreign exploitation most clearly". 
According to Moorsom, ifbusiness taxation is added to net profits, about 70% of gross domestic 
profit is swallowed up by gross profits - 40% by companies, 20% by taxation, 9% by small 
business. Another 18% goes to the wages of white employees, "whose functions are mainly to 
administer, supervise and control the black workers who actually produce the goods". This, he 
calculated, left a mere RI45 million, or 12% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), to the bulk of 
Namibia's population. About two thirds of this was wages, a tenth the cash earnings of small 
traders and transporters, and the remaining R25 million accrued to subsistence production in the 
bantustans (cited in Herbstein and Evenson 1989: 133). 
Long-tenn trends in Namibia's economic growth and development can be seen in Table 2.2. GDP 
increased at an impressive rate, rising from R140.9 million in 1960 to R321.3 million in 1970 
and Rl.327 billion in 1980. The disaggregation of Namibia's GDP by sector, however, clearly 
reveals its relatively unbalanced economic structure, with mining accounting for almost half of 
the total. From the late-1970s onwards, the nominal increase in GDP was less than the rate of 
inflation, indicating a negative GDP growth rate. The processing ofraw materials, one of the few 
options available for the development of manufacturing, has made few significant gains due to 
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a lack of skilled labour and a dependence on South African manufactured imports (see chapter 
4). The secondary industrial sector is not significant in terms of contribution to GDP, but 
employed about 16% of the workforce in the early-1980s (JowellI983:96). This sector is also 
vital to the long-term development and autonomy of the Namibian economy. In a comprehensive 
study, Thomas (1978, 1983b) disputes the claim of apartheid authorities that the Namibian 
economy was not viable as an independent entity and had little developmental potential. 
However, he (l983a) sounds a warning that Namibia is not the resource-rich and promising 
economy widely portrayed in the 1970s. 
Table 2.2 Gross Domestic Product: 1960-1980 
SECTOR 1960 1970 1980 
R i m (%) Ri m (%) Ri m (%) 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 20.5 (I4.6) 49.7 (15.5) 128.1 (9.6) 
M ining 47.6 (33.8) 105.1 (32.6) 632.7 (47 .7) 
Manufacturing 12.7 (9.0) 16.7 (5.2) 56.6 (4 .2) 
Electricity & Water - - -- ---- 3.7 (1.2) 26.3 (2.0) 
Construction 5.7 (4.0) 14.3 (4.5) 38.8 (2.9) 
Trade, Catering & Accommodation 17.2 (12.2) 32.8 (I0.2) 99.1 (7.5) 
Transport & Comm unication 12.0 (8.5) 24.6 (7.7) 76.7 (5.8) 
Financial Services 12.3 (8.7) 27.4 (8.5) 94.1 (7 .1) 
Community, Social & Personal 1.5 (1.1) 5.6 (1.7) 18.6 (I.4) 
General Government 8.8 (6 .2) 30.7 (9.6) 120.0 (9.0) 
Other Producers 2.6 (1.9) 10.5 (3.3) 37. 1 (2.8) 
(Source: adapted from Thomas 1983b:53). 
Whi le average living standards declined in real terms during the 1970s, the salaries of civil 
servants and employees in the formal sector of the economy increased during this period 
(Thomas 1983b:54). This suggests an even sharper drop in real living standards in the subsistence 
sector. The progressive deterioration of the resource base (land and water) in the bantustans, 
compounded by a lack of credit and development capital and the restrictions on trading, left these 
areas with little defences against the severe drought of the late-1970s. In 1977, income 
distribution in Namibia was probably the most unequal in the world (Allison and Green 1986:7). 
The wages of black workers still stood at a ratio of 1:25 in relation to white workers by 1988 
(lLO 1989:93). Household income far below subsistence levels was a reality for black people in 
the rural areas - i.e. the bulk of the population. In addition to the whites, a small black urban elite 
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benefitted disproportionately from developmental efforts throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The 
'Living Wage' campaign launched by the unions in 1986 graphically illustrated the inadequacy 
of minimum wage rates. Women consistently received the lowest wages, were concentrated in 
least skilled and most menial occupations, bore the brunt of unemployment, and were often 
confined to the fringes of the informal sector (Allison and Green 1986:19-22). The notional 
figure of R500 per month to feed a family of six in Katutura was within the reach of scarcely 
20% of the black population in 1986 (ILO 1989:90). Income inequality, as the table below 
indicates, increased during the 1980s and is structured along both racial and urban-rural lines. 
Table 2.3 Per Capita Gross Domestic Product (1980 US$) by Sector: 1980-1988 
YEAR WHITE BLACK SUBSISTENCE TOTAL 
1980 12380 900 59 1 140 
1984 11 236 759 62 953 
1988 12839 585 55 921 
(Source: Stone and Gaomab 1994: I 0). 
According to the Manpower Surveys of 1984 and 1988, the total labour force in Namibia was 
310000 and 430000 respectively (Van Rooyen 1996:212). The system of labour regulation 
during this period consisted of three distinct, yet partly inter-related, components (SW APO 
1981:66-8; Van Rooyen 1996: 182-3). The first component consisted of the formal, mainly 
statutory, system established by the Wage and Industrial Conciliation Ordinance, and 
subsequently augmented by the Conditions of Employment Act and the National Labour Council 
Act. This system of labour regulation was essentially tripartite in nature and catered for the 
formal private sector, excluding agriculture and domestic service and only partially incorporating 
the public sector. The second component consisted of the informal, mainly non-statutory, system 
of labour regulation. The common law and security laws had a significant impact on collective 
relations in this system. It was bipartite in character and encompassed the agricultural and 
domestic service sectors, as well as the informal sector and all unregistered trade unions and 
employers' organisations. 
The third component represented employees of the largest employer in the country, the 
government. Labour regulation in the public service system were governed primarily by the 
Government Service Act of 1980 and was administered by the Government Service Commission. 
Collective industrial relations were rudimentary and limited to isolated instances of consultations 
(as opposed to negotiations) between the Government Service Commission and a few public 
service staff associations. The manner and extent to which these three systems of labour 
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regulation were embedded in the society differed considerably. As a result, local and global 
pressures had a differential impact on their functioning and reproduction. While the formal 
system was largely endogenously determined, the informal system was decisively shaped by 
exogenous factors such as international pressure, the employment practices of multi-national 
corporations, and the struggle for national liberation. 
During this period of South African rule, especially from the mid-1980s onwards, there was a 
drastic expansion in development of trade unionism (Wood 1987a). The largely similar 
experiences of oppression and exploitation in the workplace by all black workers generated a 
common identity, 
existing and mixing with ethnic and rac ial identities: it may be called the Namibian working class. The first 
trade unions were an expression or that identity. But from the same influences grew the dominating new 
identity: Namibian nationalism (Peltola 1995:8 1). 
Trade union organisation among black workers had been largely sporadic and limited to a narrow 
range of occupations, industries and regions. The vast distances between sites of organisation, 
the lack of resources, the emphasis placed on the political struggle for independence, and the 
absence of a national federation meant that countrywide industrial unionism was non-existent 
until the late-1980s. The unions that did exist catered for the needs of a relatively passive, 
politically incorporated and minority white membership (Streek 1984). The removal of legal 
prohibitions on the registration of non-racial trade unions in 1978 paved the way for a new 
system of collective interest representation. Although the imposition of new restrictions on 
financial freedom and political affi li ation initially discouraged the unions aligned to the anti-
colonial struggle from registering, and hence being able to conclude enforceable collective 
agreements ; by the end of the 1980s, these unions were actively participating in the formal 
industrial relations regime. 
At least five factors contributed to this resurgence of black trade unionism. First, the transitional 
goverrunent which took office in 1985 expressly encouraged workers rights, collective bargaining 
and the growth of trade unions. For example: the Administrator-General refused to sign into law 
an amendment - aimed at curtailing the influence of the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSA TU) on Namibia's fledgling labour movement - that sought to prohibit non-Namibian 
citizens from assisting in the establishment of trade unions or becoming an office-bearer in any 
trade union (Van Rooyen 1996: 198). Second, several of the political prisoners released from 
detention on Robben Island in 1985 played a vital role in enhancing the coordinating functions 
of the trade unions and reactivating shop-steward structures in the workplace. Third, as the pace 
of the national I iberation struggle intensified, workers' expectations rose dramatically in 
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anticipation of Namibian independence. A broad anti-colonial consensus was established among 
workers, with the Council of Churches in Namibia and the Namibian National Students' 
Organisation playing a crucial role in legitimising and broadening the liberation struggle. FOUlth, 
the recession in the South African economy deepened into a structural or organic crisis from the 
mid-1980s onwards. The government ofP.W. Botha embarked on a cautious programme of 
'reforms' aimed at making apartheid more palatable to the international community and to extend 
its lease of life. This process of change opened new opportunities and terrains of struggle for 
worker organisations. 
Finally, the political significance of COSA TU cannot be underestimated. It not only provided a 
concrete exan1ple of social movement unionism closely aligned to a liberation movement, but 
also set a pattern for trade Ul1ion organisation and worker contro!." For example, the focus of the 
NUNW shifted from general to industrial unionism and it adopted the same organising principles 
as COSATU - namely, 'one union, one industry, one COUl1try, one federation'. This upsurge of 
trade unionism from 1986 onwards built on the victories of previous workplace struggles and 
learnt valuable lessons from past defeats, adding to the knowledge and expertise of grass-roots 
leadership. In the post-independence period, the Namibian trade Ul1ion movement has also drawn 
selectively on the strategies of 'radical reform' pursued by COSATU after 1994. These strategies, 
as Adler and Webster (1999: 144) point out, "combined long-term radical goals of social 
transformation with reformist strategies and tactics to achieve meaningful victories without 
provoking a 'hardliner' reaction". 
The majority of trade unions were either formally or informally affiliated to a federation. The 
most significant of these was the NUNW which was formerly established as a trade union 
federation in 1989. The trade unions that were affiliated to the NUNW at that stage were the 
Namibian Food and Allied Union (NAFAU), the Mineworkers' Union of Namibia (MUN), the 
Namibian Transport and Allied Union (NATAU), the Metal and Allied Namibian Workers' 
Union (MANWU), the Namibian Public Workers' Union (NAPWU) and the Namibian National 
Teachers' Union (NANTU). In its formative years, the NUNW prioriti sed the struggle for 
national liberation over the improvement of employment conditions under the colonial system 
(Melber 1983; Bauer 1997). As Ben Ulenga noted, it was impossible to separate the problems 
faced by workers from colonial oppression and therefore "the workers ' movement can only 
function as a part and parcel of the national liberation struggle" (cited in Wood 1987b:68). As 
l2 Ben Ulenga, a prominent figure in the revitalisation of the NUNW during the late-1980s, noted that "in 
South Africa they have a longer experience ... [and] links between [COSATU] and ourselves are quite strong now 
in terms of supporting each other morally, even materially" (cited in Wood 1987b:67). 
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we shall see in chapter 6, this strategic orientation had a significant impact on the unions' role 
in both the workplace and the wider society. The efficacy of trade union organisation during this 
period was heavily circumscribed by security laws, the official encouragement of collaborationist 
unions, and rising levels of poverty, marginalisation and unemployment. By the late-l 980s, an 
estimated 110 000 people were employed as migrant workers with effective trade unionism and 
rising wages confined to sectors with limited scope for further employment growth: the public 
(40000 employees), manufacturing (28500), and mining sectors (20 000). The bulk of the 240 
000 people 'employed' in so-called subsistence farming, 148 000 as tertiary sector workers, and 
56000 in commercial agriculture remained beyond the reach of the trade unions (ILO 1989:76). 
The NUNW played a major role in the consolidation of collective regulation in the workplace 
and continues to be the most influential trade union organisation in the country. There is very 
little evidence of the other trade union federations, such as the South West Africa Confederation 
of Labour and the Namibian Christian Social Trade Union, having had or presently having any 
meaningful influence on the course of collective labour regulation in Namibia. In sharp contrast 
to the rapid development and expansion of trade unionism in this period, the collective 
representation of employers remained partial and largely ineffective. With the exception of the 
Chamber of Mines and the Master Builders' Association, employers lacked a central, organised 
presence in the regulation of labour market issues. By definition, this excluded industry-wide 
collective bargaining and contt'ibuted towards the increasing variation in wage levels within and 
between the different economic sectors. 
The frequency of Conciliation Board applications showed a dramatic rise in the final three years 
of colonial rule, reflecting the upsurge in trade union activity during this period. The disputes 
involved (in order of importance) conditions of employment and wages, unfair dismissals, 
closed-shop agreements, and trade union recognition. Workers benefitting most from the high 
success rate in settling disputes (64.3%) were those in sectors, typically located in the larger 
urban centres, that had well-established systems of employee representation (Van Rooyen 
1996:205). These dispute-resolution mechanisms also contributed towards a greater 
institutionalisation of collective labour regulation. The second major regulatory mechanism 
provided for in labour legislation, namely the Wage Board, failed to progress beyond the 
exploratory stage with any wage determination. According to Van Rooyen (J 996:207), a lack of 
expertise as well as significant inter-sectoral variations in terms of size, location, cost structures, 
hours of operation, levels of ski ll, and so on precluded the successful functioning of wage-fixing 
machinery (on a voluntary basis) in Namibia. Employer opposition to minimum wages can also 
not be discounted. 
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The low levels of industrial action in the first half of the period from 1977 to 1989 were followed 
by a complete cessation of strike activity from April 1983 to October 1986. J3 This extraordinary 
period of industrial calm was in large measure the product of the vigorous application of security 
measures by the Administrator-General in suppressing the liberation struggle. The sudden and 
dramatic increase in industrial action from 1986 onwards culminated, in 1989, in the second 
highest number of recorded strikes in a single year to date. A combination of factors that included 
the progressive liberalisation of the industrial relations regime and the growing inevitability of 
national liberation, contributed to this upsurge in worker militancy. The inadequacies of the 
formal industrial relations system to deal with the heightened levels of worker activism were 
clearly exposed by this wave of industrial action. 34 High degrees of solidarity and spontaneity 
among workers tended to compensate for the unions' lack of both an institutionalised workplace 
presence and a formal leadership structure. The demands of workers included both workplace 
issues such as wages, food rations and employment conditions as well as more political concerns 
such as the abolition of apartheid and the impact of the war (IDAFSA 1980:31; Pakleppa 1988). 
In fact, Peltola (1995: 173) notes that an important aspect of this strike wave was "the intimate 
relation [between 1 political and trade union activities". 
A common response by employers included the dismissal of striking employees, the discrediting 
of the trade unions, and a reliance on (often violent) intervention by the police. This reflected 
their fundanlental opposition to collective labour regulation and underscored the absence of 
dispute-resolution procedures in the workplace. The latter also contributed to the large number 
of complaints lodged with the inspectorate of the Department of Manpower by employees in the 
construction (24.6%), manufacturing (20.6%) and retail (13.3%) industries, renown for their 
antiquated employment practices (Van Rooyen 1996:211-2). A virtual absence of complaints 
from the mining industry, by contrast, reflects the fact that established grievance procedures and 
personnel departments on the mines obviated the need to invoke and rely on external mechanisms 
of labour regulation. Significantly, tllere were only three strikes in 1990, reflecting the pacifying 
effect of independence and the upsurge of a patriotic fervour. 
Rising international pressures coincided with intensified internal strains to place demands on the 
J3 The strike frequency in this period was as follows: 1977 - 1; 1978 - 2; 1979 - 4; 1980 - 0; 1981 - 3; 
1982 - 2; 1983 - 2; 1984 - 0; 1985 - 0; 1986 - 4; 1987 - 22; 1988 - 8; 1989 - 28 (Van Rooyen 1996:208). 
34 The Commission of InquilY into Labour Matters in Namibia, appointed in 1987 and chai red by Professor 
N.E. Wiehahn, noted that " the present structure and system were no longer capable of handling and resolving new 
labour issues and disputes which were rapidly becom ing part of the Nam ibian labour scene" (cited in Van Rooyen 
1996:2 15). 
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regulation of accumulation in South Africa, which its apartheid-based mode of regulation could 
not absorb. This confluence of mounting national, regional and international pressures during the 
late-1 980s compelled the apatiheid regime to seek an internal negotiated settlement and to end 
its occupation of Namibia. When it became clear to the South African government that any 
political solution which excludes SWAPO will lack legitimacy; the regime shifted its energies 
and resources towards a neo-colonial outcome that would ensure the continued protection of 
South African interests under a future SW APO government. While the prevailing international 
conjuncture facilitated the process of national liberation, it also constrained the strategic options 
of the post-independence government. Namibia attained independence at a time of global 
economic crisis, a rising tide of liberalisation, and the collapse of the former Soviet Union. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
Changes in the supply of and demand for labour in each of the historical periods outlined above 
generated distinct shifts in the prevailing mode of labour regulation. The institutional 
mechanisms responsible for the recruitment atld deployment of labour under colonial despotism 
shaped both the manner in which work was experienced and the nature of control and resistance 
in the workplace. Through a system of institutionalised violence and expropriation the German 
colonial state played a virtually unmediated role in the incorporation, allocation, control and 
reproduction oflabour in the Police Zone. The salient features of the labour market in this period 
include the institutionali sation of forced labour and the immobilisation of black workers; the 
forceful expropriation ofland and livestock; large-scale impoverishment and social dislocation; 
the strengthening of military and administrative capacity to police the indenture of black workers; 
and the creation of a coercive migrant labour system complemented by an oppressive work 
environment. The efficacy of these processes of primitive accumulation was premised on the 
destruction of pre-colonial modes of production and the predominance of extra-economic forms 
of coercion in labour regulation. 
In the first period of South African rule, this oppressive system of labour regulation was 
consolidated, although there was now some attempt to legitimise it in terms of contractual 
principles and the virtues of hard work. Given the fact that a contractual regime depends largely 
on individual bargaining and market power, the authority of employers and the state over black 
workers was largely unbridled. Vagrancy and other laws were designed to mobil ise surplus 
labour; recruitment agencies rigidly segmented the supply of labour; repressive apparatuses 
ensured the forceful allocation of labour; an autocratic system of control in the workplace 
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facilitated the productive use of labour; and the maintenance of some 'tribal land' ostensibly 
guaranteed the reproduction of labour. As Moorsom (1977 :77) puts it: "[Ilabour supervisors, as 
dictators of an alienating production routine; the police and labour and location officials as 
heavy-handed repressers of worker attempts to humanize their social environment; and the tribal 
bureaucracy, as slavish and self-interested collaborators, together constituted a closed circle of 
labour-repressive devices". The managerial autocracy and state repression in the regulation of 
black labour contrasted sharply with the collective and statutory regime for white workers 
organised around largely self-regulating and relatively autonomous work groups. This 
co-existence of different forms of labour regulation highlights the distinct opportunities, 
constraints, capacity for resistance, and susceptibility to despotic control associated with the 
existence of non-competing groups in the labour market. 
The second period of colonial rule witnessed the consolidation of an apartheid-style system of 
labour regulation geared primarily towards the control of labour migration. The growing 
centralisation of mining capital, together with the particular nature of its labour process, 
generated a predominantly low-wage economy in which the scope for expansion in the 
production of final consumer goods, let alone intermediate and capital goods, was drastically 
reduced. With the enforced decline of the subsistence economies, the 'whip of economic 
necessity' became increasingly prominent in the regulation of black labour. Despotism in the 
workplace was grounded in the authoritarian command of the employer, a network of 
discriminatory legislation, a highly inadequate social wage, and the geographical separation of 
the spheres of production and social reproduction. The paternalistic character of the company 
state "cemented the worker's extreme dependence on the employer, and therefore his 
vulnerability" (Winterfeldt 2002:39). In the absence of collective and statutory regulatory 
mechanisms, informal resistance and occupational solidarity were the only means of defence 
against oppressive conditions of employment. Management's reliance on colonial sanctions and 
apparatuses meant that supervisors used tlu'eats and violence to elicit an 'adequate' amount of 
work. However, intensifying efforts norms through coercive measures increased the 
unpredictability of labour regulation and led to higher levels of worker resistance and mistrust. 
In the third period of South African rule, the crisis in accumulation and regulation, rooted in 
structural contradictions which were already present in the earlier periods of economic growth, 
become organic. The apartheid labour market that was consolidated in the previous period 
impeded the mobility and reduced the value of black labour power, fostered debilitating skill 
shortages, and generated extensive opposition from semi- and unskilled black workers. As the 
need for a more settled and skilled workforce increased, this rigid racial segmentation of the 
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labour market became an obstacle to further economic growth and to the restructuring of the 
labour process. The crisis in Namibia's labour market must therefore be seen as an integral part 
of the broader regulatory crisis in its economy. The apartheid regime's response to this crisis 
incorporated moments of repression and reform. Attempts at overcoming the barriers to 
profitability and stability included a strengthening of the repressive apparatuses, the incorporation 
of some black workers into the urban labour markets on a more permanent basis, the introduction 
of institutionalised collective bargaining and fornlal dispute-resolution mechanisms, and a greater 
reliance on market-induced movements of the reserve army of labour from the bantustans. The 
growing intensity of opposition to colonialism despotism in the workplace and beyond from the 
early-l 970s onwards led to a gradual realisation, by sectors of capital and the state, that expanded 
accumulation in stable conditions could only be secured through the establishment of a new 
regime of accumulation and regulation. 
With the progressive decline in the ability of the bantustans to sustain the reproduction of a large 
migrant labour force, the elimination of colonial despotism in the workplace, and the changing 
labour needs of capital; state policies and managerial strategies have turned in a number of 
directions. Of concern here, is the increasing incidence of non-standard employment in the 
Namibian labour market. The consolidation of trade unionism among semi-skilled black workers 
and the resulting increase in their wages and job security coincided with an expansion in non-
standard forms of employment which are insecure, unorganised and underpaid. The 
developments accompanying the collapse of colonial despotism shifted the incorporation-
marginalisation dialectic onto a new terrain, away from the local versus migrant division towards 
an increase in the segmentation of the labour market and ri sing urban unemployment. The 
increasingly differentiated integration of the various segments of the labour market into the 
system of production and regulation has had the effect of privileging some while marginal ising 
others. Hindson's (1988:5) observations with regard to South Africa find considerable resonance 
in Namibia: the "forces of economic decline and employment restructuring have cross cut and 
superseded the settled/migrant labour division: one group has moved up the occupational 
hierarchy into semi-skilled and skilled jobs and has formed the rump of the new industrial 
working class; the other has been thrown into the pool of unemployed" and underemployed. 
The point is to relate developments in labour regulation not only to the restructuring of the labour 
market, but also to changes in production. As we noted in the previous chapter, the way in which 
the employment relationship is regulated is contingent on the non-necessary interaction between 
the social structures and dynamics of production (structuring oflabour demand) and the social 
structures and dynamics of reproduction (structuring oflabour supply). The lack of bargaining 
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power, despotic forms of control, low wages, and so forth that confront non-standard employees 
in the workplace reflect and reinforce their vulnerable position in the labour market and vice 
versa. Burawoy (1985:219) clearly links the political mechanisms that generate labour supplies 
to the economic forces behind the demand for labour. By recognising the decisive impact of the 
technical division of labour on the labour strategies of different industries, we can consistently 
relate the supply of labour to the requirements of capitalist accumulation. For example, 
Burawoy's (1985 :220-1) research shows that the different regulatory strategies in open-cast and 
underground mines were shaped primarily by the specific technical conditions of production, not 
by management style, nationality of directors or corporate policies.35 Likewise, the nature of the 
labour supply decisively determines which regulatory mechanisms are most optimal for 
employers. For instance, where food production was not taken over by settler farmers, employers 
experienced continuous shOtiages oflabour, compelling them to improve working conditions and 
wages and to introduce policies to promote a stronger commitment to waged employment. The 
answer to the question of how labour is regulated is thus partly dependent on who is being 
regulated. 
35 For more examples of this emphasis on the recursive relations between labour market segmentation and 
labour process control in the post-Braverman labour process debates, see Thompson (1989). Of particular 
significance is the fact that these relations are viewed in conflictual rather than functional terms. The cyclical nature 
of accumulation and the resistance generated by the structured relations of capitalism may, in spite of any efforts by 
employers to the contrary, result in changes to the labour market that are not entirely functional to developments in 
production. 
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3 
A PERMEABLE REGULATION: THE 
SEGMENTATION OF LABOUR SUPPLY, 
INSTITUTIONAL MEDIATION, AND 
EMPLOYMENT 'FLEXIBILITY' 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The first decade of independence in Namibia was characterised by both a strengthening of the 
legal and social safety net covering the standard employment relationship (SER) and a 
proliferation of non-standard employment relationships (NERs) at the margins of this regulatory 
framework. These changes in the regulation of the labour market have created opportunities for 
advancement by groups of more skilled and pelmanent employees, while weaker and less skilled 
groups have generally experienced a deterioration of wages and conditions of employment and 
an increase in employment insecurity. Shifts and gaps in labour regulation provide the "channels, 
which ... increasing numbers of employers were willing and able to use in order to realise the 
manifold advantages of casual employment"(Campbell and Burgess 200 I: 182). To unravel the 
connections between changes in the employment relationship and the wider socio-economic 
context we must start with the institutional fTamework which regulates the supply of and demand 
for labour. Much of the interaction between the requirements of the labour process and the social 
context occurs through the local labour market. Failing to consider the role of the labour market 
opens up the possibility that the employment outcomes of restructuring will be incorrectly 
inferred from changing labour process imperatives alone. 
A growth in ' flexible ' employment is all too readily implicated by its proponents in a causal 
relationship with 'deregulatory' practices in the labour market. This view can be expressed in a 
simple equation: more market-based regulation = more flexibility = more growth and 
employment. In reality, however, market forces can only attain equilibrium under conditions -
such as complete information and costless contracting - that rarely, if ever, obtain in the labour 
market. Of particular significance is the extent to which there is an acceptance of the idea that 
regulation and flexibility are two poles on the same continuum. The increase in non-standard 
employment in countries such as Namibia coincided with rising levels of state and trade union 
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intervention in the employment relationship. This is clearly evident in the introduction of new 
statutory-based minimum standards and the establishment oflabour market institutions that place 
a premium on the collective regulation of employment policies and practices. This implies that 
an expansion in non-standard employment is facilitated as much by its active promotion through 
' deregulatory' policies as by a passive tolerance of silences and inconsistencies in the 
(expanding) protective functions oflabour market institutions. Understanding the growth of non-
standard employment in an increasingly regulated labour market calls for a much clearer 
specification of the varying impact of different forms of regulatory change on the functioning of 
the labour market. 
The co-existence of different forms of labour regulation is reflected in the distinct opportunities 
and constraints associated with the division between largely non-competing groups in the labour 
market. That is, what distinguishes segmentation in the labour market from mere division is that 
each segment functions according to different rules with regard to the incorporation, allocation, 
control and reproduction of labour. Distinct regulatory frameworks in the labour market reflect, 
in part, the manner in which a particular distribution of the costs and rewards of restructuring is 
institutionalised. The specific combination of standard and non-standard employment is 
"spatially redistributed in a complex and continually changing way in response to the mix of 
market opportunities, comparative labour power costs, the course of struggle between capital and 
labour and the historically specific flows and supplies of migrant and other forms of unfree 
labour" (Cohen 1987:144). Since labour market actors always transform eXisting structures, 
changes in the balance between standard and non-standard employment are fundamentally 
constrained and/or enabled by institutional and normative arrangements at a particular time and 
place. 
This chapter commences with a brief outline of the complex and contingent relationship between 
labour regulation and employment 'flexibility'. A central focus of this discussion is the notion 
that there is a simple and direct correlation between labour market ' deregulation' and the 
incidence of non-standard employment. The relationship between regulation and 'flexibility' is 
then considered in the light of shifts in the basic parameters of labour regulation and the growth 
of non-standard employment in post-independence Namibia. It is argued that regulatory changes 
involve distinct trade-offs between the various forms of flexibility and security rather than a 
simple process of substituting one for the other. Next, we outline some of the processes that tend 
to reinforce duality and division in the Namibian labour market. In contrast to 'flexibility' 
theories, the central concern here is not the extent to which social and political processes impinge 
on the operation of market forces, but rather the identification of the conditions that facilitate or 
150 
obstruct casualisation in the labour market. Finally, we discuss the nature and role of a primary 
purveyor oflabour market 'flexibility' in Namibia - i.e. the temporary employment industry. The 
latter is both a product of, and an active participant in, the restructuring of the regulatory 
framework surrounding the SER. 
3.2 EMPLOYMENT 'FLEXIBILITY' AND LABOUR REGULATION: MARKETS 
VERSUS INSTITUTIONS? 
The proliferation ofNERs is widely understood as a response to increasing levels of economic 
uncertainty and the concurrent demands for greater 'flexibility' in the labour market. I Implicated 
in these developments are heightening levels of international competition; growing levels of 
economic risk; overly 'rigid' labour markets; the ' excessive' costs and protections associated 
with SERs; declining growth rates and rising unemployment. In many of the industrialised 
economies of the North, 
far-reaching programs of deunionization, casual ization, and wage polarisation, typically packaged in the 
politically ambiguous language of flexibility, now occupy a new mainstream in labor market policy. An 
important element in these programs is the localization oJlabor: labor, literally, has to be put in its place 
(Peck 1996:239). 
The notion oflabour market ' flexibility ' has strong neo-liberal overtones and is based on the idea 
that there have been, or should be, concerted efforts to reduce the 'rigidity ' of employment 
policies. These prescriptions for the restructuring of the labour market are premised on the idea 
that statutory and other forms of social regulation cause unnecessary 'rigidities' and that policies 
of 'deregulation' would restore freedom of contract as the basis for economic relations (Deakin 
and Mtickenberger 1992: 136). In other words, the call for the deregulation of labour markets is 
based on the assumption that pristine, price-clearing dynamics are being stifled by these social 
' distortions' . Far from establishing an impersonal economic regime, however, so-called 
deregulation actually "consecrates new rules: intensifying the law ofva/ue, with effects which 
empower some economic actors while disempowering others" (Hyman 200 I: 12). Numerous case 
studies have found that 'flexible ' labour markets serve to individualise employment relations; 
intensify competitive pressures at the bottom of the labour market; enforce low-paid work; 
increase job and wage polarisation; diminish the scope of employment protection rights; weaken 
I See: Tarling (1987); Lane (1989); Deakin and Mlickenberger (1992); Standing (1992); Blank (1993 ); 
Boyer (1993); Maurau (1993); Cappell i (1995); Cordova (1996); Allen and Hcnry (1997); Callaghan (1997); Dex 
and McCullogh (1997); Horwitz et al (1998); Gallie et 01 (1998); Deakin and Reed (2000); Fudge and Vasko 
(200 I); and Cook (2002). 
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the collective institutions of labour; and reduce the number of workers covered by collective 
agreements.' In particular, ' flexible' employment policies tend to exacerbate inequalities in the 
labour market by removing protection from the weakest segments of the workforce and exposing 
them to greater levels of competition. The lack of coverage by legislation and/or collective 
bargaining means that the determination of wages and conditions for non-standard workers is 
subject largely to unilateral managerial decision-making and outdated common law contractual 
principles (see chapter 5). 
The concept of deregulation lacks precision and cannot account for the multi-faceted changes 
unfolding in the labour market. There is no simple or direct relationship between the nature of 
labour market regulation and the incidence of non-standard employment. Very rarely can changes 
in a regulatory regime be adequately understood as simply an extension or a restriction of the role 
of statutory or social regulation to the benefit or detriment of market mechanisms (Blank 
1993:183 ; Felstead and Jewson 1999b:8; Deakin and Reed 2000:37; Regini 2000:23). Hence, it 
is wrong to anticipate a simple trade-off between markets (flexibility) and institutions 
(regulation). The different forms of non-standard employment are subject to greater or lesser 
levels offormal control and generate variable patterns of flexibility. A high incidence of non-
standard employment is broadly indicative of an extensively regulated labour market.' In national 
labour markets where the regulation of the SER is relatively modest (e.g. UK, USA) we observe 
a low incidence of temporary employment. Conversely, firms have every incentive to introduce 
employment on a temporary basis in countries (e.g. France, Germany) where such regulation is 
relatively extensive. Non-standard employment wi ll therefore be more prevalent in countries such 
as Namibia where standard employment contracts are tightly regulated and non-standard work 
is loosely coordinated and controlled. Moreover, since the pricing structures of the temporary 
employment industry closely follow the costs of employment in the more regulated sectors of the 
labour market, "the industry'S business interest is best served by the growth of regulatory costs 
in the mainstream employment relation, coupled with the ongoing under-regulation of its own 
sphere of operations" (Peck and Theodore 2002: 153). 
Finding a sustainable balance between employment, wage and work process flexibility requires 
2 See: Cordova (1986); Dombois and Oster land (! 987); Dickens (1988); Harrison and Bluestone (1990); 
Storper and Scott (! 990); Deakin and Wilkinson (1991); Lawson (1992); Gallie and White (1994); Harrison (1994); 
Morley el al (! 995); Peck (1996); Rubery (1996); Felstead and Jewson (1999a); Kenny and Webster (1999); Heery 
and Salmon (2000a); Kitson el al (2000); and Campbell and Burgess (2001). 
3 See: Casey el al ( 1989); Deakin and Muckenberger (1992); Veneziani (1993); Allen and Henry (1996); 
Cousins (1999); Robinson (1999); and Regini (2000). 
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changes in labour regulation that involve "the mechanisms and the levels of regulation and which 
may require the imposition of 'beneficial constraints' on economic actors, thus giving rise to a 
different type of regulation, rather than just less of it" (Regini 2000:21). Reference to the various 
forms or modes of labour regulation suggest the existence of both a variety of regulatory 
institutions and a variety of levels at which the employment relationship may be coordinated. 
Current regulatory change "cannot be reduced to some unidirectional process of 
deregulationlmarketization, nor should it be portrayed as a benign process of zero-sum 
redistribution across scales" (Peck 2000:71). Undermining some modes or levels of labour 
regulation in the name of 'flexibility' may simply lead to their substitution by other modes or 
levels. For example, Marx (1967:490) highlights "the constantly recurring experience" whereby 
"capital, so soon as it finds itself subject to legal control at one point, compensates itself all the 
more recklessly at other points". In practice, deregulation is advocated less as a general principle 
than as "a means of relaxing specific aspects of traditional controls on the functioning of labor 
markets" (Hyman 1994c: 16). 
Labour market flexibility in the 1980s and 1990s was generally pursued through a process of 
"reregulation" (Deakin and Muckenberger 1992: 144) or a "regulated deregulation" (Hyman 
1994c: 18) involving the replacement of direct and uniform substantive legal regulation by 
alternative regulatory regimes under procedures that still rest ultimately on legal sanction. That 
is, the real world of regulatory reform is "one overwhelmingly dominated by partial and 
piecemeal flexibilization" (Esping-Anderson and Regini 2000b:2). In some cases, a reform 
intended as a flexibility measure actually results in its opposite. MacKenzie's (2002:599) 
research into subcontracting arrangements shows that, far from dismantling hierarchical 
employment structures and leading to greater exposure to market imperatives, the movement 
towards an increased reliance on external sources of labour reflect "the reconfiguration of the 
bureaucratic organization of production". 
Standing (1993:427-8) draws a useful distinction between "explicit" and "implicit" deregulation. 
The latter takes place due to (a) non-implementation of protective regulations; (b) inadequate 
resources and personnel devoted to the task of ensuring compliance with existing regulations; 
(c) the erosion of the capacity to resist among those denied their rights to protection; (d) a 
growing and cultivated sense of ambiguity among potential beneficiaries about the validity of 
such rights; and (e) an increasing loss of entitlement by virtue of employment status. A major 
cause of the last form of implicit deregulation is the proliferation ofNERs, while major causes 
of the third and fomih forms are low levels of unionisation, high unemployment and the 
insecurities engendered by widening inequality. Low levels of compliance and enforcement, as 
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de Jacto forms of flexibili sation, are common in newly industrialised countries (Cordova 1996; 
Crouch 1998; Cook 2002). Namibia is no exception in this regard 4 While there is no explicit 
deregulatory agenda in the Namibian labour market, employers are actively pursuing an implicit 
deregulation through their use of non-standard employment contracts to avoid some of the 
regulatory standards associated with the SER (Klerck 2003). As the director of a labour research 
institute points out: 
[f]lexibility comes into the public domain when employers and agencies like the Bank of Namibia moan 
about the over-regulated labour market. Generally, they complain that workers are over-protected, that the 
unions are too strong ... Employers at factory level do not often raise these issues publicly. It is so that they 
might avoid this debate and just start using labour-hire workers like some parastatals are doing. So there 
is no talk of making the labour market more ' nexible' - you leave those workers that you have under the 
conditions that they enjoy right now, but with new workers you increase the use of labour-hire companies. 
This is of course a hidden way of do ing the same thing. You are not doing it for all and at once, but as 
people resign or retire their replacements don't come in with the same permanent benefits and job security 
because of casualisation (26/06/2002). 
As we noted above, there is no single, universal form of labour market flexibility, but rather a 
variety of geographically distinct forms with different socio-economic and political effects. The 
search for "a system of labour regulation which enhances dynan1ic efficiency while also 
reflecting other, widely-held democratic values is one which must respond to a variety of diverse 
local conditions" (Deakin and Wilkinson 2000:23). In other words, the levels of precariousness 
and insecurity in the employment relationship vary with different regulatory regimes. The nature 
of the national regime oflabour regulation plays a significant role in shaping the conditions under 
which employers may seek to casualise a part of their workforce.' The use of non-standard 
employment contracts is facilitated or obstructed (to varying degrees) by the nature of the 
regulatory framework surrounding the employment relationship and by the impact of labour 
market institutions. This social context provides "a framework of entitlements and obligations, 
comprising a range of opportunities and constraints, that shape levels and forms of participation 
in employment" (Felstead and Jewson 1999b:9). Here we are concerned with the mediating 
influences of cultural norms and institutionalised expectations; welfare and training systems; 
family structures and gender relations; divisions of class, ethnicity and age; and the like on the 
employment relationship. 
4 Low levels of compliance are greatly facilitated by a lack of awareness by workers of their legal rights . 
A survey of656 workers in 1996/97 found that more than half had no knowledge of the Labour Act and that very 
few of those who were aware of the Act could specity any of its provisions (Klerek 1997:282-3). 
5 For example: Cook (2002) shows how the shift to nexible labour markets in Latin American countries 
was shaped by the distinct impact of economic po licies, political regimes and govenunent policies, the power and 
orientation of the labour movement, the unity and orientation of employer groups, the actions of international 
agencies, and the size of the informal sector. These factors innueneed not only the timing and scale of labour market 
reforms, but also their pace and dynamics. 
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Labour market institutions have establ ishing and exclusionary effects as well as protective and 
stabilising effects. Institutions in the labour market protect workers from destructive cost-cutting 
competition by providing a coordinating role that establishes labour standards, checking the 
tt·ends towards heterogeneity, introducing uniform rules and prices, and guaranteeing the social 
reproduction of labour. While they were introduced to provide protection and shelter, social 
institutions have "almost by defmition also created groups who are excluded from these areas of 
protection" (Rubery 1996 :24). The relative balance between institutions that create shelters and 
enclaves for some workers, while potentially exposing the remaining workforce to unprotected 
wages and conditions, may change over time and between labour market segments. The current 
destabilisation of markets has restricted the ability of even large employers to build stable and 
long-term employment practices. The selective functioning of coordinating regulations and 
institutional forces in the structuring of the labour market provides employers with the scope for 
a reassertion of market-determined wages for some workers. This high degree of managerial 
discretion is likely to lead "not (0 the homogenous outcomes within market-based theories but 
to the diversity and heterogeneity predicted by segmentation theories where diversity on the 
demand side ... interacts with diversity on the supply side ... to create complex and heterogeneous 
employment systems" (Rubery 1996:33). 
Table 3.1 Social Security Registration by Industry and Area: 2000 
INDUSTRY / SECTOR URBAN RURAL TOTAL 
(%) (%) (%) 
Agriculture 46.4 10.5 11 .7 
Fishing 86 .3 12.5 64.4 
Mining and Quarrying 80.8 64 .9 75 .5 
Manufacturing 63.5 14.3 38.8 
Electricity, Gas and Water 80.4 54.3 73.5 
Construction 43. 1 22.9 35 .1 
Wholesale, Retail and Hospitality 59.8 42.6 52.1 
Transport, Storage and Communication 65.8 52 .7 62.2 
Financial Services 86.4 72.4 85.1 
Public Administration, Defence and Social Services 80.6 68.3 54.3 
Other Community, Social and Personal Services 46.4 42.4 22.4 
(Source: adapted from MoL 2002:61 ). 
Differential access to social security is a good example of this institutional selectivity. The Social 
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Security Act (1994) of Namibia provides for the establishment of various funds "in order to 
provide an adequate safety net for the workforce of this country" (SSC 1996:7). These funds 
include the Maternity, Sick Leave and Death Benefit Fund, the National Medical Benefit Fund, 
the National Pension Fund and the Development Fund. The Social Security Commission also 
administers the Accident Fund and the Accident Pension Fund. These funds are aimed at 
compensating employees or their dependents in the case of occupational injuries and diseases or 
death from job-related accidents. In reality, however, the workers most in need of this ' safety net' 
are not registered with the Social Security Commission. 
According to the Ministry of Labour (2002:60), of 431 849 total employed, 180904 workers are 
registered with social security, yielding a registration rate of 41.9%. Of 109598 unemployed 
persons, only 4 075 are registered , yielding a registration rate of only 3.7%. Table 3. 1 shows the 
significant variation in social security registration between industries and areas. Registration is 
consistently and significantly lower in the rural areas and in the industries characterised by low 
levels of trade union density and poorly developed systems of collective labour regulation. Table 
3.2 confirms the uneven distribution of social security registration by occupation. Again, the least 
skilled and lowest paid workers tend to constitute the highest proportion of employees without 
access to social security benefits. There are also some significant variations in social security 
registration between males and females (MoL 2002:61). While the overall registration rates are 
46.7% for males and 36.6% for females, in occupations dominated by women such as services 
and sales the rates are 56.2% and 29.9% respectively. 
Table 3.2 Social Security Registration by Occupation: 2000 
OCCUPATION TOTAL 
(%) 
Legislators, Senior Officials and Managers 76.5 
Professionals 82 .0 
Technicians and Associate Professionals 75 .8 
Clerical Workers 76.5 
Services, Shops and Sales Workers 40.0 
Agricultural and Fishery Workers 10.0 
Craft and Trade Workers 38.8 
Machine Operators and Assemblers 62.6 
Elementary Occupations 39.2 
(Source: adapted from MoL 2002:61). 
156 
In general, the role accorded to the law in labour regulation is a significant source of variation 
in national policies of labour market flexibility (C6rdova 1996; Barker and Christensen 1998; 
Mhone 1998; Autor 2000; Cook 2000). The thresholds set by labour law distribute rights among 
employees in a manner that benefits the SER and discriminates against NERs (Miickenberger 
1989; Veneziani 1993; Rogowski and Schomann 1996; Scott 1998). That is, the way in which 
labour laws define the employment relationship leads to the under-protection of workers without 
a 'regular' employment contract. Qualifying thresholds are set to limit the rights of those who 
are not in full-time and continuous employment (Casey el al 1989:45 1-2; Hakim 1989:71; 
Cousins 1999: 112). To protect the employee, labour legislation limits the freedom of contract 
in areas such as job security, discipline and wage determination. The selective functioning of 
labour laws, however, only prutially mitigates the freedom of contract (Deakin and Miickenberger 
1992: 138; Campbell and Burgess 2001: 176-7). The law of contract, as we shall see in chapter 
5, plays a fundamental role in framing the rights and obligations ofNERs. Legal regulation was 
intended to fu lfill a secondru')' role of plugging the gaps left by collective bargaining by 
establishing a floor of statutory protection. The latter was geared, in particular, at the vulnerable 
sectors of the labour market who fell outside the ambit of collective bargaining. A study of 
employment patterns in Europe since the 1980s reveals the limited protection afforded to certain 
segments of the labour market by both collective bargaining and legal regulation. In practice, 
Dickens (1988:139) argues, "legal regulation has mirrored, rather than supplemented, social 
regulation and, consequently, those falling through the net of collective bargaining protection 
tend to fall through the legal regulation safety net as well". 
NERs are premised on a decoupling of employment terms from standard, collective protective 
measures. As such, non-standard work is a form of unprotected employment that has flouri shed 
within the interstices left by the limits in regulatOJ')' coverage. Most of the trade union 
respondents noted that employers in Namibia could only increase the number of casual and 
subcontracted workers by using the 'loopholes' in legislation and collective agreements. Non-
standard workers are generally excluded from a core of employment rights: statutory notice 
periods, maternity rights, protection against unfair dismissal, pension schemes, redundancy 
payments, minimum notice, statutory sick pay, a written contract of terms and conditions of 
employment, itemised pay statement, and protective measures in the case of insolvency and sale 
of the business. As a result, according to Burgess and Strachan (1999: 129), many of the new 
employment forms are " insecure, non-unionised, unregulated and exhibit similarities with the 
putting-out and piecework regime of the nineteenth century". Even where labour legislation 
offers some protection to non-standard workers, they are still confronted by fewer promotion and 
training prospects, less convenient working hours, lower wages and employment benefits, less 
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employment security and more menial tasks. Crucially, many non-standard employees are not 
free to choose the workplace in which their labour power will be deployed: 
[sjome of my people work for long periods - say, nine montl1s - with the same client ... The longer the guy 
works with me and becomes used to the job, the more selective he becomes - 'I don't want to work here, 
I want to work there' - which he is actually not allowed to do. He must go where we send him ... They get 
comfortable with the work and prefer jobs where they don 't have to work very hard. We banle to get 
workers for some clients because they know what work is waiting there for them. Unfortunately, this is 
usually some of our best clients: the big production people (manager, temporary employment agency -
05/0712000). 
Non-standard employment poses significant challenges to labour law and industrial relations 
insofar as it breaks the mould of standard full-time employment of indefinite duration. While 
only a small proportion of all Namibian workers are employed on non-standard contracts, there 
is evidence that non-standard employment exerts a pervasive influence on the employment 
prospects, family life and social security of workers in certain industries and occupations. That 
is, the quantitative aspects of non-standard work must be viewed in the light of its qualitative 
impact on particular categories of workers. What is important is not so much the actual number 
of non-standard employees, but the significant changes brought on by casualisation at the bottom 
end of the labour market.6 As one ofMUN's regional organisers observed: 
[0 jnce the company brings in one casual worker, all the pennanent workers are under threat. Who can tell 
how many casuals will be there tomorrow? These workers will also become disillusioned with the union 
if they think that it cannot protect them against casualisation (03 /0712002). 
The question is thus how non-standard employment has grown and not just the rate of growth. 
Gallie and White (1994) conclude that, given the difficulties associated with explaining 
employment systems by reference to product-market variables, there are potential advantages to 
studying changes in employment practices rather than levels. In other words, the significance of 
NERs carmot be reduced to "an arithmetic calculation of the number of positions that have been 
'temped', but instead relates to that much wider field of employment relations where temping is 
a viable option and where it therefore exerts an influence over the strategic choices and 
constraints of employers and workers" (Peck and Theodore 2002: 156). The use of non-standard 
forms of employment is a significant factor in the development of more flexible and intensive 
working arrangements for permanent employees - i.e. the " levelling down" of the differences 
between standard and non-standard employment (Rubery 1998: 150). For example, a casual 
worker noted that "the permanent workers who belong to the unions won't speak to the managers 
on our behalfbecause they are also scared of losing their jobs". The spread ofNERs can therefore 
6 These processes fonn part of what Beck refers to as the "Taylorism of employment re lations" (cited in 
Allen and Henry 1996:67). 
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potentially reshape regulatory norms in the labour market as a whole. 
Table 3.3 Full-Time Employment by Employment Status and Gender: 2000 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS MALE FEMALE 
(%) (%) 
Subsistence/Communal !'armer (with paid employees) 76.6 46.0 
Subsistence/Communal Farmer (without paid employees) 63.1 52.5 
Other Employer (with pa id employees) 79.3 82.0 
Other Own Account Worker (without paid employees) 64.5 64.6 
Public Sector Employee 95. 1 94.1 
Private Sector Employee 85.6 85.7 
Unpaid Family Worker (subsistence/communal sector) 70.6 62.2 
Other Unpaid Family Worker 64.8 62.8 
Others 86.1 100 .0 
Not Reported 77.3 66.4 
(Source: adapted from MoL 2002:74). 
The lack of comprehensive data on employment in Namibia means that it is exceedingly difficult 
to detennine the precise size of the ineffectively regulated and unprotected component of the 
non-standard workforce. Offi cial statistics in Namibia are not sufficiently disaggregated to 
di stinguish between the various fOnTIS of non-standard employment (Table 3.3). Some forms of 
non-standard work are, for instance, characterised by full-time employment. Employers also 
seldom report the use of (especially) casual workers. Overall, wage employment accounts for 
55% of all employment (MoL 1995:4). Almost 90% of the employed in the urban areas are wage 
earners as compared to 35% in the rural areas, where the self-employed and unpaid family 
workers dominate. While no reliable data is available on the latter, family work generally relies 
on the bonds of kinship to evade the requirements oflabour legislation. The growth of temporary 
employment agencies and the spread of casualised employment suggest that the figures in the 
table above do not reflect the true extent of non-standard employment in Namibia. 
3.3 LABOUR REGULATION IN THE FIRST DECADE OF INDEPENDENCE: 
A PROTECTED 'CORE' AND A VULNERABLE 'PERIPHERY'? 
The passage to democracy in Namibia has attracted considerable attention among researchers 
159 
concerned with the study of transitions from authoritarian rule.' In this work, Namibia's 
transition to democracy is situated wi thin the distinct (yet simultaneous) processes through which 
the authoritarian regime is dismantled and new democratic institutions created. With a few 
notable exceptions, however, the bulk of this work focuses on the economic, political and 
international aspects of the transition.' There is very little published research on the form and 
content of changes in labour regulation after independence. Democratisation had a profound 
impact on labour regulation: it introduced collective rights for workers, it enabled trade unions 
to establish ties with political parties, it encouraged the development of collective bargaining, 
and it expanded the institutional regulation of the labour market. The regime oflabour regulation 
has likewise had a significant impact on the pace and direction of democratic transformation. 
Achieving a relatively stable, redistributive pattern of economic growth depends in large part on 
the scope for conflict and accommodation in industrial relations. Hence, the dynamics of 
Namibia's transition to democracy cannot be fully understood in isolation from the prevailing 
structures of labour regulation and levels of organisational capacity in the labour market. 
During the first decade of independence, the primary focus of this study, the inherited system of 
labour regulation was transformed in an attempt to establish a more durable link between 
increased economic growth (efficiency) and greater social welfare (equity). Existing forms of 
labour market segmentation, techniques of managerial control, levels of technological 
development and so on represent a distinct, prior set of possibilities and constraints for the 
establishment of new forms of labour regulation. At independence, Namibia presented a 
contradiction common in African decolonisation: "the conditions that had allowed international 
capital to realize large, even vast profits, and were expected to do so again, were in contradiction 
with those for constructing an equitable and civilized society for its people" (Leys and Saul 
1995c: 196). The Namibian government had to balance the heightened expectations among 
workers following the transition to democracy with the need to attract foreign investment and 
maintain stability in industrial relations. This balancing act has led to a contradictory fusion of 
neo-liberal and neo-corporatist forms of labour regulation: individual market solutions in the 
structuring of labour supplies, skills development and occupational mobility; and tripartite 
strategies geared towards the collective resolution of the tensions between flexibility and 
, See: Balch and Scholten (1990); Wood (1991); Saunders (1992); Tapscott (1993); Cliffe (1994); Leys 
and Saul (1995a); Van Rooyen and Backer (1996); Kempton and Du Preez (1997); Dobell (1998); Simon (1998, 
2002); Keulder (2000); Bauer (2001); Diener and Graefe (2001); Melber (2000b, 2003); and Winterfeldt el al 
(2002). 
8 Transition theories, according (0 Adler and Webster (1999: 134), tend to neglect the ro le of the labour 
movement and are prone to "an inappropriate narrowing ofpossib\e outcomes", 
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security9 Some of the gains that workers have made through the expanded social regulation of 
the labour market are increasingly undermined by neo-liberal economic policies: 
[cJreating quality jobs used to be a strong trend within the Ministry of Labour, but it is not at all reflected 
in the Ministry of Trade and Industry where it is ' any job, whatever conditions, is better than none' ... 
Marrying the two meant that, on the one hand, you have fairly progressive labour laws and, on the other 
hand, you have extremely beneficial investment policies geared towards foreign investors ... This not a 
situation like you had in some African, Asian and Latin American states where the whole regime shifts 
towards neo-liberalism with everything that goes with it, including union repression. Here it was the 
economic policy going one way, and the conviction of the Labour Ministry that a regulated labour market 
is better than an unregulated one, going the other way ... That is why you do not have one government line. 
But it seems that the neo-liberal one is becoming increasingly dominant with the Trade Ministry being the 
stronger of tile two (director, labour research institute - 26106/2002). 
Given Namibia's narrow and racially differentiated market, sustained growth and the 
development of economies of scale are crucially dependent on increased exports and growing 
foreign investments. The latter, in turn, depend on political stability, economic reforms within 
the parameters sanctioned by international monetary agencies, and regional economic and 
political relations beyond the direct control of the nation-state. In 1994, the Minister of Labour 
told parliament: 
[dJevelopment potential will follow from increased investment - but that is something which will be 
encouraged through the establishment of sound labour administration and an efficient and peaceful 
approach to industrial relations ... Our country is in dire need of an attitude of responsibility and pride in 
what we do and how we perform work ... We cannot expect to attract investors unless we have a highly 
efficient and motivated workforce (cited in Van Rooyen 1996:239). 
In post-independence Namibia, the processes of democratisation and economic reform are key 
determinants of the policies and practices oflabour market actors. However, the constraints on 
change are numerous, complex and profound. A centUlY of colonial and apartheid rule left a 
indelible mark on the socio-economic and political landscape of independent Namibia. The 
newly-independent goverrunent of Namibia inherited an unstable and discredited political system 
rooted in discrimination and oppression; a fractured society scarred by a prolonged war and 
widespread deprivation; a distorted and dependent economy highly susceptible to climatic 
conditions and mineral prices; and an industrial relations system in which conflict and coercion 
were endemic and migrant labour was a dominant form of labour regulation (Wood 1991 ; Leys 
and Saul 1995a; Winterfeldt el aI2002). The system of social and economic institutions inherited 
by the SWAPO government - aptly described by Melber (2003 :267) as "the structural legacy of 
settler colonialism" - were designed to serve purposes very different from its own stated goal of 
9 In fact, employment policies generally contain several distinct 'pillars ' - centring around economic 
growth, employability, equal opportunities, reorganisation of working practices and production processes - that are 
in fundamental conflict as far as the levels and extent labour regulation are concerned (Deakin and Reed 2000:32-5). 
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combining efficiency and equality. As Wood (1991:769) argues: 
[s]ucccssive South African government policies ensured that, on independence, the material base, core 
apparatus and ideological coherence of the new Namibia state remained weak. A lack of new financial 
resources, a legacy of ethnic fragmentation and the preponderance of populist and cliente list political 
relations inhibit what little the state can do to overcome the sharp social contradictions between rich and 
poor. 
The neo-colonial character of the Namibian economy - with its dependence on cheap black 
labour, the predominance of primary commodity exports, and extensive resource shortages -
renders it highly vulnerable to external economic shocks (see chapter 4). Given the high costs of 
imported technologies and the preponderance of cost-based competitiveness, employers are 
resorting to the intensification of labour discipline (especially in the lower reaches of the labour 
market) in an attempt to reassert a despotic regime of labour regulation. These developments, as 
we shall see below, reflect attempts by employers to seek out new sources of labour to take over 
the burden - so long carried by the migrant labour system - of providing a 'flexible', socially-
disadvantaged, and strictly controlled workforce. Several of the respondents noted a strong 
continuity between past practices and the present expansion of the temporary employment 
industry. 
These labour-hire companies are just repeating the old system of the colonial era, the contract labour 
system. It is just a new person being baptised, but it is still the same person (general secretary, NATAU -
12/0712000). 
Labour hire is like a forced labour system. To me, it 's nothing else than establishing a recruitment agency 
like SWANLA was the past. It is the same thing with a new name (general secretary, MUN - 28/06/2002). 
Political changes have brought about a comprehensive ' indigenisation ' of Namibia's 
administrative and political structure, allowing a local black elite to widen and strengthen its 
position. Wide-reaching socio-economic redress is constrained, however, by the nature of 
transformation in Namibia. As Dobell (1998: 104) puts it: "the nature of the transition process 
itself ... served to institutionalize democratic political structures in Namibia, while 
simultaneously helping to construct perhaps insurmountable obstacles to the extension of 
political democracy to social and economic institutions". SW APO's policy of national 
reconciliation - despite its political and economic expediency in the light of experiences in 
Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe - reinforced and legitimised the colonial legacy by 
protecting the pre-independence gains of the minority. The settler community, together with the 
tiny black elite, made up just five per cent of the population whi le it was estimated to generate 
71 % of the GDP in 1989. The bottom 55% of the population, by contrast, generated just three 
per cent of the GDP (Tapscott 1995: 162). There is little to suggest that this picture of vast socio-
economic inequality has changed substantially during the first decade of independence. 
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The institutionalised discrimination associated with apartheid-capitalism has created racial 
divisions that largely coincided with occupational and class boundaries. As we can see in the 
tab le below, whites are grossly over-represented in the technical, professional , administrative, 
and managerial occupations. Conversely, black Namibians are confined almost exclusively to 
unskilled and semi-skilled positions. Even in the professional occupations where black people 
have a comparatively large presence, they are overwhelming concentrated in the lowest-paid 
sectors such as teaching and nursing. The job colour-bar in the private sector has also remained 
largely unchanged: very few white employees are directly supervised by a black manager. 
Table 3.4 Distribution of Employment by Ethnicity and Occupation: 1991 
OCCUPATION BLACK COLOURED WHITE NON-NAMIBIAN 
(%) (%) (%) ("!o) 
Administrators and Managers 18.3 11.5 52. 1 18. 1 
Professionals 3 1.2 22.7 32.2 13 .9 
Technicians 33.5 18.1 39.7 8.7 
C lerical Workers 28.2 35.2 32.8 3.8 
Service Workers 62.2 21.6 14.2 2.0 
Agricultural Workers 80.0 14.2 4.8 1.0 
Cra ft and Related Workers 69. 1 14.1 11.9 4.9 
Machine Operators 78.6 11.7 7. 1 2.6 
Elementa ry Occupations 88.5 9.4 1.2 0.9 
Not Stated 65.0 15.7 15.2 4.1 
(Source: adapted from MoL 1995 :20). 
Similar patterns of discrimination exist with regard to the position of women in the occupational 
hierarchy (Table 3.5). Females continue to be under-represented in technical, professional, 
administrative and managerial occupations. Figures from the 1991 Census reveal that males 
constitute 78% of administrators and managers, 72% of technicians, and 93.4% of craft and 
related workers (MoL 1995:20). Moreover, in those occupations where black Namibians 
predominate - i.e. in the unskilled and semi-skilled categories - men make up almost 80% of the 
labour force. This means that black women are disproportionately represented among the under-
and unemployed. 
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Table 3.5 Employment by Industry and Gender: 2000 
INDUSTRY I SECTOR FEMALE MALE TOTAL 
(%j (%j (%j 
Agriculture 27.6 30.8 29.3 
Fishing 1.5 2.1 1.8 
Mining and Quarrying 0.3 1.4 0.9 
Manufacturing 5.6 5.0 5.3 
Electricity, Cas and Water 0.2 1.6 1.0 
Construction 0.5 9. 1 5.0 
Wholesale, Retai l and Hospitality 12.9 8.9 10.8 
Transport, Sto rage and Communication 1.0 5.4 3.3 
Financia l Services 1.2 1. 1 1.1 
Pu blic Administration, Defence and Socia l Services 18.5 13.3 15.8 
Other Community, Social and Personal Services 19.2 12.8 15.8 
(Source: adapted from MoL 2002:49). 
The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia (1990), conventions of the International Labour 
Office (ILO), and an official declaration issued by the cabinet in 1990 entitled National Policy 
on Labour and Manpower Development constitute the principal sources of the new industrial 
relations regime. The establishment of the Ministry of Labour, the Office of the Labour 
Commissioner, the Labour Inspectorate, the Labour Court and District Labour Courts, the Labour 
Advisory Council and other tripartite institutions such as the Social Security Commission reflect 
the growing institutionalisation of labour regulation after independence. However, the 
government's policies of economic liberalisation have provided ample scope for employers to 
increase wage inequality and reduce employment. Employment levels in the formal sector have 
been falling mainly as a result of slow job growth and increasing retrenchments. In 1995, the ILO 
estimated that paid employment (192 700) as a proportion of the labour force (641 000) was only 
30% in Namibia (Fashoyin 1998:12). Reflecting both the neo-liberal monetarism of the SWAPO 
government and the general fee ling among employers that the unit costs of labour in Namibia are 
too high, wage increases have continually fallen below the rate of inflation. While inflation 
fluctuated between 10 and 18% throughout the 1980s and 1990s, wages increased at an estimated 
5-8% per annum (Klerck et aI1997:49). In fact, per capita GDP for black workers outside the 
so-called subsistence sector declined from US$900 in 1980 to US$5 85 in 1988 (MoL 1994:11). 
Wage levels also continue to vary considerably between industrial sectors and between 
occupational categories within these sectors. While workers in elementary occupations earned 
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on average about N$I 000 per month in 1995; technicians, professionals and managers earned 
an average salary ofN$6 000 - 11000 per month (Klerck et a/1997:50). To some extent, these 
trends reflect and reproduce patterns of racial and gender discrimination, trade union membership 
and collective bargaining across the various sectors and occupations. 
The principal piece of legislation which regulates employment conditions and labour market 
institutions in Namibia is the Labour Act of 1992. The Act is largely mandatory and allows for 
exemptions to very few provisions. It signalled the end of colonial-despotism in the workplace 
and attempted to regulate an increasing militant and assertive labour movement. The Act is 
universal in the sense that it applies to all economic sectors and all occupational categories. The 
agricultural , domestic service and public sectors were included in the statutory dispensation for 
the first time in Namibia's history. In contrast to the labour movements in many developed 
countries that have suffered major setbacks and are confronted with a hostile policy and legal 
framework, the role of the unions in Namibia is bolstered by the extensive legal protection of 
their organisational rights, the comprehensive safeguards against unfair dismissals and 
discrimination, and the statutory provisions on neo-corporatist forms of employee representation. 
As the director of a labour research institute noted, the Labour Act 
was influenced to a great extent by SWAPO's promises to workers, and especially by SWAPO's historical 
emergence out of a workers' movement with Nujoma, Ya Toivo and other migrant workers being the 
driving force behind the establishment of SWAPO. Out of that historical link came the conviction at 
independence that things must improve for workers (0911 0/1998). 
Given this historical link, the Act places considerable emphasis on the principles of equity, 
justice and the protection of fundamental human rights. A significant aspect of this statute is the 
introduction of ' fairness' into industrial relations. In theory, at least, the conduct of employers 
can now be evaluated in terms of broader social objectives by an external agency such as the 
Labour Court. Other provisions in the Labour Act include the establishment of conciliation 
boards; provision for voluntruy and compulsory arbitration; lawful strikes; a distinction between 
disputes of interest and disputes of right; decriminalisation of industrial relations; maternity 
leave; and the substitution of common law with collective and statutory regulation. A 
commitment to collective bargaining as the primary mechanism of wage determination, 
encouraged the government to refrain from introducing a minimum wage. In practice, this served 
to sustain employers' largely unilateral command over the terms and conditions of employment 
for unorganised and poorly-paid workers. 
The Labour Act deals with basic conditions of employment, dismissals and unfair disciplinary 
actions in considerable detail. On most substantive matters, the parties are encouraged to engage 
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in voluntary collective regulation, albeit within the broad framework and spirit of the Act. State 
involvement is facilitating rather than dictating, leaving considerable room for the parties to 
conduct the employment relationship. While it retained the voluntarist principles of the previous 
dispensation, the Act provides for the creation of an institutional framework designed to regulate 
the individual and collective employment relationship. Within this framework there are 
administrative, regulatory and advisory functions designed largely to govern the employment 
conditions of 'permanent' workerslo and to fortify the role of trade unions in workplace industrial 
relations. While collective bargaining would be encouraged, basic conditions of employment 
were subject to statutory regulation and a labour court would adjudicate on industrial di sputes. II 
This blend of voluntarism and compulsion was strongly influenced by the ILO conventions 
implemented in Namibia (Van Rooyen and Backer 1996:42). The system of labour regulation 
modelled on these conventions is premised on the assumption that the labour force is not 
fragmented, "the norn1 being a male full-time wage worker in regular, protected employment" 
(Standing 1993:429). Hence, the prevailing statutory framework militates against efforts at 
protecting non-standard employees: 
[cJasualisation is difficult to address as a union without the Labour Act being amended. The Act makes it 
difficult for us to organise temporary workers because they don't have any rights. The Act only regulates 
the use of casual labour, but employers use these workers for years and define them as ' temporary' rather 
than 'casual'. These temporary contracts can be extended monthly or even annually (general secretary, 
NAFAU - 26/10/1998). 
The Labour Advisory Council (LAC) - potentially the most influential structure established under 
the Labour Act - is a tripartite body which advises the Minister of Labour on various issues 
relating to industrial relations . It also has an inquiry role in investigating issues such as the 
formulation and implementation of national policy, promoting collective bargaining, and 
collecting and publishing employment statistics. Its composition is based on a tripartite structure 
with four representatives each from the state, employers and trade unions. The standing 
committees within the LAC have made very few concrete contributions to industrial relations, 
thereby diluting their potential in the realm of policy formulation. The lack of centralised 
industrial relations structures at industry level means that the LAC operates by and large without 
a foundation in the workplace. Not surprisingly, the LAC has failed to sustain any movement 
10 There is, of course, no real permanence in any employment relationship. 'Permanent' employment merely 
refers to an (often implicit) agreement between the employer and employee that thei r relationship is open-ended 
rather than fixed in duration. 
I I In his address at the first post-independence May Day celebrations in Windhoek in 1990, President Sam 
Nujoma stressed that government intervention in industrial relat ions would be kept to a minimum, allowing 
employers and employees to "handle their own affairs" (cited in Van Rooyen 1996:250). 
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towards a tripartite regulation of industrial relations policies. Its advisory (as opposed to 
negotiating) powers, the government's stringent neo-liberal economic policies, and the emphasis 
in industrial strategies on creating an investor-friendly climate have all significantly weakened 
the trend towards neo-corporatist regulation oflabour market policies endorsed by the Labour 
Act. To be sure, the LAC has had some influence over the drafting of labour legislation, but very 
little impact on macro-economic policies. Labour's share of national income, however, depends 
as much on the broader processes of political exchange in the labour market as it does on 
collective bargaining in the workplace. 
Other statutory measures introduced in this period include the National Vocational Training Act 
(1994), the Social Security Acr (1994), the Employees Compensation Amendment Act (1995), the 
Export Processing Zones Act (1995), the Public Service Act (1995), and the Affirmative Action 
(Employment Equity) Act (1998). These laws were designed to address the chronic lack of skills; 
establish a social security system applicable to all employees; provide more comprehensive 
compensation for occupational injuries and diseases; attract investment and increase employment 
levels; regulate the employment of public servants; and eliminate discrimination and 
disadvantage in the workplace. Unemployment and social security, in particular, have became 
increasingly pressing concems. 12 The Minister of Labour noted at the introduction of the Social 
Security Act that 65% of employees in the formal sector had no access to any form of pension, 
death benefit or unemployment support (cited in Van Rooyen 1996:234). The need for more 
effective policies for job creation, according to the Ministry of Labour (1998:45), should be 
regarded as "a national priority of the highest order". The SW APO government has taken several 
initiatives to stem the tide of job losses and to increase employment levels. 13 Together, the 
structures and objectives of these laws constitute an ambitious, complex and administratively-
intensive system of labour regulation. 
Following the widespread negotiation of recognition agreements under the new dispensation, 
annual wage negotiations soon became entrenched in the urban centres and in the larger 
enterprises. Typically, these agreements protect union officials and members ITom victimisation 
and provide for the deduction of union dues, the resolution of disputes, industrial action, 
12 For example: when the parastatal TransNamib advertised 235 vacant posts towards the end of 1990, over 
4000 applications were received within the first two days (Van Rooyen 1996:257). 
13 These include the National Employment Policy/or Job Creation and Protection 0/ Workers recently 
approved by Cabinet, an Employment Services Bill drafted to consolidate the various job creation initiatives, and 
a white paper on Labour-Based Works aimed at st imulating employment and skills development through public 
works programmes (MoL 1997:42-8). 
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grievance and disciplinary procedures, and training (Klerck and Murray 1997). Workplace 
bargaining is the most prominent form of collective labour regulation. This narrow bargaining 
structure is a significant factor in the considerable variation that exists in the terms and 
conditions of employment within and between industries and occupations. The decentralised 
system of collective regulation has also been reinforced by employers' pursuit of 'flexible' 
employment policies. According to the president of the national employers' federation, 
[w]e need to move away from the system where everybody in a department are on the same terms. We need 
to move to a system where our payment systems and OUf conditions of employment are more individualised 
to reward individual achievement ... There must be much greater flexibility in the sense of the emp loyer 
and employee getting together to establish conditions of employment ... Flexibility, as against rigidity, also 
means no minimum wages (08/07/2000). 
Labour regulation at the level of the workplace remains considerably varied: larger enterprises 
generally adhered to the provisions of the Labour Act and have established some internal systems 
of labour regulation. The latter generally include formal communication channels between 
management and staff, the recognition of shop steward committees, and separate personnel 
departments concerned primarily with labour administration and conflict management. In smaller 
firms and commercial famls, labour regulation generally lacked an institutional framework and 
management continued to be autocratic and paternalistic (Klerck and Sycholt 1997). Many 
employers (especially in smaller firnls) were eager to minimise the impact of what they perceived 
to be a costly, burdensome and overly prescriptive regulatory framework. As a result, the 
institutionally and collectively regulated segment of the labour market is narrowly confined to 
the more skilled, better-paid and organised workers in the larger urban enterprises." Statutory 
provisions were either ignored or haphazardly applied, depending largely on the inclination of 
and ability to comply by the employer. Labour inspections and law enforcement in these sectors 
were also virtually absent. As a management consultant noted, 
[t]here is quite often a complaint that the indigenous business people to a large extent ignore, for example, 
aspects of the Labour Act ... In fact, the Ministry of Labour and the offices of the Labour Commissioner 
are very thin on the ground. They've also got all sorts of schemes and new legislation coming in, whereas 
they are struggling to cope with the social security legislation which is not really functioning correctly ... 
There is a major burden placed on employers in Namibia through all these legislative provisions. Even our 
occupational health and safety law is a very, very bulky document with an enormous amount of 
requirements, a lot of red tape, and a lot of administrative aspects which have to be satisfied . It is the same 
with our affmnative action law. Despite this burden, employers try to comply with the Labour Act although 
they don't always succeed (19/07/2000). 
The trade union respondents confirmed the lack of enforcement and the widespread evasion of 
14 In 1989, the NUNW claimed a membership of about 75 000 out ofa total workforce of 185 000 (Wood 
1991 :765). 
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statutory duties. According to MUN's general secretary, Namibia 
has very good [Iabourllegislation in place. But this legis lation is just collecting dust. It is like having an 
old bull-terrier in the house that cannot bite. The dog has the name, but it has no teeth to chase people away. 
Comrade, we all know that legislation without the proper enforcement mechanisms in place will always fail 
(26110/ 1998 ). 
Wi th independence, the trade unions came under increasing pressure from various quarters to 
shift their focus from essentially political goals to workplace issues. The NUNW steadily moved 
out of the shadow of the ruling party and adopted an increasingly militant stance, clashing with 
the government over the provisions in labour legislation and its economic policies. The labour 
movement and state differed fundan1entally over the pace and direction of economic restructuring 
(Jauch 2002). A resolution adopted at the NUNW's first National Congress in 1993 declared that 
"economic restructuring in favour of the working class can only be achieved when the capitalist 
has been replaced ... [and] only the mobilised working class can be able to smash and replace the 
capitalist" (cited in Van Rooyen 1996:248). This overtly political orientation has subsequently 
been diluted by the rising predominance of a more economistic focus on workplace issues (see 
chapter 6). The central challenges for the trade unions after independence include the need to 
redefine their relationship with SW APO, build their financial and organisational capacity, and 
take advantage of the opportunities presented by the new system oflabour regulation (Murray 
and Wood 1997a; LaRRI 1999; Jauch 2002). 
Employers' organisations remained fragmented and largely inactive. In 1992, the Namibian 
Employers' Federation (NEF) was established to deal with industrial relations issues, while the 
Namibian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (NCCI) focused on economic and business 
matters. Both are beset by a lack of financial resources, low levels of membership involvement, 
and insufficient staff. At the end of 1994, the NEF only had 25 paid-up members. The lack of 
effective national organisations for employers means that industrial relations policies are often 
reduced to the lowest common denominator. Agreements can be reached on the easy issues, but 
disintegration threatens whenever substantial compromises are needed. While some employers 
have embraced the processes of transformation, many remain committed to the authoritarian and 
discriminatory practices of the past (Klerck and Sycholt 1997:149-52). A significant proportion 
of Namibian employers continue to cling stubbornly to their prerogatives and regard (black) 
labour as a cost to be minimised and not as a resource to be nurtured and developed. As a casual 
worker observed: "[t]here are laws for casual workers but ... the bosses don't treat us as people 
who have rights" (07/07/2000). Opposition to collective labour regulation and a disdainful view 
of new statutory regulations reach into the upper echelons of employers' organisations: 
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[alii the state really needs to do is to ensure that the legal framework that surrounds the employment 
relationship is maintained. The running of the business should be purely between the worker and his 
employer. I think it is ridiculous to have a Labour Act which spells out all kinds of conditions that are often 
inapplicable ... Industrial relations needs to be subservient to the plain, common-sense business interests 
of the firm. Anything else just doesn't make sense, The company's vision and mission, the company's 
values and culture, and the policies and strategies which emerge from all these things are paramount. 
Industrial relations is merely a manner of ensuring that personnel issues are integrated into the whole web 
of the management structure (president, NEF - 08/07/2000). 
The post-independence period witnessed a drastic upsurge in labour litigation, reflecting a new 
confidence by workers in the judicial process. The relatively low incidence of official dispute-
resolution indicates a preference for settling disputes internally and the continuing inclination on 
the part of workers to engage in wildcat strikes and to circumvent formal dispute procedures. The 
low success rate of conciliation boards seem to suggest a greater unwillingness to compromise 
and greater willingness to embark on legal industrial action. Disputes of interest lodged with the 
Labour Commissioner in the first half of the 1990s involved mainly wages and to a lesser extent 
conditions of employment, dismissals and retrenchments. The majority of conciliation boards 
were established in the mining sector (60%) with the only other significant occurrence (16.6%) 
being in the manufacturing sector (Van Rooyen 1996:253). Disputes of right adjudicated by the 
labour courts involved mainly individual industrial relations and covered all sectors of the 
economy. 
A further avenue open to aggrieved employees was to lodge complaints with the Labour 
Inspectorate.' s According to Van Rooyen (1996:254), the majority of these complaints came from 
the construction sector (20.7%), the agricultural and fishing sector (15.4%) and domestic service 
sector (13.2%). These sectors have historically been characterised by extremely poor employment 
conditions and low levels of trade union density. This shows that, in the absence of regulatory 
mechanisms such as trade unions, other means are soon mobilised to serve the needs of 
, 
employees. The majority of complaints involved the payment of wages (22.3%), termination of 
employment (19%), annual leave (14.6%) and ovel1ime (11.5%). Of all the complaints lodged, 
41.8% were determined in favour of employees, 24.6% in favour of employers and 33.4% 
remained pending or undetermined. 
The annual incidence of strikes during the first five years after independence was greater than the 
preceding twelve years of interim administrative rule. This was due in large measure to the high 
expectations of workers immediately after independence, widespread discontent with the pace 
of change, and continuing discrimination and inequality in the workplace (Jauch 1996; Murray 
15 According to the pennanent secretary in the Ministry of Labour, more than 30 600 complaints were 
received countrywide by labour inspectors between 1990 and 1999. 
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and Wood 1997b). The industrial sectors most involved in strike activity were manufacturing, 
the public sector, wholesale and retail, and transp01i and communication. Workplace issues rather 
than overtly political demands increasingly emerged as the primary trigger for industrial action. 
The bulk of disputes in the workplace revolved around wages. The majority of strikes involved 
less than 500 employees and 70% lasted only a day or less, with only 13.8% lasting longer than 
three days (Van Rooyen 1996:255). The ShOti duration of strikes reflects the fact that wildcat 
strikes continued to constitute the major type of industrial action in the country. Due to lingering 
racial tensions in the workplace, strikes were often highly volatile with widespread accusations 
of intimidation, assault, and obstructive picketing levelled against the workers. 16 The government 
has actively intervened to prevent or terminate strikes in the larger enterprises, and senior 
officials repeatedly called for an end to unfair labour practices and stressed the need for labour 
discipline and improved productivity. These attempts to strengthen labour and improve 
productivity were severely constrained by the inherent limitations ofa neo-colonial economy (see 
chapter 4). The latter, combined with the social disadvantages spawned by apartheid, resulted in 
a labour market with both a critical shortage of skills and high levels of under- and 
unemployment among the semi- and unskilled. 
There are already significant indications that the dualistic economic structure of the colonial era 
is being reproduced in a new form by the post-independence political order. Rising income 
inequalities and social divisions in the post-independence era are increasingly grounded in class, 
rather than racial or ethnic, considerations. According to the director of the NUNW's research 
institute, the Namibian government 
has very much adopted this ideology of social partnership. It is, of course, a way of pushing class issues 
aside. It has to do with the whole process of change here which never tackled class issues. The class 
divisions that exist are camouflaged by putting the emphasis on racial differences (04/07/2000). 
The foundations for a black elite were laid during the 1980s and consolidated through (among 
others) a network of clientelism and an expansion of the public sector after 1990. The hegemonic 
position of this new elite is dependent, however, on real concessions to the subordinate classes. 
In a society where capitalist and subsistence modes of production inter-penetrate, the extended 
family system that was preserved throughout the rural areas tended to mitigate the effects of 
growing class contradictions by reinforcing the legitimacy of elites. Under such circumstances, 
16 An extreme example is the wage dispute at a furniture factory in Okahandja in 1992 that led to the 
dismissal of about 350 striking employees. After mediation by the general secretary of the NUNW, an agreement 
with the company led to the re-employment of the workers with a 30% decrease in wages. Deep-seated 
dissatisfaction with the agreement among the workers led to a drop in productivity, absenteeism and tardiness, and 
was finally vented through a fatal assault on the factory manager. 
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as Tapscott (1995: 166) explains, 
[k]inship obligations and clientelism ... serve to reduce tensions between the elite and subal tern classes by 
extending influence and, to a lesser extent, economic gains to subordinate groups. In Namibia, the 
reciprocities and obligations of the extended family system are such that the socio-economic standing of 
many rural households depends heavily on remittances from those in [high] waged employment. 
The continued decline of the subsistence economies in the rural areas and the associated loss of 
employment opportunities contributed to a massive influx of people into the urban areas. The 
township of Katutura outside Windhoek, for example, was reputed to be growing in excess of 
12% per annum during the early-1990. Rising levels of urban unemployment and informal 
economic activity not only reflect the deepening of poverty, but also significantly hamper the 
development of strong trade unions and delay investments in skills and new technology. A 
significant consequence of this growth in the numbers of the urban unemployed is likely to be 
"the consolidation of a new underc1ass" (Tapscott 1995: 164). The redistributive effects 
associated with the consolidation of a black urban elite were simply not on the scale necessary 
to preclude the growth of such an 'tmderclass'. The urban informality or marginality that affects 
a growing sector of the population is an important source of division in the labour market. On 
the one hand, the decline of the migrant labour system and the rise in urbanisation led to an 
increase in standard employment contracts and the direct recruitment of workers, and provided 
the trade unions with a basis for formal and permanent organisation. On the other hand, the 
consolidation of a more stabilised and organised sector of the workforce laid the basis for an 
increased differentiation between 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. Employers on the mines and in the 
fish and meat processing industries, for instance, started in the late-1980s to employ increasing 
numbers of non-standard workers in less skilled and less secure jobs at considerably lower wages 
than permanent, male employees (Cleaver and Wallace 1990:22). 
The subsequent expansion of non-standard employment in Namibia relates both to the growing 
number of workers in NERs and the increasing differentiation in the form ofthese employment 
relationships. There are two main types of non-standard employment in Namibia. First, agency-
mediated or subcontracted workers hired indirectly through a temporary employment agency or 
subcontractor. These contracts vary significantly in content and duration, but are distinguished 
in terms of the triangular employment relationship that they give rise to. That is, these workers 
are regarded as the employees of an agency or contractor but render their services to and are 
partly controlled by the client-firm. Second, part-time workers employed on a temporary or 
permanent basis injobs that do not require full-time staff. Temporary part-time or casual workers 
are hired directly by employers 'off- the-street' on a temporary basis. Although these employment 
contracts can vary in duration from a few hours to several months, they are characterised by a 
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lack of intention on the pmi of the employer to engage in a permanent or open-ended employment 
relationship. Permanent pm-time employment is the least common form of non-standard contract 
and is confined largely to clerical , administration and technical occupations. In contrast to the 
other forms of non-standard employment, it is also largely of a voluntary nature. That is, while 
casual and subcontracted employment is invariably an involuntary choice, most permanent pm-
time workers do not wish to work in a full-time capacity. The factors that facilitate the latter foml 
of employment must be sought in the conditions of labour supply, while those of the former 
reside in the conditions of labour demand. 
The proponents oflabour market 'flexibility' are adept at identifying the various forms of non-
standard employment, but they rarely venture into a systematic explanation of their causes, 
consequences and regulatory regimes. As we shall see below, many of the deprivations suffered 
by migrant workers under colonialism have survived in the employment conditions of casual and 
subcontracted workers. 17 We are in a sense confronted by a paradox: the rise of poorly regulated 
NERs in a context of expanding institutional and statutory regulation of the labour market. This 
paradox is, however, more apparent than real. There has been a consensus developing among 
policy-makers since the late-1980s that an overarching nanative of 'flexibility' can best explain 
changes in the regulatory framework of the employment relationship. As a result, the policy 
debate over labour market reform is posed "in stark 'either/or' terms ... opposing regulation and 
rigidity to deregulation and flexibility" (Fudge and Vosko 2001 :329). Central to this debate is 
the view that "the general trend' has been towards deregulation, or what might be called market 
regulation rather than state regulation" (Hepple 1993:257). In practice, however, regulatory 
changes involve distinct trade-offs between the vm'ious forms of flexibility and security rather 
than a simple process of substituting one for the other. In other words, the conjunction of an 
expanded regulation of the SER and an increase in non-standard forms of employment 
presupposes the existence of distinct labour market segments with different modes of regulation. 
The debate on labour mm'ket 'flexibility' is therefore partly about the different ways in which the 
employment relationship may be established and regulated. As Nichols (1992: 135-6) notes, 
"there is in fact little that is given about who must perform what sort of labour or about how 
labour of any pmicular type must be organised". While there is now a general acceptance that 
the employment relationship is subject to considerable variation, there remains a dispute about 
the direction, extent and causes of the changes that have occuned. 
17 Kenny and Webster (1999) and Crush el at (200 I) note a similar process unfolding in South Africa: the 
trends towards flexibility involve the re-emergence, in a new form, of the apartheid division between (black) urban 
and migrant workers. 
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3.4 DUALITY AND DIVISION IN THE LABOUR MARKET: THE 
SEGMENTATION OF LABOUR SUPPLY 
A prominent characteristic of most developing countries is the division between a relatively 
small, advanced sector and a large underdeveloped and impoverished sector. In Namibia this 
duality is revealed in the stark contrast between the relative wealth of the country and the high 
degrees of inequality and poverty. On the one hand, Namibia has the per capita income of a 
middle-income country and, on the other, a high degree of poverty. Namibia's ranking according 
to its per capita GDP is 79 while its rank according to the Human Development Index is 116 
(Hansohm et aI1998:1). A World Bank study in 1992 reveals that the GDP per capita for the 
white population was US$ 12 839, for the black wage employment sector US$585, and for the 
black lural (,subsistence') sector only US$55 (cited in MoL 1994: 11). The vast majority of black 
people in Namibia are considered poor and, with a Gini-coefficient of 0.7, inequality is among 
the highest in the world. About half of the Namibian population continue to live in conditions 
of extreme poverty in a country that possesses some of the richest and most abundant natural 
resources in Africa. It is primarily these resources - notably diamonds, uranium, copper and other 
strategic minerals - that explained the determination of German and South African colonial 
authorities to establish and retain control of the territory. 
In contrast to ' flexibility' theories, the central concern here is not the extent to which social and 
political processes impinge on the operation of market forces, but rather the verification of the 
underlying conditions which facilitate or obstruct casualisation in the labour market. The 
Namibian labour market has hi storically displayed a dual character. First, the organised (urban) 
workforce with relatively high wages and considerable job security constitutes a protected 
primary labour market. Existing comparisons of Namibia's labour costs with its neighbours show 
that the wages of semi-skilled employees, for example, are more than four times as high as those 
in Zimbabwe (Hansohm el aI1998:5 ). Unionised workers have often gained substantially from 
the restructuring of employment in the formal sector. Many of these workers have had their skills 
upgraded, are more secure in their jobs, and earn rising real wages. Second, workers on 
temporary and fixed-term contracts, those in the informal and subsistence economies, and the 
underemployed comprise an exposed secondary labour market. The rural/informal sector includes 
unskilled labourers, domestic workers, communal farmers, and the lowest paid agricultural 
labourers, whose incomes are 7% of those of semi-skilled workers and less than 1 % of those of 
senior managers in the private sector (Hansohm et aI1998:5). The rising levels of under- and 
unemployment and the declining rate of job creation mean that many of these workers have lost 
the prospect of ever working in the formal sector of the economy. 
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Several structural and other factors reinforce this duality in the labour market. Productivity and 
income distribution in Namibia is notoriously skewed. The quantity and quality of social services 
available to black and white, rural and urban communities parallel the sharp disparities in income 
(Stone and Gaomab 1994; Tlhase and Kangueehi 1996). One percent of the top households 
command the same share (13%) of the private consumption expenditure as the bottom 48% of 
households! The wages and salaries of all workers in the formal sector make up 45% of the 
national household income. However, there are huge regional variations in this regard: in some 
regions wage and salaries account for over 80% of household income, while it others they 
constitute less than 10% of household income (LaRRI 1999:4). The employment structure is 
characterised by wide ranging inter- and intra-sectoral productivity differentials. For example, 
the value added per employee is highest in mining at N$87 000, while agriculture languishes at 
the bottom with N$2 415. The current wage structure also reflects substantial variations both 
within and across industries and occupations (see chapter 4). For instance, during the early-I 990s 
farm workers in elementary occupations received on average N$366 per month, while workers 
in the same occupations in the mining industry received on average N$ I 094. Similarly, 
managers in the mining industry received an average monthly salary ofN$1O 728, whi le their 
counterparts in the agricultural sector only received N$4 401 per month (MoL 1995 :30). This 
yields an income ratio for the highest (skilled/white) and lowest (unskilled/black) wage-earners 
of more than 29: 1. 
The competing claims of management's interest in preserving the ' flexibility' to hire and fire and 
the trade unions's interest in preserving the jobs of the permanent workforce are all too ofte~ 
resolved at the expense of workers in the secondary labour market. The rising real wages of 
organised workers, combined with a more fastidious legal regulation of dismissals, forced 
employers in Namibia to seek alternative means of reducing costs and increasing productivity. 
A combination of work intensification at the ' core' and job insecurity at the 'periphery' of the 
workforce is increasingly viewed by employers as the most viable route to competitiveness: 
[i]n this terribly competitive world that we are living in and where we are such weak players, the job 
security factor becomes so exceptionally important ... It is extremely important that employers can hire and 
fIre workers far more easily than is currently the case ... You say to yourself: let's try and manage without 
employing an extra person, we will just work a litt le harder ... It is sensible to have a two-tier system where 
core employees are permanent, but below them you bring in casuals, temporary and part-time workers. It 
means that even in bad times you can still keep going ... Flexibility should be promoted because it enables 
you to react so much faster to economic conditions as they change (president, NEF - 08/0712000). 
While employers are at the forefront in promoting non-standard employment, it is the interplay 
of state, management and trade union policies that account for the formation of labour market 
segments, the perpetuation of inequalities, and the tendencies towards incorporation and 
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marginalisation. State policies tend to oscillate between strategies of inclusion and those of 
exclusion, depending largely upon business cycles and the balance of class forces. The Labour 
Act, for instance, is geared less towards the protection of labour per se and more towards 
institutionalising the gains made by organised workers. The strategies of employers and trade 
unions also tend to have contradictory effects of inclusion and exclusion on both the job structure 
(degrees of homogeneity and differentiation) and the labour market (ban-iers and openings for 
worker mobility). For example, during periods of economic growth and an increase in the 
demand for labour, management may resort to strategies of inclusion of (especially skilled) 
labour in order to decrease competition from other finns , while trade unions may seek to protect 
the pay and conditions of their members through practices of exclusion. The restructuring of the 
labour market has a differentiated impact on workers because it is not merely the size of the 
labour surplus but "the capacity and costs of substituting unemployed for employed labour that 
detennines the relative power of capital" (Sengenberger 1981 :255). In other words, new forms 
oflabour market segmentation are premised on the reconstitution ofthe local labour supply. 
The size and composition of the non-standard workforce are contingent on a variety of interacting 
local conditions and are not simply the product of variations in labour market 'flexibility'. 
Prevailing labour market conditions and forms of labour regulation may either accentuate or 
moderate the trends towards duality and division in the labour market. In the chapters below, we 
will outline the role of economic competition, industrial structure and collective regulation in 
constraining and/or enabling the casualisation of labour in Namibia. For the moment, we will 
focus attention on the impact of the high levels of under- and unemployment and the legacy of 
institutionalised discrimination on the segmentation of the labour supply. 
3.4.1 High Levels of Under- and Unemployment 
The increasing segmentation of the labour market associated with the rise in non-standard 
employment in Namibia must be related, first and foremost, to the high levels of under- and 
unemployment. One reason why 'flexible' or 'precarious' employment exists is the prior 
existence of a group of workers whose labour power can be deployed in an en-atic and precarious 
manner. High levels of under- and unemployment, combined with the absence of both a viable 
subsistence sector and a meaningful welfare system, compelled some workers to take whatever 
jobs are on offer and not to report abusive labour practices and non-compliance with minimum 
standards (Klerck 2003). The proliferation of low-skill, low-wage NERs is therefore premised 
on the ability of employers to exploit less skilled labour pools that are vulnerable to wage-cutting 
and employment insecurity due to the lack of job opportunities. "Since many of the permanent 
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jobs are not skilled and the labour market is flooded with unskilled employees, managers can 
replace any ofthem, at any time, with casual workers" (general secretary, NAFAU - 26/1 0/1998). 
The facilitating impact of unemployment on the casualisation of work was widely recognised by 
the respondents. 
People are so desperate for work that they go for anything that is available. That makes it easy for labour-
hire companies to source labour (permanent secretary, Ministry of Labour - 0410712000). 
People only do this work because there is so much unemployment. Crime is your on ly other option. The 
bosses are taking advantage of this by saying: 'if you don ' t like the job, then go' ... They say: 'a haifa loaf 
of bread is better than nothing ' (part-time worker - 20110/ 1998). 
It is not .particularly useful to blame labour market 'rigidity' for the poor performance of a 
national economy in tenns of job creation. The high level of unemployment in Namibia has less 
to do with the degrees of labour market regulation than with the impact of colonialism and the 
neo-liberal economic policies pursued by the SW APO government. There is little evidence that 
the 'rigidities' of hiring and firing or of wage structures can account for high unemployment and 
a lack of job growth (Esping-Andersen and Regini 2000b). There is substantially more credible 
evidence that ' rigidities' of this sort influences who are the unemployed. The burden of 
unemployment is overwhelmingly concentrated on the least powerful social groups. In other 
words, extensive employee protection affects primarily the structure and not the levels of 
unemployment. The roots of rising unemployment and poverty in Namibia are to be found in the 
structural legacy of colonial rule and the narrow confmes of socio-economic tTansfonnation after 
independence. 
On the expanded definition, Namibia had an official unemployment rate of33.8% in 2000 with 
28 .3% of all economic active males unemployed and 39% of all economic active females without 
work (MoL 2002:43). The corresponding figures in terms of the restricted definition (i.e. 
excluding those not actively looking for work) are total unemployment of20.2% with 21.5% 
female and 19.0% male components. These figures suggest that a significant number of the 
unemployed believe that no work is available and have given up looking for ajob. In fact, only 
46% ofthe unemployed were active looking for work (MoL 1998:36). 
It is not only the extent of unemployment, but also the social composition ofthe unemployed that 
has stimulated the casualisation of employment. The majority (57%) of those who are 
unemployed have had no previous job experience and are seeking employment for the first time 
(MoL 1998:24). Over 60% of the unemployed are young people aged between 15 and 24 years. 
In fact, Namibia has a relatively young population with more than 40% below 15 years of age and 
more than 50% below 20 years (MoL 1998:44). Unemployment in Namibia also tends to be of 
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a long-telm nature: some 55% of the unemployed have been without work for more than a year 
and 40% for more than two years (MoL 1998:35). A further defining characteristic of the 
unemployed is their relatively low level of education: 23.1 % has no formal education, 35.8% has 
primary education, 41.8% has junior secondary education, and only one percent has senior 
secondary education or higher (MoL 1997:3). The high population growth rate (more than 3%), 
combined with the limited growth of the formal sector labour force, means that the prospects of 
stable employment are bound to get worse for the bulk of those in the lower echelons of the 
labour market. 
A large portion of the employed labour force in Namibia is underemployed in the sense that they 
work less than 35 hours a week, do so on an involuntary basis, and are seeking additional work. 
On this definition, almost half of the economically-active population is underemployed (MoL 
1997:3). The range of thirty to forty usual number of hours worked in all jobs accounted for only 
31 % of all employed persons. By contrast, a quarter of the employed labour force usually works 
more than fifty hours a week. Quantitative adjustments in the demand for labour are thus in part 
achieved through an extension of overtime. Underemployment of females was slightly higher 
than for males, while underemployment in the rural areas (54%) was higher than in the urban 
areas (46%). The majority of the underemployed are found in the private sector and in 
' elementary occupations' (MoL 1998:42). With a combined rate of unemployment and 
underemployment of about 60% (using the expanded definition), a sizeable majority of the 
Namibian labour force was available and/or looking for more work. 
There is considerable movement at the lower rungs of the labour market as part-time and 
temporary jobs tend to turn over at a faster rate than full-time and permanent jobs. As a result, 
they are significantly over-represented among the job openings available to the unemployed. 
This movement is usually of a cyclical nature: from unemployment to low-paid and precarious 
employment to unemployment again. Research shows that it is notably easier for an unemployed 
person to obtain non-standard employment than to get a full-time, pern1anentjob and that people 
in non-standard employment are more likely than full-time permanent employees to have 
experienced recent unemployment (Rogowski and Schomarm 1996; Gallie el a11998; Peck and 
Theodore 2000; Theodore 2000). According to Payne and Payne (1993:531), the strong 
association between recent unemployment and non-standard forms of employment "provides 
evidence that the labour market is segmented into secure and insecure sectors, whether or not 
employers consciously adopt core/periphery strategies of labour use". Increased female 
participation in the Namibian labour market has also generated a sizeable labour force that is 
often deemed to be ' suitable ' for casualised employment. As we shall see in the next chapter, 
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female non-standard employees tend to be concentrated in particular industries and occupations. 
3.4.2 Discrimination and Household Survival Strategies 
A long-standing reliance on large numbers of black migrant workers, combined with a 
burgeoning informal sector, generated a labour market structure which is characterised by 
significant variation in the rules that govern employee conduct and in the terms and conditions 
of employment on offer. Segmented labour markets allow employers to utilise differentiated 
labour supplies to meet the employment demands of technologies at different levels of 
development. Racial divisions continue to be a significant factor in the structuring of labour 
supplies in Namibia. As a management consultant noted: 
[rJaee plays a major role. There's no getting away from that. It is always an undertone ... When it comes 
to hard negotiations, employers velY quickly start to think in terms of race because they are inclined to think 
that poverty is a black phenomenon and not for whites (1211011998). 
While it goes without saying that no employee in Namibia can be lawfully discriminated against 
on the basis of race, gender or trade lU1ion membership; the social composition of non-standard 
employment reveals that it is precisely the unorganised, women and black people who are most 
vulnerable to such employment. This highlights one of the ways in which the segmentation of 
labour supply and of labour demand become mutually reinforcing. The priorities of employers' 
permeate the structures of non-standard employment to such an extent that they tend to entrench 
and amplify existing patterns of labour market inequality. It is no coincidence that women 
constitute the overwhelming majority of employees in subcontracting firms that offer cleaning 
or catering services (Leonard 1992; Lapidus 1993; Zeytinoglu 1994). That these jobs are 
primari ly women 's jobs, and that they are located in the lowest rungs of the labour market, 
suggest that non-standard employment is "an extension of occupational sex-segregation that 
continues to leave women in a severely disadvantaged position, and serves to heighten the 
exploitation of women as a source of cheap labour" (Smith 1987 :241). The co-existence of 
secondary and primary labour markets allows management to partly ensure the stabi lity and 
consent of the 'core' labour force, and provides it with the ability "to off-load the costs of 
flexibility on to the more vulnerable sections of the work force" (Garnsey et aI1985:54). The use 
of unskilled non-standard workers, in particular, reflects the attempts by employers to mobilise 
the cheapest and most disadvantaged segments of the labour market. As such, non-standard 
employment exploits non-union rates, regional differences and labour market disadvantage, and 
allows for the avoidance of costs associated with the implementation and maintenance of 
statutory duties. 
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Far from being a self-regulating entity, social institutions and cultural norms have a significant 
influence on the structure and dynamics of the labour market. They play an important part in 
"defining the social limits of wage-labor: not only do they define and regulate the [non-standard] 
workforce, but also help to maintain a social balance between the crosscutting processes of 
inclusion and exclusion in the labor market" (Peck 1996:31). This institutional formation of the 
non-standard workforce helps to resolve the questions how to distribute primary and secondary 
jobs socially as well as how to adjust the labour supply to fluctuations in aggregate employment 
levels. The fami ly, for instance, plays a crucial role in the ideological preparation for selling 
different types of labour. The extent to which gender and race are implicated in structured labour 
markets bears testimony to the deep-rooted causes of employment differentiation. Since job 
demarcations and allocations tend to conform to wider social divisions, "conflict is reduced and 
co-operation promoted despite inequalities at work" (Garnsey et aI 1985:69). Moreover, labour 
market segmentation theories have long emphasised the fact that, by "rewarding people not solely 
in accord with their prospective productivities, a segmented market acquires an active role in the 
generation of inequalities and low pay" (Ryan 1981 :6). There is thus no necessary correlation 
between terms of employment (wages) and levels of contribution to the productive process 
(effort). 
Table 3.6 Educational Profile of the Population by Gender: 2000 
GENDER NO PRIMARY JUNIOR SENIOR CERTIFICATE, 
EDUCATION SCHOOL SECONDARY SECONDARY DIPLOMA OR 
(%) (%) (%) (%) DEGREE (%) 
Ma le 11 .6 53.4 20.4 9.7 3.2 
Female 11 .5 50.1 24.0 10.1 3.0 
(Source: adapted from MoL 2002:32). 
Access to education and training was historically differentiated along racial lines: most white 
people have a senior secondary qualification and whites also constitute the vast majority of those 
(two percent of the popUlation) who have attained higher education. Apartheid's 'bantu 
education' and the near total absence of occupational training have effectively trapped black 
people in the lower rungs of the labour market. The fact that more than 60% of the population 
has little or no education means that there is a significant over-supply of labour for low-skill , 
menial work (Table 3.6). The majority of employers in Namibia provide their less-skilled (black) 
employees with very little training and regard skills development as an integral part of the 
managerial prerogative and hence not subject to negotiation (Klerck and Sycholt 1997:150). In 
their quest for short-term profitability, many employers remained locked into a low-wage and 
low-skill system of production. The low-skill character of Namibia's labour force also attracts 
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a particular kind of foreign capital (or branch circuits thereof) and labour process which tend to 
reproduce industrial relations reminiscent of the pre-independence era. 
The institutional determinants of prevai ling standards of living are important elements in the 
analysis of changes in an employment system. Employers may seek to reduce or constrain the 
historical and moral element in wages by drawing on sources oflabour whose social reproduction 
costs are borne partially by the state and/or family networks. Given the low inputs from the 
former, the latter are particularly significant in further reducing wage levels at the bottom end of 
the casual labour market. In the words of casual worker: 
[p]eople from the rural areas are prepared to work for very low wages .. . They don ' t have the same 
expenses that we have. We must pay for water and lights, while they just live in a shack ... They know there 
is a place waiting for them on the farms (15 /0712002). 
In situations of high unemployment and discontinuous work, the division oflabour in the family 
is key to social reproduction (Beneria and Roldan 1987; Warde 1990; Lapidus 1993; Jordan and 
Redley 1994; Kenny 2003). The pooling of a variety of sources of income from different labour 
markets, pensions, remittances and unemployment benefits increasingly becomes a necessary 
survival strategy for low-income families. This places the household at the centre of the social 
reproduction of labour. The table below graphically demonstrates the vast disparities in 
household income between the predominantly white (Windhoek Central), coloured (Khomasdal) 
and black (Katutura) residential areas. 
Table 3.7 Annual Private Household Income in Windhoek by Area: 1993/94 
AREA POPULATION TOTAL INCOME HOUSEHOLD PER CAPITA 
(%) N$ million C%) INCOME INCOME 
(N$) (N$) 
Katu t ura 62.5 38 1 (24.6) 24 553 4288 
Khomasdal 11.3 158 (10.3) 53347 9906 
W indhoek Cent ral 26.2 I 009 (65 .1) 92 027 27065 
(Source: adapted from NPC 1996:229). 
The widespread practice of recruiting new casual workers through informal networks tends to 
concentrate the burden of non-standard employment on some families. As NAFAU's general 
secretary noted, " [wJhen someone is fired, new casual workers are usually recruited through 
family members who are working there as casuals" (28/06/2002). This not only increases the 
number of casual workers in a particular household, but also introduces a set of strong social ties 
into the casualised labour process. 
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Since the casualisation of work allows employers to shift the costs of adjusting to changes in 
economic conditions onto the most vulnerable workers (Fudge and Vosko 2001 :331), it has led 
to a polarisation between full-time, job-rich households and households dependent on a 
succession of casual and temporary work. The absence of a integrated industrial sector in 
Namibia means that the informal sector was historically small and sustained largely by the 
recycling of wages earned in the formal sector (Simon 1984). Although over 150 000 people 
derive some form of employment and income from small and informal business activity, the 
sector is characterised by low-value outputs, outdated technologies, a lack of management and 
technical skills, and accounted for a meagre 2.3% of GOP (MoL 1997:39). Insofar as paid 
employment fails to provide the conditions necessary for the reproduction of non-standard 
workers through wage income, "it transfers its structural problems to the social security system, 
creating the need for an alternative system of reproduction through income transfers" (Deakin 
and Miickenberger 1992: 142). Social security payments, which partly decouple the spheres of 
production and reproduction, are limited in both scope and duration. 
Table 3.8 Distribution of Households by Main Source ofIncome and Area: 2000 
MAIN SOURCE OF INCOME URBAN RURAL TOTAL 
(%) (%) Number (%) 
Subsistence Farming 0.5 45.9 89228 (26.8) 
Cash Cropping 0.2 2.1 4448 (1.3) 
Animal Reari ng 0.1 2.0 4 11 5 (1.2) 
Business Activities 8.5 4.3 20176 (6.1) 
Wages and Salaries 76.2 28.3 160852 (48.4) 
Pension 6.5 11.5 3 1 230 (9.4) 
Cash Remittances 5.3 4.3 15615 (4.7) 
Other Means of Income/Not Reported 2.6 1.6 6755 (2.1) 
(Source: adapted from MoL 2002:36-7). 
In 1993/94, 35% of households relied on subsistence farming as their main source of income; 
44% were dependent on wages; 6% on business activities; 11 % on pensions; and 4% on cash 
remittances (NPC 1996:77). In 2000, according to the Ministry of Labour (2002:37), the 
percentage of households with secondary sources of income was as follows: subsistence farming 
(6.0); cash cropping (0.8); animal rearing (2.1); business activities (4.2); wages and salaries (8.5); 
pension (9.6); cash remittances (6.2); none (60.1); and other sources/not reported (2.5) . The high 
percentage of households with no secondary sources of income, combined with the fact that the 
vast majority of households depends on the income from wage labour (Table 3.8), suggest that 
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there is a high socio-economic price attached to the loss or lack of employment. 
3.5 RETAILING LABOUR: THE TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT INDUSTRY 
In contrast to the prolific range of studies on the trends and pattems of non-standard employment, 
very little attention has been paid to the structure and functions of the temporary employment 
industry. A conjunction of legal, social, economic and political forces facilitated a drastic 
expansion of temporary employment agencies in post-independence Namibia. The industry 
(known as ' labour-hire ' in Namibia) provides businesses with a whole host of labour services 
ranging from highly skilled technicians to unskilled manual labourers. These workers are paid 
by the employment agency or labour broker and only have employment with the agency or broker 
for as long as the contract with the client company lasts. While some of these workers are 
employed in a quasi-pem1anent capacity, there is generally an ex ante regulation of job tenure and 
terms of employment. Given the fragmented structure of the temporary employment industry, 
however, there are invariably tensions between the (prior) formal regulation from the centre of 
operations and the (subsequent) informal regulation at the dispersed sites where temporary staff 
are deployed (see chapter 5). These tensions stem from the fact that the temporary employment 
agency is deemed to be the ' employer' of the workers it supplies to a cl ient-firm, although it is 
the latter that deploys and controls these workers. 
The pressures to create a more malleable and responsive employment structure decisively shaped 
the demand fo r non-standard employment, whi le the regulatory status of agency-mediated or 
subcontracted labour was vital in securing the supply of non-standard workers. Temporary 
employment agencies and labour brokers fulfil an important role in driving down wages, 
expanding secondary labour market conditions, and establishing a new 'working poor' (Mangum 
et a11985; Harrison and Bluestone 1990; Brown and Sease 1991; Allen and Henry 1997; Heery 
and Salmon 2000b). The efforts by temporary employment agencies to institutionalise the NER 
in a manner favourable to the expansion of the industry, as we noted above, affected the norms 
surrounding the use and deployment of labour throughout the economy. In effect, it constituted 
"a step in the deregulation of the employment relationship itself' (Gonos 1998: 184). As a result, 
a growing number of workers are regarded by employers as a 'hired service' and as a 'production 
cost' rather than as a valuable asset. 
The rapid growth of temporary employment agencies internationally forms an integral part of a 
more general trend towards outsourcing, casualisation and the restructuring of the labour market 
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(Cordova 1986:645; Macken 1992:64; Campbell and Burgess 2001: 180). In fact, these agencies 
allow firms to outsource a significant part of the employment function itself. Contrary to its own 
pronouncements, the industry plays an active role in reconstituting employment relationships and 
in the erosion of the SER. The temporary employment industry is both a product of, and an active 
participant in, the restructuring process. Important as they are, cost factors are not always the sole 
or even primary consideration for the use of agency temporaries. The mobilisation of precarious 
and poorly-regulated forms of employment through temporary employment agencies provides 
industries with predominantly primary employment conditions with numerous advantages in 
terms of labour deployment and control (see chapter 6). As such, the growth of the temporary 
employment industry can be viewed, in part, as the outcome of attempts by employers to 
circumvent the primary labour market without incurring the disciplinary problems normally 
associated with the secondary labour market. According to the director of a labour research 
institute, 
[w]hen one looks at the proclaimed benefi ts, cost-wise it is not a benefit to get workers though [the larger 
temporary employment agencies] because as the client you pay all these add-on costs. For that amount, you 
could hire directly. There is no financ ial reason. The motivation comes in terms of hiring and firing, getting 
them in when you need them and getting them out when you don 't need them, and being protected against 
unionisation (26/06/2002). 
A number of temporary employment agencies have become large, multi-national corporations 
with an expanding presence in many developed and developing countries. However, the 
emerging global market for agency-mediated temporary labour is highly uneven in character, 
reflecting the variety of national regulatory conditions. To create sustainable markets, the global 
temporary employment industry depends significantly on its abi lity "to navigate complex and 
often unfamiliar regulatory settlements" (Peck and Theodore 2002: 170). Despite their expanding 
global and regional expansion, these firms are not as substantial as they might appear at first 
sight: 
they are hollow (rather than ' hollowed out') entities who formally organise workers on somebody else's 
site. They are multi-site operations, yet they do not own the sites. They are mass service firms in terms of 
employment, yet they possess few tangible assets other than perhaps the offices which house their 'lean' 
management ... While the centre of operations in these large service firm s may be formal, dynamic and 
strategic, the sites are scattered, loose, unpredictable workplaces (Allen and Henry 1996:73-4). 
The industry is also becoming increasingly organised, as reflected in the formation of the 
International Confederation of Temporary Work Firms. The Confederation reported growth rates 
of 15 to 20% per annum in the number of workers in Europe on temporary contracts during the 
1980s (Standing 1993:433). Temporary employment agencies are keen to represent their function 
in the labour market as a mutually-beneficial matching of supply and demand. The agency is 
presented as serving a vital and largely passive function in the labour market by linking the needs 
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of enterprises with the preferences of workers. That is, the industry is simply an impartial 
intermediary working to the benefit of both employers and employees. In the words of a 
temporary employment agency manager: 
(o]ur market share is growing mostly with our manual workers. The client does not have to hire or fire, he 
can just use my workers for as long as the job takes ... Most of my workers are people who come off the 
streets. People who have basically never had any lncome in their lives ... Now send such a person to a client 
to apply for a job - he has no education, he cannot read, he cannot write. I think we help such people 
tremendously. Now he is earning something he never had before in his life ... This guy hangs on to what 
he has, he does not want to give it up to someone else (15/1 0/1 998). 
Peck and Theodore (2002:147) propose an alternative conception of the temporary employment 
industry as "an active intermediary in the job market, the role of which can only be fully 
understood in the context of wider processes of employment restructuring and labour market 
reregulation". Temporary employment agencies do not only exploit conditions found in 
secondary job markets (i.e. market-following), but also contribute to the reproduction and change 
ofthesejob markets (i.e. market-transforming) (Mangum et a1 1985; Gottfried 1992; Peck and 
Theodore 1998). In the case of the former, the focus is on channelling subcontracted workers into 
available jobs usually at or below minimum wage. The latter is most apparent in the extent to 
which subcontracted workers constitute a continuously job-ready, pre-processed and 'voluntary' 
labour supply for the lower end of the job market. 
3.5.1 Labour Market Intermediation and the Triangular Employment Relationship 
The division of legal responsibility for enforcing minimum labour standards between the agency 
or broker and the customer is often not clear in these de facto triangular employment 
relationships. As a result, many of the regulatory protections that apply to the SER are evaded 
or undermined (Collins 1990; Macken 1992; Maurau 1993 ; Gonos 1998). Some NERs do not 
fit the traditional binary employment model. As Becker notes: "contemporary labour law is 
marked by a disjuncture between theories of rights and duties based on privity of contract 
between employer and employee and new forms of work relations that disrupt this model of 
employment by increasingly interposing intermediate employers between the entities of labour 
and capital" (cited in Fudge and Vosko 2001:335). The mediating role of the broker or agency 
between the employer and the subcontracted labourer, subjects the latter to more coercive forms 
of control and structural dependencies not experienced by permanent employees. It must be 
noted, in opposition to the emphasis on novelty among the proponents of 'flexibility ', that the 
process oflabour market intermediation has a long and sordid history. Marx (1967:462) clearly 
shows how the exploitation of women and children during the nineteenth century in England's 
"domestic" industry was much more "shameless" than in manufacturing, because "a whole series 
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of plundering parasites insinuate themselves between the employer and the workmen". 
As the legal employer of subcontracted workers, the temporary employment agency does not use 
their labour, nor does it control the labour process in which they are employed. In other words, 
the subcontracted worker is placed under a dual dependency: on the temporary employment 
agency or labour broker for hislher wages and on the client company for hislher supply of work. 
Agency-mediated labour can thus be understood as workers employed in an enterprise that is 
neither owned nor contro lled by their direct employer. Their labour is the source of two distinct 
but related forms of value: (a) ' direct' value - the profits that the subcontracted worker produces 
for the firm which hires himlher; and (b) ' indirect' value - the profits that the employment agency 
makes by hiring out the services of these workers . These workers earn lower wages and receive 
fewer benefits than workers in SERs due, in part, to the payments that accrue to the employment 
agency or broker. The wages of most less ski lled temporary agency employees vary greatly from 
one month to the next, but they earn on average between N$ 150 - 300 per month. These workers 
resented the deduction from their meagre wages that goes to the labour broker: 
I get paid three dollars an hour. [The temporalY employment agency] takes about seventy five cents of my 
hourly wages. Why should it come off my wages? We are the ones doing the work, not them. They are 
getting money for nothing (temporary agency worker - 12/07/2002). 
Temporary employment agencies produce a secure labour supply for insecure work, in the 
process reshaping the balance of power relations in the both casualised labour process and the 
secondary labour market. Temporary employment agencies are responsible for the selection and 
placement of workers, pay their wages and administer their benefits. This allows the client-firm 
to shed labour and still maintain an adequate supply of workers to produce its products or deliver 
its services. The client-firm is absolved from the responsibilities of paying wages and benefits, 
adhering to hiring and firing procedures, and the provision of training. The agency-mediated 
workforce in each client-firm is not only isolated from central operations, but also from the 
permanent staff in their respective workplaces. The client-firm is also relieved of the 
management function and ensured of arm's-length dealings with workers when agencies provide 
supervisors to manage the subcontracted workers at the workplace (see chapter 5). By absorbing 
some of the social reproduction costs of non-standard work - costs that employers of non-
standard labour seek to avoid - the employment agency guarantees and even subsidises the 
production of non-standard work. In the words of a labour broker: 
I take a lot of pressure off our clients' shoulders ... The advantages for the client is that he does not have 
to appoint extra staff to handle all the paper-work around pay and so on. I remove all that administrative 
work from the client. All those people that he hires rrom me are my responsibility (1411 011998). 
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The employment relationship of these workers is regulated through a contract for service between 
the agency and the client-firm. The workers themselves have no say in these matters: "we are not 
told what our conditions of employment are - you just find out when you get to [the client-firm)" 
(subcontracted worker - 29/06/2002). A labour broker also insisted that "[t]he terms and 
conditions of employment of our casuals is a matter between us and the client" (05/07/2000). The 
efficacy of the laws of supply and demand in the labour market depends on a neat match between 
the information on available jobs and the information on available employees. In practice, 
however, any additional information, recruitment, interviews and the like are costly and often 
result in jobs remaining vacant. By institutional ising the casualisation of employment, the 
temporary employment industry not only lowers employers' recruitment costs, but also eliminates 
both short-term and long-term disjunctures between labour demand and supply. According to the 
manager of a temporary employment agency, 
[o]n average, most of my people work five days a week. But it won't always be at the same place. Many 
of my workers go to the same place, but it all depends on the demand from our cl ients ... The casual doesn't 
go to the client every day at eight o'clock and sits there whether he works or doesn ' t work. No. He comes 
to me and goes from here in telms of demand (11/07/2002). 
Small and constantly varying contracts raise problems of coordination for the temporary 
employment agencies. As a result, these agencies are eager to expand the scope and duration of 
the services they offer: 
I have no problems with how long a temporary worker works with a client. It is an advantage for me and 
for him the longer he works there. I will also find any type of worker that the client may need (manager, 
temporary employment agency - 11107/2002). 
The expansion of temporary employment has more to do with a strong demand or high turn-over 
in the local labour market than with any particular policy innovation. The growth and 
occupational diversification of the temporary employment industry are firmly integrated into the 
business cycle (Mangum et a11985; Maurau 1993; Peck and Theodore 2002). At the beginning 
of an economic recovery, new recruits are often appointed on non-standard employment 
contracts. The experiences of retrenchment in the late-1980s and early-1990s encouraged 
employers to try to avoid lay-offs by employing non-standard workers. Permanent contracts are 
only extended to new workers with important skills and when economic conditions seem to 
stabilise. As a temporary employment agency manager noted: 
I think temporary work follows the economy. Many companies were retrenching in the eighties and nineties. 
When business started picking up, they were scared of taking on permanent staff and having to retrench 
again. It's not a nice thing to retrench, so they started bringing in temps (10107/2002). 
The role of the temporary employment industry is therefore akin to that of "unproductive 
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hawkers, the only constructive function of which is to provide a fragile , temporary bridge 
betweenjobseekers and employers" (Peck and Theodore 2002: 148). Firstly, they are not directly 
involved in the production of value and operate exclusively in the sphere of circulation. 
Secondly, their capital is no more than the sum of money to transfer commodities (labour power) 
from one place to another. Third, they are not an independent (class) force, but are subject to the 
fluctuations in capital-labour relations . As one labour broker so succinctly put it: " [w]e hire 
people and you can't hire people to companies who don't need people" (05107/2000). Given their 
unproductive nature and reliance on the cheapest sources oflabour, the proliferation of temporary 
employment agencies may become an obstacle to sustained economic growth, provide employers 
with a union-avoidance mechanism, and lead to an overall decline in terms and conditions of 
employment, a dilution of labour standards, and a rise in employment insecurity. 
3.5.2 Labour Regulation and the Rise of the Temporary Employment Industry 
The ability to generate high levels of profit by paying low wages and diluting labour standards 
means that some of the fastest growing firms in Namibia are now in the service and personnel 
sectors. Temporary employment agencies experienced remarkable growth in Namibia from the 
mid-1990s onwards. As we noted above, a steady supply of 'willing' workers, implicit 
deregulation, and the virtual absence of statutory and collective controls on the use of non-
standard employment in Namibia are highly favourable to the expansion of agency-mediated 
temporary employment. Although these agencies are concentrated in the major industrial centres 
(Walvis Bay, Swakopmund, Luderitz and Windhoek); they are also found in smaller towns such 
as Arandis and Tsumeb. The temporary employment industry in Namibia is dominated by one 
large company that employs about I 500 workers countrywide on a semi-permanent basis in 
addition to the numerous workers hired out on a daily basis as demand dictates (LaRRI 2000a:5). 
The other temporary employment agencies are considerably smaller and limited in their 
operations to specific towns, companies and skill categories. Some of the smaller agencies, for 
example, deal exclusively in the supply of temporary workers to one large firm (usually a mine). 
Semi- and unskilled workers constitute the bulk of the employees hired to private companies and 
parastatals. However, most temporary employment agencies also supply a whole range of skilled 
personnel and a few even specialise in the provision of skilled labour on fixed-term contracts. 
The temporary employment industry is not simply a mechanism to enforce flexible employment 
practices, but "its structure and development must be understood in terms of the complex 
renegotiation of employment relations and regulations on a country-by-country basis" (Peck and 
Theodore 2002: 145). This implies that the composition of the temporary employment sector, the 
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reasons behind its growth, and its effects on the SER are geographically-specific. There are at 
least two reasons for this spatial contingency. First, temporary employment agencies playa 
complex role in the restructuring of employment relationships, not only reflecting but also 
contributing to the prevailing segmentation of the labour market. The trends towards the 
casualisation of employment in Namibia are clearly structured and reinforced by those towards 
duality in the labour market (outlined above). Second, the services offered by the industry are 
fundamentally shaped by the specific labour demands of its clients. The later, in turn, are 
influenced by the market conditions, labour process requirements, and regulatory dilemmas 
endemic to a particular industry or firm. 
The temporary employment agencies in Namibia provide firms with temporary employees to 
meet labour requirements where permanent staff are on leave, absent or sick, to carry out 
irregular or unforeseen tasks, and to expand the workforce during special projects. In these 
situations labour brokers do not necessarily replace permanent jobs, but satisfY employers' 
special or exceptional labour needs. However, there is a growing trend whereby whole 
departments are being subcontracted to external agencies (see chapter 4). Here standard 
employees either loose their jobs or find themselves in an employment relationship that is inferior 
in most respects to that which they enjoyed as permanent workers. According to the permanent 
secretary in the Ministry of Labour, 
[s]ome of the companies go so far that they outsource everything except a few senior chaps. Even their 
personnel administration is sourced out to a labour consultant. All the core functions of that company are 
sourced out and that, I think, takes it too far. They must be reasonable (04/0712000). 
The outsourcing of work to temporary employment agencies following the retrenchment of 
permanent employees is a particularly contentious subject among trade unionists. 
I think outsourcing is there to avoid direct responsibility from the management. Management would just 
retrench all the workers and take in a subcontractor, which is unfair to the workers. No-one wants to take 
responsibility for the workers (national organiser, Namibian People's Social Movement - 0211111998). 
Strategically, employers know that the Labour Act makes provision for retrenchment. So they will retrench 
some workers saying that their job no longer exists. But then they bring in labour-hire workers into these 
same jobs. The law is not very strict on that issue, as long as the company follows the correct procedure 
(general secretary, MANWU - 27/0612002). 
This process also leads to situations in which employees performing similar or the same work 
may receive substantially different benefits. For this reason, many countries have sought to 
regulate this type of contracting by placing joint and several liability on the client-firm (especially 
where the agency 's employees perform work that forms a part of the client's principal or core 
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business)J8 and by requiring equality of treatment for non-standard employees. Trade unions in 
Namibia have occasionally succeeded in preventing employers from retrenching workers and 
then (unlawfully) employing non-standard workers in the jobs that were ostensibly made 
redundant (see chapter 6). Despite victories in some battles, the labour movement seems to be 
losing the war against casualisation as employers continue to expand the outsourcing of 'non-
core' departments and the government remains unwilling or unable to regulate the temporary 
employment industry: 
[wje have a big problem with retrenchments. The membership has been declining quite drastically. The 
introduction of these labour hire companies has severely increased job insecurity as businesses do away 
with penn anent jobs and hire casual labour to do the work (general secretary, NUNW - 22/1 0/1998). 
Standard and non-standard employment, as we emphasised above, imply alternative modes of 
labour regulation with different structural logics. Likewise, each form of non-standard 
employment represents "a distinctive social arrangement, the continued validity of which 
depends on the presence of a favorable regulatory environment and supporting legal doctrine -
or the absence of specific institutional barriers to its legitimacy" (Gonos 1998:171). The 
distinctive mode of labour regulation of non-standard employment allows businesses to evade 
andlor reduce the regulatory costs associated with the SER, mobilises workers for low-waged 
work, and maximises participation in non-standard, unorganised and low-paid work at the bottom 
of the labour market (Hakim 1989; Gottfried 1994; Felstead and Jewson 1999a). The industry' s 
rationale is "to open up (comparatively) deregulated spaces within the employment relation 
within which there is scope for profitably trading ' less regulated' labor" (Peck and Theodore 
2002: 154). As such, the temporary employment industry constitutes a mechanism for the social 
reproduction of a non-standard labour supply. It actively seeks to counteract the weak pull 
(demand) of non-standard work by inducing a concerted push (supply) from unemployment. For 
example: 
[sjince our last study, the labour force of [the largest labour-hire companyj has jumped to 12000 - a 
massive increase of six hundred percent in three years. They would only take on these workers if there is 
a demand from the various industries ... Of course, they also create a demand by very aggressively 
marketing their services. They approach companies directly and then says things that they would never put 
on the record. We suspect that they will tell the relevant manager: 'we heard you had an illegal strike and 
you lost so much as a result. If you use our workers and they get involved in that, just give us a ring and 
we will replace them'. These things of course never appear in a contract and are completely off-the-record, 
but they strike a chord with certain managers (director, labour research institute - 26/06/2002). 
The larger temporary employment agencies not only advertised their services widely among 
J 8 This is a legal ob ligation on each party to indemnify the temporary employee for all harm caused or 
damage suffered, irrespective of which party is actually at fault. 
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employers, but were also quick to promote the conditions best suited to the expansion of their 
industry. According to the general manager at one of these agencies, 
[w]e must move away !Tom placing undue restrictions on employers to hire and fire employees. We need 
to move away from the idea ofa job for life. Part-time and temporary work must be seen as stepping stones 
for both employer and employee. It is to their own good ultimately. Unfortunately, Nam ibia is moving 
towards a paternalistic system of employment and protection for the employees. Actually it is 
Namibianisatioll rather than globaiisation ... Not that there's anything wrong with that, but the inherent 
danger is that when you have a choice where to invest, you will invest in a place where you have more 
flexibility in releasing staff that are not suitable for the job (05/07/2000). 
There is a tension in this view of the industry between the celebration of poorly regulated forms 
of employment and the recognition of the vital role that regulation plays in facilitating non-
standard employment. This reflects the fact that regulation in the labour market is both a threat 
and opportunity for labour brokers. While extensive regulation of the SER has in part facilitated 
the growth of the temporary employment industry, as we noted above, its continued survival 
depends on minimal social and statutory regulation of NERs. The temporary employment 
industry has actively sought to limit the extent of regulation imposed on its own sphere of 
operations and not the employment relationship more generally (Abraham 1988; Anderson et at 
1994; Gonos 1998; Autor 2000). The industry therefore exists to undercut prevailing standards 
of labour regulation. Contrary to the image of the temporary employment industry as the 
impartial and neutral purveyor of a 'free ' market ideology, 
the temp sector is very much a creature of regulation and as such is an active player in the process of 
regulatory change. It exists in the shadow of the more regulated zone of the labor market, and the size and 
vitality of the [temporary employment industry] reflects how that shadow falls ... The temp industry ' s 
bus iness interests are best served by being the (marginally) less regulated 'other ' of the mainstream 
economy, hence the sector's structural position not at the heart but on the fringes of the labor market, in 
the undertow created by successive waves of regulation ... The industry exists ... in the messy interstices 
of the regulated economy, with which it has a complex and symbiotic relationship (Peck and Theodore 
2002:151-3). 
By mobilising and demobilising labour strictly in accordance with prevailing demand conditions, 
the temporary employment industry increasingly assumed the role of a safety valve for the labour 
market as a whole. The industry forms an integral part of the institutional mechanisms that set 
and continually adjust the parameters of the labour supply in line with the cyclical movements 
in economic activity. This has had a profound effect on the way in which employers adjust to 
fluctuations in economic activity. Retrenching workers during a decline in demand, according 
to the general manager of a construction firm , 
causes you to lose that continuity of an employment relationship. We are working towards a situation where 
we have more core labour that stays longer in the company ... The rest ofthe work is done through contract 
workers (05/11/1998). 
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In their role as "agents of deregulation", temporary employment agencies play the role of "neutral 
brokerage" in the labour market through a "market-enhancing presence" (Peck and Theodore 
2002:150). The low-cost, market-orientated strategies of these agencies tend to exploit labour 
market conditions as they find them. When a client-firm purchases the labour power of a 
temporary worker, it not only acquires a set of competencies but also a gendered and/or racialised 
subject whose expectations conform to relations of subordination in the wider social milieu. This 
establishes a "regressive regulatory accommodation" between non-standard employment and 
flexible labour markets (Peck and Theodore 2000: 133). As a management consultant observed: 
[oJutsourcing is becoming one of the ways in wh ich companies keep their own numbers as small as possible 
and concentrate on ly on their own central line of business. There are a lot of problems in our labour 
legislation and the District Labour Court has passed a lot of decisions that are very unfair to employers. It 
is very difficult to terminate services, even of people who are incompetent. Employers are picking up a lot 
of problems with peop le they just can't terminate for one or other reason. Therefore they are becoming 
hesitant to employ people. They are looking for other ways to substitute for employees which is actually 
a very bad thing for our country because we are looking for job creation (19/0712000). 
The labour brokers viewed their role explicitly in terms of alleviating some of the costs and 
burdens imposed on employers by the regulation of the SER. Not surprisingly, therefore, agency-
mediated temporary employment is most prevalent in larger, unionised firms where terms and 
conditions of employment are jointly regulated and statutory provisions are meticulously 
implemented. According to the director of a labour research institute, the larger temporary 
employment agencies "watch very carefully which sectors are tom apart by tense labour relations 
and then target those companies by saying: 'we can avoid these problems for you in the future'" 
(26/0612002). 
3.5.3 The Two Guises of the Temporary Employment Industry 
The temporary employment industry is internally differentiated. As the industry expanded up and 
down the occupational ladder at the same time, it become both more heterogenous and polarised. 
There are the small, locally-owned agencies providing wage-sensitive sectors with low-skilled 
labour and the large, often multi-national, agencies that service a range of higher level markets . 
According to Peck and Theodore (1998:671), there are 
[sJ imul taneous processes ... at work for the industry to 'restructure down' into the lowest reaches of the 
labour market, constructing hyper-eommodified employment relat ions in wh ich daily instability and high 
rates of exploitation are the norm, and to 'restructure up ' into once-stable spheres of employment, 
developing increas ingly regularised relationships with corporate clients, for whom the utilisation of temps 
has become a functionally-integral aspect of medium-term business strategy. 
The inadequate legal regulation of the industry in Namibia means that the competition between 
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large, established firms and numerous small, ' fly-by-night' operations can easily degenerate into 
a race to the bottom. In fact, some of the latter retain as much as 75% of the fees that they charge 
and pay wages as low as N$2 per hour (LaRRJ 2000a: I 0). Self-regulation, weak as it is, has 
nevertheless imposed costs on larger firms not faced by smaller firms with more informal, 'off-
the-books' operations. The managers of two larger temporary employment agencies contrasted 
their business with the smaller operators in the industry as follows. 
We supply his protective clothing: his overalls, earplugs and boots ... We work according to the minimum 
wages set by the law and carefully screen our workers ... All our casuals are registered with social security, 
and their leave is payable for 18 days a year ... At the moment we don't have medical aid or pensions - we 
are still wait ing for that to come ... If a temp works more than 45 hours, then it is overtime. If he works on 
Sundays, it is overtime. And if he works on a public holiday, it is overtime ... If one of my people gets 
injured at the client 's place, we take all the responsibilities on our shoulders. We fetch the person, make 
sure all the social security forms are filled in and make sure that the man gets to a doctor (10107/2002). 
Customer service is very important to us. We offer a continuous and high-quality service. You get a lot of 
people who work out of their garage or out of their bakkie, but they simply cannot provide the service that 
is really needed. All they are interested in is making a quick buck. There has to be some control over these 
people ( 11 /07/2002). 
At the bottom end of the industry, we find individuals who run temporary employment agencies 
from their homes or back-street offices, largely beyond the reach of formal regulation. 
Employment relationships in this segment of the market are highly fragile, precarious and price-
sensitive. This segment of the industry is characterised by tight profit margins and erratic flows 
of mostly lmskilled labour. "The characteristics I look for is where does he live, how old is he, 
and where has he worked before - I am not interested in any qualifications" (labour broker -
1411 0/1998). The costs of entry into tile lower echelons of the temporary employment industry 
are also relatively low. This not only facilitates an increase in the number of operators in the 
industry, but also allows some labour brokers to avoid their obligations by simply changing their 
identity or location. As MANWU's general secretary noted, 
you will find that some of these subcontractors are not even registered. You will never find where their 
offices are, where they are operating from. And their name is also unknown ... The subcontractors have cell-
phones [to receive orders for labour] and sometimes their ' office' is inside the boot of their car. Even if you 
manage to report [an unregistered] subcontractor to the labour inspectors, he simply closes the 'business' 
and starts under a new name the next day (2311 011998). 
The general secretary ofNAFAU noted a similar process with regard to some of the agents that 
actively promote the use of non-standard contracts: 
[t]here has been a mushrooming of 'consultants' who are inter-linked with the labour-hire companies. They 
are making a lot of money by telling the companies to reduce their labour costs by using temporary workers. 
They are not regulated and they can operate fTom their house or even from a cafe while they are drinking 
coffee (2611 011998). 
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Despite the prominence of market regulation, social regulation continues to figure prominently 
in the incorporation and allocation of temporary workers in this segment of the market. That is, 
even in labour markets where statutory regulation is minimal and trade unionism is absent, 
immanent social processes are decisive (Jones 1996). These processes revolve largely around the 
conventions that been developed to structure the selection and allocation of labour. The 
perfunctory screening of workers by the small employment agencies means that ' undesirable' 
workers invariably slip through the cracks. However, 'trouble-makers' and 'unsatisfactory' 
workers are soon identified by the labour broker and/or the client-firm and they are then excluded 
from any future allocations of work. According to a labour broker, the workers "get sorted out 
very quickly in terms of who can do what" (05/07/2000). While labour in this segment of the 
labour market may be largely homogenous and therefore highly substitutable, the selection and 
allocation of workers is influenced by a range offactors. These include preferential treatment by 
the labour broker based on the individual ' s past reliability and capacity for hard work; the 
demands of the task to be calTied out; the client-firm' s preference for 'reliable' workers with the 
'right' attitude and prior experience; and the labour queues established by workers. The latter 
operate primarily on the principle of ' first-come-first-served '. Hence, workers generally have to 
alTive at assembly points near the industrial areas at six o'clock in the morning if they are to have 
a realistic change of getting a job. 
The labour broker receives orders from firms and collects the requisite number of workers from 
the assembly points. The duration of the work can vary from a few hours to several weeks. 
Despite some variation in the tasks to be performed, the work is generally of a menial and 
strenuous nature . Pay is low, the work is irregular, and the struggle to make ends meet is a 
constant source of worry. While the workers were desperate to get longer-term jobs, they were 
largely indifferent to the nature of the work. "We don't ask what type of job it is, but you hope 
it is not just ajob for the day" (temporary agency worker - 02/07/2002). By mid-morning, most 
of the assembled workers are dispersing with only a few remaining on the off chance that work 
may become available after lunch. This cycle is repeated six days a week. For the majority of 
these workers, many hours are spent idle waiting for work in a context where labour supply 
consistently exceeds demand. "We are wasting our lives away waiting for these jobs" (temporary 
agency worker - 06/0712000) . The interaction among subcontracted workers is strongly 
influenced by their experience of precarious and intermittent employment, and often centres 
around mutual aid such as the sharing of experiences and infOlmation about access to temporary 
work. 
High labour turn-over in the less skilled categories of employment is not a concern since these 
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agencies perform their role as labour-market intermediaries in a favourable context of excess 
labour supply. According to MUN's general secretary, "[a]s long as they know that these workers 
can easily be replaced, firing them is not an issue" (26/10/1998). The small temporary 
employment agencies are generally unconcerned with the manner in which the work is done, 
unless complaints are received from the client. "The client can get [the temporary worker] to do 
any jobs that are necessary" (labour broker - 19/10/1998). While there is little concern shown by 
labour brokers in retaining the services of a particular worker, satisfying the requirements and 
maintaining relationships with a client-firm are paramount to the survival of the agency. 
Temporary employment agencies allow employers to harness the benefits of casualisation by 
"extending their 'recruitment reach' deep into the under-employed and impoverished pockets" 
of the labour market (Peck and Theodore 1998 :661). As such, the temporary employment 
industry represents an institutionalised mechanism for relocating the costs of fluctuating demand 
into the bottom end of the labour market. 
The larger, more established temporary employment agencies have well-appointed offices in or 
near the major industrial areas. These firms are designed to mobilise and allocate large numbers 
of temporary workers, with varying levels of skill and work experience, as rapidly and efficiently 
as possible. In addition to absorbing the fluctuations in its labour demand, the client-firm derives 
a number of other benefits from these employment agencies (see chapter 6). The sheer size of the 
reserve army of labour for unskilled occupations raised numerous problems for management's 
standard recruitment practices. As the manager of a large employment agency explained: " [i]f 
you advertise for a production job today, you will have hundreds of people outside your factory 
gate tomorrow" (16/1 0/1998). Furthermore, in contrast to the dispensability of the less skilled, 
high labour turn-over among skilled or experienced temporary workers is a major concern for 
these agencies. Managers in the larger employment agencies that were interviewed consistently 
complained about the 'poaching' of their best staff members by client-firms. A growing number 
of employers are using skilled and experienced agency-supplied workers as a more effective and 
less costly means of screening potential employees in a process of 'try-before-you-buy'. In the 
words of an employment agency manager: 
[cJertain specialities start developing among some workers. Then I know which workers to use for a certain 
job ... The feed-back that I get from many clients is: 'we want this guy - you don't send him to another 
place, he stays with us'. That is how his permanent work starts. Of course, this often means that we loose 
some of our best workers (07 /07/2000). 
A small staff complement of four or five employees processes the orders for labour from client-
firms, registers and screens new work seekers, and despatches selected workers to their respective 
workplaces. In contrast to the smaller 'fly-by-night' employment agencies, these firms are more 
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likely to keep records on employees, adhere to social security and other labour laws, establish 
internal disciplinary and grievance procedures, and practice more stringent selection of workers. 
The larger agencies target a distinct sector of the market. 'They are looking at companies that are 
making money - that' s where they want to go in" (regional organiser, MUN - 05107/2002). These 
agencies are also much more concerned about the negative image ofthe industry in Namibia. 
The bad stories about labour-hire companies that are going around come from people who don't work for 
us ... The stories that are going around say that we are taking half of the guys ' money, that these guys don ' t 
get leave, they don't get paid overtinle and they don ' t get social security. This may be so with other labour-
hire companies but not with us. My guys are happy .. . The bad stories come from the guy who knows that 
he is walking on thin ice. He is a guy who is constantly off sick, he is the guy who has disciplinary hearings. 
The chances that he is going to loose his job and that a casual is going to be put in his place are great ... We 
don ' t abuse people here because we follow the correct procedures ... Our clients feel more sure about what 
they get from us than just hiring workers from outside the gates. Now they know they are safe because we 
are registered. Now there are no more shortcuts (manager, temporary employment agency - 0610712002). 
There are many employment agencies that are, as you say, fl y-by-night operators, but the market situation 
soon sorts them out. Everybody wants to jump on the bandwagon, but many of them don't have any 
experience with running a good employment agency. I carulOt force any company to use my services, but 
if you provide a professional service, the word will soon spread ... I have about 800 applicants on my books 
and it is easier for me to find someone ajob than it would be ifhe went from office to office looking for 
work. I will say to the client: 'I know this guy and he did a good job at the previous companies I sent him 
to ' . It is better to work through a recognised employment agency if you want temporary workers. We know 
how to screen the workers and we do all the necessary paper work (manager, tempor3lY employment 
agency - 0210712002). 
The workers in this segment of the labour market tend to carry out a more diverse range of tasks, 
have more job experience, and obtain work of a longer duration than their counterparts in the 
smaller agencies. Workers on long-term contracts must find their own way to the client-firm and 
their interaction with the employment agency is reduced to a weekly collection of wages. Both 
the small and large temporary employment agencies had relatively informal , arm's-length 
relationships with their employees. There is a tendency, however, for the larger agencies to 
establish much closer relationships with client-firms and to offer their employees greater 
employment (albeit not job) security: 
[e]verybody after all wants a pennanentjob. I believe that once our pension fund is up and running, we will 
get more commitment from your workers. Then the guy knows: 'today I'm working here, tomorrow I'm 
working there, but I have something to take care of myoId age'. Once that comes in, then we will have a 
much more relaxed atmosphere among the people. Then he won't have any more problems like 'why am 
I not being appointed pennanently?' He is, in other words, already appointed and has his pension scheme 
with us (manager, temporary employment agency - 06/0712002). 
The clients evaluate the performance of agency-supplied workers and the processes of finding 
the ' right' workers for the job and weeding out those who do not meet expectations are key to 
the longevity of relationships with client-firms. Longer and larger contracts are sometimes 
accompanied by the provision of on-site supervision by the temporary employment agency (see 
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chapter 5). Since the corporate image of a large client-firm could be tarnished through its 
association with a disreputable employment agency, they tend to rely almost exclusively on the 
services of the established agencies. These agencies place a premium on matching employees 
with the 'corporate culture' of their clients. In the words of the general manager of a large 
employment agency: 
[i]n my line of work you need to be a good judge of character ... Our bigger clients are very fussy about the 
type of worker you send [0 them. You must know how things are done in a particular company. Then you 
can send them the right workers ... We first look a[ what type of business our clien[s are involved in. That 
will give me an understanding of what the clien[ will require. After going through all [he growing pains, 
we establish a relat ionship with our cl ients. We both grow through that relationship. We become a part of 
the company (06/07/2000). 
While they possess few tangible assets, a major asset for these agencies is "the value created by 
customer loyalty - the goodwill of a client to renew a contract and release a further steam of 
profits" (Allen and Henry 1997:191). The cost-minimising competition in the temporary 
employment industry has been intensified by the spread of small, unregulated labour 
subcontracting agencies. Several respondents noted the deleterious consequences of this rise in 
price-based competition. 
As far as subcontractors are concerned, the price gets the job - unless you have built up a special 
relationship with a specific subcontractor who you want to use again. Mostly it is really a system of 
cheapest price gets the job. That is unfortunate in many ways because quality can be sacrificed (president, 
Construction Industries Federation - 18/0712000). 
These contractors have no future, they can be told any day that there is no more work. The company can 
quickly take another contractor and put him in [heir place. So [hey are told: 'you must perform if you want 
a future in this company' (general secretary, MUN - 28/06/2002). 
Pressures from these sources have compelled the larger employment agencies to diversify their 
range of value-adding services to include payroll administration, the provision of human resource 
'solutions' , and so on. In an effort to distinguish themselves from the smaller agencies and to 
evade the negative perceptions of the industry, some of the larger temporary employment 
agencies have changed their names from ' labour hire ' to 'personnel services'. However, as one 
ofNAFAU's regional organisers observed: "[yJou can give shit another name, but it is still going 
to stink" (02/07/2002). While there is some truth in this remark, the larger temporary 
employment agencies have become more selective in the contracts they bid for and are less 
willing to compromise on certain minimum employment standards in their negotiations with 
clients. The smaller employment agencies, by contrast, 
try to get away with less and provide services at a very low rate. The company will tell the labour broker: 
' if you don ' t want the contract, we will get someone else'. So you will find that some brokers will even go 
for the lowest contracts. As long as they can get in, make some money and gain the experience to get 
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another contract, they will accept any conditions (general secretary, MUN - 28/06/2002). 
Although price competition remains fierce, temporalY employment agencies at the top of the 
industry hierarchy are to some extent shielded from the bottom-end operators by their emphasis 
on providing a 'professional ' service, their close and long-term relationships with leading 
companies, and their sensitivity to the distinctive needs of each client. According to a manager 
in a large employment agency, " [ w]e work closely with our clients, we are all together in this 
arrangement" (14110/1998). What these agencies offer is not just warm bodies, but rather 
"particular bundles of work and social skills" (Peck and Theodore 1998:668). Whereas the 
smaller agencies trade purely on the basis of low wage costs and as a source of employment 
flexibility , the large firms also operate as the purveyors of work process flexibility by expanding 
the specialist skills of the client's own workforce. In short, the role oflabour market intennediary 
varies depending on whether the agency is located at the top or the bottom of the temporary 
employment industry. 
3.5.4 Regulating the Temporary Employment Industry in Namibia 
A lack of precision in legal terminology has led to a conflation of two distinct forms of statutory 
regulation. The first is how to provide safeguards against the abuses that have traditionally been 
associated with casualisation. The second is the regulation of the temporary employment industry 
itself. While the latter may alleviate some of the excesses associated with agency-mediated 
employment, it is the former that determines the extent to which temporary workers qualifY for 
broader statutory and institutional protection. Emphasis is sometimes placed on the limited 
duration of temporary employment. This is done by setting a time limit when the temporary 
worker acquires legislative protection akin to that of permanent employment. This may, however, 
simply encourage employers to continuously rotate their temporalY staff. 
In relatively few countries (Italy, Greece, Spain, Sweden) the law forbids fee-charging 
employment agencies . The countries which authorise the existence of temporary employment 
agencies fall into two categories (Hepple 1993:265-6; Anderson et aI1994:511 -2). In the first 
category are those countries (USA, Canada, Finland, Portugal and some Latin American states) 
where law and practice allow these agencies to operate in the same unrestrained manner as any 
other business. In the second category are those countries where specific legislation has been 
passed to regulate the business and to protect temporary workers (Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK). In these countries, legislation is geared 
towards three main objectives: (a) to ensure that only reputable and solvent businesses are 
engaged in supplying temporary workers by imposing licencing requirements; (b) to grant 
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temporary workers similar protection as permanent workers through non-discrimination clauses; 
and (c) to protect permanent employment by confining recourse to temporary employment to 
situations where it can be justified economically and is restricted in terms of duration. In some 
countries, temporary employment agencies are not allowed to operate at all in certain industries. 
In others, the precise circumstances in which temporary labour can be used are clearly specified 
(Casey et a11989; Maurau 1993; Numhauser-Henning 2002). Despite continuing diversity in the 
regulation of temporary employment agencies, the recent trend in most countries has been 
towards allowing employers greater latitude in their use of temporary employment contracts 
(Hakim 1990a: 182; Hepple 1993:267; Locke 1995:13). 
While recognising the abuses often associated with agency-mediated employment, the Nanlibian 
government does not view outright prohibition as a viable solution. Despite the fact that most 
non-standard employees are not members of a trade union, considerable emphasis is attached to 
the role of collective regulation. In the words of the permanent secretary in the Ministry of 
Labour: 
[ don't think banning labour hire companies is the only way to solve the problem ... [think from the point 
of view ofa regulator, labour hire is only there because there are gaps in the legis lation ... Assuming that 
the basic rights of workers are not infringed upon - they are not exploited - then [ don't think that banning 
them is altogether a good concept. Banning is an easy way out. [fyou look at it constructively, together with 
the unions, I think there are possibi lities where one can make it a usefu l instrument. Not necessarily as a 
substitute for permanent employment. It should not be seen as that, but there is room for its existence .. . 
There has to be soft law such as codes of conduct that can to a large extent be done by the labour-hire 
companies together with thei r uni ons. Together they can have an understanding ofwha! are the do 's and 
the don'ts. But there are certain areas where the government has to come in with more rigid regulatory 
systems. For instance, to ensure that the contributions to social security or the pay-outs in terms of 
retrenchment are enforced (04/07/2000). 
The Proposed Guidelines for Labour Hire Employment and Operating Standards, circulated for 
discussion in 1999 by the Ministry of Labour, constitute the first meaningful attempt at regulating 
the temporary employment industry in Namibia. As such, the proposed guidelines attempt to 
regulate employment practices that are already widespread. These guidelines provide for the 
registration of temporary employment agencies, the introduction of training programmes, and the 
establishment of grievance and disciplinary procedures and employment records (LaRRI 
2000a:22-3). After some negotiations between the representatives of labour, business and the 
government in the LAC, an amended set of proposals was presented by the Ministry of Labour 
in August 2000. The amended proposals compel temporary employment agencies to: (a) register 
with the Labour Commissioner; (b) adhere to labour and other legislation; (c) register their 
employees with the Social Security Commission; (d) design and implement a training 
programme; (e) promote 'good' industrial relations; and (f) refrain from activities aimed at 
replacing retrenched workers with agency-supplied workers. In addition, the guidelines set out 
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the following, rather modest, minimum wages: N$4.70 per hour for labourers, N$5.30 per hour 
for semi-skilled workers, and N$6.00 per hour for skilled workers. By the late-1990s, most semi-
and unskilled temporary labourers eamed slightly less than these minima, while skilled temporary 
workers earned considerably more. 
These regulations are unlikely to stem the tide of casualisation or limit the proliferation of 
temporary employment agencies. Firstly, the agencies are only required to provide their 
employees with benefits such as pensions and medical aid 'where possible ' . Given the nature of 
competition in the temporary employment industry, the provision of benefits wi ll only be 
'possible' if it is made mandatory for all agencies. Secondly, while the regulations provide for 
the training of temporary workers employed on a ' regular basis ', they do not define what 
constitutes such employment. The employment agencies are thus largely free to decide who will 
benefit from training. Thirdly, the provision that aims to prevent the replacement of permanent 
employees with agency-supplied employees is exceedingly difficult to enforce. Employers may, 
for example, eliminate permanent jobs vacated through natural attrition through the use of 
temporary employment agencies. Fourthly, the regulations would have been much more effective 
in preventing abuses if equality of treatment and j oint and several liability were imposed on all 
parties involved in work arrangements that depend on the services of intermediaries. Finally, the 
regulations do not provide any limitations on the period for which an employee can be regarded 
as ' temporary' or 'casual'. Employers can therefore use the services of agency-supplied workers 
for an indefinite period and are under no compulsion to create permanent employment. 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
Capitalist economic growth is characterised by uneven development and cyclical patterns which 
result in (among others) an uneven demand for and an unstable supply of labour. Which groups 
of workers will benefit from restructuring is historically and spatially contingent and is shaped 
by developments in the labour process (i.e. which type of jobs are increasingly being created) and 
by the state of the labour market (i.e. which categories oflabour, suitable to these developments, 
are available) . There is, however, a discernible tendency for permanent, skilled and organised 
workers to benefit disproportionately from changes in production. "Asymmetries of power within 
the labor market - rooted in the labor process, the sphere of social reproduction, and the 
regulatory regime - are principal determinants of the structure and segmentation of labour 
markets" (Peck 1996: 135). The casualisation of labour tends to mirror and reinforce existing 
hierarchies of subordination in a society, reflecting the broader tendency for insecure, low-wage 
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jobs to be held by workers with diminished bargaining capacity in the labour market. Our 
understanding of labour market segmentation will be significantly enhanced if the notion of a 
linear and unidirectional process of increasing fragmentation is jettisoned in favour of a more 
contradictory process of decomposition and recomposition of the division of labour (Michon 
1987:34). Periods of rapid economic restructuring demand highly variable levels of adaptability 
and are associated with highly variable levels oflabour market insecurity. The mode of regulating 
this structural change is particularly important: overly prescriptive and bureaucratic mechanisms 
run the risk of petrifying the restructuring process, while an extensive reliance on market forces 
invariably generates high levels of insecurity and inequality. Regulated participation by the social 
partners in the process of economic restructuring is therefore vital if a sustainable trade-off 
between increased efficiency and greater equity is to be established. 
The prospects for marrying labour market flexibility, cost-cutting and greater social equality and 
employment security in Namibia do not look good. The stability and transparency of the labour 
market are undermined by the increasing precariousness of jobs, the rising number of jobs which 
do not provide for acceptable standards of living, and wages linked to discretionary decisions by 
management. Internationally, the record of deregulation and non-standard employment in 
creating new jobs and reducing unemployment is poor. 19 In fact, ' flexible' labour market policies 
do nothing to raise the aggregate level of labour demand and are almost entirely passive with 
regard to demand-side conditions in the labour market. At best, short-term employment growth 
is obtained through a process of substitution at the expense of other secondary sector workers. 
The majority of non-standard jobs are highly precarious and most temporary workers have to 
endure significantly inferior conditions of employment and the virtual absence of training and 
career prospects. In the process an 'underclass ' of employees is created, increasing the 
fragmentation of the workforce and resulting in a weakening of collective representation. 
The analysis above clearly exposes the weaknesses of an internal/social versus external/economic 
conception of divisions in the labour market. Any failure of institutional regulation leads not to 
the revival of price-competitive markets and hence to the absence of social regulation. Far from 
restoring a 'free' market order, the redistributive effects of deregulation "divert the costs of 
recession and economic change on to the least politically and economically entrenched groups" 
(Deakin and Wilkinson 1991:142). Segmentation in the labour market is therefore sustained in 
part by distinct forms of labour regulation. When non-standard employment is regulated by 
statute or collective agreement it does not signal protection, it merely ratifies the absence or 
19 See: Brooks (1985); Lane (1989); Storper and Scott (1990); Valverde el at (1997); Cousins (1999); 
Esping-Anderson and Regini (2000a); and Peck and Theodore (2000). 
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limits of protection. It establishes what has been described as a "regulated precariousness" 
(Campbell 1996). In practice, regulatory reforms are associated with a partial and ad hoc 
implementation of market-mediated forms of employment 'flexibility'. The path of labour market 
development is contingent and has tended to weave between the extremes of long-term, 
' offensive ' flexibility and short-term, 'defensive' flexibility (Boyer 1988b). This lack of 
convergence in the evolution of labour market structures highlights the continuing importance 
of the choices that are made as to how employment is regulated and refutes the idea that current 
restructuring is inexorably driven by immutable market forces. There is a growing body of 
evidence which suggests that the correlation between labour costs, rigidity and economic 
competitiveness is far more complex than implied by the proponents of 'flexibility' . There is also 
no single response to the demands of increased competition - such as the search for greater 
'flexibility' - since there are significant differences in employment relations and practices 
between and within countries and industries. 
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4 
'FLEXIBLE' JOBS: INDUSTRIAL 
RESTRUCTURING, MECHANISATION REGIMES, 
AND THE SEGMENTED DEMAND FOR NON-
STANDARD EMPLOYMENT 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Social scientists of almost every persuasion accept that the economic crisis which has persisted 
since the mid-1970s is not a phase of the usual capitalist cycle, but is of a deeper, structural 
nature. Changes in the workplace are increasingly portrayed as part of an epoch-making 
transformation in the very forces which propel, stabilise and maintain the capitalist world. The 
emerging new age has been variously described as an information age, a post-modem age, a post-
industrial age, an age of globalisation, and a post-collective age. Which of these purported new 
ages will consolidate or combine in the future remains an open and vexed question. Equally 
contested is whether the emerging new trends represent a qualitative break with the past or a 
refinement and modification of old trends. What is clear is that the optimistic 'best-practice' 
accounts of industrial restructuring, which postulate the dawn of a new virtuous cycle of growth, 
seriously underestimate the deep-seated institutional and normative constraints on fundamental 
changes in work and employment arrangements. The prescriptions that emanate from these 
discourses do not only imply that national modes of social regulation are equally capable of rapid 
and decisive change, but also that there is a universal dynamic in restructuring towards the 
elimination of 'rigidities' which impede the ideal ' flexibility ' of the market. 
Having outlined some of the primary sources of differentiation in labour supply in the previous 
chapter, we now tum to the conditions that generate a differentiated demand for labour. While 
the segmentation of labour supply determines which workers will take on non-standard 
employment, the segmentation of labour demand determines which jobs will be done by non-
standard workers. The focus of attention will therefore shift from the availability of diverse 
sources of labour towards the variegated employment outcomes of industrial restructuring. On 
the demand side of the labour market, the ability to mobilise different forms of employment 
allows capital to expand its workforce without the general increase in wages that would be 
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fostered by competition for homogeneous categories of labour. The pressures for an increasingly 
adaptable and variable labour force are generating types of employment that both strengthen and 
undermine the regulatory framework associated with standard employment. Since the 
employment outcomes of restructuring are always mediated through the actions and values of the 
various institutions of interest representation, they cannot be determined in advance or made to 
conform to a model of linear and universal progression in labour utilisation. In contrast to the 
erstwhile prominence attached to the increasing homogenisation of the working class (Gordon 
et al 1982), now the inevitable 'peripheralisation' of the labour market is assumed. Such 
extremes leave us ill-equipped to provide the conceptual foundation necessary for an adequate 
understanding of what is a highly uneven process with divergent implications for labour. What 
has emerged is "a mosaic of different types and levels of security and vulnerability" among 
different segments of the labour market (Storper and Scott 1990:577). In other words, modes of 
labour regulation enhance the security of some employees while increasing the precariousness 
of others. 
The processes of capital accumulation are inherently unstable and prone to CriSIS. This 
necessitates a continuous transformation in the conditions necessary to secure the expanded 
reproduction of capital. The crisis of Fordism was in part the product of growing tensions 
between established national forms of regulation and the increasingly global dynamic of 
accumulation. As such, it was a crisis of both accumulation and regulation. Workplace 
restructuring is thus not simply a technological or economic process, but also a social and 
political process. In fact, the proponents of 'flexible' accumulation regard the social regulation 
of labour as a fundamental obstacle to competitiveness and hence as the primary site of 
restructuring. A regime of labour regulation mediates the impact of product and labour markets 
on the employment relationship, shapes the capacity of employers to respond to changes in labour 
supply and demand, and provides employees with the resources to constrain management's 
predilections in the workplace. 'Resolving' a crisis of regulation therefore involves a process of 
restructuring the employment relationship to reassert the priorities of accumulation. In other 
words, the restructuring of production is always also the restructuring of the employment 
relationship. In the process of restructuring, as Peck (1996:240) points out, "the contours of 
labour control are [continuously 1 reworked and remade". It is in this light that we should view 
the attempts by capital to introduce (selectively and partially) elements of a post-Fordist 
accumulation regime such as employment ' flexibility' and 'lean' production. 
In this chapter, we first consider the development of the ' flexible' firm and its role in the 
segmentation of labour demand. Next, we outline some of the limits to and possibilities of 
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restructuring in the Namibian economy since independence. Attempts at strengthening labour and 
improving productivity are severely constrained by the inherent limitations of a neo-colonial 
economy. The wider economic context in which the labour market is embedded is increasingly 
confining the search for competitiveness to considerations of price rather than quality. Many of 
the factors that contribute to the growing stratification of the workforce have less to do with 
productive efficiency and more with the prevailing costs and methods of control over the 
workforce. Finally, we consider a sorely neglected dimension of non-standard employment in 
' flexibility ' theories - the sectoral dynamics of restructuring. The debate on labour market 
' rigidities' generally fails to shed light on the reasons why particular types of non-standard 
employment flourish in some industries rather than others. Segmentation on the demand side of 
the labour market is explored through an analysis of the types of non-standard jobs created in 
different economic sectors. The largely distinct regulatory dilemmas that are identified with the 
various industries explain the search for different regulatory 'fixes' . 
4.2 THE 'FLEXIBLE FIRM': SEGMENTATION OF LABOUR DEMAND 
The processes of industrial restructuring that have unfolded since the 1980s are conceptualised 
in different ways: flexible specialisation, the Japanisation of work, new production concepts, 
manufacturing excellence, and lean production. 1 Common to all these perspectives is the idea that 
changes in the workplace involve a radical and largely uniform departure £i'om the employment 
patterns, mechanisms of control, and technologies associated with the Taylorist and Fordist 
organisation of mass production. The model of the 'flexible firm' proceeds from the micro-level 
of labour demand in the form of employer strategies to vary labour inputs directly with 
fluctuations in external demand conditions. That is, the flexible firm is defined by its ability to 
meet rapid changes in product markets (Atkinson 1985). This is achieved by the 
institutionalisation of at least three forms of flexibility. First,jimctional flexibility is achieved 
in two main ways. Internally, by fostering the development of a 'core' group of permanent 
employees through multi-skilling, semi-autonomous work groups, quality circles and the like. 
Stable employment is offered in exchange for flexibility and a continued reliance on the 
firm-specific skills of these employees. Flexibility is achieved, externally, by using specialist 
subcontractors in non-routine projects or tasks. Second, numerical flexibility is established, 
internally, by using overtime or short-time working to match supply and demand; and externally, 
by employing a 'peripheral' workforce through employment contracts such as part-time work, 
1 See: Peters and Waterman (1982); Piore and Sabel (1985) ; Kern and Sehumann (1987); Oliver and 
Wilkinson (1988); Womaek el at (1990); and Upton (1994). 
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subcontracting and self-employment. Third, financial flexibility is attained by keeping labour 
costs variable. This can be done by utilising peripheral workers strictly in accordance with 
demand andlor by linking the wages of core workers to individual performance. All three 
strategies lead to an increase in the segmentation of labour demand. 
The notion of employment 'flexibility' has long ceased to be a mere academic or theoretical issue 
- it directly informs the policies and practices of governments, employers and various other 
influential economic agencies. Managerial discourse in Namibia is replete with ideas drawn from 
'best-practice' literature. For example: " [aJs far as line management is concerned, we believe in 
a lean structure where open commwlications are of vital impotiance to the running of the 
company, where people are flexible and multi-skilled and W1derstand the broader issues that are 
vital to us" (president, Construction Industries Federation - 18/07/2000). 'Flexibility' is put 
forward as the solution for alienated work, industrial conflict, recession, the instability of product 
markets, and much else. Its antithesis - 'rigidity' - is presented as the main obstacle to increased 
cooperation and productivity. Such universal claims are a hallmark of flexibility theories. In 
practice, however, flexibility strategies are inserted into the distinct evolution of particular labour 
markets and production systems. As such, flexibility can be traced to numerous causes and has 
different meanings in different places. Labour market flexibility is therefore a function of the 
wider system of labour regulation. This is clearly reflected in the overriding concern with the 
problems of management. As Pollett (1991 b:26) notes, unless the flexibility debate is understood 
at the polilicallevel , it is not easy "to comprehend its popularization as a new orthodoxy, its 
insertion in policy or its intractability to empirical verification or refutation". 
The flexible-firm model has come in for extensive criticism.' Most ofthese critics do not deny 
that working practices have undergone significant changes, but dispute the supposedly radical 
disjuncture and universality of these changes. In other words, it is not clear to what extent these 
developments are not simply a local manifestation of tl1e inherent tendencies of capitalism 
towards crisis, to revolutionise the forces of production, and to extend the division of labour. The 
Parisian regulationists, and Aglietta in particular, are cautious about naming a successor to 
Fordism3 By contrast, the flexibility approach amoW1ts to a tfW1cated, ' productionist' debate that 
, See: Elger ( 1987); Williams el 01 (1987); Marginson (1989); Wood (1989), Hirst and Zeitlin (1991); 
Hyman (1991); Pollert ( 1991a); Gilbert el 01 (1992); Curry (1993) ; Hunter el 01 ( 1993); Legge (1995); Brown 
(1997); Burgess (1997); and Storey (1997). 
3 As a thesis, post-Ford ism is not generally associated with the n!gllialion approach, although the 
conceptual framework that informs the thesis clearly draws on the theoret ical stance adopted by the regulationists. 
It is , however, a crude and detenninistic appropriation of the conceptual tools of regulation theory. 
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fails to seriously explore how a post-Fordist economy and workplace might be regulated (Peck 
and Tickell 1994:283). Despite the sheer volume of literature on the debate, "surprisingly little 
progress has been made in resolving key problems associated with the nature and outcomes of 
flexibility ... because of the speculative nature of much of the discussion" (Harley 1994:107-8). 
This is starkly revealed by the dearth of empirically-grounded analyses of the various dimensions 
of flexibility. 
Sayer (1989:666) contends that the literature on ' flexibility ' is "confused in its arguments, long 
on speculation and hype, and based on selected examples whose limited sectoral, spatial and 
temporal range is rarely acknowledged". By general ising from localised and sectorally-specific 
changes, complex socio-economic and political problems are often reduced to mere technical 
and/or organisational obstacles. The central concept in this debate - ' flexibility' - is burdened 
with an inordinate amount of explanatory power. It attempts to capture a myriad of often discrete 
changes in production and employment under the rubric of a singular dynamic.' Current 
industrial restructuring is far more problematic for both capital and labour than these purely 
technical-organisational discourses suggest. Crude notions of ' flexibility' radically simplify the 
dynamics of the employment relationship and seriously underestimate the costs and difficulties 
associated with institutional and nonnative transformation. 
Some of the key shortcomings in the flexibility approach, of relevance here, include the 
following. First, the search for greater ' flexibility' is essentially concerned with creating the 
conditions in which the market can operate more efficiently (Pollert 1988; Burgess 1997; 
Callaghan 1997; Deakin and Reed 2000). The economic order secreted by these theories is 
essentially that ofa 'free' or minimally regulated market. As Anderson et al (1994:492) note, 
"greater flexibility is largely a neo-liberal war cry". Monetarists of the New Right insist that price 
stability, a restrictive monetary policy, and the removal of barriers to competition in labour, 
product and financial markets would restore the conditions under which the market could rectify 
structural imbalances in an economy. Numerous 'rigidities' in the labour market are seen as 
responsible for rising unemployment, declining productivity, wages that are too high and too 
rigid, and wage differentials that are too small. These institutional rigidities ossified the major 
systemic power of a capitalist market economy: the capacity for a fast and flexible response to 
changing circumstances. This idea of flexibility as adaptability to changes in external 
circumstances sees only one form of response - i.e. responsiveness to price signals. In reality, 
however, many of the perceived 'rigidities' are necessary to make markets work in the first place 
, Likewise, the notion of 'flexible specialisation' is, as Sayer and Walker (1992: 192) note, "overly flexible 
and insufficiently specialized". 
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by producing price norms, reducing uncertainty, guiding expectations, generating a minimum of 
trust, and so on (Lawson 1997). Not surpri singly, the ro le of the state is largely overlooked by 
the proponents of flexibility. An appreciation of the state's invo lvement in regulating the labour 
market is crucial for countering the claim that the search for flexibility is a spontaneous, 
market-driven phenomenon that is confined largely to the private sector (Colling 1999). The 
emphasis on market-led restructuring devalues the intractable problems of economic coordination 
that find expression in the industrial strategies devised by national governments (Peck 1996). 
Second, the relationship between systems of production and labour market outcomes is highly 
complex. There is no straightforward connection between industrial structure and labour market 
structure, and hence between flexibility in production and flexibility in employment (Peck 1996; 
Waddington 1999). The flexible-firm model simply translates "the neo-classical emphasis on 
labour market deregulation and employment fragmentation into a new management policy of 
'peripheralisation', without considering how sectoral and occupational development relates to 
employment forms" (Pollert 1988:283). This encourages the assumption of a direct and 
unproblematic relationship between production flexibility and a flexible labour force. There is 
no scope for conflict between these two forms of' flexibility', nor any appreciation of the variety 
of contingent effects in terms of employment outcomes. The development of a functionally 
flexible workforce, for example, is constrained by the quality of available skills, the degrees of 
functional integration in the production process, and the levels of trade union opposition to the 
blurring of job demarcations. As such, functional flexibility requires a more long-term 
commitment to training and quality; depends on significant changes to the organisation of work, 
trade union practices and occupational solidarities; and is more costly to sustain than numerical 
flexibility . Most of the management respondents also noted that investment in training is a high-
risk endeavour in Namibia since the 'poaching' of ski lled staff is rife. These limits on the scope 
for functional adaptability have encouraged the use of alternative flexibility measures. 
Third, underlying the flexibility debate is the notion of a universal shift in production paradigms 
that is disconnected from the national context. Research shows that "particular institutions and 
types of social groups tend to encourage the development and reproduction of distinctive kinds 
of work organization and control and, perhaps more directly, discourage antithetical ones" 
(Whitley 1997:228-9). A failure to explore the constraints on new employment strategies that are 
imposed by prevailing institutional and normative arrangements invariably results in a voluntarist 
conception in which anything is possible. Distinct national growth paths are the product of "a 
coherent and interlocking system of consumption, production and social reproduction" that 
forecloses certain paths of development by virtue of its embeddedness in a specific societal 
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system (Rubery 1994:347). Here the focus of analysis is on the social institutions associated with 
distinct kinds of industrialisation. As Thompson and Smith (1999: 197) argue, 
each nation state has a panicular institutional configuration that reflects factors such as the nature of class 
formation, the development of the various circuits of capital and the forms of market and inter-finn 
relations. The mode of regulation of such relationships typically involves both distinctive fonns of 
articulation and representation of interests and a social settlement between the major socia-economic actors 
... Each nation state has an historical mode of integration into the international division aflabar, reflecting 
the particular character of[its] industrialisation process. 
Distinct national strategies of competitiveness are forged in the context of various organised 
interests, with particular power and ideological resources, that struggle to assert discrete paths 
of restructuring (Nielsen 1991; Boyer 1993; Frenkel 1994; Whitley and Kristensen 1997; Esping-
Andersen and Regini 2000a). That is, the effects of industrialisation and development are filtered 
through a range of different socio-economic, political and institutional frameworks. The different 
possible combinations of Fordist and non-Fordist elements imply not only different types of 
Fordism, but also different routes to post-Fordism.' By implication, it is necessary to 
conceptualise industrial restructuring not only in terms of successive phases of development, but 
also in terms of "historically coexistent and competing local alternatives" (Peck 1996: 120). Some 
forms of non-standard employment, for instance, are more closely tied to a revival of , old' forms 
of labour utilisation than to 'new' forms of employment flexibility. We are therefore more likely 
to witness the development of composite models with post-Fordist developments III some 
industries and a continued reliance on Fordist and Taylorist techniques in others. 
Fourth, the establishnlent of a 'flexible firm' presupposes an increasing polarisation of the 
workforce. Several studies identify a growing divide between a skilled, technical elite that 
appropriates the lion-share of gains from restructuring, and an increasingly marginalised and 
insecure periphery that is either des killed or unemployed (Chalmers 1989; Brown and Scase 
1991; Felstead and Jewson 1999a; Heery and Salmon 2000a). Even the pioneers of flexible 
specialisation recognised that its implementation could lay the basis for an "island" of highly 
flexible craft workers surrounded by a "sub-proletarian sea of misery" (Piore and Sabel 
1985:279). The casualisation of labour, as we noted in the previous chapter, has had the most 
debilitating effects on those sectors of the population who are most vulnerable and lacking in 
labour market power. Labour market 'flexibility' has simply become a euphemism for 
downgrading the rights and conditions of certain sections of the workforce. In fact, there tends 
to be a "systematic relationship between management's attempts to increase labour market 
5 The point is not that there are no comparable institutional and normative features between nation-states, 
but rather that there is a distinct lack of convergence in the evolution of national modes of social regulation. 
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flexibility - that is, to recomrnodify labour power - and the recent growth in earnings dispersion" 
(Harrison and Bluestone 1990:363). Although polarisation on a number of levels is evidently on 
the increase, to view this "as stabilising into a clear-cut dualism ... misinterprets the constant 
dynamic of restructuring and conceals the continuation of conflict and inequality" in the 
workplace (Pollert 1991b:4). In other words, what may be emerging now are a variety of new 
permutations of f1exibilities and rigidities rather than a simple trend towards greater flexibility 
(see chapter 6). Forms of micro-regulation that enhance flexibility at the workplace level may 
well generate and reinforce rigidities at the macro level (Boyer 1988b:229; Deakin and Reed 
2000:11). The segmentation of labour demand, in particular, is more likely to encourage a 
reallocation of rigidities rather than foster a generalised increase in flexibility. 'Flexibility' is thus 
more an ideological slogan than an analytical device: 
[t]o define certain social regularities as rigidities (rather than points of stability) and others as f1exibilities 
(rather than areas of uncertainty) is to impose a particular evaluation, to commend a particular distribution 
of options and constraints, and hence to propose a particular structure of social power. Thus the issue is not 
rigidity versus flex ibil ity but what kinds of rigidity? ... Here the ideological dimension is of crucial 
importance, for a key influence on the discourse of flexibility is who gains or loses from a particular set 
of institutional arrangements, and whose interests would benefit or suffer from their alteration (Hyman 
1991:281). 
Finally, faced with an astonishing variety of changes, many researcher have seized upon "simple 
polemical contrasts, often in the form of binary histories" (Sayer and Walker 1992:192). 
Attempts to draw sharp distinctions between phases of development are susceptible to a logic of 
binary contrasts between rigid or collective 'old times' and flexible or individualistic 'new times' 
(Williams et a11987; Sayer 1989; Legge 1995; Peck 2000). Such a logic, Arnin (1994:3) argues, 
produces "overviews based on arbitrarily derived guiding principles and universal claims based 
on partial truths, thus denying the key aspect of history as a complex and heterogeneous process 
of many detelminations". Several critics of the flexibility thesis reject the idea of absolute turning 
points and clear breaks between distinct phases of development, preferring instead a more 
evolutionary conception of change which incorporates a mixture of continuity and change from 
one period to another (Lever-Tracy 1984; Pollert 1988; Hyman 1991; Curry 1993). For example, 
multiple technological systems are known to coexist and managers have always been interested 
in some degree of adaptability on the part of labour. The overburdened dualisms contained in 
flexibility theories also obscure the relations between micro and macro processes: "the micro-
economic trend takes on such a multitude of forms that no dichotomy at the global level can 
appear" (Michon 1981 :91). What is generally observed is a continuum of possibilities, with some 
correspondence between micro and macro levels (e.g. propelled by similar social forces , 
operating through similar institutions, and discriminating against the same groups) . 
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At stake in this debate is the extent to which changes in the workplace are (a) the outcome of a 
long-term, broad-based settlement in the form of a 'new' production strategy; or (b) the local 
manifestation of the cyclical tendencies inherent in capitalist economic activity. It is simply not 
clear how far these changes are a product of the transition to post-Fordism or the outcomes of 
other tendencies, dilemmas and contradictions. An increasing differentiation of employment 
conditions, for instance, is not merely the product of 'flexible' management strategies. The 
uneven impact of an economic crisis itself lays the basis for greater differentiation in the wages 
and conditions that different firms can afford, and changes in the workplace do not entail the 
same consequences for all categories of employees. In short, restructuring takes place on a 
number of different levels and is characterised by a highly uneven pace of development (Tail by 
and Whitston 1989:12-3). A nan'ow conception of production, a simplistic account of industrial 
restructuring, and a disregard for the inherent contradictions of labour regulation encouraged 
many of the exaggerated claims that a 'flexible' or 'post-Fordist' regime of accumulation is in 
the process of consolidation. The opportunities for and limits to workplace restructuring are 
determined in large measure by the wider economic context in which the enterprise is embedded. 
The nature, pace and direction of changes in labour demand are thus the contingent outcome of 
the institutional propensities and liabilities in a specific spatio-temporal conjuncture. 
There is an urgent need for a greater appreciation of the open-ended and complex nature of 
industrial change. This calls for a concrete analysis of the diversity in contemporary workplace 
restructuring and not simply grand theorising. An important inference is that there is "no single 
emerging pattern which characterises the integration of Third World countries into the 
international division of labour" (Jenkins 1984:46). A whole variety of different models of 
growth have emerged between and within countries. The focus of analysis is on the socially 
embedded nature of industrial change, and the likelihood of it taking a hybrid character of old 
and new constituent parts rather than conform to some universal model. The inherently uneven 
nature of industrial development raises the issues of contingency and particularity: 
[i]f sweatshops and economic backwardness would result from industrial restructuring in one place, while 
technological irmovation and the revival of craft might emerge in another, one challenge was [sic] to clearly 
understand the factors responsible for shaping different patterns of industrial change. Underlying this 
approach is the conviction that no superior logic dictates how the profile of industry must evolve. The 
process will always be contingent upon local, political, social and cultural forces that deserve to be placed 
atthe centre of economic analysis (Benton, cited in Lawson 1992: 12). 
We need to unpack the various dimensions of industrial restructuring and not glibly present them 
as part of one coherent package such as 'post-Fordism' or 'flexible specialisation'. The 
interaction between production, distribution and consumption implies that we cannot look for the 
determinations of industrial restructuring exclusively within the parameters of the workplace. Not 
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only would this yield a distorted vision of changes that are occurring, it would also be incapable 
of shedding light on the ways in which broader socio-economic, political and ideological 
processes are shaped in different industries and regions. 
4.3 THE NAMIBIAN ECONOMY IN THE 1990s: NEO-COLONIALISM, 
GLOBALISATION, AND THE SEARCH FOR COMPETITIVENESS 
The economic woes that plague post-independence Namibia are not unique in the region. A 
majority of the people in sub-Saharan Africa face a future in which "not even bare survival is 
assured" (Leys 1994:34). Out of a total population of about 500 million, nearly 300 million are 
already living in absolute poverty, and it is likely to get much worse. Per capita incomes have 
been falling at over two percent a year since 1980, world demand for what sub-Saharan Africa 
produces is growing slowly or even declining, while world supplies are constantly expanding and 
produced much more efficiently elsewhere (Leys 1994:34-5). The decline in world trade in the 
early-1980s shattered many illusions regarding the inevitability of economic expansion. This 
created systemic instability at the level of the global economy and a much less favourable 
international climate for the industrialisation of developing countries. Attracting and retaining 
foreign investment became increasingly difficult at exactly the time when it was punted as a 
central pillar of economic growth. In general, there is little prospect of industrial development 
solving the problems in most African countries. For a start, social and political conditions in 
much of Africa have reached a point where manufacturing investment no longer appears 
profitable. Many African countries have seen significant disinvestment by foreign companies 
over the past decade. The level and share of manufacturing in the sub-continent remains 
extremely low compared with other parts of the developing world. There has also been minimal 
growth in manufactured exports from the region (Riddell 1993 :223). Furthermore, manufacturing 
based on current technologies will never absorb Africa's surplus population, while goods that are 
still produced by labour-intensive methods are less and less in demand. What is required is a 
"fundamental restructuring" of African economies rather than a perpetuation of the "neo-colonial 
monoculture export production system at a time when the external demand prospects are dismal" 
(Adedeji 1991:781 ). 
The developmental problems confronting sub-Saharan Africa are formidable . The industrial base 
of most African countries remains small, fragile, and predominantly high cost (Riddell 1993 :219-
20). Production is linked primarily to a limited processing of agricultural or mineral products and 
exports are dominated by low value-added primary commodities. In 1988, industry contributed 
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25% to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in sub-Saharan Africa, while the manufacturing share 
was only 10% as compared to 24% for all low-income countries (Riddell 1990:5). In fact, sub-
Saharan countries contributed only 3.6% of total manufacturing value added in all developing 
countries (Riddell 1990:11). None of the economies in the region have managed to decisively 
overcome the restrictions on economic growth imposed during the era of colonial dependence. 
Industrial development is constrained by low degrees of interlinkage between manufacturing and 
other productive sectors of the economy, outdated machinery, a lack of skilled labour, poor 
management skills, low productivity, and a small domestic market. The slowdown of economic 
growth in the 1980s - combined with the sharp rise in the price of imported capital goods, 
growing shortages of foreign exchange, and declining levels of investment - exacerbated these 
constraints as capacity utilisation levels plummeted, plant and equipment deteriorated, and 
processes of de-industrialisation set in (Weiss 1988; Adedeji 1991; Riddell 1993; Mihyo and 
Schiphorst 2002). As Leys (1994:45) puts it, it is not so much that Africa 'got off to a bad start' 
at independence, it is rather that "the timing of its original incorporation in the world capitalist 
system, combined with the extreme backwardness of its precolonial economies and the 
limitations of subsequent colonial policy, prevented most of the continent from starting at all on 
the key transition to self-sustaining capital accumulation after independence". 
4.3.1 Apartheid, Neo-Colonialism, and Economic Dependency 
Namibia, as we noted above, has all the hallmarks of a country that does not consume what it 
produces and does not produce what it consumes. An expOli share in GDP that is twice as high 
as for sub-Saharan Africa signals the high degree of openness of the Namibia economy. 
Namibia's economy is characterised by its export orientation, sensitivity to changes in external 
demand, and its reliance on the expOli of primary commodities. Through its structural 
dependence on South Africa and its highly uneven distribution of wealth, the colonial economic 
structure has attained a largely self-perpetuating dynamic. During the colonial era, the apartheid 
government in Pretoria sought to bolster its unlawful occupation of the territory by actively 
encouraging foreign companies to share in the country's riches and acquire a stake in the 
exploitation of its human and natural resources (Cooper 1988). The South African government 
encouraged foreign investment in Namibia through a policy of favourable taxes and licence fees, 
generous write-off provisions for capital invested, and the granting of exclusive prospecting 
grants. An important strategic consideration behind the involvement of foreign capital in 
Namibia 's economy was the creation of a "bond of mutual interests" between the apartheid 
regime and multi-national corporations as a bulwark against international sanctions (Mbuende 
1986:90). Foreign investors recognised that enormous profits could be reaped in the vulnerable 
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and dependent economy of Namibia and took active steps to minimise diplomatic pressure on 
South Africa to relinquish its control over the territory (Moorsom 1980; Green and Kiljunen 
1981; Cooper 1988). Long-term investments by British, Canadian, German, French and other 
corporations in the Rossing uranium mine during the 1960s and 1970s, for example, were 
premised on the assumption that "South Africa was there to stay" (Minter 1986:244). 
Namibia's economy is dominated by foreign private investment and up to half of its GDP was 
estimated to be creamed off every year in the form of dividends and remittances sent abroad 
(Cronje and Cronje 1979:7). Foreign-owned companies generally have higher rates of 
productivity than local companies, but the fOlmer create only seven jobs per N$1 million invested 
as compared to 18 for the latter (Iyanda 1998:14). The giants of the Namibian economy in 1960s 
and 1970s were Consolidated Diamond Mines (South African owned), Tsumeb Corporation 
(majority share-holding from the United States), and the British-based South West Africa 
Company. The capital assets of these three companies were estimated to exceed the country's 
annual GDP of $300 million in the mid-1960s (Minter 1986: 199). Mining accounted for more 
than half of total exports and contributed an average of forty to fifty percent of government 
revenue. This extreme dependence on a few mining operations constitutes a serious economic 
risk to the post-independence economy. Moreover, not only did the black majority benefit very 
little from mining's contribution to the colonial economy, the taxes that accrued from the mining 
sector helped to sustain South Africa's occupation of the territory and provided a significant 
incentive for its continuation. The largely foreign-owned mining industry also stands accused of 
tax evasion, transfer pricing, and the payment of excessive dividends instead of reinvestment in 
the country. In 1986, the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations concluded: 
[t]he transfer of technology by transnational corporations into Namibia appears to have been negligible 
because the companies concerned are almost exclusively involved in the mining and extraction of the 
territory's natural resources ... The activities of transnational corporations in Namibia have therefore made 
practically no direct or indirect contribution towards the development of the human resource base required 
for sustained development (cited in Kempton and Du Preez 1997:594). 
In 1989, mining and quarrying accounted for 31.6% of GDP (down from 43.6% in 1980), 
agriculture and fishing 10.7%, wholesale and retail trade 12.7%, manufacturing 4.7% and 
construction 2.2% (LaRRl 200 I :25). The long-term decline of the primary sector is reflected in 
GDP contributions for 1995 and 1999 at constant 1990 prices (Table 4.1). Unfortunately, this 
decline was not the result of growth in other sectors of the economy but largely due to decreases 
in the mining industry. After the building boom in the mid-1990s, the share of the construction 
industry has also declined. The manufacturing, trade and hospitality sectors show almost no signs 
of meaningful growth in contribution to GDP. The Namibian government stresses the association 
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between manufacturing growth and overall growth rates, and views an "efficient and flexible" 
manufacturing sector as the "motor force of sustainable and equitable economic development" 
(MTI 1999b:3). The overall picture, however, remains one of an economy dominated by a large 
non-tradeable sector (govemment services) and an exp0l1-orientated primary sector (agriculture, 
fishing and mining). 
Table 4.1 Gross Domestic Product by Selected Sectors; 1995 and 1999 
INDUSTRY I SECTOR 1995 1999 
N$ million (% of total) N$ million (% of total) 
Agriculture 521 (7 .6) 493 (6.5) 
Fishing 307 (4.5) 386 (5.1) 
Mining and Quarrying 129 1 (18.9) 1 388 (18.4) 
Manufacturing 922 (13.5) 1 001 (13.3) 
Construction 221 (3.2) 157 (2. 1) 
Wholesale, Retail and Hospitality 606 (8.9) 705 (9.3) 
(Source: Simon 2002: 175). 
Namibia's real Gross National Product (GNP) at constant 1985 prices grew at an annual average 
rate of less than 0.3% during the 1980s (Tlhase and Kangueehi 1996:79). With a population 
growth rate of3.5% per annum, real per capita incomes declined in the aggregate by nearly 22% 
over the decade. Real GDP grew at an average annual rate of only 0.1 % during this period. This 
trend has essentially continued during the 1990s with GDP per capita declining from N$5 011 
in 1992 to N$4 897 in 1996 as the population growth rate continues to outstrip the average real 
growth of the economy (MTI 1999b: 18). The impact of a declining GDP per capita is 
compounded by a grossly uneven distribution of wealth. Less than a quarter of Namibia 's GDP 
per capita of US$1 259 in 1983 accrued to black people, and the richest 10% of the population 
still received 65% of income in 1993/4. Social spending was also highly skewed in favour of 
white people. For example, state expenditure on health in 1980/1 was R233.70 for each white 
person, compared with spending for black people ranging from R4.70 to R56.84 per person, 
depending on their 'ethnic authority' (Andersson and Marks 1987:274). Similarly, the allocation 
of state pensions was characterised by such high levels of inequality that, despite the adjustments 
made by the SWAPO govemment, it still stood at N$382 per month for whites as against N$120 
per month for blacks in 1994 (Tlhase and Kangueehi 1996:82). As we noted in chapter 2, the 
colonial state intervened extensively in mobilising, allocating and controlling black labour, while 
relegating its social reproduction to the subsistence economies of the labour reserves. 
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A small internal market, an inability to attract significant foreign direct investment (FDI), and 
a 'new world order' opposed to protectionist, state-driven economic policies ruled out a viable 
import-substituting industrialisation strategy in post-independence Namibia. As Curry and 
Stoneman (1993:42) argue, although Namibia had 
experienced a thoroughgoing free market experience from its integration with South Africa, and has 
inherited a price structure completely unrelated to its own development needs, it has nevertheless joined 
most other countries in committing itself to adopting a world market price structure ... that may be equally 
inappropriate for the needs of internal development. The observed outcome in Namibia of integration 
through a free market with a more advanced economy, is a structure of extreme distortions. 
The most salient features of Namibia's inherited socio-economic structure include: an 
underdeveloped rural sector, especially in the populous north; a small industrial sector dominated 
by the production and export of a few primary products with minimal processing; a capital-
intensive production structure that is not commensurate with the need for a labour-absorbing 
growth strategy; a severe shortage of skilled labour combined with high rates of illiteracy among 
the black population; a highly skewed distribution of income resulting in a small domestic 
market; a poorly integrated industrial structure with few vertical linkages; negative growth rates 
ofreal Gross National Income; and a high degree of dependence on the South African economy6 
The pace of social transformation in post-independence Namibia is severely curtailed by an 
economy that was run as an enclave of trans-national corporations 7 Of the Rl.8 billion invested 
in the means of production in the three major export sectors (mining, agriculture and fishing) and 
related processing industries by 1980, not more than R40 million was owned by local interests, 
and hardly any by black Namibians (Uys 1983: I 09). The vitally-important diamond industry, for 
example, continues to be the most profitable and most foreign-owned sector of the Namibian 
economy. 
South Africa has historically maintained Namibia as a market for its exports, while its raw 
materials serve as comparatively cheap inputs for the South African manufacturing sector. The 
general manager of a chemical plant echoed the views of many other respondents: "[t]he most 
pressing challenge that we face at the moment [is] the unfair advantage of South African 
6 See: Thomas (1978); Cronje and Cronje (1979); Green ef at (1981); SWAPO (1981); Gottschalk (1983); 
Allison and Green (1986); Andersson and Marks (1987); Cooper (1988); Wood (1991); Freeman (1992); Curry and 
Stoneman (1993); Van Rooyen and Backer (1996); Kempton and Du Preez (1997); Melber (2000b); Diener and 
Graefe (2001); LaRRl (2001); Motinga and Mohamed (2002); Simon (2002); and Winterfeldt e/ at (2002). 
7 Many of these corporations stepped up production during the 1980s in an effort to strip Namibia of its 
mineral deposits before an independent, democratically-elected government took power (Herbstein and Evenson 
1989:133 ; Kempton and Du Preez 1997:593). The reckless over-exploitation of Namibia ' s marine resources, as a 
result of foreign-owned companies pressing for ever higher quotas, followed a similar logic (Simon 1998: 108). 
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companies that come over the border and dump their products on our market" (05/1111998). At 
the time of independence, 90% of physical goods produced in Namibia were exported to South 
Africa, while 90% of imports were from South Africa. Approximately 85% of all Namibia's 
imports are still sourced from South Africa (MTl 1999b:21). It is the composition rather than the 
scale of exports that constitutes the most formidable barrier to diversified industrial development 
in Namibia. Almost 90% of Namibia's exp0l1s before independence comprised unprocessed raw 
materials (lLO 1989:90). In 1994, merchandise exports by commodity still reflected the low 
value-added character of production: diamonds (31.3%); processed fish (22.5%); other minerals 
(18.8%); livestock (10.4%); meat products (8.1 %); unprocessed fish (6.1 %); and other 
manufacturing (2 .8%) (ORN 1995:248). 
The legacy of apartheid-colonialism combined with the pressures of globalisation to create a 
formidable barrier to meaningful socio-economic development. A pressing and exceedingly 
demanding task confronting the government is to loosen Namibia's economic dependence on its 
former imperial master. South African companies dominate diamond and other mineral mining, 
as well as the construction, fishing, retail, hotel, banking and financial services sectors. Wood 
(1991 : 744) convincingly shows that an essential precondition for N ami bian independence was 
"the South African regime's prior consolidation of the conditions for a stable semi-colonial 
state". The various measures taken to ensure that South African capital would continue to 
dominate the Namibian economy after independence were an essential part of this process. Local 
companies are highly dependent on the supply chains dominated by South African firms. The 
manager of an information technology (IT) consultancy expressed a widely-held objection to the 
current trade regime when he noted: 
[t]echnology is expensive in Namibia because there are too many people in the chain who want to make 
money. Everything that is coming into Namibia, comes from South Africa. I cannot sent my courier to pick 
up equipment from a South African importer overnight. I have to order it through the Namibian branch of 
the South African company, and this takes three weeks. This puts a lot of pressure on us with our clients. 
For example, sometimes we need to keep certain components in stock in case there is an urgent need for 
them. We are also paying import duties twice. The price difference in computer technology between South 
Africa and Namibia is already nearly thirty percent' (14 /0712000). 
In the absence of protective barriers, South African companies exerted monopoly control over 
the Namibian market through dumping, over-pricing of intermediate inputs, and restrictive 
purchasing policiess Under these conditions, as a World Bank report concluded, "the intriguing 
question is not why is the Namibian manufacturing sector so small, but why does it exist at all" 
8 See: CllR and BCC ( 1981); Green et at (1981); SWAPO (1981); Allison and Green (1986); Mbuende 
(1986); Isaksen and Shipoke (1992); Cuny and Stoneman (1993); and Kempton and Du Preez (1997). 
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(cited in Curry and Stoneman 1993:52). Since the bulk of their products are exported to South 
Africa and production is mainly small-scale, Namibian producers have little experience in or 
opportunities for competing on world markets. South Africa's dominance within the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) also has a major impact on the conditions under which 
Namibian firms produce for the domestic market. Historically high levels of subsidisation, 
together with economies of scale, have given South African exporters a distinct advantage over 
their counterparts in SACU. As Curry and Stoneman (1993:51) note, 
Namibian fmns in all sectors therefore suffer from a double disadvantage in that they get no protection from 
South African firms, but have to pay high tariffs on their extra-regional inputs (or above world prices for 
South African inputs) so as to protect South African firms. The overall effect has been of natural resource-
based sectors exporting at world market prices, but buying inputs at considerably above world market price 
levels. 
The Namibian Dollar is tied to the Rand and the country's financial policies are dictated by the 
needs of the South African economy. As a result, it is difficult to access loans, independent 
sources of investment funds are few, and loans that are obtained bear high interest rates (Curry 
and Stoneman 1993 :50). Only larger firms can finance their working capital requirements and 
continuing investments from retained earnings, but they find it difficult and costly to finance 
major expansions. Even well-established, smaller firms face severe financial constraints: raw 
material costs comprise up to two-thirds of operating costs, making the cost of working capital 
prohibitive. A lack of collateral, high interest rates, and the administrative costs of small loans 
effectively prevent borrowing (LaRRI 2002a: 18-9). So, even where the requisite skills and 
materials are readily accessible, the availability and cost of finance remain a formidable obstacle 
to the expansion of small enterprises in the local market. 
4.3.2 Economic Policy, Industrial Structure, and Neo-Liberalism 
Namibia's fragmented industrial structure with little or no links between the various sectors 
means that growth in one sector simply raises import demand rather than stimulating growth in 
other sectors. The lack of horizontal integration has resulted in the different sectors of the 
economy being more closely tied to outside interests than to each other. This renders the short-
term potential for creating additional employment and expanding down-stream operations 
negligible. Poorly developed inter-firm linkages in the Namibian economy are reinforced by the 
fact that the largest and most profitable companies produce almost exclusively for export and 
consume very little of Namibian origin except labour, water and electricity. Likewise, the 
extensive reliance on imported basic consumer goods such as food and clothing means that few 
jobs and economic opportunities are created for Namibians. As the general secretary of NAT AU 
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observed, 
[w]e must talk about what sort of business we are putting up in this country. For instance, our timber comes 
from SOUdl Africa, it is already a finished product. What our people are going to do is simply to off-load 
the product. This will not create the experience necessary to manufacture something ... We must focus on 
investors that will come in and start production instead of just using an imported finished product 
(12 /07/2000). 
The SW APO government's overall policy objectives are (a) to eliminate the high levels of 
inequality and to reduce poverty among the majority of the population; and (b) to resuscitate the 
crisi s-ridden economy and to set it on a more competitive and labour-absorbing growth path 
(GRN 1995; MoL 1997; MTI I 999a). However, the capacity of the government to find a 
sustainable balance between growth and equity depends in large measure on forces beyond its 
control. Low rates of economic growth, in particular, are a fundamental obstacle to a process of 
sustained industrial restructuring. The government is severely constrained in its policy options 
to shift competition towards high-quality, high-wage and high-skill production. According to 
Deakin and Reed (2000:36-7), 
[aJs national governments lose the power to adjust to changing economic conditions by modu lating the 
exchange rate and altering the balance between taxation and public expenditure, the burden of adjustment 
is thrown on to the labour market, which is now required to operate with maximum flexibility in the sense 
of bringing wages and terms and conditions into line with changes in demand. 
In an attempt to promote business confidence, minimise potential political instability, and prevent 
the fli ght of skills and capital, the SWAPO government adopted fairly conservative economic 
policies.9 A pragmatic decision to avoid alienating the white business and farming elites, 
according to Simon (2002: 172), favoured "a relatively hands-off approach" to the economy. This 
is perhaps best exemplified by the emphasis placed on attracting FDI into a capital-scarce and 
labour-abundant economy. SW APO also moved cautiously on the issues of land redistribution, 
affirmative action, worker participation, and minimum wages. The equipment, training, transport 
and processing facilities necessary to reap greater rewards from the beneficiation of raw materials 
require the active participation of the (largely white and foreign-owned) private sector. The latter 
is, however, unlikely to succeed in stimulating a more diverse, integrated and higher value-added 
industrial sector in the absence of resolute government invention "to counteract the underlying 
pattern established by market forces" (Curry and Stoneman 1993 :42). This will require, among 
9 At its second National Congress, the NUNW (1998:8) adopted a resolution that noted: "[tJhe Namibian 
government adopts a conservative neo-liberal framework for econom ic growth in line with the policies of the World 
Bank and IMF and to please international investors .. . It adopts a growth first redistr ibution later approach ... It 
incorrectly assumed that the current Namibian labour market is inflexible ... It focuses on wage moderation and belt-
tightening without dealing with existing wage gaps in formal employment and proposes a social accord to focus on 
wage restraint". 
2 19 
others, the protection of nascent and strategic industries; the expansion of the small and medium 
enterprise sector; the provision of institutional and financial support to encourage greater 
investment by local firms; the introduction of measures to foster backward and forward linkages 
within the economy; the development of tendering systems to increase local preference in 
government contracts; and the establishment of institutions to promote skills development 
(Isaksen and Shipoke 1992). The success of an export-led growth path depends in large measure 
on an institutional framework capable of controlling costs, keeping wage growth in line with 
productivity, and curtailing the excesses of market-based regulation. However, far-reaching 
government action (0 modify the operation of the market is not often sanctioned in the new world 
order. The crux of the problem, as the president of the Chamber of Mines explained, is that 
Namibia [is] a poor country eager to attract foreign investment. However, to succeed the government had 
to pass legislation that would protect both existing and future investments and allow unrestricted dividend 
returns to investors (cited in Kempton and Du Preez 1997:599). 
The new world order dictates that economic intervention by national governments should be 
limited to the creation of an ' investor-friendly' business environment. According to these 
prescriptions, the activities of the state need to be rolled back from areas that are best left to the 
workings of the market. That is, growth on business ' own terms is regarded as the sine qua non 
of economic stability and competitiveness. This abstentionist logic contrasts sharply with the 
record of extensive state intervention in the newly industrialising countries during the 1970s and 
1980s. The relative success of their industrialisation can be explained in large part by government 
regulatory policies designed to limit the nature and extent of their integration with the world 
economy; and manage the impact of international competition on the domestic economy. In short, 
state intervention was designed to guide the market towards structural change rather than simply 
conform to it. In the current context of a neo-liberal hegemony and a generalised shortage of 
global investment, by contrast, 
it is difficult to see how local strategies can do anything other than bend to the will of global competition : 
progressive local social contracts are likely to be difficult to sustain in the face of 'jungle law' at the global 
level. The basic difficulty, then, lies in trying to establish local order in the face of global disorder ... 
[W]hile some localities may be successful for some of the time, their success in the current global climate 
is only being achieved at the expense of failure elsewhere (Peck and Tickell 1994:298). 
The Namibian government believes that it was compelled by the force of circumstances to create 
a favourable climate for FDI by endorsing a market-driven process of economic reform. In 
particular, the government's industrial policies are essentially geared towards "improving the 
enabling environment for expanding the contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP" (MoL 
1997:36). The Foreign Investment Act (1990) amounts to a free-market investment code with 
considerable protection against state expropriation, extensive incentives for foreign firms, and 
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with no requirements for participation or share-holding by local firms in the operations of foreign 
enterprises. 10 The Export Processing Zones Act (1995) provides that any factory within Namibia 
may apply for export processing zone (EPZ) status subject to certain conditions. After an initial 
flurry of investment, several EPZ companies went out of business with those remaining providing 
only a few hundred, mainly low-wage, low-skill jobs (LaRRI 2000b). The flagship of the EPZ 
programme at Walvis Bay soon became "an enclave with little organic linkage to the rest of the 
economy" (Simon 2002: I 83). Despite considerable opposition from the trade unions, the EPZ 
Act also suspended key elements of the Labour Act (such as the right to strike) within the EPZs. 11 
As a result, the incentive-led EPZ strategy is associated with a regime of labour regulation 
characterised by jobs of variable quality with almost half of the workforce in non-standard 
employment; widespread union avoidance strategies by employers; the almost total absence of 
collective bargaining; low wages and minimal benefits; dangerous and unsafe working 
conditions; high rates of absenteeism and low levels of productivity (Simon 1998: I 19-2 I; LaRRI 
200 I :83-4). According to the director of a labour research institute, there is a tension at the heart 
of government policies: 
[the] government's job creation policies place the question of EPZs and attracting foreign investment 
alongside the development of small and medium-sized enterprises. Whereas the EPZs will in all likelihood, 
!lu'ough the benefits that they get, wipe out an emerging and cash-strapped small and medium-sized sector 
simply because they can produce cheaper and they can sell 25% of their products in the country ... The 
Labour Act gives workers fundamental rights that cannot be compromised. But parallel to this, with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and any kind of socialist ideas within SWAPO, came a complete shift towards 
neo-liberal economic policies under the Washington Consensus ... Despite the improved regulation of basic 
worker rights in the Labour Act, the economic policy is very much one of an open economy, offering 
increasing incentives to investors, and keeping the unions in check within that framewo rk (26/06/2002). 
In its assessment of Namibia's industrial policy of 1992, the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
(I999b:63-4) noted that mechanisms designed to stimulate resource-based industrialisation 
arising out of the major primary sectors are largely under-developed and under-resourced. The 
1992 policy is criticised for failing to target specific industries; disregarding the international 
economic environment; fai ling to explore the role of teclmology and innovation in industrial 
development; and making no mention of trade unions although they are "of general concern for 
the manufacturing sector ... [and are 1 perceived as inflexible, and a deterrent to investment and 
growth". In spite of these objections, subsequent revisions to industrial policy remain firmly 
committed to market-driven solutions for the lack of competitiveness, diversification, integration, 
10 The objectives of this Act were reinforced by provisions in the Manufacturing Incentives of 1993 and 
Export Incentives of 1994 (GRN 1999). 
II President Nujoma suggested that "the non-application of Namibia's [labour] code in the EPZ regime is 
a delicate compromise which is necessary to achieve the larger goal of job creation" (The Namibian 30 October 
1995). 
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beneficiation, skills development, equal economic opportunities, small enterprise development, 
and technology transfer (MTI 1999b). The government summarised its approach to industrial 
policy in the following terms: 
[g]ovemment will provide an enabling environment for the industrial sector. Government policies will be 
orientated at creating and maintaining markets. Specific interventions will operate through markets by 
providing the appropriate incentives and inforn1ation ... Government will strengthen its institutional 
capacity in order to increase its ability to implement flexible industrialisation strategies ... As a small open 
economy, trade liberalisation represents a unique opportunity for the Namibian industrial sector to benefit 
from access to larger markets (MTI I 999a:4-6). 
The economic and industrial policies pursued by the SW APO government amount to a self-
imposed structural adjustment programme."1! regards the private business sector as "the engine 
of economic growth" (GRN 1996: 1) and "will not intervene in [the] market mechanism except 
as a last resort" (MTI 1999bJO). This policy orientation finds expression in an unwavering 
commitment to the eradication of trade ban'iers, stringent control of the money supply, reductions 
in government expenditure, privatisation and commercialisation, and the like. There are, 
however, significant tensions between "economic growth and rising incomes through free trade, 
on the one hand, and internal economic integration and social security through protectionism, on 
the other" (Kiljunen 1989:120). For instance, while FDI increased from N$386 million in 1997 
to N$785.4 million in 2000, it was more than offset by capital outflows, which increased from 
N$994.6 million to over N$2 billion during the same period (LaRRl200 1 :42). FDI remains small 
given the generous incentives and is still concentrated on traditional exports such as minerals 
(Iyanda 1998:9). Like externally-imposed structural adjustment programmes, the combined effect 
of these policies is to separate "the pursuit of short-term objectives from long-term 
transformational goals" in a manner whereby the former constitute the "very antithesis" of the 
latter (Adedeji 1991 :780). This tide of neo-liberalism has attracted considerable criticism, 
especially from the labour movement. 
The state is basically following the IMF-World Bank recipes: liberalise and everything else will fall in 
place. For the IMF the problem is simply that our liberalisation is too slow. Speed it up and then you will 
reap the benefits. There seems to be sections of govemment who naively believe that this will be the case 
(director, labour research institute - 04/07/2000). 
Although the Namibian govemment claims that we are not affected by these structural adjustment policies, 
if you look at what is transpiring at the workplace level, you can see that we are affected. Downsizing and 
outsourcing show that it is taking place here (general secretary, MUN - 28106/2002). 
12 There is considerable support for these policies in some quarters of Namibian society. For example, a 
prominent economic analyst suggests that the key policy measures for stimulating growth include tile 
"conunercialisation and privati sat ion ofparastata!s, measures to stimulate competition ... and a further opening up 
of the economy to the global market in order to reap the benefits of globalisation" (Hansohm 2000:26). 
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The economic principles and long-term objectives that inform these policies were never the 
subject of serious negotiations with the trade unions. In fact, the transition to democracy in 
Namibia was chaJ'acterised by considerable restraints on the ability of labour and other organs 
of civil society to press their demands on the post-independence political structure. An 
"inevitable complement" to a neo-colonial economic structure, as Leys and Saul (1995b:4) note, 
is a neo-colonial politics that "limits popular demands for radical social and economic policies". 
The leadership of the trade union movement is acutely aware of the social costs ofneo-colonial 
politics and its exclusion from policy debates. 
The future is dark ... We are still becoming a manufacturing country and most of the peop le we have here 
came through direct foreign investment. These people want to make profits very quickly. They ran away 
from their countries because their labour is becoming very expensive. The politicians are also very much 
involved in encouraging this process. They say: 'you are scaring the investors with the way you are 
organising people. We are trying to create jobs for the people. It is better for people to get twenty dollars 
per day instead of sitt ing in the street without anything '. The way in which we are to create jobs is not 
mapped out clearly. We are trying to attract direct foreign investment, but these people are not really being 
observed in terms of the jobs they create. It is easy for the skilled workers, but the unskilled and semi-
skilled are not really integrated into the industrialisation process (general secretary, NATAU - (2/0712000). 
The lack of effective tripartite structures at the level of the economy and industry means that 
there is no supportive institutional framework for cooperation in restructuring at the workplace 
level. Institutional arrangements play an important role in providing workers with employment 
security amidst growing labour market insecurity, encouraging greater economic efficiency 
without increasing social inequalities, and establishing sustainable, high-productivity coalitions 
in the workplace (Streeck 1992; Boyer 1994; Peck 1996; Esping-Andersen and Regini 2000a). 
A low-cost response to market pressures and changes appears to be most frequent in countries 
with weak institutions, low levels of unionisation, decentralised bargaining structures, and 
limited government intervention in the economy. In a country such as Namibia where these 
conditions prevail , there is a lack of significant moderating influences on the tendency of firms 
to adjust to competition by reducing and controlling labour costs. In the absence of strong 
industrial relations institutions, decisions about the restructuring of work are effectively left to 
individual employers: 
[iJndustrial restructuring is not driven by a national policy framework, it is very much a case of each 
industry restructuring as they see fit. Restructuring is very industry-specific in Namibia ... Managers simply 
respond to conditions in their industry without considering long-term policy objectives (director, labour 
research institute - 04/07/2000). 
The internal labour market that was reserved almost exclusively for white workers during the 
colonial era in Namibia was restructured and enlarged after independence. The insulating effects 
of the internal labour market on the employment relationship are now largely coterminous with 
the permanent, full-time and organised segment of the workforce. The current restructuring of 
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the Namibian labour market has engendered increasing differentiation as employers attempt to 
incorporate the more skilled and better organised segments of the workforce and to mobilise 
cheaper, more pliable and less regulated sources of labour. The former ensure continuity in 
production and provide a basis for cooperation in the workplace, while the latter are deployed to 
offset rising costs and increase responsiveness to changes in the market. The pressure to enhance 
competitiveness by reducing labour costs and job security stems, in part, from the preponderance 
of low-skill , low-productivity and low-technology industries in Namibia. The tendencies to 
casualise employment and the forms that they assume, as Lawson (1992: 18) notes, are related 
to "the fit between specific industries' technology and labour needs and place-specific 
pre-existing production structures". We are therefore witnessing the coexistence of 'the old' and 
'the new' rather than a simple displacement of the former by the latter. Total change is as 
untenable as complete stasis. 
4.3.3 Globalisation, Workplace Restructuring, and Cost-Competitiveness 
The processes of globalisation and the exposure of domestic markets to more intense competition 
have made the survival of most firms dependent on drastic cost-cutting. Since employers have 
more direct control over labour costs - as compared to capital or intermediary costs - workers 
have become the prime target for 'right-sizing'. This is reflected in a lack of any significant 
retooling in many Namibian finns for several decades. As the human resource (HR) manager of 
a leading meat processing firm noted, "[ m Jost of our equipment is older than me, they have been 
here since the establishment of the company" (10/1111998). The increased uncertainty and 
volatility associated with globalisation have not only reduced the incentives to invest and 
innovate, but have also reinforced the reliance on low pay and casualised employment as the only 
means of survival. The CUITent destabilisation of markets has even restricted the ability of large 
finns to build stable and long-term employment relationships. 
The director from [a large transpol1 company 1 instructed the manager to replace permanent employees who 
are retiring or are being fired with labour-hire personnel ... The main aim of the bosses in Namibia, as you 
know comrade, is to make a quick profit. They forget about the we ll-being of the worker ... They cut out 
the pennanent workers and bring in temporary workers to reduce the salary costs and increase their income. 
This is not really making a profit, they are just cutting wages. The money should have gone to the full-time 
employees (general secretary, NATAU - 12/0712000). 
We use labour hire workers as cleaners and as packers to load the trucks ... We used to have our own 
security. but now it is outsourced. We also outsourced our gardening and catering services. It is much less 
costly for the finn to use casual workers in certain jobs ... Outsourcing is definitely going to increase in the 
future . At the moment, we are employing too few casual and temporary workers (HR manager, beer and 
beverage manufacturer - 20107/2000). 
Shifts in the sources of labour supply for a range of different jobs are a prominent characteristic 
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of current industrial restructuring in Namibia. In a climate of uncertainty and insecurity, as we 
noted above, managers tend to seek for ways to cut costs and to shift the risks of uncertainty to 
the weaker sections of the labour force. This encourages employers to deal with an unplanned 
reduction in the number of employees or an unanticipated increase in workload not through 
labour reserves, but by leasing labour or issuing fixed-term contracts. A growth in the use of 
performance appraisals and perfonnance-related pay systems in most economic sectors has also 
reinforced the trends towards imposing risk on individual employees in order to elicit higher 
productivity, make earnings more variable, and introduce more exacting scrutiny of employee 
conduct. As the general secretalY ofNAFAU observed, 
[tJhere is a trend for wages and increases to differ among workers because of these perfonnance appraisals 
... The traditional thirteenth cheque is falling away. Now your bonus depends on the performance of the 
company during the year. Don 't expect anything if the company has not done well. This system exp loits 
workers - it is a slave driver. You are forced to work overtime because if you want to perfonn you will 
definitely have to put in extra hours ... Workers get some perfonnance bonuses, but it is mostly the store 
managers and company executives who benefit from huge incentives (28 /0612002). 
High levels of unemployment, accessible pools of vulnerable and disadvantaged labour, 
outmoded techniques, obsolete technologies, short-term cost-cutting, low quality and effort-
intensive systems of work organisation, and the ease with which the terms and conditions of 
employment ofless skilled and unorganised workers can be depressed have historically provided 
the basis for the competitive survival of inefficient producers (Deakin and Wilkinson 1991: 141 ; 
Nolan and Walsh 1995:81 ; Kitson el aI2000:633). The combination of these factors with an 
emphasis on sholt-term proftts created an environment in Namibia in which it is simply easier 
for many firms to contain labour costs than to seek enhanced profits through costly investments 
in new technology and skills. 
You are not going to grow an IT sector in a company where they still count stock manually. The production 
and distribution processes need to be automated before the industry wi ll really take off here. The problem, 
of course, is that there is a lot of cheap manpower available (general manager, IT consultancy -
14/07/2000). 
To expand productivity, we would have to bring in new machines - the workers are already pushed to the 
limit. But machinery is very expensive. We have a fairly cheap, but happy, labour force. Unemployment 
is also high. If we had expensive labour which was militant, unionised and causing trouble all the time, we 
would not hesitate to mechanise everything (general manager, pasta and biscuit manufacturer - 17/0712000). 
With the partial exception of the mining and fishing industries, there were no major technological 
changes in the Namibian economy during the 1990s (Klerck el al 1997:50). Workplace 
restructuring tended to be confined to particular aspects of production or service delivery without 
involving any qualitative shifts in the way that the labour process was traditionally organised. 
The piecemeal and ad hoc diffusion of new technology is geared more towards cutting costs in 
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specific operations than towards the creation of an integrated system of production. 
In mining, you have a lot of new technologies and capital-intensive production methods because the global 
conglomerates are linked and use the latest technology available. This contributed to the down-sizing in 
the sector. Then you have the many small workshops in Namibia, local companies, that are not driven by 
any new technology. They often use their machines for a very long time and don't see the need for a 
complete overhaul in tenns oftechno]ogy. You also have the service sector that is the fastest growing sector 
in Namibia. Here you see IT being used. But this is not so much a restructuring as an expansion of the 
sectors utilising new technologies. Besides mining, fishing and the retail sector which is medium-sized, 
every other productive industry in Namibia is fairly small-scale and don't use technology on a huge scale. 
Here and there you have new machines, but that's it (director, labour research institute - 04/07/2000). 
Many Namibian firms have become caught in ' low productivity traps' from which they have little 
incentive to escape. When these firms face competition from more efficient producers with 
advanced technology and innovative products, their only hope of survival is to reduce labour 
costs. Not all categories of labour, however, are amenable to this strategy. Given the excess 
supply, the less skilled are particularly vulnerable to cost-minimising strategies. The bias towards 
low value-added production reflects, in part, the historically low levels of investment in training 
and the lack of access to education by black workers. As the table below illustrates, a significant 
part of the Namibian workforce has little if any educational qualifications. 
Table 4,2 Distribution of Labour Force by Selected Industry and Education: 2000 
INDUSTRY 1 SECTOR NO PRIMARYI TERTIARY TOTAL 
EDUCATION SECONDARY EDUCATION Num ber (%) 
(%) (%) (%) 
Agriculture 63.1 63.6 16.5 123 297 (28.6) 
Fishing OJ 7.5 3.7 7863 (1.8) 
Mining and Quarrying 0.2 303 4.8 4 034 (0.9) 
Manufacturing 3.7 17.2 11.4 22 92 1 (503) 
Construction 2.7 16.0 5.2 2 1 390 (5.0) 
Wholesale, Retai l and 6.8 37.3 17.9 47 575 (11.0) 
Hospitality 
(Source: adapted from MoL 2002:51). 
A severe neglect of multi-skilling and polyvalency decisively qualifies the types of industrial 
change that are feasible or possible. Like the pressures that stem from the high costs of imported 
technology, raw materials and loans, a poorly educated and trained workforce reinforces the low-
wage route to competitiveness in Namibia. The managers that were interviewed admitted that 
very little resources were allocated to training and tended to confuse multi-tasking with multi-
skilling. 
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If you look at a driver from the depot, for instance, you need a forklift to load the truck. What is the driver 
doing while the truck is being loaded? He could operate the forklift and it cou ld become one job (HR 
manager, beer and beverage manufacturer - 24/07/2000). 
Managers have a different interpretation offiexibility. To be 'fiexible', for them, means you can do multiple 
jobs. If you are not fiexible, or what they call 'multi-skilled ' , they will streaml ine the workforce. Workers 
are laid off and, for the few that remain, the workload is being doubled ... Workers are sent on a few 
courses, given a small salary adjustment, and then they are told: 'you are now multi-skilled and must do 
all the jobs ' (general secretary, NAFAU - 26/1 0/1998). 
Multi-skilling just means more jobs for the same salary. You end up doing the job of a man who is now on 
the street. The employers are the only ones benefitting from this process (general secretary, MUN -
28/06/2002) . 
The local adaptation of new methods of work organisation has followed classic apartheid-
colonial lines. Hierarchical and adversarial relations in the workplace, combined with the divisive 
racial policies of the past, make it very difficult for Namibian firms to realise the cooperative 
benefits of participatory forms of production such as quality circles. As the president of the NEF 
noted: 
[w]e need to encourage what the Japanese call quali ty circles, where people get together right throughout 
the company to see how they can improve things. We need to work in the interests of the company by 
stressing common interests, rather than to create so often and so horribly the idea that the interests of the 
employer and the employee are in confiict with each other. We are almost like enemies ... The black-white 
syndrome is the scourge of Namibian society and leads to distrust and a lack of loyalty between 
management and unions. This syndrome has resulted in a situation where I cannot confide in my black staff 
to the extent that I would like to (08/07/2000). 
A system of low-skill, low-wage and low-trust relations is embedded in industrial and work 
organisation in Namibia. Most Namibian fimls lack the market power and resources to move into 
higher value-added batch production and lack the stabi lity and levels of demand necessary to reap 
the benefits of economies of scale. In the lower value-added segment of international trade, 
Nanlibia has to compete with low-wage economies like Bangladesh and China. Much of the low 
productivity observed in different sectors arises as a direct consequence of the outdated forms 
of organisation which pervade Namibian enterprises. This rendered most unionised firms highly 
vulnerable to changes in the regulatory framework: 
[w]e had a 49-hour working week and the government brought it down to 45 hours within months of 
independence. They should have done it much more slowly so that you can bring your productivity up. 
They have really dented industry by bringing it in immediately (general manager, furniture manufacturer-
17/07/2000). 
Comparatively high wages, combined with low labour productivity, act as a major brake on 
competitiveness (Table 4.3). Although wages in Namibia are considerably lower than those in 
the industrialised countries, Fashoyin (1998) shows that they remain high by comparison with 
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many other developing countries, especially in Asia. 
Table 4.3 Average Monthly Wages by Selected Industry: 1992/93 
INDUSTRY / SECTOR MONTHLY WAGES 
(N$) 
Agriculture and Fisheries 641 
Construction 986 
Trade and Hospitality I 178 
Manufacturing 1265 
Transport and Communication 1779 
Community and Personal Services I 860 
Electricity, Gas and Water 2208 
Finance and Real Estate 2538 
Mining and Quarrying 2972 
(Source: adapted from MoL 1995 :30). 
Most Namibian employers interviewed as part of a national survey regarded the unit costs of 
labour imposed by statutory and collective regulation in the post-independence era as excessive 
(Klerck et al 1997:49). As a result of these pressures on profit margins, "there is an attitude 
developing among some employers that makes them move into labour hire so as to avoid the 
higher social costs for permanent employment" (permanent secretary, Ministry of Labour -
04/07/2000). In this sense, the growth ofa 'flexible ' or ' peripheral ' workforce is one of the prices 
for high wage rigidity in the 'core' workforce. 
In some industries the pressure of labour costs is felt more keenly than in others. The relative 
contributions to the total compensation of employees from 1993 to 2000 reveal that agriculture 
and hospitality contributed an average of 1.3%; construction 2.1 %; fishing 4.4%; manufacturing, 
wholesale and retail trade 8.8%; and mining and quarrying 8.9% (Motinga and Mohamed 
2002: 13). Despite these variations in capital-labour cost ratios, there was a general consensus 
among managers interviewed for a national survey that the most significant obstacles to 
expanding economic growth in Namibia lay with unproductive workers and unrealistic wage 
demands (Klerck and Sycholt 1997:157). By contrast, over 80% of the 656 workers interviewed 
thought that their wages were too low (Klerck and MUlTay 1997:247). These findings suggest, 
firstly , that employers are likely to regard a reduction in labour costs as the most viable route to 
greater competitiveness and, secondly, that the wages of pe1Tl1anent, organised workers are at best 
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a highly contentious source of cost reduction. Cost-savings must therefore be sought among the 
more vulnerable and least powerful sectors of the labour market. Moreover, the comparatively 
high costs of overtime for permanent workers reduced its attractiveness as the primary labour 
adjustment measure and enhanced the incentives to use non-standard employees. 
Many of the retail shops are saying that the market is forcing them to extend their trading hours ... This has 
meant that more casual workers are brought in because they don't want to pay overtime rates. Overtime is 
a huge cost to these companies and they want to reduce it (general secretary, NAFAU - 28/0612002). 
The factory workers tend to budget on overtime. But, like all companies, we are looking at ways to reduce 
the high costs of overtime by outsourcing certain functions (HR manager, beer and beverage manufacturer -
20107/2000). 
Not all employers experience and respond to the various economic pressures outlined above in 
a unifonn or consistent manner. In particular, there is significant divergence in the opportunities 
and constraints imposed on employers in different product markets by the prevailing regime of 
labour regulation. A secondary labour market of temporary and part-time workers reflects a 
response by some employers to the legal, political and economic incentives to reduce labour costs 
by degrading wages, diluting worker rights, and differentiating employment conditions. 
Understanding sectoral variations in the extent and fonn of casualisation calls for an analysis that 
links the employment of non-standard labour to the dynanlics of a particular sector of industry 
and conditions in the local labour market. This will allow us to explore, in more concrete terms, 
the actual employment conditions of different types of non-standard labour. It is only through the 
construction of such a meso-theory of employment and labour regulation that the complex and 
contingent nature of casualisation and outsourcing can be fully appreciated. The focus is on the 
underlying social, economic and political relations that shape the distinct patterns of industrial 
and employment restructuring in different industries and occupations. In other words, each 
industrial sector is confronted with a distinct set of possibilities and constraints in its markets, 
technology, organisation and regulation. 
4.4 THE SECTORAL DYNAMICS OF NON-STANDARD EMPLOYMENT: 
COMPETITION, COSTS, AND MECHANISATION REGIMES 
Industrial restructuring is characterised not only by its highly uneven nature, but also by its 
sectorally-specific dynamics. In some industries significant changes have occurred, while in 
others changes are relatively minor modifications to a pre-existing system of production. 
Flexibility theorists were quick to generalise their findings across a number of industries, thereby 
ignoring "the limits created by general trends and pa.t1icular fomls of mechanization" (Blackburn 
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et al1985 :99). The sectoral dimensions of restructuring, as Meulders and Wilkin (1987: 16) note, 
are very rarely seriously considered in the flexibility debate . The balance between security and 
vulnerabi lity, flexibility and rigidity tends to vary with the technological and organisational 
structures of production in different economic sectors (Tail by and Whitston 1989; Storper and 
Scott 1990; Horrell and Rubery 1991 ; Burgess 1997). This implies that changes in the workplace 
are not entirely random or arbitrary. Although the nature, extent and direction of change depend 
on a multiplicity of factors, they are patterned by the internal structures and dynamics of an 
industry. A focus on distinct 'mechanisation regimes ' places the issue of sectoral variations in 
industrial restructuring at the centre of the sociology of work.1J 
In contrast to the emphasis on determinant managerial strategies by flexibility theories, a focus 
on the limits and possibilities generated by the material characteristics of different productive 
technologies and factory regimes presupposes a more complex, contested and sectorally-specific 
process of industrial and labour market development. Although many employers face similar 
pressures to reduce costs and increase productivity, research shows that "the modalities and 
tempo of restructuring varied across and within occupations, industrial sectors and by gender" 
(Gottfried 2000:235). The notion of discrete mechanisation regimes gives prominence to the 
structure and organisation of work rather than the characteristics of particular workers. As 
Storper and Walker (1989: 158) argue, labour demand is differentiated because 
[tJhe nature of the product, the structure of markets, the possibilities for production technology, and 
production organization feed on each other to propel an industry along a particular development path; they 
engender divergent sectoral development, based on sequences of positive feedback between teclU1ical 
possibilities, cost structures, and market structures. 
A decisive determinant of the growth in low-skill, low-wage non-standard employment is the 
underlying nature of labour demand.'4 Since it is the employer who determines employment 
patterns, ' flexibility ' is available largely on management's terms. That is, employer needs rather 
than employee preferences determine the extent and di stribution of flexible working patterns. 
Over 70% of the managers interviewed as part of a national survey indicated that staff selection 
and the subcontracting of work fall within their discretion and are not open to consultation or 
negotiation with employees (Klerck and Sycholt 1997: ISO). The director of a labour research 
institute confirmed this: "[ w lith the possible exception of some white-collar workers, the unions 
13 An emphasis on the possibilities and constraints generated by different fomls of mechanisation is a long-
standing theme in the sociology of work. Studies by Blauner and Woodward in the I 960s, for example, identified 
dist inctive types of production technology and associated forms of management and work organ isation. 
'4 See: Horrell and Rubery (1991); Standing (1992); Cappelli (1995); Gallie et at (1998); Fe1stead and 
Jewson (1999a); Heery and Salmon (2000b); and Peck and Theodore (2000). 
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have very little control over the hiring and deployment of labour in the Namibian workplace" 
(04/07/2000) . Demand-side explanations prioritise employer autonomy in shaping human 
resource policies, while those on the supply-side emphasise changing priorities and lifestyle 
choices of workers and changes in the household division of labour. If supply-side factors were 
the primary force behind the growth of non-standard employment, as many flexibility theorists 
insist, workers need to prefer such jobs. The forced or involuntary character of temporary and 
part-time employment in Namibia, as we shall see in chapter 5, is perhaps the clearest indication 
of employers' ability to unilaterally determine the nature of non-standard employment 
relationships (NERs). 
According to Sayer (1995:63-5), the economies and diseconomies of scale and scope involved 
in combining a variety of activities derive from two sources: (ex) the powers and liabilities of 
specific forms of organisation (relations of production); and (p) the powers and liabilities of the 
activities which the organisation tries to control (forces of production). Both can be changed, but 
only in accordance with the causal powers and liabilities of their constituent parts. Neither is 
completely malleable or capable of doing just anything. The forces and relations of production 
interact recursively, the activities being shaped to a greater and lesser degree by the modes of 
organisation and vice versa. This does not, however, licence the reduction of one to the other. 
The most common fa llacy here is a kind of institutional voluntarism in which p is reduced to ex 
so that activities appear infinitely pliable in the hands of management. Automobiles, clothes or 
municipal services (P) can each be produced within a variety offorms of organisation (ex). The 
economic effects of doing so will vary, precisely because they are "materially different activities, 
which is largely why their industrial organization tends to differ" (Sayer 1995:64, emphasis 
added) . While industrial organisation can take many forms, it can never be indifferent to the 
material properties of the activities that have to be coordinated. To some extent, therefore, the 
different forms of governance or regulation in the workplace reflect the technical character of the 
product. 
Social relations in the workplace, as Storper and Walker (1989: 166) point out, "have qualities 
peculiar to every industry or group of industries, whatever the levelling effect of labor market 
legislation and large unions". For instance, a basic contrast can be drawn between capital- and 
labour-intensive systems of production. The total capital-labour ratio for Namibia is I :8, which 
means that in value terms eight times more capital than labour is employed. In manufacturing, 
an investment ofN$72 800 in fixed assets is required to create one job (Iyanda 1998:22). This 
figure may be as high as N$97 400 in the chemical industry and as low as N$30 300 in the wood 
industry. Sectors with capital-intensive production are characterised by relatively high wages, 
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while those with more labour-intensive production have predominantly low-wage structures. 
Significant sectoral variation in capital-labour ratios, as indicated in the table below, generates 
di stinct pressures to restructure workplace relations and encourages different competitive 
strategies . 
Table 4.4 Capital-Labour Ratios of Selected Industrial Sectors: 1991 
INDUSTRY I SECTOR CAPITAL-LABOUR RATIOS 
Agriculture 1.75 
Fishing 0.31 
Mining 22.75 
Manufacturing 2.57 
Construction 0.62 
Wholesale and Trade 2.32 
(Source: adapted from Gaomab 1994:12). 
The predictability, frequency, intensity and duration of demand fluctuations will tend to vary 
depending on the nature of the product or service as well as the organisational and technical 
features of the production process. There is no 'one best way' in which a firm must respond to 
fluctuations in demand and the associated regulatory dilemmas that confront it. The precise 
manner in which the opportunities and constraints imposed by broader structural conditions (such 
as the nature of product markets) are experienced is contingent on the manner in which the labour 
process is organised (Edwards 1986). This implies considerable variation in both the way that 
enterprises may choose to compete and the methods they may deploy to raise productivity. The 
productivity oflabour is a contingent combination of at least three elements (Wilkinson 1983). 
Firstly, the quality of labour power, which includes the skill s of the workers , their experience, 
and their general level of education. Secondly, the means of production at the disposal of the 
worker which includes, on the one hand, the technology in the workplace as well as the way in 
which it is arranged. On the other hand, this includes the quality and nature of the intermediate 
goods, such as raw materials, that go into the process of production. There is, thirdly, the 
relationships of control, command and subordination in the workplace. The productivity of 
labour will therefore vary from enterprise to enterprise depending on (a) the quality and nature 
of these three elements, and on (b) how they are brought together in the process of production. 
The level and structure of an industry'S costs are relatively fixed by it products, methods of 
production, and the nature of its product and labour markets. Hence, they can only be changed 
through a transformation of the economic, technical and power relations in which the industry 
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is embedded. There are significant sectoral specificities and patterns of technical interdependence 
specific to each industry's division oflabour. The latter determines, in part, the material bases 
for employers' and workers' control over the production process. Variations in the range and 
nature of tasks required by the production process and in the costs and constraints imposed by 
systems of labour regulation lend themselves to different sorts of cost-minimising staffing 
arrangements. The product markets of firms that rely on numerical flexibility tend to be 
characterised by price-based competition, while firms that increase the fW1ctionai flexibility of 
their workers tend to operate in markets that value the non-price elements of competition (Lane 
1989; Gallie and White 1994; Allen and Henry 1997). There are thus essentially two strategic 
options for reducing labour costs: (a) those designed simply to cut wages or intensify work; and 
(b) those aimed at increasing labour productivity through the redesign of products, production 
techniques and organisational structures. While these strategies are not mutually exclusive in the 
sense that a firm cannot pursue both simultaneously, the balance between them will tend to tilt 
in favour of a particular strategy for certain workers and under specific market conditions. As 
Tarling and Wilkinson (1987: 19-20) argue, 
[t]he tighter the financial constraints and the more pessimistic the firm's expectations of the future, the 
greater will be the probability that the firm will attempt to reduce labour costs directly by cutting wages and 
increasing the pace of work within its existing technical and organizational structure. The less onerous the 
fmancial and economic constraints, the wider the choice of strategies will be and the greater the possibilities 
of investing in new methods of production and new products. 
Institutional factors are cruci al in explaining the variable patterns of non-standard employment 
across and within industries and firms. For example, the strength of internal labour markets is 
strongly correlated with use of non-standard employment (Mangum et at 1985; Abraham and 
Taylor 1996; MacKenzie 2000; Grimshaw et at 200 I). Strong internal labour markets provide 
incentives to employees to reduce costs and increase flexibility through casualisation and 
outsourcing. Conversely, a weak internal labour market may provide sufficient sources of 
flexibility so that the benefits of non-standard employment do not offset their disadvantages. As 
the director of a labour research institute noted, 
[i]n the smaller companies, managers can do as they want with their workers and therefore they do not need 
to use casual workers. Although their staff are all 'permanent ', they can be controlled and are effectively 
treated like casual workers. In Nam ibia, it is very much the medium to large firms that use casual workers 
(26/06/2002). 
There can be no general model of internal labour markets that is simply applied in concrete 
situations because "the specific conditions in each industry give rise to different patterns of 
segmentation" (Gabriel and Holzapfl 1981 :73). Sectoral variations in the way that work is 
organised are more significant in countries such as Namibia where labour market institutions are 
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not highly standardised and differ between industries. As a result, firms in the different economic 
sectors adopt distinct regulatory ' fixes' depending on specific institutional contingencies. The 
emphasis on commercial isation in Namibia's public sector, for example, has contributed to a 
climate in which outsourcing is viewed as a primary tool of restructuring (LaRRI 2000c). There 
is also a deep commitment to outsourcing among many managers in the private sector, although 
it is inspired by a different set of pressures and incentives: 
[c]ompanies in Namibia are not yet using outsourcing to its full potential ... I believe in the principle of 
outsourcing because it makes good sense in a competitive world. Why do it yourself if you can get it done 
for you, possibly even better at a reasonable cost. Then you can focus your own limited amount of time on 
the heart and soul of the business. We have outsourced our security and cleaning. If they fail us, we won't 
say: 'we are going back to our own staff. We wi ll try and find another supplier who wi ll give us a better 
service (president, NEF - 08/07/2000). 
Instead of seeking a genera] explanation for the use of non-standard employment, a more fruitful 
approach is to focus attention on the reasons why certain industries are more inclined to resort 
to casualisation or outsourcing (Harrison and Kelley 1993; Maurau 1993; Gallie and White 1994; 
Drago 1998). This calls for a study of the factors peculiar to a sector - its product market, 
technologies, industrial relations and so on - that encourage or facilitate the recourse to non-
standard employment. There is strong evidence that the frequency with which employment 
flexibility was pursued by employers varies strongly by industry group. IS Given the complex 
distribution of non-standard employment across and within economic sectors, however, there can 
be no simple or functional relationship between type of production process or market conditions 
and the use of non-standard employment. To be sure, sector-specific conditions do not "set up 
a detenninate labor demand so much as they set the bounds for a political relationship between 
employers and workers which serves as an ongoing basis for employers' definitions of labor 
demand" (Storper and Walker 1989: 166). Despite the lack of a simple or direct correspondence 
between the type of firm and the use of non-standard labour, case studies have revealed some 
correlation between the nature of the production process and the type of flexibility needed. For 
example, where volatility in a firm 's work load is an important determinant of levels of 
outsourcing and casualisation, it suggests that employers place a premium on the ability to offer 
stable employment to their regular workforce. 
There are not only distinct differences in the propensity of various industries to casualise or 
outsource a part of their workforce, but also marked variations in the particular types of non-
15 See: Mangum ef al (! 985); Dombois and Osterland (1987) ; Michon (1987); Dale and Bamford (1988); 
Chalmers (1989); Lawson (1992); Lapidus (! 993); Anderson ef al (1994); Morley et al (1995); Allen and Henry 
( 1997); Storey (1997); Gal lie ef al (1998); MacKenzie (2000); and Barton and Turnbull (2002). 
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standard employment found in different sectors. Industries characterised by large firms tend to 
use a greater variety of non-standard employees than those dominated by small firms since the 
former are better equipped to manage diversified employment forms (Shah and Ward 2003). The 
co-existence of different forms of employment in the workplace, attracting varying degrees of 
statutory and institutional regulation, also generates a number of sectorally-specific advantages 
for employers (see chapter 6). Large manufactming plants, for instance, cut costs by hiring 
temporary or part-time workers in elementary occupations and expand their services by 
outsomcing specialised skills. 
A survey of 11 0 randomly selected workers in various occupations, economic sectors and regions 
of the country explored the impact of restructming on Namibian workers (LaRRI 2001 :57 -66). 
Some of the central findings of this research include the following. First, changes in the types of 
goods produced or services rendered were limited and confined primarily to the fishing, retail and 
manufacturing sectors. Second, the major reason cited by managers in all sectors for the 
introduction of new technology was to improve competitiveness by cutting costs. The effects of 
the new technology on employment conditions varied: a majority of the respondents from all 
sectors cited no effects, some indicated increased training (mainly manufacturing), while others 
noted a rise in retrenchments and in the pace of work (mainly mining). Third, almost two-thirds 
of the respondents indicated that their employers use casual and temporary workers. Casualised 
employment was highest in manufacturing (92.9%), followed by mining (75.0%), fishing 
(72.7%) and retail (51.4%). Fourth, subcontracting and outsourcing is most common in the 
mining sector (93.9%), followed by fishing (27.3%), retail (24.3%) and manufacturing (15.4%). 
Over two-thirds of the respondents in all occupational categories stated that the workers in the 
outsourced jobs were transferred to the subcontractor, 23.8% said they were retrenched, and 
14.3% indicated that they were shifted to another department within the company. 
The character and effects of economic incentives are central in an explanation of the causes of 
prevailing employment practices. The lack of statutory or collective disincentives to use non-
standard workers in Namibia is reflected in the ease with which certain functions can be 
casualised or outsourced. "The fact is that in a country like Namibia you want to make it easy to 
employ people without asking what will happen if things tum against us and we don't need these 
people any more" (group HR manager, retail - 03/11/1998). The prominence of small firms in 
the outsourcing industry has exacerbated this lack of disincentives. Trade unions have 
encountered many obstacles in their attempts to enforce legal regulations and collective 
agreements in small fim1s (LaRRl2002a). The growth in outsomcing has also contributed to the 
recent expansion of the small industry sector. As the HR manager of a beer and beverage 
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manufacturer noted, 
we will definitely have to look at outsourcing more functions in the future ... One way in which this is done 
is to support the development of SMEs [small and medium enterprisesj. We have just appointed a SME 
manager to coordinate this programme. We have set up Smart Deliveries and Ice Man to empower small, 
black entrepreneurs (2010712000). 
The various types of non-standard labour are therefore employed for a variety of different and 
interacting reasons, in different market circumstances and positions in the occupational hierarchy, 
and as a 'solution' to different regulatory dilemmas. The use of non-standard employment is not 
so lely determined by the volatility or unpredictability of product markets as implied by the 
flexible-firm model ; equally important are the functional divisions of a firm, the ski ll 
requirements of various stages of production, degrees of specialisation, levels of job protection, 
and labour-supply factors. In other words, the relationship between industrial sector and the 
levels, forms and functions of non-standard employment is multi -faceted and contingent on a 
whole host of factors. In stark contrast to the low levels of production subcontracting between 
large and small firms in Namibia, the subcontracting of labour is widespread. Non-standard 
employment in Namibia is not confined to cases of short-term employment to meet exceptional 
or irregular work demands in industries such as construction. Non-standard employment is found 
- in varying degrees and forms - in virtually all economic sectors. As the NUNW's general 
secretary put it: "[y]ou will find casual and labour-hire workers in all industries" (26/06/2002). 
The mining, manufacturing, construction and retail sectors are, however, at the forefront of 
casualisation and oLltsourcing. 
4.4.1 Mining 
Namibia ranks fourth in Africa in temlS of OLltput value from mining. Mining has been the single 
largest contributor to GDP throughout much of the terri tory's colonial past. Namibia possesses 
a relatively wide range of minerals, including diamonds, uranium, lead, cadmium, silver, zinc and 
copper in significant deposits . However, the bulk of all marketable output comes from only a few 
minerals, with dianlonds and uranium from Consolidated Diamond Mines (CDM) and Rossing 
respectively, accounting for almost 80% of Namibia's output value, 45% of its GDP, 75% of its 
export value, and about 50% of government revenue in 1980 (Thomas 1983b:64). Mining 
companies contributed as much income to government revenues as all non-mining companies 
combined in 1996 (UNDP 1998:57). Comparatively high levels of capital intensity, however, 
mean that the mining industry'S contribution to employment creation has been less impressive. 
While the sector accounted for over 60% of Namibia's exports and over 40% of state revenue 
between 1960 and 1980, it accounted for less than six percent of employment for the same period 
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(Mbuende 1986: 1 07). In 1993, the mining sector only employed about four percent of the total 
labour force, albeit at wage levels well above national averages (Hansohm et af 1998 :7). By 
Namibian standards, the sector has progressive managerial policies and well-established relations 
with the mining unions. 
The industry is dominated by a tightly-knit group of trans-national corporations such as Rio Tinto 
Zinc, American Metal Climax, Anglo-American Corporation and Metallgesellschaft AG 
(SW APO 1981 :33-4; Mbuende 1986: 110-2; Freeman 1992:34-5). South African shareholders 
and companies owned about 40% of all share capital in the mining companies that operated in 
pre-independence Namibia (Thomas 1978:81). Most of the capital goods, processing facilities 
as well as the technical and managerial staff also came from South Africa. Foreign mining 
companies were enticed by low tax rates, generous scope to write off capital expenditure, and the 
proximity of specialised services in South Africa. The lack of linkages to other sectors of the 
economy means that mining has not contributed much to the development of an industrial and 
tertiary sector in Namibia. Nearly all minerals are exported in raw or semi-processed fOlTI1. While 
value addition in diamond mining was 10.6% in 1999, this is in stark contrast to a mere 1.9% in 
the other mining operations (LaRRI 2001 :49). In short, the people of Namibia have historically 
benefitted very little from the mining industry. This situation has not changed substantively since 
independence, and the Namibian govemment regards its primarily role in the mining sector as 
creating "an environment that enables private companies to maximize profits" (MoL 1997:33). 
Namibian mines vary significantly in size and methods of operation. The three largest mines -
Tsumeb, CDM and Rossing - accowlt for the bulk of employees in the sector, with a fairly even 
divide between underground and open-cast methods of extraction. In 1983, 20% of mining 
employees were white, 6% coloured and 74% black. The latter earned an average wage ofR400 
per month, less than a third of the average wage for white miners (Andersson and Marks 
1987 :280). All three mines are highly mechanised with extensive investments in plants and 
machinery. The Tsumeb Corporation, for instance, operates its own copper smelter and lead 
refinery. Four mines accoWlted for over 80% of the R740 million invested in the sector by 1978: 
Rossing (R260 million), CDM (R210 million), Otjihase (R61 million) and Tsumeb (R55 
million). Under the highly favourable conditions of colonial rule, the mining companies realised 
vast profits. For example, since the early-1970s CDM consistently returned more than three-
quarters of its total capital investment each year (SWAPO 1981 :39). However, as Curry and 
Stoneman (1993 :48) and Hansohm et af (1998 :7) note, there has been a precipitous decline in 
investment in mining since the early-1980s. Fluctuating prices on international markets; the high 
costs of water, electricity and transport; escalating labour costs; declining reserves and ore grades 
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have all eroded the profit margins of the mining industry. Since its entire product is exported, the 
mining sector depends absolutely on the level and stability of world market prices. 16 As the prices 
of minerals decline, the pressures to raise efficiency and lower costs intensify. In primary 
industries such as mining, the latter are more easily achieved by reducing the costs of 
employment and utilising more capital-intensive methods of production. 
Historically, labour demand was for a mass of semi- and unskilled workers. For example: out of 
the total workforce of 6 800 employees in 1982, the Tsumeb mine employed over 5 000 semi-
and unskilled black workers with the rest made up of skilled white workers (Mbuende 1986: 115). 
In 1972, the minimum cash wages for black underground workers at Tsumeb were £10 per month 
plus accommodation and food, whereas the equivalent for white workers was £ 125 per month 
with extensive fringe benefits such as free transport and housing, service bonuses, and subsidised 
medical and life insurance. Since the 1980s, much of the labour demand is for more skilled and 
experienced machine operators (Kempton and Du Preez 1997:607). In the late-1990s, the sector 
provided about 8 200 jobs, a decline of more than 50% since the early-1980s (UNDP 1998:57). 
Although employment levels have declined significantly, wages levels have improved 
considerably: average remuneration in 1996 (N$53 514) was almost nine times that of 1981 
(Iyanda 1998: 12). The relatively skilled, adaptable and highly-paid workforce is more adequately 
explained in terms of the demands imposed by the integrated, capital-intensive nature of the 
industry than by a conscious managerial strategy to consolidate a 'core' workforce. A strong 
internal labour market surrounded by several tiers of subcontracted labour is largely the product 
of the mines' extreme vulnerability to disruptions in the regular supply oflabour and the intense 
pressure to reduce operating costs. While labour does not constitute a major cost factor for most 
of the modem, capital-intensive mines, it does represent a sizeable and growing proportion of 
working costs. 17 A reduction in labour costs also assists the mining companies to ride out slumps 
in mineral prices. 
The declining productivity of Namibian mines spells a bleak future for the industry. The viability 
of the Rossing mine, for example, is threatened by increased global competition, obsolete 
technologies and low world market prices for uranium (Freeman 1992:34). To prevent its closure, 
16 Depressed base mineral markets forced the closure of at least six mines between 1973 and 1977. In 
1997, there were 240 disused, non-rehabilitated mines in Namibia (UNDP 1998:58). 
17 For example, the total annual wage bill for black workers at CDM was no more that 10% of the 
company's annual net profits in the late-19 70s (Mbuende 1986:1 13). Diamond mining pays a much smaller 
proportion of its gross value added as wage remuneralion (19.5%) as compared to other mining operations (36.9%) 
(Kempton and Du Preez 1997:607). 
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the mme is restructuring by substituting low-grade ore, old technology and outdated work 
practices (LaRRI 2001 :50). The cut in production costs is evident in the drop in employment 
levels from 1 006 workers in 1999 to about 700 in 200 I . Large-scale retrenchments have led to 
a significant intensification of work among permanent employees: 
[tlhe mines reduced the number of operators when they brought in a trolley system. But these workers are 
still carrying out the same tasks that were done by the retrenched workers in the past. The work doesn't 
change, there are now just fewer workers. In the offices, staff was also reduced because everything is now 
computerised. Those that remain find that their jobs now include many extra tasks (regional organiser, 
MUN - 05/0712002). 
The outsourcing of 'peripheral ' or 'non-core' activities is an integral part of this restructuring 
process. In 2000, the Tsumeb mine employed about 400 permanent workers along with 360 
temporary workers in outsourced functions such as transport and engineering (LaRRI 2001 :50). 
Only the existence of segmented labour markets can explain why we find an increase in the 
employment of vulnerable temporary and part-time labourers coinciding with escalating 
redundancies among sheltered permanent employees. In contrast to the claims of flexibility 
theories, the profile of the workforce is marked by an expanding, vulnerable 'periphery' and a 
shrinking, endangered 'core'. This means that the unions in the mining industry are forced to 
battle on two fronts against the threats to employment security. 
In the mining industry, the companies shrink to what they consider their core business and then bring in 
labour-hire workers in jobs that are not considered to be a part of the core workforce. At one of the larger 
mines, only 800 out of2 000 workers are a part of this core ... With the mining industry now est imated at 
5000 workers, coming from 14000 before independence, it poses a threat to the MUN's very existence. 
Some mines have closed down, others have cut back dramatically, like Rossing, and with this goes the 
outsourcing of certain functions. This is a lethal combination for the union (director, labour research 
institute - 26/06/2002). 
The main challenges that we are currently facing in the mining sector are retrenchments and the outsow'cing 
of non-core departments, which has made job security uncertain ... Employers are now aiming for global 
competitiveness. The companies are increasingly saying that, to be competitive in the global market, they 
have to get rid ofthe non-core business and they want more labour flexibility. They concentrate more on 
the core focus of the industry, where their business is, where they are really involved, but the supporting 
functions are outsourced ... The jobs that are being outsourced on the mines include cleaning, catering, 
hospitals, engineering and some workshops (general secretary, MUN - 28/06/2002). 
Managers at the Tsumeb mine are committed to reducing the number of subcontracted workers 
in the future if market conditions improve. The MUN also set up its own investment company 
to bid for outsourcing contracts and told employers: " if you want to outsource, it must come to 
our company" (general secretary, MUN - 28/06/2002). As a result, some mining companies 
simply withdrew their offer to outsource particular functions. The development of subcontracting 
has always been a highly uneven process that cannot be conceptualised in terms of a steady, 
unilinear progression. Depending on the relative costs of internal and external solutions to 
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staffing problems, some companies may extend their subcontracting activities while others 
reduce their reliance on outside sources by reincorporating certain productive functions. 
Subcontracting relationships also vary significantly depending on the skills involved, the degrees 
of formality, the pricing mechanisms, and whether the work is carried out on-site or off-site. 
Subcontractors that only supply labour charge an hourly rate, while those that provide their own 
specialist machinery are paid for completing a particular task. The employment contracts of the 
less skilled subcontracted workers only last as long as a specific outsourcing agreement with a 
mine lasts. Conversely, some of the more skilled subcontractors are employed on longer-term, 
more open-ended contracts. Outsourcing on the mines is therefore not confined to short-term 
and/or specialised services. Many of the subcontracted workers carry out tasks that are 
substantively the same as those of the permanent employees: 
[t]he labour-hire workers are the nonnal, general workers you can expect in a mine. You fmd boiler-makers, 
fitter and turners, cleaners, welders, builders, electricians, painters, truck drivers and all kinds of trades. 
They are all working in the same environment alongside pennanent workers. The difference is just in their 
pay and their conditions, but the work is the same (regional organiser, MUN - 29/10/1998). 
The subcontracting companies vary from large enterprises with operations on several mines to 
small firms dedicated to a particular mining operation. Functions such as the sinking of shafts 
and construction were historically outsourced to specialist contractors. The latter, in tum, 
subcontracted labour brokers to supply them with semi- and unskilled labour. While the 
subcontracting of non-production activities such as cleaning, maintenance and catering dates 
back to the 1980s, a striking feature of more recent outsourcing is its penetration into core 
production functions . 18 
In the beginning, the labour-hire companies just employed ordinary labourers. The system has now 
changed, you can even find qual ified HR managers, all types of artisans, whatever... Anything that has to 
do with labourers, like cleaning, they will definitely outsource ... For example: catering, cleaning and 
medical services are outsourced because they are not part of the core business. Engineering is the heart of 
any operation, but it is also outsourced. When you outsource engineering, what type of cost-saving is that? 
On the mines, health and safety cannot be outsourced . It remains the responsibility of manage men!. But on 
some of our mines health and safety has also been outsourced .. ' So they do outsource core business areas 
(general secretalY, MUN - 28/06/2002). 
In contrast to the experience in other sectors of the economy, the retrenchment (rather than the 
transfer) of employees in functions that have been outsourced is common on the mines. Some 
of the retrenched miners have been employed by mining subcontractors, albeit under inferior 
conditions to those they formerly enjoyed as permanent employees. Low wages and the lack of 
employment benefits are a constant source of dissatisfaction among these employees. 
18 The trends in outsourcing on South African mines followed a simi lar trajectory (Bezuidenhout and Kenny 
1998; Kenny and Webster 1999; Crush ef al200 1). 
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When the [retrenched] workers get re-employed, it is on conditions that are much worse than before. A 
mine will outsource a certain department to a private guy. He will reduce the number of workers and offer 
them much lower wages than they earned before. The labour-hire companies tell their workers: 'we cannot 
provide you with any benefits because we are not a production company. We can be chased Ollt, and 
another contractor can take over, at any time' ... Labour-hire workers only get paid for the hours they work-
other than that, there is nothing ... You can see clearly that it is a deliberate attempt to make more profits, 
to spend less on benefits. Management isjust focusing on production without having the interests of these 
[subcontracted] workers at heart (regional organ iser, MUN - 05/07/2002). 
The employers get a lot of benefits from using casual labourers. It is not just a saving of money. Department 
heads are told that if they save this much money, they will get a bonus of so much. The department head 
will then convince his bosses that he can cut costs by outsourcing certain functions. Once he gets a fat 
bonus, he will sit back and say: 'I am a good manager'. In reality, he just reduced the costs of the company 
by using cheaper labour (regional organiser, MUN - 2911 011998). 
A significant part of the subcontracted workforce from the larger contractors possess 
considerable experience in mining operations. This has absolved the contractors from investing 
any resources in the training of their more skilled or experienced staff. This pool of skilled, 
retrenched miners is, however, a finite resource. It is therefore likely that the mining companies 
themselves will, in the long-term, have to bear the costs for this reliance on subcontractors who 
depend on past investments in training to realise a profit. 
4.4.2 Manufacturing 
Manufacturing is the most diverse of the industrial sectors with great variation in average wages 
across the sub-sectors. At independence, Namibia's manufacturing sector was small and virtually 
an appendage of the primary sector (Table 4.5). The bulk of the activities in the manufacturing 
sector are undertaken by branches or subsidiaries of South African enterprises. Key foundations 
for a competitive manufacturing sector are undermined by existing market and ownership 
structures. These include the abi lity of dominant firms in highly concentrated markets to 
determine the economic growth of upstream suppl iers and downstream client-firms, and smaller 
enterprises unable to scale the baniers to entry created by market concentration and pervasive 
conglomeration (LaRRI 2002a). 
In the industrial sector, there are about 350 manufacturers of which 16 are export-orientated 
(mainly fish, meat and minerals); 61 are orientated towards the regional market (mills, beverages, 
packing, engineering and chemicals); 120 are orientated towards local demand (abattoirs, 
butcheries, bakeries, construction and joineries); and a further J 50 are small handicrafts like 
pottelY (Andersson and Marks 1987:278). Most of these industries are tied to the consumption 
patterns of the predominantly white elite or to the supply and servicing of equipment in the 
primary export industries. In fact, most of the large-scale, capital-intensive production is 
concentrated within the primary export and processing sector. For example, the British-owned 
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Metal Box Company in Walvis Bay supplies the fish processing factories with metal cans. 
Table 4.5 Distribution of Enterprises and Employees by Sub-Sector: 1989 
SUB-SECTOR NUMBER OF NUMBER OF 
ENTERPRISES EMPLOYEES 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 75 4687 
Textiles, Clothing and Leather 21 389 
Wood Products and Furniture 42 669 
Paper, Printing and Publishing 13 454 
Chemical Products II 329 
Non-Metal Mineral Products 19 1094 
Metal Products 33 I 130 
Other Manufacturing 20 131 
Repair Services 25 293 
Total 259 9176 
(Source: Curry and Stoneman 1993 :45). 
The minor contribution of this sector to the Namibian economy reflects a high-cost, capital-
intensive production structure, low capacity utilisation and low competitiveness (MoL 1997 :34-5; 
Hansohm et al 1998:7). In terms of performance, the manufacturing sector is ranked sixth in 
terms of average annual increase in sectoral output for the period 1990 to 1996 (MTI 1999b:5). 
The lack of a viable and meaningful industrial sector in Namibia is the product of the historical 
absence of any coherent industrialisation strategy and the unrestricted entry and indirect 
protection of South African manufactured goods. Although the share of manufacturing in exports 
is significant (28% in 1995) given its small size, this includes almost exclusively fish and meat 
processing. The dominance of natural resource-based manufacturing renders the whole sector 
highly vulnerable to fluctuations in inputs. '9 The cyclical nature of outputs from agriculture and 
fisheries also increases overhead costs and constrains efficiency. The little processing of raw 
materials that does occur is mainly for export, disconnected from the rest of the economy, and 
largely capital-intensive. In short, the sector is not geared towards diversifying the economy or 
creating a significant number of jobs. 
Manufacturing is concentrated geographically in the urban areas: only 23 companies with 298 
19 For example, the contribution of manufacturing to total exports decl ined ITom 15.5% in 1993 to a mere 
4.5% in 1996 as a result of progressively severe cuts in fish quota allocations (MTI 1999b: I 0). 
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employees are in the communal areas where the bulk of the population lives, while half the 
companies and 60% of employment is in the Windhoek area alone (Curry and Stoneman 
1993 :43). The country lacks many of necessary preconditions for a dynamic and expanding 
manufacturing sector: a small internal market; low levels of economic development in the more 
densely populated rural areas; the lack or high cost of energy resources and raw materials; a small 
population scattered over a vast area; a high concentration of subsidiaries of large South African 
enterprises; and a shortage of skilled labour and capital. The Africa Competitiveness Report of 
1998 highlights the following concerns by investors and local manufacturers: competition from 
South Africa, labour rigidities, the cost of inputs, and the availabili ty of managerial and teclmical 
skill s (cited in MTI 1999b:17). The industrial sector in Namibia 
operates on a small scale, without protection against imports, and grew up in the context of a regional 
economy dominated by South African suppliers. It is no surprise that it is small and unintegrated, and that 
it should face many constraints on its expansion (Curry and Stoneman 1993 :49). 
In 1995, the manufacturing sector (excluding enterprises with less than ten employees) employed 
16836 males and 4 469 females as compared to 10 758 male and 12 079 female workers in 1991 
(MTI 1999b:7). The sharp decline in the employment of women is indicative of significant 
changes in the social composition of the workforce. Labour cost per unit of output in 1994 was 
as follows: fish processing (20%), meat processing (6%), assembly of machinery and equipment 
(21 %), and total manufacturing sector (16%) (MTI 1999b:8). Namibia's average labour cost per 
unit of output is comparable to that of South Africa, but considerably higher than in the other 
Southern African Development Community (SAD C) member countries. Costs are low in the 
relatively simple production process of meat processing, but much higher in the more capital 
intensive sectors such as fi shing. In terms of average labour costs in the manufacturing sector, 
Namibia (US$6 587 per person) and South Africa (US$9 358) are higher than in the rest of the 
region. However, labour productivity is much higher in Namibia (US$15 911 per person) and 
South Africa (US$21 133) than in countries such as Botswana (US$I 0 187) and Zimbabwe (US$ 
8 950). Increasing average labour costs in the sector could send investors to the cheaper 
economies in the SADC, where longer hours may compensate for the productivity shortfall . 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) in the manufacturing sector expanded rapidly from 1990 
(N$ 19 million) to a peak of N$ 12l mill ion in 1993 and then declined to N$89 million in 1996 
(MTI 1999b:14). The continuous increase in FDI, while GFCF has declined during this period, 
shows that foreign investment has been directed towards sectors other than manufacturing. 
In contrast to other countries in the region, in Namibia two-thirds of all manufacturing employees 
are employed by large firms (50 and more workers), and only 12% in micro-enterprises (less than 
10 workers) (Hansohm et al 1998:8). Less than 10% of all small firms are involved in 
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manufacturing and have little, if any, linkages with larger manufacturers (GRN 1997:6-9). Curry 
and Stoneman (1993:43-4) highlight this disjointed nature of the manufacturing sector. A variety 
of product and market circumstances with some sub-sectors (e .g. grain milling) where local 
products satisfy a high proportion of local demand, while others (e.g. diary products) are 
conditioned by trade relations with South Africa, export the bulk of their products (e.g. processed 
meat) or whose products are dominated by imports (e .g. sugar). The viability of much local 
production in non-metallic mineral products such as bricks and cement is dependent on the high 
bulk and low unit value of the output, and highly vulnerable to competition from large South 
African suppliers. The metal products sub-sector satisfies up to 96% of local demand and 
survives despites fierce competition from South Africa. These are mostly small factories 
assembling and manufacturing a limited range of metal products that demand a limited range of 
engineering skills. Larger processes such as rolling and milling, foundries and precision 
machining are absent. 
The dependence on imported supplies of raw materials and intermediate goods, combined with 
the poor integration between the different sub-sectors, suggests an industrial structme of "isolated 
producers, most competing with imports, but themselves dependent on imports also" (Cun'y and 
Stoneman 1993 :46). A typical example of the effects of this industrial structure: 
[iJt may seem strange that we have to import leather when there is such a large cattle industry in Namibia. 
The problem is that the meat industry does not have a fini shing plant. So they have to export the hides to 
get them finished and then import them again to se ll them locally (general manager, automotive component 
manufacturer - 10107/2000). 
The dominance of light manufacturing and of consumer rather than intermediate or capital-goods 
manufactming suggests a production process that is simple in technique with easily acquired 
skills. This greatly facilitated the widespread use of non-standard employment. 
There has been a general decline in job security in the manufacturing sector. Not so much that penn anent 
workers were converted into casual workers, but what has happened is that when companies expand or 
when there has been resignations and retirements) the new workers are increasingly coming through labour-
hire companies (director, labour research institute - 26/06/2002). 
The labour-hire workers are all over, across the board, in all jobs. The companies are just keeping a small 
group of core workers as permanents and then bring labour-hire workers into the rest of the jobs (genera l 
secretary, MANWU - 27/06/2002). 
Most of the larger manufactming plants have outsourced one or more of the following functions: 
security, cleaning, catering, despatch, transport and maintenance. Subcontracted workers are used 
extensively in this sector to carry out a whole range of different tasks that vary considerably in 
duration. 
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Clients often say to me that they need people for a few hours because a lorry has to be loaded or there has 
been a spill that needs to be cleaned up. I give them the people to load the lorry or clean up the mess or 
whatever. Otherwise, the client would have to hire a lot of workers and there isn't enough work for them 
every day. Then you have a company that uses casual workers for several months or even a year. You could 
almost say that they are 'permanent' casuals. It all depends on the client. The kind of work my people do 
depends on his production (manager, temporary employment agency - 1411011998). 
For the salaried staff, we get temporary workers when secretaries go on maternity leave or when someone 
in the finance department, for example, is absent or on vacation. Here we need to bring in someone with 
expertise and the necessary experience. In the lower levels, we are basically looking at general labourers 
to pack and carry the products and so on. We only keep these workers on for as long as there a high demand 
(HR manager, meat processing - 04/07/2002). 
The most important branch of manufacturing is food processing, with a major part accounted for 
by fish and meat products for export. Fish products accounted for 72% of the value of all food 
products in this sector in 1972 (Mbuende 1986:135) and nearly 70% of manufactured exports in 
1995 (MTI 1999b:9). Fishing experienced rapid expansion during the 1990s: the value of 
production rose from N$500 million in 1990 to around N$2 billion in 1998 (UNOP 1996:61). 
With a value addition of six percent in 1999, the fish processing sector reinforced its vital role 
as a source of manufactured exports (LaRRl2001:47). Between 1991 and 1997, over 98% of all 
marine fish landings were exported (UNOP 1996:61). Namibia has one of the world's richest 
offshore fishing grounds. Under conditions of full production, the fish-processing factories in 
Walvis Bay accounted for 70% of the sector's gross output, 90% of its profits, and more than half 
of the total industrial employment during the mid-1970s (Thomas 1978: 133). The 7 000 black 
workers in the industry during the 1970s - most of whom were Ovambo migrant workers -
constituted almost half the total employment in the manufacturing sector. According to official 
statistics released in 1974, a black workers in a canning factory typically earned a monthly cash 
wage of R27.30 and R18.85 in kind (cited in Mbuende 1986: 133). Employment levels in the 
fishing industry have increased from around 6 000 in 1990 to an estimated 14 500 jobs in 1995, 
equivalent to about five percent of formal sector employment (UNOP 1998:64). 
South African companies have a significant share in the fishing industry that is concentrated 
around Walvis Bay, which remained a South African enclave until the mid-1990s. The bulk of 
fish products was exported to South Africa at well below world market prices. By the mid-1970s, 
the entire production and much of the marketing were controlled by just four corporations -
dubbed the "Afrikaner fishing cartel" (SWAPO 1981 :30). As a result, Namibia was importing 
much of its own fish from South Africa! The local ownership rate of fishing companies has, 
however, increased drastically since independence as the government pursued a vigorous policy 
of Namibian is at ion. Over N$400 million was invested in new on-shore plants and fishing vessels 
between 1991 and 1997 by both local and foreign firms (MoL 1997:26). 
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Fish processing is concentrated on two types of fish (pilchard and anchovy) and geared towards 
export markets. The canneries are large, highly mechanised production units employing an 
average of 400 workers each. In 1979, a study by the German Development Institute noted that 
"fully processed tins and fish meal are produced in fully automized factories on large scale" 
(cited in Mbuende 1986:132). A serious depletion offish stocks resulted in significant cuts in 
quotas during the 1990s, leading to a sustained 'fishing drought' 20 Further growth will have to 
corne from fish processing, to increase added value. The processing sector, which accounted on 
average for 20% per annum of manufactured output for the period 1990 to 1996, saw its output 
contribution decrease by more than 40% in 1996 as a result of new quota allocations (MTI 
1999b:4). These restrictions, combined with the high costs of inputs and competition from South 
African firms, placed considerable pressure on profit margins and provided powerful incentives 
to casualise and outsource a significant part of the workforce. The use of non-standard labour 
must also be seen in the light of the fact that a continuous introduction of new technology (given 
the absence of a capital-goods sector) is very costly to sustain in Namibia and increased 
productivity has to be achieved with existing technologies . This reduces the scope for 
restructuring and compels management to seek solutions to the profitability crisis in the 
recomposition of the workforce. 
We have outsourced our security and maintenance, and we use labour-hire workers to debone the carcasses 
during night. They used to be employees of the company, but then we thought: 'why should we keep them 
on?' Now they get paid a commission for every kilo of meat that they produce. At the momcnt, we are 
thinking of giving meat-cutting away as well. People can come in, do the job on their own, without being 
a part of the company (HR manager, meat processing - 09/07/2002). 
We used to just hire casual workers when there was a work overload situation and when the permanent staff 
could not cope. Now we are also using labour-hire workers in some departments such as cleaning and 
despatch. These workers are not directly employed by the company, but through the labour-hire company 
... It is much easier to get rid of these workers and we also save on many employment benefits (HR 
manager, fish processing - 1611111998). 
The wages of black women are consistently and considerably lower than their male counterparts 
in most, if not all, economic sectors (Cleaver and Wallace 1990:21-2). Further cost savings can 
therefore be achieved through changes in the social composition of the non-standard workforce: 
[tJhe majority of casual workers in the fishing industry are women. Maybe 80% are women and 20% are 
men. They are also only looking for young people ... because they can work much faster (regional organiser, 
NAFAU - 2811 011998). 
20 For example, the high quotas and overlapping of catching and spawning seasons for pilchards led to a 
drastic decline in catches from 760 000 metric tons in 1975 to 572 529 tons in 1976 and the reduction of quotas to 
200 000 tons in 1977 (Thomas 1978: 134). The rock lobster industry faces a similar threat with catches declining 
from an unsustainable 2 891 tonnes in 1981 to 328 tonnes in 1991 (Amutenya 1992:3). 
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The fishing industry is also subject to sizeable seasonal fluctuations. Hence, the ability to discard 
the bulk of its workforce during the off-season without costs of maintenance or retrenchment, and 
re-engage it again during the peak-season without excessive recruitment and training costs, is 
clearly of major importance. The bulk of the burden of seasonality and variability falls on the 
workers: 
[t]here are certain seasons for fishing and then the factories call the manual fish workers to come and work. 
They have to pack the fish in boxes, load the boxes on trucks, they have to clean the insides of the fi sh ... 
Most of the workers are casual workers in the fishing companies because [the employers] know at the end 
of the day it is easy to let them go. They just say: ' there is no more work for you any more ' (regional 
organiser, NAFAU - 27/10/1998). 
4.4.3 Construction 
The contribution of the construction industry to GDP and employment fluctuated significantly 
during the 1970s and 1980s, never reaching much more than five percent of GDP and four 
percent of total employment. Value addition in the sector was 2.3% in 1998 and 1999 (LaRRl 
2001 :54). In 1976, unskilled black workers in the construction industry could expect to receive 
around R28 in cash per month, plus their food (Cronje and Cronje 1979:59). Wages in the sector 
vary, often significantly, from job to job. The industry was sustained historically by large-scale 
infra structural projects linked in large measure to the demands of the mining industry and the 
South African military. Since most black people cannot afford fom1al residential housing in the 
urban areas, the construction sector has became increasingly dependent on public-sector spending 
for hospitals, schools, strategic roads and the like. In relation to its small population and vast 
area, Nan1ibia's physical infrastmcture is of a comparatively high standard. Although small local 
contractors have derived some benefits from these public projects, it is subsidiaries of British and 
South African firms that have appropriated the lion's share of profits . A recent drop in 
government-funded projects has been partly offset by a rise in commercial and residential 
constmction sparked by the drop in interest rates. 
Recent trends in constmction include a move toward more flexible methods of production, 
particularly that oflabour subcontracting. The latter enables finns to avoid the costs of providing 
benefits and complying with certain regulations. Although the increase in labour subcontracting 
has shifted employment towards smaller enterprises, the many of which are black-owned, it 
comes at the expense of training, health and safety, and minimum-wage protections. As the 
general secretary ofMANWU observed: 
[i]n the construction industry we face a dramatic challenge from casualisation. You find the construction 
companies are now using casual labour and some of them are using subcontract. The companies concentrate 
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on their core business and key staff like artisans and engineers. The rest of the workforce they get from the 
labour-hire companies ... Our concern is that [the employers] want to hide themselves behind the 
subcontractor because they know the subcontractor is not providing his workers with overalls or protective 
clothing or whatever. They are not even giving a pension fund for the workers. The subcontractor is also 
not paying the minimum wage (23/10/1998). 
Construction, as is well known, is a feast or famine industry that experiences regular booms and 
downward cycles, with large fluctuations in the level and composition of employment. This has 
a major impact on the employment strategies of employers. The industry'S ability to influence 
the type or level of demand is heavily dependent on external forces, especially the state. More 
coherent and transparent planning of public sector infrastructure projects is necessary to ensure 
that the construction industry has a more predictable demand for its services over the long-term. 
Without the guarantee of a steady demand for infrastructure, the few large firms that dominate 
the industry are unl ikely to be persuaded by a strategy that serves to alter the manner in which 
business has been done for many years. As the general manager of a large construction firm 
noted: 
[i]n terms of flexibility, there are not too many variables in the construction industry as a whole that you 
can actually change. Given the local conditions, with high unemployment and government really wanting 
employment and not supporting the idea of bringing in machinery, we are sort of tied down to the way in 
which we do things. Compared to international standards, there is some opposition to bringing in new 
building methods and we do not really fit that profi le of change (05/11/1998). 
The construction industry is the only economic sector in which centralised bargaining regulates 
employment conditions on an industry-wide basis. This bargaining structure was established 
primari ly as a convenient means to address the particular challenges confronting business and 
labour in the industry. On the one hand, the Construction Industry Federation (CIF) was keen to 
have fixed minimum wages to counter unfair competition in the tendering for construction 
contracts, especially from Chinese firms. On the other hand, the comparatively small size and 
limited resources of MANWU are mirrored in the low trade union density in the industry and in 
the union's inability to conclude separate collective agreements with all employers in the sector. 
As the president of the CIF noted, industry-wide bargaining in Namibia's construction industry 
essentially provides "a foundation for tender and labour costs" by ensuring that operators in the 
industry are "on the same playing field". However, he noted that the 
idea was to create rules and standards that everybody would adhere to. The pitfall is that there isn't really 
a controlling body that has the power to enforce it and make sure that people adhere to it. The contractors 
that are not members of the C1F and don't implement the minimum conditions then have the advantage ... 
We can only compete as long as the foreign companies that come into Namibia play by the same rules by 
paying taxes, by paying minimum wages, by belonging to pension funds , by paying social security for the 
workers, and by employing local people ( J810712000). 
Workplace labour regulation in the industry has become ' hollow'. Low levels of union activity 
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at site level , combined with a narrow focus on mInImum wages In centralised collective 
bargaining forums, created a regulatory vacuum in the detail of employment relationships. This 
'vacuum' does not signifY an absence of social regulation: it provides space for the development 
of semi-spontaneous and largely informal social relationships that augment and supplant price 
mechanisms (Jones 1996:124). These relationships are developed, in large measure, to coordinate 
the cascading series of subcontracting arrangements that allocate responsibility for the different 
stages or parts of a construction project. Programme deadlines also require employers to be 
highly adaptable in terms of the quality and quantity oflabour that is deployed at any given time. 
Subcontracting is an endemic feature of the industry. The reasons for thi s form of labour 
utilisation include the following: it allows the main contractor to bring in specialist trades when 
required; organisational and managerial costs are reduced; working capital becomes the 
responsibility of the subcontractor; profits can be increased by obtaining low prices through 
competitive tendering for subcontracts; subcontractors can be laid off without cost or disruption 
when work is delayed; and closer supervision can be attained, non-productive time and fixed 
labour costs minimised, and more efficient perfomlance attained (Bresnen et a11985; Gibson and 
Graham 1986; Evans and Lewis 1989). Competition in the construction industry is based largely 
of cost factors. Administrative, professional and technical staff constitute a significant fixed costs 
for the larger companies and contributes to the pressures to casualise on-site labour. The 
incentives to subcontract have also grown as the market became increasingly competitive with 
the entry of more fo reign firms. 
The government, through its expenditure on infrastructure, is the major player in the construction market 
... Fair competition is probably the most burning issue for the CIF at this point in time. Chinese companies 
get preference on the basis of some system that we do not understand one hundred percent. It is all 
speculat ion at the moment, but we have heard that they don ' t pay min imum wage and they don 't pay 
penalties on government contracts (preSident, CIF - 18/07/2000). 
Labour-only subcontractors are playing an increasingly important role in reducing the 
employment costs and risks of the main contractors. Subcontractors face less onerous obligations 
than direct employers with regard to compensation and insurance for accidents. Labour 
subcontracting also allows for tighter controls over project cost and deadlines by the larger 
contractors. Temporary employment agencies and labour brokers are increasingly performing the 
labour supply function for a hierarchical network of large and small contractors. 
There are three or four tiers of subcontractors. There are the subcontractors with whom you have a good 
working relationship because they have the same principles as the main contractor, because their price is 
good, their quality is good, and they can produce on programme. Then there are subcontractors that you 
work with on a less regular basis. Finally, you have the subcontractors that provide specialist ski lls or 
manual labourers (general manager, construction - 05/1 1/1998). 
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A few large firms dominate the market and pass the risks associated with large-scale direct 
employment in a fluctuating market on to the smaller firms who act as subcontractors in an 
informal but well-defined networks of suppliers. The division of the industry into discrete 
segments ensures that large firms do not compete directly with the smaller operators. In addition 
to the large number of casual workers in manual occupations, the large construction companies 
outsource mainly specialised work like infrastructural pipe work and other civil engineering 
projects (LaRRI 2001 :55). Foreign construction companies supply their own management and 
engineering staff, but are compelled to employ local artisans and labourers on government 
contracts, which still account for a significant part of all construction work. It has been estimated 
that foreign firms that have received government contracts subcontract 40 to 50% of their work 
to local firms. 
4.4.4 Retail 
The tertiary sector as a whole contributed 30.5% (R400 million) to GOP in 1977, compared to 
42% by mining, 13% by commercial agriculture, and 9.5% by manufacturing, construction and 
utilities (SWAPO 1981 :42). In 1995, the trade sector accounted for 6.4% of GOP and 18.3% of 
formal employment in Namibia (MoL 1997:40). The wholesale and retail sector contributed 
N$508 million to the GOP in 1998 and N$53 l million in 1999 with a value addition of 7.5% 
(LaRRI 2001 :55). Urbanised, black male shop assistants in the commercial and distributive 
trades earned from Rl70 to R240 a month, with an average ofR205 in 1973. Unskilled workers 
in this sector, most of whom were migrants, earned from R55 to R90 a month, with an average 
ofR71 (Cronje and Cronje 1979:60). The retail industry in Namibia is constrained by the lack 
of a mass market and was structured almost exclusively to cater for the affluent white urban 
population. The retail market in Namibia is further limited by low levels of household 
consumption due to unemployment, subsistence farming and recessionary conditions. The small 
and largely informal retail sector aimed at the rural poor is heavily dependent on wholesale 
supply chains, restricted to a narrow range of basic conSW11er goods, and burdened by high 
transport costs. Most urban retail outlets during the colonial era were small-scale, locally-owned 
family businesses. More recently, the retail sector is increasingly dominated by large South 
African companies such as Shoprite, Pick 'n Pay, and Game. 21 The resulting increase in 
competition is forcing local retail firms to review their organisational structures and employment 
21 On the one hand, South Africa's domestic retail market has seen little intrusion by international 
competitors 10 challenge the dominance of a few large companies. On the other hand, an important component of 
South Atrican retailers' growth strategies is a move into the rest of Atrica to capture new markets (Kenny 2003: 171). 
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practices. 
Major changes occurred from the mid-1990s onwards when Shoprite entered the Namibian market. Before 
that, there were basically just two local firms in the sector. Shoprite came into the Namibian market with 
a new perspective on trading and with an enby strategy oflow prices and quality which compelled the other 
companies to adapt in order to compete. Local companies had no option but to start revamping their stores 
... Once the issue of quality was met, the emphasis shifted back to prices again (group HR manager, retail -
01 /07/2002). 
There is no getting away from it, Namibian managers are struggling with giobalisation. Namibia is 
becoming more and more an open economy .. , One hears a lot of complaints about unfair competition. 
Companies with a very vast advantage in terms of economies of scale and so on, come in here and they 
flood the market with products which the locals can't compete with because the companies from the outside 
can afford to come in with a lower price and so on. We talk of big retail outlets, for example. It is tough. 
They are struggling and they are tlying to compensate (management consultant - 19107/2000). 
The service industry is characterised by highly unstable and fluctuating conditions of demand 
with significant changes in levels of demand between peak and non-peak times. Employment in 
the service sector has traditionally been less organised and less continuous than manufacturing 
employment. Service sector growth has generated a large number of low-paying, low-skilled jobs 
filled mainly by women and young people (Brooks 1985; Gregory 1991 ; Leonard 1992; Burgess 
1997; Ambrosini 2001). The retail sector in Namibia has more female non-standard workers than 
most other sectors: "[tJhe women that work for us are all cashiers, shop-assistants and rack-
packers in the retail sector" (manager, temporary employment agency - 14/10/1998). The amount 
of flexibility needed is a product of the degree of variance within the sector, especially the extent 
of discrepancy between labour supply and labour demand (Riley and Lockwood 1997:416). 
Employers in the retail sector face the perennial problem of long trading hours and peaks and 
troughs in labour demand." Part-time or temporary employment is an obvious choice in an 
industry where the volume of work is highly variable over time (Dombois and Osterland 
1987:229). A system of 'capacity-orientated variable working time' - aimed at creating a flexible 
and temporally variable labour supply that encompasses the majority of the workforce - is 
common in the retail sector where the volume of work is not only predictably subject to 
fluctuations depending on the time of day, but also according to individual days of the week and 
for certain periods of the year. 
The number of casual workers, especially in the retail sector, has more than doubled over the last few years. 
Once one company uses casual and labour-hire workers, then the others have to do the same ... Companies 
are developing 'core' employees - I would say between IOta 20% of the workforce - and the rest, that is 
80% of the employees, can be hired and fired on an hourly or daily basis ... To be honest, many of the 
casuals in the supennarkets are permanent casuals. They work three days a week, every week, in the same 
22 Like the retail sector, the variab ility and unsociabi lity of working hours in the hospitality industry are 
a prime motivator for non-standard employment, even in so-called 'core' functions (Riley and Lockwood 1997; 
Deery and Jago 2002). 
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shop (general secretary, NAFAU - 28/0612002). 
The top managers in Johannesburg said that we are spending more than we are getting in. We had to cut 
costs ... So, when we hire new workers, we decide whether it is a job that requires the same person to be 
there every day. If it is not, then we hire casuals. But in the deli, for example, you need people to prepare 
food every day. In the ordering department you also cannot have a different person every two or three days. 
These posts must be filled with penmanent workers. It is different with the person who packs the shelves. 
When he comes in on Mondays and Tuesdays, he knows what has to be done (store manager, retail -
06107/2002). 
Most retail firms compete for demand through extended trading hours and greater responsiveness 
to the needs of consumers. Part-time and casual workers carry the bulk of the work load after 
hours, on Sundays and public holidays. The Labour Act imposes a limit of two days per week for 
'casual' employment. To circumvent these stipulations, employers introduced rotating shifts. 
Part-time workers are treated as casual employees, rostered on different days and different hours 
from week to week. These workers have little influence over their hours and days of work, 
receive no overtime or weekend rates, have drastically reduced rest periods, and few if any 
benefits such as leave or sick pay. 'Flexibility' is largely to the benefit of employers and has little 
bearing on the needs of employees. 
We are working more hours than the penmanent staff but our salaries are much smaller than theirs ... If the 
shop is busy, then we casual workers don't even go out for lunch. As a casual worker, you are just there to 
do the work ... Although you are a cashier, you stay behind with the other casuals to clean the shop. The 
penmanents won't do that, they are going home (part-time worker - 13/0712002). 
The reason for this policy of using casual staff is the extended trading hours that we have to operate our 
stores ... When the shop is very busy, we bring in more casuals. But before we do that, we don't let the 
casuals have their tea and lunch breaks. They must just quickly swallow their food while they are busy 
working. It is better to get the casuals who are already here to work longer and harder than to bring in more 
casuals (store manager, retail - 06107/2002). 
Non-standard employment allows for a less costly, more precise and more rapid matching of staff 
numbers and daily or weekly patterns of trade. Considerable diversity in terms and conditions of 
employment is in part a reflection of the myriad of employment contracts in the sector. The drive 
for labour flexibility is shaped by "management perceptions of the advantages of simple cost 
minimization versus other considerations such as continuity of supply, and quality of output and 
customer service" (Wright and Lund 2003: 152). While quality considerations are important, cost 
factors are increasingly swaying managerial decisions. This focus on cost reduction stems not 
only from the fact that the wages of organised, permanent employees have risen considerably 
since 1990, but also from the low profit margins available in a highly concentrated market. As 
NAFAU's general secretary noted, 
[i]n the supermarkets, they use casuals and part-t imers as well as workers supplied by the labour-hire 
companies. Employers outsource these functions to labour brokers to reduce their labour costs. They say 
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this is the only way because labour costs are growing. In the big supermarkets, the casuals only earn 
between 20 to 30 dollars a day ... This casualisation has nothing to do with ' flexibility' , it is just a way to 
reduce labour costs (28/06/2002). 
New technology such as electronic point-of-sale systems and computerised inventory control 
allowed for the increasing centralisation of decision-making processes, a growing fragmentation 
of working hours, and more complex staffing arrangements to cut labour costs and increase 
flexibility (Gregory 1991; McLaughlin and Ramussen 1998; Wright and Lund 2003). This 
technology allows retailers to identifY optimum product mixes for individual stores as well as the 
turn-over of particular items based on point-of-sale information. 
With the new infonnation technologies that we use in our stores we can pick up sales every hour, we can 
pick up sales by customer, we can pick up average customers. The system provides us with essential 
information for long-term plalUling and even the number of stalT needed at a particular time. Another 
advantage is that you can go back a year and compare your current performance with the figures of last year 
... It also helps us a lot with our productivity measurements. In a store like the one here at Swakopmund, 
for every man-hour we clock, we must sell forty units. So we take the hours they have worked during a 
specific week and compare them with the number of units sold (store manager, retail- 06/0712002). 
We know exactly how many items of stock there are in the store at any time. We can also go into the system 
to find out how many bread rolls, potatoes or toilet paper we sold on a particular day ... The scalUling 
system has made the work of the cashiers much easier. It goes much quicker now, there are no mistakes in 
ringing up an amount, and it allows us to prevent shrinkage (group HR manager, retail - 0311 111998). 
These technologies also enable retailers to measure changes in the volume of work over an 
extended period and to identifY peak periods of trading more precisely. Accurate forecasts of 
demand patterns to stagger the hours of a largely part-time staff have become increasingly 
important. 
We are also looking at the way life is Changing. Today, the customer wants to get what he wants as quickly 
as possible and then get out of the store ... Most of our customers prefer to do their shopping on Saturdays 
and Sundays and to avoid busy month-end periods ... The experience we had was that between five and six 
in the afternoon there were so many customers in the store that you had long queues. By extending our 
trading hours, it gives the customer time to go home, get his wife and they can both come in to do their 
purchases. Another trend that is developing, especially among women, is that they want to watch the 
soapies like eGoli after work and then go shopping. We adjust and accommodate to the trends among the 
people, what we refer to as the ' in-thing' (group HR manager, retail- 01 107/2002). 
In an environment of increasingly comprehensive and readily available information, labour can 
be hired in discrete and discontinuous ' chunks' of time according to demand. This reduces 
unproductive, idle time and allows employers to restrict the number of full-time staff to the 
lowest levels of labour demand. Pat1-time workers tend to be concentrated in jobs (such as 
packers and cashiers) that vary directly in accordance with customer demand. The use of non-
standard employment contracts is therefore structured in terms of both a Taylorist labour 
measurement system and a system where staff numbers are essentially related to the turnover of 
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a store. 
Each store is broken down into departments that directly generate income. These are the departments that 
you need to have to run the store, like your admin and receiving guys. Each department is allocated a 
number of penn anent and casual staff members that they must have. It is down to them to ensure that, in 
line with labour legislation, they plan to have the casual staff only when the shop is very busy and not to 
use them when things are quiet. It is down to each store based on their circumstances because the market 
varies tram store to store (group HR manager, retail - 01 /0712002). 
The work carried out by non-standard employees is routine, inter-changeable and requires little 
skill or training. However, there is often no clear distinction between the activities carried out 
by permanent employees and part-time or casual workers. 
Casual workers do the same jobs that pennanent workers do. The only difference is that they have to work 
longer hours and get less pay than the permanent workers ... Some of them have been working for more 
than six years as casual workers. So, you may [md a casual worker who has been in a shop longer than some 
of its permanent workers (regional organiser, NAFAU - 03 /07/2002). 
The casuals do all types of work - some are cashiers, others are packers or cleaners. The permanent workers 
do the same jobs, but at the moment we only have one permanent cashier and a few permanent packers 
(store manager, retail- 0910712002). 
The major retail outlets in Namibia have adopted remarkably similar strategies of labour 
flexibility. The convergence in employment practices of large grocery retailers in different 
countries, according to Gregory (1991:510), is in large measure attributable "to intra-industry 
factors, which suggest in themselves some common logic of industrialism". In addition to the 
conunon reliance on a large casual workforce, all the major retail outlets have outsourced their 
cleaning, security and maintenance functions. Of course, the casualisation of employment is 
merely one strategy for lowering operating costs in a sector characterised by tight profit margins. 
However, given the low levels oflocally sourced inputs and the established distribution chains 
of South African firms, it is more difficult for retai lers in Namibia to restructure their supply 
networks, impose quality criteria on their suppliers, reduce inventories, and shift the risks of 
inventory maintenance on to manufacturers and distributors. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
In some respects, the outsourcing and casuali sation of employment in Namibia reflect an 
intensification of pre-existing practices and the expansion of those industries that have always 
depended on a non-standard workforce. Surface manifestations of flexibility and fragmentation 
may therefore reflect underlying processes of integration and centralisation. There has not been 
a complete shift in work organisation as postulated by flexibility theorists, but rather a new 
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direction of change confined to certain industries and occupations. Here we emphasised the 
different motivations for and routes to employment flexibility as well as the importance of the 
context in which these measures are introduced. In contrast to an 'offensive' flexibility which 
aims to compete on the basis of high quality and skills, the ' defensive' flexibility pursued by 
many Namibian employers serves to reinforce the low-wage, low-skill route to competitiveness. 
The gains in economic efficiency related to the rise in non-standard employment have come 
largely at the expense of social equity. The essence of the regulatory dilemmas confronting 
flexible accumulation is countering the socially destructive effects of economic competition. 
Labour regulation has to adapt to changes in the production system if it is to remain effective, 
while the impact of changes in industrial organisation are decisively influenced by the prevailing 
systems of labour regulation. The capacity of regulatory mechanisms to absorb the effects of 
change in a manner compatible with higher growth rates is limited: the efficacy of organisations 
lies entirely in the stabi lity of their internal rules. That is, the institutionalised compromises 
between the capital and labour only reduce uncertainty by virtue of their rigidity. But this allows 
them limited scope to respond to variations in the conditions governing the accumulation of 
capital. In other words, labour regulation forecloses certain options while allowing others. The 
goal of a capitalist enterprise is not to transform employment relations, but rather to remain 
competitive. If that goal can be achieved within the parameters of existing institutions, they are 
not likely to be altered. "Historically consolidated institutional arrangements create systems of 
vested interest, a heritage of assumptions, practices, and familiar relationships, which sustain a 
bias to stability" (Hyman I 994c:20). It is only when labour market institutions became 
intolerable 'fetters ' to the regulation of capital accumulation that they are likely to be drastically 
altered. The socially embedded nature of these institutions also suggests that the pace and 
direction of changes will be path-dependent and conditioned by historical factors . This rules out 
any monocausal or unilinear conception of capitalist restructuring. 
The interaction between product market conditions and technical and organisational factors shape 
the demand for non-standard employment across industries and occupations. Non-standard 
employment is internally differentiated in accordance with the structures of the technical and 
social divisions of labour within which they produce value. The extent and nature of non-
standard employment depend on the balance of class forces and the specific material conditions 
of production. As such, it will vary between industries, countries and over time. If technological 
and organisational changes affect industries to varying degrees and at different times, it is 
reasonable to expect that the demand for the various forms of non-standard labour would be 
uneven and sectorally specific. Since certain industries may be more inclined to rely on non-
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standard labour, it is important to unravel the different motivations and benefits behind such 
decisions. The use of external sources of labour or 'distancing' involves the severing of direct 
employment links with the worker. Numerical flexibility sustained by subcontracting may be 
performing a basic regulatory function in mobilising a job-ready supply of workers by 
transferring the costs and risks associated with non-standard employment onto the workers 
themselves. It also lowers labour costs by limiting the application of statutory minimum 
conditions. For management, there is little obvious return to paying high wages to workers whose 
jobs can be easily monitored, are easily replaced and/or perform work that is peripheral to the 
flffil'S main objectives. Finally, non-standard employment matches labour supply to demand in 
a way that eliminates idle time and labour shortages, especially in the lower reaches of the labour 
market. 
In the long-term, an increasing reliance on cheap and precarious labour can become a serious 
obstacle to economic recovery and may inhibit the introduction of more productive technologies, 
ilillovative work practices, and the provision of training (Tailby and Whitston 1989; Sayer and 
Walker 1992; Zeytinoglu 1994; Crouch 1998; Heery and Salmon 2000b). As we shall see in 
chapter 6, the casualisation of employment incurs its own penalties in the form of some loss of 
control, reliability, potential conflicts between non-standard and permanent employees, and 
problems in maintaining quality and co-ordination. There are also numerous (often hidden) 
transaction costs associated with the monitoring and enforcement ofNERs. These problems of 
commitment, quality and so on have encouraged some firms to do away with casual and 
temporary work and revert to more stable patterns of employment. It is therefore misleading to 
assume that the trends towards employment flexibility are linear or unidirectional and without 
limits or contradictions. As the HR manager of a meat processing factory noted, 
[t]he numbers of temporary and casual staff have actually decreased over the last few years. In the past 
there was inadequate planning and forecasting of HR needs which allowed people to take leave when 
demand is high and so on. Now each department is responsible for planning their HR needs more carefully 
... We also had numerous problems with the workers in some of the departments, such as transport, that 
were outsourced (04 /07/2002). 
The shortcomings in flexibility theories highlight the need to explore the impact of restructuring 
on work and employment in the context of given product and labour markets . The central 
concepts of 'core' and 'periphery' in the debates surrounding labour market flexibility need to 
be re-examined and more closely linked to the dynamics of a particular mechanisation regime 
and prevailing labour market conditions. As a dualistic employment model, the ' flexible firm ' 
rests on questionable assumptions and muddled influences, and has acquired more sway than its 
precarious base warrants. It should be jettisoned in favour of 
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a clear, historically informed sectoral analysis which highl ights both continuity and the key sites of change, 
elaborates the complex relationships between employment structure, employment law and the employment 
relat ion, recognises that there is more to management than the control of cheap, flexible labour and does 
not attempt to reduce the uneven and complex nature of evidence into a single mould (Pollert 1988:311). 
Assertions to the effect that we are witnessing a universal trend towards ' flexible' employment 
shed little light on the variety of different forms of non-standard labour, their uses, levels of 
autonomy, and so on. The presence of unskilled subcontracted labourers in a 'core' industry, the 
employment of skilled subcontracted workers through a 'peripheral' firm, and casual workers 
performing core functions alongside permanent employees all raise intractable problems for the 
dualistic core-periphery model. Labour is increasingly segmented, not only in terms of high-wage 
and low-wage economic sectors, but also along the lines of standard and non-standard 
employment. The latter division is overlaid by a further stratification between the skilled and less 
skilled, permanent and casual. This growing plurality of employment relationships poses a 
pressing challenge to redefine the standard employment relationship and to incorporate NERs 
within the framework of statutory and collective regulation. 
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5 
AN IMPOSED CONTRACTUALISM: 
MANAGEMENT, THE POLITICS OF 
PRODUCTION, AND THE NON-STANDARD 
WORKFORCE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
A hallmark of workplace restructuring over the last two decades was the continuing efforts of 
managers at loosening the restrictions on the use oflabour and deepening the divisions between 
different sectors of the workforce. These processes of restructuring do not so much affect the 
number of employees working for a firm as change the type of employee required and increase 
the differentials in the rewards of employment. The proliferation of non-standard work and the 
associated differentiation in employment conditions challenge many traditional conceptions of 
authority structures and systems of work organisation. The bulk of the literature on human 
resource (HR) management is premised on assumptions of standard employment. As such, it 
provides few insights into the regulation of non-standard employment. Yet it is largely employer 
needs rather than employee preferences that determine the extent and distribution of' flexible ' 
working patterns. Management is the principal actor in industrial relations and the employment . 
strategies that it pursues are among the most influential factors shaping the institutional 
framework of the labour market. These strategies, as Rubery and Wilkinson (1994:33) argue, 
"create the rules, norms and structures which shape wage, job, and promotion opportunities in 
both the internal and external labour market and through which individuals progress, enhancing 
or diminishing their labour-market credentials". The search for labour market ' flexibility ' is in 
large part an attempt to selectively dismantle or restrict some of these rules, norms and structures 
in a manner that enhances managerial authority over the use and deployment of labour. That is, 
the nature and incidence of non-standard employment will tend to reflect the costs and constraints 
imposed on management by the prevailing systems of labour regulation. 'Flexibility' in the 
labour market is therefore as much a political as an economic process in the sense that it will 
invariably generate losers as well as winners. 
The literature on employment 'flexibility' has re-introduced the idea of convergence in industrial 
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organisation and labour policies. A convergence in managerial practice is said to arise from the 
growing significance of multinational corporations, the free movement of capital, the transfer of 
technology, and the compulsion to follow 'best practice '. Despite the pressures to conform to a 
single model, the reality is increasing diversity with considerable variation in managerial 
approaches and employment policies (Valverde el at 1997; Horwitz el al 1998; Felstead and 
Jewson 1999a; Heery and Salmon 2000a; Cook 2002). The wide divergence in working practices 
and the management of labour across occupations, industries and regions reflects the social 
embeddedness of the employment relationship. Labour regulation, as we emphasised above, is 
a conjuncturally-specific phenomenon that only coalesces under certain spatio-temporal 
conditions. In fact, given the social nature and institutional dependence of its production and 
reproduction, "labor is the most placebound of the ' factors of production '" (Peck 1996:148). 
Changes in the mechanisms through which labour is incorporated, allocated, controlled and 
reproduced are always partial, contested and highly context-dependent. As Gallie and White 
(1994: 107) point out, current restructuring is characterised by slow and cautious changes on a 
trail-and-error basis; a limited and discontinuous search for new employment strategies; a status 
quo bias in the need to maintain worker commitment and legitimate managerial authority; and 
an ad hoc and piecemeal renewal of policies in response to specific pressures. Managements' 
attempts at restructuring the workplace are therefore far less universal, uniform and purposeful 
than implied by the perspectives on ' flexibility'. 
To adequately understand the management of a capitalist enterprise we need to be sensitive to 
its contradictory, multi-layered and multiply-determined character. Converting the potentiality 
of labour power into actual, productive labour is not a zero-sum ganle in which workers gain 
what managers lose and vice versa, but rather a dilemma at the heart oflabour regulation. The 
open-ended, indeterminate nature of the employment relationship means that management needs 
to simultaneously secure its authority over workers and gain their cooperation and consent. In 
other words, labour is both required and resisted by capital. Labour regulation does not revolve 
simply around managerial control and worker resistance, but rather involves the more complex 
and intractable problem of dissent and accol1unodation, conflict and cooperation (Burawoy 1985; 
Edwards 1986; Cohen 1991). The control-autonomy dialectic suggests that the attempts by 
employers to 'solve' the problem of order in the workplace will exacerbate the problem of 
consent and vice versa. As a result, structural breakdown and spontaneous disorder is as likely 
an outcome of regulatory processes as spontaneous order and structural integration (Sayer 
1995:141). Changes in the management of the workplace should therefore not be seen in terms 
of an optimal path chosen from a range of equally accessible altematives. A system of regulation 
takes on the character of a trial-and-error process in which each trial changes the environment 
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for the next, so that 'successful' strategies depend not only on their intrinsic qualities, but on 
when and where they are implemented. To be sure, regulatory change is largely path-dependent 
and geographically-specific constraints may restrict developments along particular paths for long 
periods of time. This implies that the politics of production 
need to be set within the larger frame of labor markets and broader processes of social reproduction. People 
in different labor market or national contexts will practice production politics differently. Employers and 
workers use the conditions in the labor market and in the larger community and society as a way of 
influencing life within the workplace. This wider relationship between workers and employers is the 
employment relation, and it is only in the context of employment relations that real demands for labor are 
defined and supplies of labor produced (Storper and Walker 1989: 166). 
Our knowledge of the ways in which non-standard employment relationships (NERs) are 
regulated is extremely limited and has received scant attention in the ' flexibility ' debates. 
Underlying the notion of convergence in the flexible-firm model is the assumption that managers 
act strategically, with external pressures leading directly to clear and largely uniform courses of 
action. That is, management strategies are always comprehensive, purposeful and successful. 
These views rest on the voluntaristic fallacy that anyone can do anything in any context. A 
rejection of voluntarism raises the need to inquire what it is about a certain situation that gives 
rise to particular outcomes. In this chapter, we will consider the ways in which employers shape 
the wage-effort bargain of non-standard employees. Since most typologies of managerial 
strategies are premised on the standard employment relationship (SER), they cannot fully account 
for the distinct amalgam of regulatory mechanisms involved in the management of non-standard 
employment. First, we evaluate the extent to which the use of non-standard employment 
contracts is part of a general, coherent and strategic plan on the part of employers. Whether or 
not employers act strategically in their deployment of non-standard labour is judged in terms of 
the extent to which they pursue a 'core-periphery' strategy, as suggested by the flexib le-firm 
model. Second, we highlight the pivotal role of the law of contract in the management of non-
standard employment. The distinction between standard and non-standard employment pivots 
on the relative balance between market-mediated and bureaucratically-governed modes of labour 
regulation. Next, we consider the terms and conditions of employment of non-standard 
employees. Many temporary and part-time workers in Namibia obtain work in the context of 
unspecified terms and conditions of employment. This regulatory 'vacuum' grants employers an 
almost unbridled capacity to construct the detail of NERs. Finally, we show how changes in 
employment practices and the organisation of work are filtered through discrete occupational 
structures. Shifts in the fOIms of employment have not only been highly uneven across industries, 
but have also been assimilated into pre-existing patterns of occupational segregation within 
industries. 
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S.2 THE MANAGEMENT OF NON-STANDARD EMPLOYMENT: A RETURN TO 
'MASTER AND SERVANT'? 
\. The 'labour problem' at the heart of any mode of regulation - i.e. the conversion oflabour power 
into actual labour - is effectively suspended from analysis by the proponents of employment 
' flexibility ' . Every workplace must solve this implacable dilemma through the negotiation of 
order between employers and employees. J That is, employers require the cooperation of their 
employees, but this need has to be tempered by the demands of profitability and the requirements 
of general or overall direction of the labour process. Flexibility approaches tend to assume that 
employers always act strategically and have at their disposal the managerial techniques and 
resources necessary to elicit the required levels of performance from their workforce. This 
implies that employers have a unique insight into the implications of their decisions and largely 
rules out the possibi lity of unintended and unanticipated consequences. In reality, however, 
labour management issues are dealt with under conditions of deep uncertainty, creating an important gap 
between intent and outcome in actual managerial practice. In this sense, labour management is an ongoing 
process, involving frequent surprise and disappointment. Thus, it cannot always be assumed that the actions 
taken by capitalist emp loyers are in any meaningful sense the 'best' ones, or more importantly, wi ll yield 
the same results, regardless of when and where they are taken (Spencer 2000:555). 
Implicit in much of the thinking underlying flexible accumulation and its total ising production 
concepts is the fallacy that there exists 'one best way' in which to manage the workplace. This 
emphasis on 'best practice', Pollert (1991 b:30) suggests, is evidence that "beneath the surface 
of certainty and assertiveness lie disorientation and a desperate search for panaceas". The 
effectiveness of an enterprise depends on the contingent amalgamation of a whole myriad of 
mediating processes that include managerial style, job demarcation and coordination, the 
distribution of information, the encouragement of learning and innovation, and the motivation 
of employees. In the workplace, managerial practices find a number of distinct compromises 
depending on the differences between and within established national work systems and their 
associated regulatory institutions (Whitley and Kristensen 1997). An analysis of the structural 
and normative context that makes management possible will allow us to move beyond the vague 
notion of 'context' and to highlight the social construction and institutional mediation of the 
management function. This wider societal and cultural milieu in which systems of labour 
regulation are embedded is so varied that a search for universal models of management is 
destined to end in disappointment. New forms of labour flexibility, according to Peck 
! This 'problem' is, of course, manifested in different forms: interruptions to production, deterioration of 
quali ty, absentee ism, labour turn-over, a lack of commitment and cooperation, trade union militancy. and so all. 
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(1996:136), 
are associated with new forms of labor control, new fonns of labor exploitation and, by implication, new 
forms of gender and racial exploitation. Again, because these processes are socially constructed, they tend 
to vary in character and intensity from one place to another ... reflecting the diverse economic histories, 
regulatory structures, and social conditions. 
The flexible-firm model suggests that the move to greater numerical flexibility was primarily 
related to changes in the technological and market conditions confronting employers. Rubery 
(1994) shows that these strategies could equally well be interpreted as opportunistic responses 
to high levels of unemployment. The conceptions of managerial strategy and workplace control 
that inform the notion of a 'flexible firm' tend to neglect the complex and contingent ways in 
which order is actually negotiated under specific conditions. Changes within the workplace must 
be related to internal as well as external opportunities and constraints as mediated through the 
impact of prevailing organisational structures and regulatory regimes. While managers face the 
general problem of converting the purchase of labour power as a commodity into actual work 
performance, their responses are shaped by the particular circumstances in which they find 
themselves. As Edwards (1986:41) argues, 
[f]inns will develop their practices of labour control with whatever materials they have available. They are 
unlikely to have explicit strategies and more likely to react to particular circumstances as best they can. 
Even when they have fairly clear goals they are unlikely to follow a policy which conforms to an ideal-type: 
they will proceed according to their own needs. In particular, they are likely to use a variety of means of 
controlling the labour process and tying workers to the timl. 
A rise in the incidence of non-standard employment is seldom the product of a qualitative change 
in employment policies. Rather, it appears to be the result of an intensification of existing 
practices; a reaction to unfavourable economic conditions; the exploitation of inconsistencies and 
silences in the prevailing patterns of statutory and collective regulation; and an expansion of 
those industries that have always relied on a 'peripheral ' or 'marginal' workforce. The 
proliferation of non-standard work and the associated differentiation in employment conditions 
challenge many traditional conceptions of authority structures and systems of work organisation. 
The management of non-standard employees involves an amalgam of regulatory mechanisms that 
do not readily fit into the typologies of managerial strategies that have been put forward (Fox 
1974; Friedman 1977; Edwards 1979; Purcell and Sisson 1983). The negotiation of order and 
institutionalisation of the wage-effort bargain - even in workplaces that lack formal and collective 
procedures - are far more complex and contradictory than is often assumed (Ram 1991; Moulle 
1998; Harris 2002) . As Edwards (1986:41) correctly notes, for management to rely "solely on 
arbitrary power or technology or rules would be a very limited and dangerous approach". Even 
'simple' or 'direct' control is far from rudimentary or unmediated. 
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5.2.1 Managerial Strategy, Labour Regulation, and Taxonomies of Control 
Management strategy, in its broadest sense, is fast becoming a central focus of industrial 
relations. To warrant the label 'strategic' managerial actions must be deliberate, coherent, 
ubiquitous, integrative, pro-active, consistent and long term. The extent to which managers act 
in a strategic manner is an empirical question. In a wide-ranging study, Marginson et al (1988: 1 0) 
note that "it is a moot point whether it is appropriate to dignify management's approach to 
industrial relations with the adjective 'strategic"'. Research shows that management practices are 
generally "opportunistic, habitual, tactical, reactive, frenetic, ad hoc, brief, fragmented and 
concerned with fixing" (Thompson and McHugh 1990: 137). Management's labour strategies "are 
not calculated; they are struggled over" and these struggles mobilise particular political resources 
and capacities, are constrained by different sets of political and economic forces, and regulated 
in contrasting ways (Peck 1996: 138). There is no 'one best way' to manage these conflicts, "only 
different routes to partial failure" (Hyman 1987:30). Managerial strategy is thus best 
conceptualised as "the pragmatiC choice among alternatives none of which can prove 
satisfactory" (Hyman 1987:30). This view clearly contradicts the notion that employers have an 
overall and consistent approach to the management of industrial relations. 
Achieving and maintaining a balance between efficiency and equity in the workplace depends 
less upon the relatively simple task of meeting employees ' comparative wage aspirations, than 
on the endlessly demanding one of "creating and maintaining the institutional forms that will 
maximise their willingness to work efficiently" (Brown and Nolan 1988:353). The productivity 
of labour is shaped by both the objective combination of the various factors of production and 
the subjective mobilisation of consent and cooperation. A coherent analytical framework to 
explain managerial behaviour requires a rejection of approaches that view management simply 
as a conduit of market forces , an agent of capital or a wilful contingency. There is a pervasive 
tendency in the literature to view managers as "unproblematic agents of capital who dispatch 
their ' global functions' in a rationalistic manner" (Storey 1985: 195). Understanding the 
conditioning effects of structural relations over managerial behaviour has not been greatly 
assisted by the current penchant for models of 'strategic choice'. In Namibia, as we noted above, 
the rise in precarious forms of employment is more strongly associated with structural features 
of the economy (such as unemployment, poverty and the impact of labour market institutions), 
strong demand or high turn-over in the local labour market than with any particular policy 
innovation (such as employment' flexibility') on the part of employers. Tlus is partly manifested 
in the high degree of susceptibil ity by temporary employment agencies to business cycles 
(demand) and labour market conditions (supply). 
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A notion implicit in the flexible-finn model is that employers are acting in a more strategic 
manner in developing fundamentally new staffing policies. Research in different contexts shows 
that the use of non-standard employment contracts is very seldom part of a long-term, coherent 
and strategic plan on the part of employers.' In fact, Hunter et al (1993 :40 1) found "an absence 
of strategy for labour use, and much more concern about survival and opportunistic cost-saving". 
Managerial decisions about employment contracts, staffing levels and recruitment are largely ad 
hoc, tentative and based on the perceived benefits and drawbacks of each type of employment. 
The SER remains the default position injobs where there are no clear or immediate advantages 
to using non-standard employees. 
A lot of the things, like outsourcing, are dealt with as they come up. Our policies are flexible. It all depends 
on the situation and how it would affect production. Every problem that arises is looked at separately (HR 
manager, clothing manufacturer - 0911111998). 
It is impossible to say whether we will use more or less casual and labour-hire workers in the future . They 
are brought in as we need them. It changes from one day to the next ... There is no plan that says we must 
use so many casuals this month and so many next month. It depends on the circumstances at the time (HR 
manager, electrical engineering - 0110712002). 
Few employers have a clearly articulated strategy on the use of different types of employment 
contracts and their reasons for using non-standard workers reflect a response to particular 
contingencies and a reliance on specific opportunities as they arise. In Namibia, temporary and 
part-time workers are used to cover for the absence of pennanent employees, to carry out 
irregular or short-tenn tasks, to reduce costs and economic risks, and to match labour supply and 
demand. 'Flexibility' was very rarely cited as a reason. This predominance of 'traditional' 
reasons for using NERs does not suggest a substantive shift in managements' employment 
strategies - it is more indicative of a reorientation of traditional approaches to the incorporation, 
allocation and control of labour. As we saw in chapter 2, Namibian managers have historically 
evaded responsibility for labour regulation through strategies that depend on intennediaries such 
traditional leaders, private contractors and government agencies. 
Whether or not employers act strategically in their deployment of non-standard labour is perhaps 
best judged in tenns of the extent to which they pursue a 'core-periphery' strategy, as suggested 
by the flexible-finn model. The stated goal of this model is an expanded market regulation in 
which new patterns of management emphasise the identification of core competencies and the 
use of contractual relationships to provide all services falling outside the ambit of this narrow set 
2 See: Towers (1987); Poller! (1988); Hakim (1990b); Casey (1991); Anderson ef al (1994); Rubery and 
Wilkinson (1994); Legge (1995); Burgess (1997); Storey (1997); Valverde ef al (1997); Nollen and Axel (1998); 
and Robinson (1999). 
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of functions. According to Linder et al (2002:23), firms are increasingly using outsourcing not 
only to "off-load non-core activities and reduce costs", but also to "gain access to competitive 
skills, improve service levels and increase their ability to respond to changing business needs". 
More 'flexible' outsourcing - based on trust and partnership - is seen as a driving force in 
business transformation and as vital in gaining a competitive advantage and increasing efficiency 
(Cross 1985; Upton 1994; Ghausi 2002; Shy and Stenbacka 2003). Increased global competition, 
the move to leaner organisational structures, the growing importance of niche markets and 
specialisation, and the search for greater flexibi lity are presented as the prime determinants of 
the upsurge in outsourcing. A more strategic use of outsourcing, it is argued, leads to greater 
efficiency and quality, a strengthening of the firm's core functions and increased specialisation, 
better utilisation of new technologies, and cost discipline. These conceptions of outsourcing as 
mutually beneficial are closely associated with the view that "the individual has benefited from 
flexible employment arrangements, particularly in terms of allowing greater time with the 
family" (Kakabadse and Kakabadse 2002: 194). Non-standard employment in Namibia, as we 
shall see below, rarely corresponds to this optimistic 'best-practice ' scenario.' 
Tasks demanding higher skill levels and necessitating greater autonomy are assigned to 
permanent employees over whom hegemonic rule is enforced, strengthened by high wages and 
comprehensive extra-wage benefits. Employers seeking to fill stable, well-paid primary sector 
jobs - in which training and induction costs are usually high - are at pains to ensure that turn-over 
risks are minimised. The division between 'core' and 'peripheral' workers, it is argued, gives 
employers an additional measure of flexibility in that they can apply different strategies to 
different sectors of the workforce. This ' regulatory flexibility' stems from the strategies of 
inclusion exercised over a functionally flexible core (e.g. bureaucratic control, internal labour 
market) and the strategies of exclusion exercised over a numerically flexible periphery (e.g. 
market control, external labour market). From being a cause for concern, the co-existence of a 
high-wage, high-protection and a low-wage, low-protection workforce is now celebrated as a 
source of renewal: 
in today 's volatile business environment, executives are called on to change their operating models much 
more frequently than ever before. More often than not, they do not have all the skills and capabi lities that 
they need to succeed at the new game. Companies that have fallen behind should consider using business 
transformation outsourcing to regain their lead (Linder et 012002:28). 
3 An extensive survey of employment practices in New Zealand also found that the picture that emerged 
from the fmdings was not one of innovative working practices that benefitted employer and employee alike. Rather, 
the most common 'f1ex ibilities' involved "crude methods of reducing labour costs such as retrenclunents and 
reducing hours of work" (Anderson et 0/1994:502). 
265 
Any attempt to understand labour market segmentation in terms of a general theory of 'core' and 
'peripheral' workers "veils rather than illuminates the distinctive pattern of employment 
disadvantage associated with specific non-standard contract statuses" (Gallie et at 1998: 185). 
The core-periphery model is basically a modified version of the dual labour market theory. Both 
assume that labour market segmentation can be encapsulated in dichotomous terms. Such broad 
generalisations may be useful in presenting extremes in the employment profile, but are unable 
to concretely specifY intermediate forms of employment. As labour market categories, concepts 
such as 'core' and 'periphery' fail to fit any general definition. For example, research by Hunter 
et at (1993 :398) shows that managers interpreted the concepts of 'core ' and 'periphery' in 
different ways: 
as the nature of the contract of employment, the conditions of service associated with it, the status of the 
job or of the worker perfonning it, and as whether the tasks comprising a job were a main activity of the 
workplace or ancillary ... [The] dimensions of the employment contract used to ascribe workers to the 
'periphery' are in fact conceptually - and often empirically - quite distinct. 
There is a distinct danger in dislocating changes in production from their national and regional 
contexts through a process of abstract theorising. Rojot argues that the attempt to impose "a logic 
of flexibility" on industrial change rests on the false belief that "apparently identical elements 
(subcontracting, overtime, short-term contract, etc.) of different industrial relations systems can 
... be treated as similar and comparable outside their national social context and thus subject to 
similar interpretations" (cited in Pollert 1991 b:8). The core-periphery framework is inserted into 
flexibility theories in a manner that obliterates both crucial and more subtle variations in 
employment practices. As we saw in the previous chapter, non-standard workers are employed 
alongside permanent employees in most economic sectors in Namibia. However, there are 
significant variations in the duration, form and content of their employment relationships across 
the various industries. The managers that were interviewed indicated that the number of non-
standard workers that they take on and the duration of their employment vary greatly: as few as 
one to as many as several hundred workers were employed on non-standard contracts ranging in 
duration from a few hours to as long as several years. 
In certain sectors, such as retail and hospitality, non-standard workers make up the majority of 
the workforce and are absolutely central to the operations of the firms in which they are 
employed. The social construction of non-standard employment suggests that these workers may 
be regarded by management and (on occasions) by the trade union as 'peripheral ' irrespective of 
the centrality of their work to the enterprise. In addition to sectoral variations, levels of 
organisation and skill , and the impact of regulatory institutions in the labour market also have 
an important bearing on the internal differentiation of non-standard employment on lines other 
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than core versus periphery. The debates on the demarcation of labour market segments can be 
most fruitfully conducted at a more concrete level of analysis. This would reveal that labour 
market boundaries by and large preclude abstract, universal definitions: they are temporally and 
spatially determined, integrated into the cycles of economic activity, and contingent on a host of 
other factors. 
The available evidence provides little support for the contention that employers are explicitly 
adopting a core-periphery employment strategy (Hakim 1990b; Casey 1991 ; Marginson 1991). 
Dale and Bamford (1988:31) argue that it is "hard to make clear cut divisions into 'core' and 
'periphery'" and suggest that the various categories of so-called ' flexible' labour should be 
ranged along a continuum from full-time permanent employees to part-time temporary employees 
in accordance with the extent of their "peripherality". Workplace restructuring is generally 
understood and justified by employers in terms of conventional staff-planning principles and not 
in grand terms of new ' flexible' strategies. As the study of Nichols and Beynon (1977) among 
others demonstrates, most enterprises 'muddle through' most of the time. In other words, actual 
changes in employment practices have been less dramatic or proceeded more hesitantly than the 
ideology of ' flexibility ' suggests. Although he understates its impact on permanent employment, 
the manager of a temporary employment agency clearly highlights the continuity of temporary 
staffing arrangements: 
[w]e haven't taken any jobs out of the hands of pennanent workers. The work that is there has always been 
there. What we have done is to take over the cl ient's own temporary workers or casuals. Everybody uses 
casual workers and, as [ have said, the guy does not get paid his overtime or his Sunday work. The network, 
I think, is perhaps getting a bit small and the companies know they are going to get into trouble. That is why 
they switch over to us (10107/2002). 
The flexible-firm model not only exaggerates the strategic dimensions of managerial practice, 
but also hinges on a rather simplistic dichotomy (internal versus external) in management's 
strategies of labour control. As such, it provides few insights into the amalgam of regulatory 
mechanisms utilised by employers to incorporate, allocate and control labour in different 
employment relationships. Likewise, in its search for all-embracing categories, the labour process 
approach also tends to underestimate the "tremendous variations" in how "detailed control" of 
work is exercised (Thompson and McHugh 1990:147). Braverman's (1974) seminal work has 
been widely criticised for neglecting the impact of worker resistance; creating an impression of 
management as unduly unified and rational; conceptualising the evolution of managerial control 
in a deterministic and unilinear fashion; failing to locate managerial control in concrete historical 
circumstances; and dislocating control at the point of production from wider social, political and 
ideological relations (Friedman 1977; Edwards 1979; Littler 1982; Storey 1983). What must be 
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retained fi'om his analysis, however, is a rejection of the view of the employment relationship as 
merely an exchange relationship, as primarily a site of bargaining rather than of exploitation. 
Labour regulation is not simply about the struggle for control, but about valorisation (i.e. the 
realisation of surplus value) . Wood and Kelly (1982) convincingly argue that many of 
Braverman's critics have situated an ill-defined and unsubstantiated notion of 'control ' at centre 
of the labour process.' In so doing, they have obscured Marx's (1 967) insistence that valorisation 
is the central operative principle of both the circuits of capital and the politics of class struggle. 
Control is, of course, necessary for valorisation. 
The excessive preoccupation in much of the labour process debates with the substantive issue of 
control " renders this perspective incapable offocusing on causal powers of management other 
than control, and gives it a detemlinistic character" (Tsoukas 2000:38). For Tsoukas (2000:41 ), 
management in a market economy is "a sedimented structure" that is vested with the following 
set of causal powers. First, the ability to control the transformation of labour power of 
subordinates into actual labour given the indeterminacy of labour potential. Second, the ability 
to elicit active cooperation from employees through the provision of material and symbolic 
rewards. The need for such cooperation stems from the fact that "no system of regulation is 
comprehensive enough to achieve complete control over the system to be regulated" (2000:39). 
In other words, labour power must always in part be self-regulating. Third, in the context of 
competitive product markets and scarcity of resources, managers are organisationally imbued 
with a drive towards efficiency and effectiveness. The effects generated through the exercise of 
these contradictory powers are contingent on prevailing conditions at the enterprise, sectoral and 
societal levels. Different configurations of product and labour market pressures are therefore 
likely to give rise to distinctive strategies for regulating the employment relationship. 
Following Burawoy (1985:87), the dynamics of workplace restructuring can be conceptualised 
in terms of changes in the political apparatuses of production - i.e. "the institutions that regulate 
and shape struggles in the workplace". The most primitive form of labour regulation identified 
by Burawoy - market despotism - describes a situation in which workers are wholly dependent 
upon wage-labour for subsistence and are, as a result, exposed to both the economic whip of the 
market and the autocratic discipline of the capitalist. Despotic regimes were progressively, albeit 
unevenly, superseded by hegemonic regimes in which various forms of state intervention 
, In the studies of the labour process that followed the publication of Braverman 's Labor and Monopoly 
Capitalism, as Sayer ( 1995:216) notes, "one could be forgiven for imagini ng that the point of producing cars or 
whatever (usually cars!) was a means towards the goal of dominating labour rather than as a way of meeting the 
demand for cars". 
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ruptured the direct link between the reproduction of labour power and wage-labour. The 
development of employment legislation and the evolution of welfare systems partially separated 
the processes of production and reproduction: employees were no longer absolutely dependent 
on waged employment for their livelihoods nor were they absolutely vulnerable to the arbitrary 
despotism of employers. While coercion was the predominant form of labour regulation under 
market despotism; politically-mediated consent has come to prevail under the currently dominant 
labour regime, hegemonic despotism, in which the bargaining power of employers is enhanced 
by virtue of "collective labour's vulnerability to [capital's] national and international mobility" 
(1985:127). 
By reducing production to the question of management 's control over its employees, the labour 
process debates have tended to underestimate the complex and uneven development of the 
political apparatuses involved in the regulation of capitalist accumulation. In Burawoy's 
approach, by contrast, there is no simple and uniform transition from one factory regime to the 
next. The institutional forms of hegemonic regimes vary widely across time and space, ruling out 
a simplistic periodisation. For example, he identifies a "peripheralization of the core", in which 
some 
[a]dyanced capitalist states haye responded [to increased competition] by carYing out arenas in which 
labour is stripped of the powers embodied in hegemonic regimes. The urban enterprise zone is one such 
attempt to return restricted areas to the nineteenth century through the withdrawal of labour protection and 
the abrogation of minimum wage laws, health and safety regulations, and national labour re lations 
legislation ( 1985: 149). 
Classifying managerial strategies, as a first approximation, in terms of the relative balance 
between market-mediated and bureaucratically-governed modes of labour regulation allows us 
to establish a link between the nature of the employment relationship and the mode of regulation 
involved in its reproduction. As we saw in chapter I, Streeck (1992) analyses the recent shifts 
in work organisation and employment strategies in terms of changes in the balance between 
status and contract within a particular system oflabour regulation. Similarly, Williamson (1985) 
considers the relative efficiency of completing a transaction in a market relationship (regulated 
by contract) or within an organisational relationship (regulated by bureaucratic mechanisms). 
Completing transactions within an organisation means that the coercive power of the contract 
must be replaced by a whole range of control systems if performance is still to be regulated. 
Setting up and maintaining such systems of control involve numerous costs that can be 
significantly reduced by utilising market relationships. Williamson's analysis can be usefully 
deployed to show that control systems vary depending on how heavily the employment 
relationship leans towards a market relationship or an organisational relationship. For example, 
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the more company-specific the qualifications of an employee and the more difficult it is to 
measure hislher performance, the more bureaucratic the control system is likely to be, 
incorporating promotion ladders, bonus schemes, and the like. If the employee's qualifications 
are not company-specific and hislher performance can be easily measured, there will be little 
impetus to convert an essentially market-based relationship into an essentially organisationally-
based one. This is best exemplified by the unski lled casual labourer, hired on a day-to-day basis. 
In contrast to the clUde, dualistic conception of managerial strategy that informs the flexible-firm 
model, the distinction between contract- and status-enhancing strategies suggests a continuum 
of possibilities that is multiply determined. 
The typologies of managerial strategies in industrial relations based on ideal-types are rarely, if 
ever, observed in practice in their 'pure' fOlm. As Hakim (1990b:167) shows, employers rely on 
a blend of industrial relations policies with few sharp distinctions and considerable overlap 
between types, and some ambiguity and variation within types. There is thus no single, clear 
division between strategies, but rather many gradations. Hence, it is necessary to move down a 
level of abstraction in order to consider the more concrete dynanlics of labour regulation. 
Descending from the abstract level of analysis, as we noted above, means coming to grips with 
the complexity and indeterminacy of policy change and institutional restructuring. Empirically, 
strategies may be combined and the particularities of each case will reflect institutional legacies, 
conjunctural conditions, and the balance of class forces. These considerations will become 
particularly evident when we highlight the differences in managerial control exercised over 
standard and non-standard employees. In the case of agency temporaries, for instance, control 
cannot be adequately conceived in terms of "a succession of discrete management systems that 
embody a single organizational logic; bureaucracy coexists with decentralization rooted in 
opposing organizational logics" (Gottfried 1994:121). Shifts in the relative importance of 
markets and institutions within a regime oflabour regulation are particularly sensitive to broader 
changes in the balance of powers. 
The management ofNERs, as we shall see below, is characterised by the growing prominence 
of a contractual regulation. This expansion in the regulatory influence of the individual 
employment contract has enhanced the significance of common law principles - flowing from 
the master-and-servant imagery - in management's control over non-standard employees. As a 
result, the regulatory sphere of substantive conditions of employment (such as wage levels and 
other benefits) is effectively insulated from statutory and collective regulation. Labour control 
regimes tend to vary not only with production technology, industrial sector and plant size; but 
also with the nature of the labour supply and the prevailing mechanisms of labour regulation. 
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Very few studies have explicitly sought to account for these factors. 
5.2.2 Non-Standard Employment and the Law of Contract 
According to Atkinson (1987:89), the internal labour market is restructured into fixed and 
variable components: "the former being structured by the long-term logic of mutual commitment, 
and the latter being structured by the short-term logic of the market". There are a number of 
inherent weaknesses in the internal-social versus external-economic division oflabour markets 
implied by the core-periphery model. Deregulation, as we noted above, does not involve the 
simple unleashing of pristine or unregulated market forces and a corresponding elimination of 
social regulation. As Peck (1996 : 188) correctly notes, market forces are not simply ' out there' 
waiting to be freed, but are po litically constructed and institutionally mediated. Even in 
circumstances such as the casualisation of employment in which market forces might appear to 
reign supreme, employment contracts are inherently social and context-dependent. The 
proliferation of non-standard employment has occasioned a shift in, rather than the 
decomposition of, the established mechanisms through which the employment relationship is 
regulated. According to Deakin and Wilkinson (1991: 13 8), the primary significance of changes 
in labour regulation at both the collective and individual level is 
not a general opening up of the employment relationship to the 'fTee' or unregulated market, but rather a 
shift in the direction of protective regulation and its more narrow concentration upon an elite of workers 
.. . [Those] in the ' flexible ' labour force are left as a surplus labour army to be disciplined by the external 
market without having the benefit of access to the sources of training and education and to the forms of 
labour organisation which would enable them to establish minimum bargaining positions. 
The shift from a collective-social to an individual-contractual regulation - i.e. a move from 
contested and circumscribed managerial prerogatives to explicit contractual rights and duties -
allows management to frame and inscribe employment relations with the dictates of contract. 
Freedland (1995:24-6) distinguishes between two levels at which contracting takes place within 
the employment relationship. At the first level, the concern is with the exchange of services for 
remuneration. Here collective and associative considerations are marginalised. At the second 
level, the focus is on the creation of obligations relating to the security of expectations (e.g. 
security of income or employment and commitments going beyond the rendering of particular 
services). It is at the second, relational, level of contracting that most of the concerns that labour 
law has developed for social values come into play. A growing recourse to short, fixed-term or 
task-defined forms of employment threatens to move the contracting process towards the first 
level, leaving the relational issues to be resolved, if at all , by common law. In other words, the 
exclusion of non-standard workers [rom collective bargaining and statutory protective measures, 
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relegates their terms and conditions of employment to the dictates of contract. Statutory 
regulation of the individual employment relationship 
all too often has the status of an exception from 'freedom of contract'. Deregulation present itself as just 
a matter of its removal. This is what is at the root of our inability to cope with the 'atypical' employment 
relationships ... Without the rigidities of a legal code, we are swept along by the fluid changes of the 
market. Not only are we unable to adapt the old common law definitions even to know who is an 
'employee' and who is not ... [but) also base our legislation upon this uncertainty in a way that encourages 
a withdrawal of protection from [non-standard) workers (Wedderburn 1988: 197-8). 
Deakin and Freedland (2000) deploy the notion of an imposed contractualism to account for the 
regulation of public services. It refers to the contract-like relationships between service-providing 
agencies and the government department they are accountable to for the way in which services 
are delivered and set targets are reached. Governments impose standards and expectations on 
public service providers which are enforced as if they were contractual ones. The sanction for 
failure is essentially conceived of in contract-like tenns: it is "envisaged as a fundamental breach 
of contract, meriting the termination of the contract, and the transfer of the activity in question 
to a different and more successful contractor" (2000:11). While it may appear to be a 
contradiction in terms, an imposed contractualism captures many of the central aspects of the 
regulation of non-standard employment. 
Contractual ism should refer to the promotion of vo luntary exchanging of obligations, and so cannot 
meaningfully consist of the imposition of regulation. There is, indeed, a temptation for those in power to 
dress the regu lation which they impose, in the clothing of agreement or contract ... It is a marked feature 
of imposed contractual ism that it permits a high dcgree of specific regulation of the activity to which it 
relates; as a mode of governance, it is conducive to an intensity of regulation which would be attacked as 
overly bureaucratic [autocratic?) if it appeared in the form of the direct exercise of unilateral power (Deakin 
and Freedland 2000:5-6). 
To the extent that statutory and collective regulation was limited or rolled back, it gave way to 
the contract of employment. Far from revealing "a state of anomie, [this] placed the law of the 
contract of employment in a new position of prominence ... as a regulatory system in its own 
right" (Freedland 1995:18). Deakin and Michie (1997:121) similarly note that changes in public 
policy and corporate strategy have led to "an increased role for contracts as mechanisms of 
economic governance". In the 'free market' solutions to the restructuring of the labour market, 
contractual regulation is regarded as the most efficient mechanism for the allocation of the 
rational preferences of utility-seeking individuals (Ackers et al 1996: 18). The role of the law of 
contract is thus being re-defined not just in relation to an enhanced freedom of contract, but also 
in tenns of a rudimentary conception of contractual employment relationships. The legal doctrine 
of 'employment at will' that underlies the contract of employment - in terms of which an 
employment relationship can be summari ly terminated without the need to satisfy the statutory 
requirements of procedural and substantive fairness - is particularly apposite in the case of non-
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standard employees. The industrial relations perspective on non-standard employment has shown 
little awareness of the contributions made by scholars of labour law. If industrial relations 
researchers are to make a contribution to the analysis of the restructuring of employment 
relationships, "they will have to get a handle on the labour law and employment contract issues 
". [since] a combination oflabour sociology and labour economics will not provide a sufficient 
basis on their own" (Hakim 1990b: 180). In particular, they need to come to grips with the dual 
role of the contract of employment in the modern system of labour law: 
on the one hand, it underpinned the common law of 'managerial prerogative' through the open-ended duty 
of obedience, while simultaneously supporting the edifice of social legislation aimed at providing the 
individual with protection aga inst econom ic risks ". The reconstruction of the juridical evolution of the 
contract of employment makes it possible to see more clearly the mu ltiple functions of regulation and 
classification which this concept serves (Deak in 200 I :32, emphasis added). 
Labour law is a complex of protective legal provisions aimed predominantly at "covering 
workers in subordinate employment relationships regulated by employment contracts of 
unspecified duration" (Veneziani 1993 :203). It is precisely by identifYing deviations from the 
archetypal model of the SER that we are able to evaluate the limits of the protections provided 
by labour law. Non-standard jobs are premised on a selective decoupling of the employment 
relationship from statutory, and hence almost invariably also collective, protective measures. This 
grants employers considerable latitude in constructing the form and content ofNERs to suit their 
needs. For management, the ideal is an employment contract with conditions that are infinitely 
variable on a daily basis. Leading voices in Namibia's business community are advocating a 
generalised 'return to contract ': 
[t]he running of the business should be purely between the worker and his employer. I think it is ridiculous 
to have a Labour Act which spells out all kinds of conditions that are often inapplicable to a particular kind 
of business. There must be much greater flexibility in the sense of the emp loyer and emp loyee getting 
together to establish conditions of employment. As far as possible this should be done through a written 
contract. Both sides should know that the common law applies. To my mind, the present Labour Act has 
weakened the appl ication of the common law to the extent where, quite frankly, the employment 
relationship breaks down (president, Namibian Emp loyers' Federation - 08/0712000). 
Recent developments in labour law go precisely in the direction of easing the prohibitions that 
once restricted the use of a contractual model of employment. The type of employment contract 
that regulates an employment relationship has as much of a bearing on the individual' s terms and 
conditions of employment as sectoral, occupational and other broader determinants of labour 
market opportunities. A more intensive contractual regulation of the employment relationship 
is a defining feature of most forms of non-standard employment. In fact, employment 'flexibility' 
is premised on a shift in both "the form in which labour is contracted and the scope provided to 
management by the contract of employment for varying labour inputs" (Regini 2000: 15-6). By 
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contrast, regulation of the SER traditionally involved the introduction of legislation which set 
limits on both the individual freedom to contract and the managerial prerogative. Within this 
framework, 
regulation means 'de-contraclUolisalion' - i.e . institutionalisation oflega\ guarantees for workers which 
are not at the disposal of the parties to the individual contract of employment. As opposed to that, 
deregulation means 're-conlraclualisation' - i.e. a process shifting back tenns of employment to the 
contractua l regime and thus to managerial prerogative (MUckenberger 1989:385, emphasis added). 
The common law sees the individual employment contract, like any other contract, as an 
agreement between free and equal parties to regulate their relationship through reciprocal rights 
and duties. This notion of a 'freely bargained' agreement shrouds the real social relationship that 
secures the subordination of the employee to his/her employer (Fox 1974; Wedderburn 1986; 
Erbes-Seguin 1989; Collins 1993). Very few employment contracts are arrived at by the 
bargaining implied in this conception. This is especially the case with non-standard employees: 
"[t]here is no negotiation about how much money we will get or what our conditions will be" 
(temporary agency worker - 12/07/2002) . Moreover, since a contractual regime depends more 
on individual bargaining and market power than on a collective and statutory protective regime, 
a re-contractualisation will be to the advantage of those who have such power and will 
discriminate against those who do not. Where market power is as unequal as it is between 
employers and non-standard employees, contractual arrangements are "contracts only in form ; 
in reality they are commands" (Streeck 1992:4 1). A widespread reliance on contractual 
arrangements to regulate behaviour in the workplace - grounded in weak forms of collective 
regulation and a surplus of unskilled workers - is one of the hallmarks of Taylorist work systems 
(Whitley 1997:252). The proliferation of non-standard employment and the associated 
contractualisation of the employment relationship, according to Beck, is more accurately 
described as a form of Taylorism rather than flexibility: 
Taylor's 'philosophy of dismembelment' is transferred here fTom the substantive aspects of labour to the 
temporal and contractual relations of employment. The starting points for th is new 'Taylorism of 
employment relations ' are no longer situated in the combination of labour and machine, but in the temporal 
limitation, legal (non-)protection, and contractual pluralization of the employment of labour (cited in Allen 
and Henry 1997: 185). 
The form that state intervention takes tends to have a significant impact on the regulation of 
NERs. In Namibia, the legal distinction between permanent and casual employment is clearly 
delineated. However, the commitment to voluntarism in industrial relations means that the 
inequalities inherent in the employment relationship are to be ameliorated primarily through 
social rather than legal regulation. This ' collective laissez faire' seeks to limit the unilateral 
determination of terms and conditions of employment by the employer through legislative 
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support for trade unionism and voluntary collective bargaining. The role of regulatory legislation 
in providing a minimum floor of rights has therefore been limited in favour of the voluntarist 
goal of encouraging self-regulation by unions and employers. This emphasis on self-regulation 
introduces a latent deregulation into the system of labour regulation that achieves much of the 
same outcomes as an explicit focus on deregulation (Woolfson and Beck 1996). Voluntarism in 
collective labour regulation has not only encouraged the development of disparate conditions at 
the local level, but also frustrated the attempts at transforming the labour market structures of 
Namibia. The common law rarely intervenes in the internal functioning of the enterprise or the 
day-to-day management of the employment relationship. Employers are in charge of the 
organisation of work and employment, and sanctions are imposed only in cases where this power 
is patently abused. While he acknowledged that "outsourcing can be a problem", the permanent 
secretary in the Ministry of Labour suggested that the 
main anchor of proper working conditions should be, in my mind, contained in collective agreements that 
are converted into legally-enforceable instruments ... The prescriptive legal component should be reserved 
only for the worst kind of abuses (04 /07/2000). 
Since independence, only the more skilled and better organised sectors of the Namibian labour 
market have succeeded in making consistent and lasting gains in the negotiation of the wage-
effort bargain. There is thus a tendency for developments in labour law to favour those who 
already occupy strong occupational and bargaining positions in the labour market. This has led 
to a widening of the gap between the wages and employment conditions of non-standard 
employees and those achieved by standard employees through collective bargaining. 
Furthermore, by regulating NERs through a labour regime based primari ly on conunon law 
principles, employers have in part resuscitated the master-and-servant paradigm of the colonial 
era. This clearly exposes most non-standard employees to a greater level of economic dependence 
and subordination than that faced by standard employees. As Peck and Theodore (1998:662) 
argue, "while temp jobs may be here today and gone tomorrow, the expectation is that temp 
workers will always be back, a most asymmetrical form of employment contract". As such, non-
standard employment contracts reproduce employment conditions that have historically proved 
to be unacceptable to full-time, organised workers. 
A contract worker's conditions are regulated by the law of contract. Because of this technicality they are 
not protected by labour law, a recognition agreement or by the company policy. The chances for a union 
to intervene to safeguard these workers are minimal (general secretary, MUN - 28/0612002). 
The major prob lem with our industrial system is that labour laws should just provide the framework for 
industrial relations and not dictate the terms of employment. The contract of employment shou ld be more 
important in managing the employment relationship. This is probably the reason why so many compan ies 
are now using casual and labour-hire workers (HR manager, mechanical engineering - 3011 011998). 
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The non-standard employment contract not only limits the scope of collective regulation and 
facilitates a more detailed specification of employment conditions; but also allows for the 
enforcement of a highly disproportionate wage-effort bargain through penalty clauses and 
contractual remedies. The standard employment contract, by contrast, is largely silent on both 
the actual pace of work and the levels of wage and extra-wage compensation. These are 
determined largely through collective struggle and accommodation. In this regard, Watson (1995) 
draws a useful distinction between 'diffuse' and 'restrictive' employment relationships. In the 
latter, the implicit employment contract is highly specified, the employee is given detailed 
instructions and the relationship is based on low levels of trust. In the diffuse employment 
relationship, the implicit employment contract is more general, the employee has a measure of 
discretion and autonomy, and the relationship is based on high levels of trust. An enterprise could 
have both types of employment relationship as well as control systems for different types of 
work. Restrictive employment relationships are reserved for simple, manual tasks in parts of the 
firm with a detailed division of labour and an extensive hierarchy of managerial control; and 
diffuse employment relationships for more complex tasks in parts of the firm with a modest 
division oflabour and relatively autonomous control systems. 
The proponents of employment 'flexibility' implicitly assume that legally enforceable contracts, 
rather than bureaucratic administration, are the most effective means of regulating the nature and 
level of services provided by a third party. 5 It is widely argued that, by turning a permanent 
employee into a subcontracted labourer, management replaces employment relations with 
commercial contracts (Bresnen et a11985; Fevre 1987; Muckenberger 1989). In fact, MacKenzie 
(2000:709) suggests that the subcontracting of labour relocates "the mediation of the firm's 
activities through a series of commercial contracts rather than via vertically integrated 
bureaucratic structures". As we shall indicate below, however, bureaucratic forms of control are 
supplemented rather than simply supplanted by market forces. In practice, as Rubery et al 
conectly point out, ostensibly deregulated labour markets "required a more frequent recourse to 
the law [and other social institutions 1 in order to regulate the system of industrial relations" (cited 
in Peck 1996:74). All means to regulate labour require some degree of active management. 
Contractualisation is therefore not self-sufficient, without contradictions or identical in all places. 
There are a number of inherent limitations to the efficacy of the law of contract in regulating the 
5 Outsourcing contracts are allegedly capable of governing, among others, the tasks to be carried out, the 
hours of employment, and the arrangements when the client-firm is not satisfied with the performance of an agency 
worker, loss or damage is caused by the agency worker, and injuries are sustained by the agency worker (Leighton 
and Syrett 1989: 138). 
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employment relationship in an efficient and equitable manner. The 'contract model' is ill-suited 
to the task of protecting employment rights since it is too uncertain, too committed to favouring 
the interests of employers, too exclusive of important categories of workers, and too concerned 
with individuals rather than collectives. A private law interpretation of the employment 
relationship reinforces a fundamental assumption underlying the contract of employment: that 
employees are consenting parties to hierarchy and subordination in the workplace. It is also 
difficult to enshrine trust or cooperative and quality commitments in a contract, and contract 
perfOlmance is not always easily monitored. The wages of standard employees do not normally 
depend on a definite expenditure of effort or how much is produced and, as such, these workers 
do not suffer economic loss for unsatisfactory or sub-standard performance. Hence, 
management's need for the cooperation of the permanent workforce cannot be secured by 
contract alone and has to be achieved in large measure through systems of bureaucratic control. 
As Durkheim insisted, not everything in a contract is contractual: "a contract is not sufficient 
unto itself, but is possible only thanks to a regulation of the contract which is originally social" 
(cited in Hyman 200 I: II). The very fact that work-to-rule is viewed as a form of resistance 
illustrates the fact that an employment relationship cannot be reduced to an explicit set of rights 
and duties . A study of the construction industry by Evans and Lewis (1989:72), for example, 
shows that "the practical limits of relying on the formal contractual provisions are indicated by 
the frequent resort to informal economic pressures on subcontractors and the maintenance of 
approved li sts of subcontractors - a practice designed to cultivate co-operation, flexibility and 
access to supplies oflabour". 
The ability of employers to circumvent the safeguards in protective labour legislation by 
employing non-standard labour is facilitated by the restrictive definition of 'employee' on which 
such laws are often based. Workers falling outside these definitions are classified as 'independent 
contractors' by reference to antiquated notions of the extent to which subordination to detailed 
managerial control is regarded as a pre-condition to the existence of an employment relationship.6 
The law thus plays a crucial role in sustaining the division between permanent, well-paid and 
6 The ' conn-ol test', as app lied by the courts from the early twentieth century, was linked to disputes about 
the employer's liability in the context of the widespread practice of internal conn-acting (Clawson 1980; Littler 1982; 
Kristensen 1997). The conn-act system of hiring labour through an intemnediary meant that there was no conn-actual 
nexus between the workers hired by the butty worker or foreman (responsible for recruitment, payment and 
discipline) and the owners of the plant or materials on which they worked (Brooks 1985: 164-6; Wedderburn 
1986: 113-4; Betten 1995:7; Deakin 200 I :30). In temns of this test, the gang workers themselves had no claim against 
the ultimate users of their labour since the latter did not 'control ' the performance of their work. Hence, it allowed 
employers to escape responsibility for the social risks of illness, injury and unemployment that labour legislation 
sought to impose on them. 
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legally protected employees and a growing class of 'marginal' and unprotected labourers who 
are discriminated against and condemned to carry out the least desired jobs for the lowest pay. 
Non-standard work, as we noted above, is a form of unprotected employment that has flourished 
within the gaps left by the limits in regulatory coverage. Changes in the regulation of the labour 
market led to the fragmentation of labour into forms that the law was ill-equipped to protect. 
Even to the extent that the contract of employment had ever offered a satisfactory basis for 
identifYing the workers on whom statutory employment rights should be conferred, it had done 
so on the basis of assumptions about the vertical integration of production (Collins 1990). The 
latter has been superseded in some sectors and occupations by increasing horizontal integration 
as firms resort to outsourcing. Wedderburn (1986: 132) warns that " [l]abour law cannot have lost 
it touch for inventing different types of 'workers ' for different purposes; it cannot muddle on in 
the pretence that the common law 'contract of service' is a formula for all seasons". For workers 
falling outside the legal definition of the contract of employment; the managerial prerogative, 
custom and practice at the workplace, and social conventions in the labour market tend to 
substitute for statutory rights and obligations. The fact that 
the entrepreneur has shifted certain risks onto the worker may indicate rather more about their respective 
bargaining positions than the true nature of their economic relation. The exact pathway to an efficient 
acquisition of labour power is therefore unlikely to reveal to a court any profound insight into the nature 
ofthe relations of production under scrutiny (Collins 1990:365). 
The legal status of many non-standard employees is often uncertain. For example, as Chesterman 
notes, the labour supplied by subcontractors occupies "a twilight zone between employment and 
independent status" (cited in Evans and Lewis 1989:69). Temporary workers supplied by an 
intermediary have long been a problem for labour law. It is often a matter for speculation 
"whether temporary workers - who in other respects may appear to be employees - are engaged 
under contracts of employment with either the [temporary] employment business or the user" 
(Hepple and Napier 1978:84). The vulnerability of non-standard employees is in large measure 
a problem of appropriate legislation and labour market policy. However, labour laws have not 
proved to be particularly effective in conditioning the choices made by firms in utilising non-
standard employment contracts. This is underscored by the fact that the courts often allow 
managers, under the guise of the freedom to contract, to choose whether or not they will incur 
the normal incidents and costs flowing from the role of an employer. By entrusting the will of 
the parties to the contract, the courts put "bargaining back in the free market" (Veneziani 
1993 :206) and failed to establish intelligible and coherent criteria for determining the limits to 
the coverage of employment protection rights. If the latter is to be expanded, Collins (1990:356) 
suggests that the courts must seek the boundaries of the employment contract, not in the intention 
of the parties, but rather in considerations of public policy. 
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There have been widespread calls for the reconstruction of individual employment law on some 
radically different basis that will render it largely independent of the contract of employment, 
especially insofar as the criteria for inclusion within statutory employment rights are concerned. 
The binary division that is embedded in labour legislation - between employees in a dependent 
relationship signalled by the contract of employment and independent contractors indicated by 
a contract for services - attempts to force into neat compartments what in fact comprises "a 
myriad of patterns of the allocation of contractual ri sk, and the degrees and range of bureaucratic 
controls" (Collins 1990:354). The spectrum of dependency or subordination on which the 
employment relationship is based is not a simple, unilinear one. Employment relationships lie 
along a broad spectrum of dependency, and there is no sound basis for confining the contract of 
employment to one pole of that spectrum. While the need remains to identify a category of 
dependent employment relationships for the purposes of various statutory regimes, this should 
be achieved without resort to two mutually-exclusive stereotypes. To this end, Freedland 
(1995:23) suggests that we accord to the contract of employment "a broader more loosely defined 
scope across a wider spectrum of work relationships". Moves towards a recognition of wider 
social interests in the employment context have led to a growing emphasis on the public's interest 
in the manner that production is carried out, the way in which the employment relationship is 
formulated, and a recognition of its inherent social nature. These concerns have not yet filtered 
into Namibia ' s labour laws in any meaningful sense. This is largely a product of the emphasis 
on self-regulation and the fact that ordinary magistrates, who are quick to resort to a common law 
interpretation of the employment relationship, are responsible for enforcing labour rights and 
adjudicating disputes on labour matters. 
While the law must distinguish employees from the genuinely self-employed, it should not do 
so in manner that deprives most part-time, temporary and subcontracted workers of statutory 
protection. Many contracts for services are in effect contracts of employment. This is particularly 
true when employees are engaged through a cascading series of subcontracting relationships as 
in the construction industry or where the contractor has minimal infrastructure as in the security 
industry. In South Africa, for instance, the client-firm is compelled by law to grant the 
protections associated with 'employee' status to the staff of persons who, while supplying a 
service: (a) do not directly supervise their employees while working; and (b) supply little or none 
of the infrastructure or equipment used by their employees. The duration of employment has no 
bearing on whether a worker is engaged under a contract of employment, a contract for services, 
or some other species of contract. The overriding question is whether a person could be said to 
be in business on his/her own. The notion of economic dependence stands at the centre of most 
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recent attempts at testing for a contract of employment.' The inquiry concern itself with the 
realities of the employment relationship, especially where it falls within that uncertain area 
between a dependent and independent relationship, and where it is a multi-pal1ite rather than a 
bilateral relationship. A central challenge to the regulatory functions of the contract of 
employment is the extension of the basic labour protections associated with the SER to non-
standard employees. 
5.2.3 Human Resource Management and Non-Standard Employment 
The bulk of the literature on HR management presupposes a SER. As such, it provides few 
insights into the dynamics of NERs.8 Management 's primary objectives in increasing 
employment ' fl exibi lity' are to secw'e cost-savings, increase the intensity of effort expenditure, 
dismantle institutional barriers to its control over the deployment of labour, and to reduce the 
amount offree or idle time available to employees. In particular, the aim is to remove or dilute 
the protections that insulate employees from competitive pressures in the external market. The 
proponents of 'lean' production (Womack el a11990) and ' flexible specialisation' (Piore and 
Sabel 1985) portray the rules that relate directly to work organisation as the main source of 
'rigidity' and hence inefficiency in the workplace. To be sure, the putative search for employment 
'flexibility' is concerned precisely with the terms of the various institutional rules that govern 
the employment relationship (Storper and Walker 1989: 172). These strategies have struck a 
sympathetic chord with employers given the context of rising economic instability and 
uncertainty. Such are the times when cost-cutting is prioritised, the scope for compromise is 
reduced, and the unions are generally on the defensive. As Wilkinson (1981 :9) notes, "the 
common response of capital to the crisis is to marginalise at least a part of its labour force". Calls 
for greater ' flexibility ' in the deployment and use of labour often amount to an attack on the 
collective and statutory regulation of work practices. Research has revealed that shop stewards 
in firms that adopted flexibility agreements were forced to "sell the conquests their grandfathers 
fought for" (Marsden and Thompson 1990:95). Far from leading to greater autonomy and 
participation by workers, research in a variety of different settings found that labour market 
' flexibility ' is more often associated with an enhancement of managerial control over the labour 
, The control test is increasingly giving way to a more inclusive conception of emp loyee status focused on 
'integration' into the organisation and the <economic dependence' of the worker. Most non-standard emp loyees in 
Namibia are dependent on the business of another person rather than being entrepreneurs or employers in their own 
right. 
8 In particular, the management literature seriously underestimates the resilience of 'older', more coercive 
forms of control. 
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process and a degradation of employment conditions9 
The types of 'flexibility' that employers are likely to seek and obtain are directly dependent on 
the nature of the prevailing mode of labour regulation. In Namibia, a welfare system has not 
evolved to separate the processes of production and reproduction: most workers remain 
abso lutely dependent on wage-labour for their livelihood. The country also lacks a centralised 
system of labour regulation that would take wages out of competition and compel employers to 
compete on the basis of quality, service and productivity rather than labour costs. As we noted 
in the previous chapter, attempts to cut costs and intensify work within a largely unchanged 
technical and organisational framework can only increase profit levels at the expense of labour. 
These factors decisively qualify the type of hegemonic regime that is presently possible or 
feasible in Nanlibia. The ideological hegemony of baasskap - i.e. the notion of racial superiority 
fostered by apaltheid policies - encouraged white employers to adopt authoritarian and 
paternalistic approaches towards their black employees. As we noted in chapter 2, the system of 
colonial despotism in the workplace could only sustain high levels of profitability at the price of 
considerable instability in industrial relations. 
Historically, because of apartheid, industrial relations were not that good in this country. Our first focus 
point was improving the relations between management and our staff members, and among the staff 
themselves. There were always these racial tensions because of the divide-and-rule pol icies that the South 
African government implemented here. We launched an initiative in 1998 - under the banner of a local 
word for 'we stand together' - that focused on developing company values and integrat ing them into our 
service (group HR manager, retail - 01 /0712002). 
The discriminatory statutory framework meant that the system of collective industrial relations 
was largely informal, subject to the balance of powers at a particular workplace, and prone to 
unpredictable outburst of militancy. Labour legislation since independence has, however, curbed 
the autocratic discipline of the employer over permanent employees in the workplace. A balance 
of class forces decidedly in the employers' favour changed (often dramatically) as new labour 
laws and the increasing power of organised labour limit some of management' s discretion and 
room to manoeuvre. 10 As Andersson and Marks (1987:285) observed with regard to the mining 
indUStry, "management controls virtually all aspects of production" and the social life of workers . 
9 See: Eiger (1987); Abraham (1988); Fevre (1991); Leonard (1992); Harrison (1994); Harley (1994); 
Campbell (1996); C6rdova (1996); Allen and Henry ( 1997); Moody (1997); Colling (1999); Kenny and Webster 
(1999); Standing (1999); and Peck and Theodore (2000). 
10 Trade union density has increased significantly since the promulgat ion of the Labour Act in 1992. While 
only 25.4% of the total labour force was unionised in 2000 ; there are important variations in union density between 
men (29%) and women (21 %), urban (34%) and rural (18%) areas, and between industries and occupations (MoL 
2002:56). 
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A coroIlary of this search for 'total ' control is that it "seeks to pre-empt independent decision-
making by workers, and is disrupted by even small changes or chaIlenges to the authority 
structure" (1987:286-7). Trade unionism, in particular, constituted a formidable challenge to the 
despotic regime of labour regulation inherited from the colonial era. 
A lot of managers tend to do things in the way that they think is right and they never consult the workers. 
As far as managing a business is concerned, they havc a rather paternalistic approach. They regard the 
enterprise as their own undertaking and that they have various entrenched prerogatives which it is their right 
to pursue. They would look after their employees, but would not necessarily like having to consult the 
employees on matters which they regard as in their own domain ... These managers also see trade unions 
as a threat and they have a very negative attitude towards them. OUf indigenous business sector is very 
conservative as far as labour relations are concerned. They have their own view - a rather autocratic view 
(management consultant - 19107/2000). 
At this stage in our economic history, there should be a better regard for the tremendous rcsponsibility that 
rests on management. The government should prevent the unions from taking militant action and 
undennining management ... The impact of politics on the trade unions is hampering and hUJ1ing the 
economy. It is causing disincentives for investment ... The animosity that is being created by the unions 
against the employer, I think, is counter-productive and against the national interest (HR manager, electrical 
engineering - 04/0712002). 
The impact of trade unionism has decreased managerial prerogatives in the use of permanent 
labour and the organisation of work by enforcing some degree of employment and occupational 
stability and by securing coIlective agreements that circumscribe management's authority in the 
workplace. Since the control of standard employees cannot be secured simply through despotic 
management strategies, it comes to depend in important ways on the social context in which their 
employment relationship is embedded. The construction of discipline over permanent workers 
in the larger firms - the prime sites of casualisation and outsourcing - depends on a day-to-day 
negotiation of order. There are often genuine efforts to sustain an implicit bargain, with managers 
being careful to maintain certain standards of 'fairness'. 
We are like a team here. The workers don't call me 'boss' or anything like that ... My workers even come 
and discuss the smallest, personal problems with me. I try to understand their culture and explain to them 
that the stronger the firm gets, the better their working conditions will be. They know that it is not a case 
of them against me, but rather us against our competitors ... I go out of my way to sort out problems, to keep 
that relationShip going. Problems are now sorted out very quickly because there is trust between us. It is 
basically an open door po licy (genera l manager, automotive component manufacturer - 10107/2000). 
Employers in certain sectors of the economy no doubt benefit from the levels of cooperation and 
adaptability that can be derived from a stable, permanent workforce. These employees are more 
likely to warrant long-term investments in training and possess skills that cannot be readily 
obtained in the external labour market (Iyanda 1998: 17). Punitive and autocratic disciplinary 
measures simply have too many adverse effects on morale and efficiency. Considerable tacit and 
express negotiations reflect the fact that managers cannot be too assertive for fear of losing 
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workers and then being unable to meet peaks in demand. In other words, the negotiation of order 
in the workplace turns on the politics of the management of labour. Under bureaucratic systems 
of control, punishment flows from agreed organisational rules, is corrective rather than coercive 
in purpose and consistent rather than arbitrary in application (Edwards 1979:33). Supervisors 
negotiate the day-to-day application of the rules and, in so doing, may promote custom and 
practice that interpret the silences and smooth over any inconsistency of the formal rules or even 
supplant them (Edwards 1994b). This subterranean world of custom and informality is a prime 
target in management's efforts at rationalisation. 
These 'problems' of control - together with others of a technical or market nature - managers 
seek to avoid through the use of non-standard employment contracts. A basic interest of 
management in a recessionary climate is to "free itself as far as possible from rules and 
procedures that impose restrictions on the utilisation of manpower" (Sengenberger 1981 :253). 
Such 'flexibility' allows employers to take advantage of the high levels of under- and 
unemployment through selective hiring-and-firing and provides them with the opportunity to 
marginalise a sector of the workforce. The resulting polarisation in employment conditions, as 
Cousins (1999:114) argues, produces a workplace of ' insiders' and 'outsiders ' , exacerbates 
labour market segmentation, increases wage unresponsiveness to unemployment, and leads to 
greater precariousness of employment. Non-standard employment is almost by definition also 
unorganised employment. A non-standard worker enters into an employment contract in which 
"his or her individual rights are not directly protected by anybody independent of the company 
of employment" (Gibson and Graham 1986:140). The absence of any collective voice to regulate 
their terms and conditions of employment means that management can shape their relationship 
largely at will. Non-standard workers are thus unable to "exert organised control over the type 
of labour they supply" (Garnsey et aI1985:59). This underscores the importance of effective 
statutory and institutional protection for non-standard employees. 
The Labour Act must also address the outsourcing and casualisation problem that we are facing. We cannot 
just fight casualisation at the workplace, we also need national policies (general secretary, NA TAU -
12/07/2000). 
The Labour Act does not say what are the rights of casual workers. Most employers are taking advantage 
of this. The Act does not say how many years you have to work to become a permanent worker. This is a 
way for the employers to exploit these people because they know that casual workers don't get benefits and 
are cheap labour (regional organiser, NAFAU - 27/1 0/1998). 
While selective statutory and institutional protection may provide employers with the incentives 
to casualise the employment of certain segments of the workforce, it does not dictate a definite 
or coherent pattern of casualisation. The development and implementation of strategic plans for 
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the utilisation of non-standard labour presuppose (among others) a dedicated HR function. Many 
Namibian firms do not possess a specialised personnel division. HR managers playa relatively 
marginal and limited role even in firms that possess such a function. Senior managers devote 
little attention to industrial relations issues. Labour is merely one of several problems that 
confront managers and is often not the most important. 
Personnel departments are essentially administrative units dealing with wages, time sheets, leave, etcetera. 
There is no distinct IR [industrial relations] function. Supervisors are responsible for training, discipline 
and perfonnance evaluations ... The fmance, marketing and production managers carry the most weight in 
the company. Decisions that are made are production-orientated. Whatever happens afterwards, in tenns 
of HR, that comes second. 'We will deal with it when we get there ' ... Personnel issues are always at the 
bottom of the agenda in our monthly management meetings. The meetings start after lunch and by the time 
personnel issues come up, nobody is listening to you and everybody wants to go home (HR manager, meat 
processing - 04/07/2002). 
Often the personne l officer here is actually only sort of for personnel administration. Even in wage 
negotiations they will sit in and take the minutes, but they are not really involved in conducting the 
negotiations. On the whole, they are of a lower status than line management who regards itself as the 
backbone of the company. Human resources is just a staff function. Many big companies have personnel 
managers, but consultants are still doing their work for them as far as industrial relations are concerned 
(management consultant - 1910712000). 
Almost 50% of the firms surveyed in 1996 had made use of the servIces of management 
consultants since 1990 (Klerck and Sycholt 1997: 149). This highlights the fact that many 
Namibian firms are unequipped to carry out certain human resource functions . Many industrial 
enterprises in Nanlibia developed from small, family-owned entities and retained this form rather 
than becoming limited liability companies. I I In these circumstances, as Curry and Stoneman 
(1993 :50-1) observe, there is little division oflabour between management functions and little 
formal management training. Since attention must be focussed on the production process, little 
time and resources are devoted to other managerial functions such as human resources. This has 
allowed the large temporary employment agencies to play a crucial role in shaping the 
employment practices of many Namibian companies. Some client-firms, according to an 
employment agency manager, "come to us for all sorts of things - even salary inquiries and 
hunlan resource decisions" (1411 0/1998). Another agency manager noted: "[ w]e basically take 
on the whole personnel function of the client-firm, especially in the case of medium-sized 
companies" (11107/2002). 
Rising levels of competition, pressure from trade unions, and legal restrictions on the exercise 
of managerial power are making Namibian employers more conscious of the demands of 
II As a consequence, business loans are often personal loans secured against personal property. This greatly 
increases the risks of expansion and constrains the size of firms. 
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efficiency. As the pressures for efficiency increase, so the problem of labour costs intensifies. In 
finns with a high proportion of non-standard and less-skilled workers, dismissal or the threat of 
it remains an important form of control. "If we cannot dismiss workers on the spot, they will 
cause endless problems for us" (general manager, chocolate manufacturer - 0411 111998). Many 
Namibian managers resisted the tide of statutOlY and collective regulation and were quick to use 
arguments about a ' lack of flexibility '. The latter, however, were often simply an excuse to be 
inconsistent and capricious. The impact of changes in the regime of labour regulation in the 
workplace is starkly revealed in the extent to which managers regard the provisions on unfair 
dismissal as inhibiting their capacity to remain competitive. 
It is extremely important that employers can hire and fife workers far more easily than is currently the case 
... [At present,] firing is so di fficult that you think three times before you engage somebody. It is better to 
get casual or contract workers ... Flexibility, to my mind, should be interpreted as the ability to prosper, 
rather than to be handicapped. When you employ a person, management must be fi'ee to use that person 
when and where it believes his or her services are worth more to the company ... The rules in the workplace 
should be management's responsibility and should encourage entrepreneurship (president , Namibian 
Employers' Federation - 08/07/2000). 
Employers find the provisions on dismissals a rea l obstac le because of the lack of internal dispute resolution 
mechanisms. They just want to get rid of problematic or excess workers without having to worry about 
following the correct procedures (regional organiser, MANWU - 03/07/2002). 
The power of an employer to hire and fire in accordance with demand is a fundamental aspect 
of authority within the workplace. This power is not only diluted by legislation and trade unions, 
but also by labour shortages. 
The attitude of white managers is: 'any mistake that you make, I will just fire you. Your brother or s ister 
is outside begging me for work on a daily basis. So if you give me problems, I won't hesitate to get another 
person' ... Of course, this attitude wi ll not work with artisans and so on whose skills are scarce in Namibia 
(general secretary, NUNW - 26/06/2002). 
A major preoccupation of employers, therefore, is "to find new supplies of labour, and to ' fix' 
these new supplies so that they remain available and dependent" (Michon 1987:44). Labour's 
relative immobility and hence its bondage in space is a major source of capital's power over the 
working class. However, since workers are not all equally bound in spatial terms, it follows that 
the power that employers derive from their immobility will vary. There is a widespread lack of 
sufficient appreciation of "the significance for managerial control of, first, variability in product 
market conditions and, secondly, variability and resilience in employee resistance" (Macdonald 
1985:54 1). These variations have been found to result in significant differences, not only in the 
degree of control that management is able to exert over a particular segment of the workforce, 
but also in the means by which management attempts to exert its control. In the system of 
"autocratic despotism" (Burawoy 1985: 149) that is enforced over less skilled non-standard 
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workers, the employer has little need to underpin his/her power with consent and reciprocity. A 
typical example of the way in which the managers that were interviewed regarded their 
relationship with non-standard employees: 
[tJhere is no bond between management and the temporary employees. They are not our responsibility. 
They don't have a career here and they are not a part of our pension plans or medical-aid and housing 
schemes (HR manager, beer and beverage manufacturer - 04/07/2002). 
With non-standard employees, as we noted above, the control over work is less central because 
payment is for services rendered rather than on a time basis. That is, where payment is linked to 
a definite expenditure of effort, the generation of consent is less necessary than in the case of the 
day-to-day dealings with permanent employees, who can shape their effort-levels through 
struggle. In spite of the fact that he tends to regard non-standard employment as anachronistic 
and assumes a unilinear development towards an increasingly homogeneous working class, Marx 
(1967:553-4) provides some insightful comments on the dynamics of labour subcontracting: 
[sJince the quality and the intensity of the work are here controlled by the fonn of the wage itself, 
superintendence of labour becomes in great part superfluous. Piece-wages therefore lay the foundation of 
the modem 'domestic labour' ... as well as of a hierarchically organized system of exploitation and 
oppression ... [PJiece-wages facilitate the interposition of parasites between the capitalist and the 
wage-labourer, the 'sub-letting oflabour'. The gain of the middlemen comes entirely from the difference 
between the labour-price which the capitalist pays, and the part of that price which they actually allow to 
reach the labourer. 
Non-standard workers are confronted by a more immediate and arbitrary exercise of managerial 
authority. "The [client] company does not get involved with you - if there is a problem, they 
simply tell you to leave" (temporary agency worker). This 'minimalist' approach to the control 
of temporary employment agency workers allows employers to take advantage of "a high-
discipline work regime, the mobilisation and management of which is contracted out" (Peck and 
Theodore 1998 :661). The general secretary ofNA TAU highlighted a common practice when he 
noted: 
[iJfthe employer feels that one ofthese workers is not doing what he expects, he will just phone the labour-
hire company and say: 'please remove him and bring me another one'. lnunediately this worker is sent 
home without even being paid. The employer can just say: 'he did not meet my requirements, he must go'. 
It is not the responsibility of the recipient to look after the worker, it is the responsibility of the labour-hire 
company (12 /07/2000). 
These views were echoed by one ofMUN's regional organisers: 
[wJith outsourcing, the company will tell the labour broker that his workers must maintain certain standards. 
' !fyou cannot do this, you will lose your contract'. So, the labour broker will make sure that he keeps the 
contract by dismissing workers and by making their employment conditions favourable to the company. 
The company that hires the services of these workers is the one that determines their future. The company 
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can fIre them and their real employer, the labour-hire company, must just remove them and accept that the 
company is right when it says that the worker was not performing ... Management doesn't manage the 
labour-hire workers, they just tell them to go if there is a problem. These workers are not their employees, 
and they know that as long as they can be replaced it is not an issue (05107/2002). 
While the client-firm and the temporary employment agency share a common goal of ensuring 
an adequate supply of cheap labour and controlling the performance of temporary workers, there 
is some divergence in their interests at the point of production (Gottfried 1994: 117). The client-
firm derives value from control over the workers' work intensity, whereas the agency gains value 
fyom control over the workers' time at work. The time it takes a temporary worker to complete 
a particular task has a bearing on the profits of both the client-firm and the agency: the former 
gains when the task is carried out in as short a period oftime as possible, while the latter benefits 
when the task takes as long as possible. Although the client-firm normally carries some 
responsibility for the supervision of agency workers, labour problems are virtually eliminated by 
the fact that these workers have no say over placement, conditions of employment, and so on. 
Managers do require some cooperation and initiative from the non-standard workforce especially 
when, for example, a tight deadline has to be met or an unforeseen disruption to the nOlmal flow 
of work occurs. In such circumstances, management has to concede some degree of autonomy 
and discretion to its part-time and temporary workers. However, the way in which the casualised 
labour process is organised allows few opportunities for individual, let alone collective, 
responses to grievances. 
If! go to my casual supervisor and ask him: 'why must they treat me like that?', he will go and tell the boss. 
Then the boss will tell me: 'if you are not happy with the job, then go home'. They won't listen to you ... 
So the thing is that we are afraid to discuss our problems. Many casuals don't want to talk about problems 
because they know that they will lose their job (part-time worker - 06/0712000) . 
Once you are on labour hire, the manager will not negotiate anything with you. If he thinks you are not 
working hard enough, he will just tell you to leave. If that happens, even the labour-hire company will not 
give you ajob again. The people are hungry and they will try very hard to keep their job. People are very 
much afraid of losing their jobs because of all this unemployment (regional organiser, NAFAU -
27/10/1998). 
Non-standard workers are made acutely aware of the importance of having the 'right attitude' if 
they are to attain even a modicum of employment security. The client-firm and the employment 
agency only have an interest in retaining the most cooperative and diligent of temporary staff. A 
'trouble-free' work record is therefore the best guarantee of some continuity of employment. 
Given the triangular relationship of an outsourcing arrangement, the client-firm needs to manage 
its relations with the agency as well as the temporary workers. As Gottfried (1991) illustrates, 
agency temporaries are subordinated within the 'dual control' temporary labour regime of the 
agency and the client-firm that subjects them to overlapping systems of sanctions. The 
management of production and the management of labour are located in separate organisational 
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domains leading to "a mode of regulation that disperses control functions and articulates different 
fonus of control into an overall system" (Gottfried 1994: I 13). Whereas employers ' strategies of 
control over standard employees involve the conjoining of time and effort to minimise the 
amount of unperformed potential labour time; with agency employees time and effort is 
dissociated (Gottfried 1994: I 05). That is, the temporary employment agency profits from time 
on-the-job leaving control over effort to the client-firm. 
A reliance on external sources of labour leads to a redrawing of the boundaries of responsibility 
between the client-firm and the subcontractor. In theory, there are several approaches to the 
perfonnance monitoring of outsourced services: the development of performance indicators to 
specify and measure workload, efficiency and effectiveness; inspections of work and on-site 
management to monitor quality by own personnel or a third party; the maintenance oflong-tenn, 
reciprocal relationships with service providers; the completion of checklists or certification by 
the contractor; and client complaints and surveys. In practice, as Valverde et at (1997:604) and 
Dean and Kiu (2002:401) argue, outsourcing contracts often lack enforceable mechanisms to 
ensure accountability for perfonnance, quality issues are addressed in such vague or broad terms 
that are they difficult to measure and enforce, and transient buyer-seller relationships fail to 
generate trust and cooperation. The micro-level checks and balances, nOlmally associated with 
an outsourcing agreement, are increasingly being abandoned by senior managers "so that they 
achieve an arrangement that is flexible enough to adjust to business conditions" (Linder et at 
2002:25). Leighton and Syrett (1989:69) also note that the systems used by managers to regulate 
the use of temporary agency workers are "often loose and poorly thought out". The client-firm's 
expenditure on monitoring the perfonnance of temporary agency staff is decisively shaped by the 
extent to which the quality of the work outsourced is readily observable or amenable to 
quantitative assessment, the immediacy of the outcome and hence the extent to which poor 
performance can be speedily rectified, and the importance of the function to the success of the 
business.12 The general trend in Namibia, as NAT AU's general secretary noted, is for 
[m]ost of these casual and labour-hire workers [to be] employed in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs. They are 
just general labourers doing the most basic jobs. You cannot take an unskilled casual workers and put him 
in a job that is very important to the company. He is just hired to complete a piece of work and, at the end 
of the day, he is gone (! 2/0712000). 
The internal labour market structure of a firm reflects a particular compromise between 
management's concern with efficiency and workers ' interests in job security. The governance 
12 Occupational dynamics, as we shall see below, have an important bearing on the nature of control that 
is exercised over skilled and less ski lled non-standard employees. 
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procedures associated with internal labour markets are a particular manifestation of the rules 
governing the boundaries of management's authority within the employment relationship. They 
are not a substitute for managerial authority, but a different means of regulating it (Marsden 
1999:2 1-2). It is exceedingly difficult for employers to lower wage costs and improve 
perfom1ance at the same time without sparking discontent in the workplace. Employees who are 
forced to work harder will inevitably demand a larger share of any resulting increase in profit 
margins. If management concedes to such demands for higher wages, it becomes increasingly 
likely that it will reduce the number of staff through redundancies and/or outsourcing to 
compensate for the pay rises of remaining employees. Since non-standard employees fall outside 
the internal labour market that partly insulates permanent employees from the pressures of 
external market forces, their terms and conditions of employment are not shaped by internal 
equity considerations. As such, non-standard employment is an institutional response to the 
uncertainties and risks faced by employers in product and labour markets (Bresnen et a11985; 
Beneria and Roldan 1987; Anderson et aI1994). If internal labour markets buffered employment 
from changes in the extemallabour market, then the shift to more market-mediated employment 
relationships may well be associated with increased variability in employment conditions and 
relations. Managing this variability, as Cappelli (1995:595) notes, "represents an enormous 
challenge for employers". The 'flexibility' of labour therefore comes at a price. 
The work performance of semi-permanent non-standard employees in low-paid, unskilled jobs 
with little intrinsic motivation and divorced from the established work practices and procedures 
of the firm has to be controlled through close supervision. That is, in the absence of a clearly 
defined task to be carried out in a pre-determined period of time, the pace of non-standard work 
is closely tied to the level of supervision. The natme and duration of non-standard employment, 
and hence its form of management, are in large part a product of the specific labour demand 
conditions faced by the enterprise. This implies that the significantly inferior tern1S and 
conditions of employment for non-standard workers are associated with the employment of 
disadvantaged persons and "the rationale of industrial structures and processes" rather than with 
the productivity of these workers (Chalmers 1989: 122). Despite the fact that non-standard 
employees often work alongside permanent, full-time employees, there are profound differences 
in the way in which their employment relationship is negotiated: 
[tJhe organised workers stand their ground when the bosses want to change things in the workplace ". With 
casual workers it is very different. The employer will just call a casual worker: 'hey, do you want work?' lf 
he says 'yes', they will say: 'start work here ' . That is it, there are no negotiations (regional organiser, 
NAFAU - 03 /0712002). 
The discipline of daily hiring and the associated exclusion of ' troublemakers' and ' low-quality' 
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workers effectively undermines the bargaining power of non-standard employees. 
Unpredictability is an important mechanism of control in the relationship between the temporary 
worker and the employment agency. Arbitrary power relations make it difficult for these workers 
to respond collectively to changes in the nature of their work and employment that are perceived 
to be unfair or unwarranted. The authority of the employer is also highly visible with non-
standard workers frequently being admonished or dismissed for what often amounts to minor 
infringements of company regulations. The employment security of non-standard workers is 
largely unaffected by statutory or collective regulations and directly dependent on the levels of 
effort and cost-savings that managers are able to extract from their labour. 
As a manager, when I have a problem with a casual worker because he is lazy or he is tardy, I call him into 
the office and give him a warning or fIre him. With the permanent workers, you have to deal with the union. 
There is always a shop steward who represents him and wants me to give him another chance (store 
manager, retail - 06/07/2002). 
The relations with our workers are becoming more collective, but we try, as far as possible, to deal with 
them on an individual basis ... To improve productivity we would need to incentivise OUf operations and 
reward workers individually. That is, only pay for results. But the union will never go for that as far as the 
pennanent workers are concerned ... With casual workers it is a different story; they don't have a union and 
are basically just individual workers (general manager, paint manufacturer - 0511111998). 
In theory, the affairs of each subcontract firm or temporary employment agency are administered 
by its management. In practice, however, subcontracted and agency employees are structurally 
controlled by the client-firm. "Most of these labour-hire companies don't look at what their 
employees have to do, all they are concerned about is how much money they will get from the 
company that is receiving the workers" (general secretary, NATAU - 12/07/2000) . A 
subcontracting or outsourcing relationship rests on the client-firm's strong negotiating position 
and its non-negotiable requirements regarding quality, price, and speed of delivery. The 
subcontract therefore allows the client-firm to specifY employment relations as well as define the 
nature of work by specifYing (among others) the location, degree of regimentation, and speed of 
production. 
The client says how the job is to be done, we don't get involved in that. We work according to the 
advantages and disadvantages o[evelY client. Ifhe says: 'you must work like th is ', then we work like that 
... Every client has his own rules and regulations, and we naturally work according to them. We adapt to 
every client (manager, temporary employment agency - 1411011998). 
We normally accept the hourly rate that the company is prepared to pay for a particular type of worker, 
unless their offer is completely unreasonable ... Before the labour hire companies were here, the clients 
knew how many workers it takes to do a specifIc job. They know how much a man can do in a day. They 
will soon sec if they have enough workers to fInish the job on schedule ... The client will say how many 
people he needs. He will rather hire more people for shorter hours. He will not stretch out a job because 
it will cost him more money (manager, temporary employment agency - 1010712002). 
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Rather than involving a radical departure from a Taylorist work organisation, as claimed by its 
proponents, the search for employment 'flexibility' actually presupposes it. The principles of 
work organisation which standardise tasks and divide jobs into 'measurable' units lays the basis 
for most preparation and servicing tasks to be divided off and performed by workers in more 
precarious fom1s of employment. Stabilising effort-levels ensures predictabili ty or calculability 
within the firm, and Taylorism is concerned precisely with the processes of determining and 
fix ing effort- levels (Littler 1982:59-62). Once productive tasks are observed, recorded and 
analysed, knowledge of them can be rendered independent of any workers to the extent that given 
outcomes can repeated, taught and built into the organisational structure of the firm . The costs 
associated with high turn-over rates and on-the-job training - usually experienced in the lower 
skilled categories - can be largely overcome by the use of subcontracted labour already 
possessing the necessary skills. Taylorism can thus be extended to further minimise the impact 
of labour turn-over by structuring work organisation around a mobile (temporary) workforce. 
The subordinate status of outsourced service functions such as cleaning, despatch or security is 
reinforced by the structure and timing of the work. It is much the same from one firm to the next, 
requires very little training or experience, and is largely separate (organisationally and 
temporally) from the client-firm's main line of work. Subcontracted cleaners, for instance, often 
carry out their work before or after normal office hours and in the absence of any direct 
managerial presence. For subcontractors, the uncertainty attached to the coordination and control 
of on-site work and employment leads to a "tension between, on the one hand, the need to 
regulate workers across a multitude of sites and, on the other, the need for the work to be 
completed on site each day, regardless of the regulatory requirements laid down by firms or 
government legislation" (Allen and Henry 1997: 191-2). The former requires a largely formal 
system of regulation, while the latter introduces the possibility of some informal employment 
practices entering contract work. Hence the diversity of mechanisms drawn on by subcontractors 
to control and coordinate workforces at disparate sites to ensure that the work gets done on a 
daily basis. 
Besides their own financial and organisational control , labour brokers also carry out personnel 
functions normally associated with management. As a labour broker put it: "[ w Je maintain strict 
discipline as we should and take responsibility for our workers" (14/10/1998). However, since 
most subcontracted workers are regarded as temporary employees (i.e. for as long as their 
contract lasts), the subcontractor is 'spared' a number of managerial obligations such as 
providing medical -aid schemes, pension funds and paid leave. The forms of control exercised 
by subcontractors and temporary employment agencies over their employees also tend to be 
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highly paternalistic: 
[mly people have accepted me as their saviour. I am like their father because I provide them with their 
bread and butter (labour broker - 1511 0/1998). 
There are significant variations in the degree to which the client-firm assumes responsibility for 
the day-to-day management of non-standard employees. While the firm is solely responsible for 
the performance of part-time or casual employees, its control of subcontracted and agency 
employees varies with the extent of on-site supervision provided by the contractor or agency. 
Where on-site supervision is provided by the latter, the supervisor is responsible for wage and 
time sheets, job allocation, sick leave, health and safety standards, the induction of new workers, 
and the recruitment of additional staff through the social networks to which the existing 
workforce belong. The discipline or dismissal of staff is also usually dependent on the opinion 
of the supervisor. He is the link between the contract workforce, the client-firm and the centre 
of operations. Although it is norn1ally associated with larger orders, on-site supervision by the 
agency reinforces the lack of direct relations between agency workers and the client-firm. That 
is, not only labour mobilisation, but also labour control is externalised. Arm's-length labour 
management is particularly suited to situations where the control of quality and output can be 
contractually separated from the control of labour. Under such circumstances, the client-firm 
increasingly manages contracts rather than employing labour (Evans and Lewis 1989 :72). The 
supervisory presence of the agency in the workplace also contributes to better relations between 
it and the client-firm by addressing problems that might otherwise have jeopardised those 
relations. On-site management allows the temporary employment agencies 
to deepen and broaden their sphere of control from the labour market to the labour process: from the 
predominantly labour-market practices of hiring, screening, (re)alloeation, scheduling and payment of 
workers, through to the predominately labour-process practices of induction and training, supervision, task 
allocation, performance monitoring and relations with other (temp and non-temp) workers (Peck and 
Theodore 1998:665). 
In the absence of an on-site supervisory presence, the larger employment agencies typically 
appoint their most loyal and trust-worthy workers as ' team leaders', and liaise closely with their 
clients to rectify any problems as and when they arise. While on-site supervisors supplied by the 
employment agency reduce the managerial responsibilities of the client-firm, they do raise the 
costs of non-standard employment. As a result, the anticipated cost-savings associated with 
outsourcing and casualisation are not always realised in practice. A reduction in the costs of 
employment is not, however, the only or even the primary consideration for employers of non-
standard workers. Several of the managers that were interviewed indicated that the ability to 
rapidly adjust the size of their workforce with minimal consideration for procedural requirements 
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was an important motivation behind the decision to use non-standard employees. For example: 
[iJf demand is low, then we let our temps go. Otherwise, we would have to retrench workers all the time 
and then hire new ones again when the demand increases (general manager, fumiture manufacturer -
17/07/2000). 
The manner in which the SER is organised and controlled has a significant bearing on the 
regulatory functions that non-standard employment may be expected to fulfill. That is, the nature 
of the regulatory dilemmas faced by managers influences the type of regulatory 'fixes ' they are 
likely to seek. An imposed contractualism allows Nan1ibian employers to tie wages much more 
closely to levels of effort; facilitates ex ante forms of regulation that reduce the need to maintain 
bureaucratic systems of control over the entire workforce; and underpins a system of autocratic 
despotism in which non-standard employees have little collective influence over the deployment 
of their labour, their services can be terminated at will, and their conditions of employment 
resemble those of a bygone era. 
5.2.4 The Employment Conditions of Non-Standard Workers 
The power of the employer is clearly visible in his/her capacity to enforce sub-standard 
conditions of employment over the more vulnerable sectors of the labour market. The benefits 
that employers derive from the use of less skilled non-standard employees are premised on the 
continued availability of second-rate industrial citizens. Research shows that most employers 
have "a clear and stereotyped model of the behavioural characteristics of each type of worker, 
and it was these models, rather than detailed cost comparisons, that formed the framework for 
most decision-making over types of contract" (Hunter et al 1993:394). There are marked 
contrasts between standard and non-standard employment in terms of opportunities for skills 
development; career prospects and upward mobility; the quality and task discretion of jobs; the 
importance of motivation and loyalty; autonomy and responsibi lity in the labour process; the 
abi lity to affect changes in the workplace; the likelihood of having to carry the burdens of internal 
restructuring and external threats; and physical working conditions. In the words ofMANWU's 
general secretary: 
[aJs a casual worker, you could be employed for a week, a month or even a year - it a ll depends on the 
position and the company ... Management behaves very differently towards the casual workers. If a casual 
commits a offence, he is immediately dismissed, but the permanent worker is subjected to an internal 
disciplinary procedures. The casual workers don' t have any say. Whenever they complain about something, 
management just says: ' if that is the case, you can go back to the labour-hire company and they will send 
me another worker' ... Most of the people who are hired though the labour-hire companies don't have any 
benefits like pension, medical-aid, overtime, transport and housing subsidy. The employer finds this very 
cheap and, at the end of the day, he has no social responsibility towards these people ... When these workers 
get injured on the job, they usually lose their job because the companies will refuse to hi re them again 
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(27 /06/2002). 
The tenns and conditions of employment for non-standard workers can best be appreciated when 
they are contrasted with those of pennanent employees. A nation-wide survey of 656 employees 
explored the employment benefits of workers in SERs in some detail (Klerck and Murray 1997). 
A large majority of private sector employees receive most of the usual benefits, with medical-aid 
being the notable exception. Only 43% of the employees surveyed were members of a medical-
aid scheme. With regard to the other employment benefits, it is important to note that a relatively 
consistent group of employees (about 20%) do not receive annual bonuses or regular salary 
increases, paid or compassionate leave, overtime payor paid sick leave. The fact that these 
employees are mainly from small firms devoid of a trade union presence means that their 
employers are likely to persist in offering only the bare minimum of employment benefits. There 
also seems to be a general lack of emphasis on perfonnance-related pay: only 14% of the 
respondents received any productivity bonuses. This is indicative of both the reluctance by 
employers to involve employees in their efforts to increase productivity and the present inability 
of the unions to move beyond so-called bread-and-butter issues in collective bargaining (see 
chapter 6). The employment benefits of public sector workers are, in general, more extensive than 
those extended to employees in the private sector. In common with the private sector, however, 
a sizeable minority of public sector employees do not receive an annual salary increase, sick 
leave, medical-aid or overtime pay. 
The tenn 'casual' labour has gained widespread currency in Namibia. It carries connotations of 
an ' unusual' employment relationship as well as ' inferior' or 'sub-standard' work of a precarious 
nature. As such, the category of 'casual' combines work that is short-tenn and insecure with work 
that is more long-term and regular. While it may conflate the variety of employment relationships 
in terms of job security, the notion of casual labour does capture important aspects of practice. 
The value of the category of 'casual' work, as Campbell (1996:576) points out, lies in the fact 
that it highlights the existence of employees with long-term service for whom there appears no 
compelling grounds for denying the benefits and entitlements of permanent status. 
Despite a growing recognition of the importance of casualisation in contemporary workplace 
restructuring, its impact on employment conditions is poorly researched (Beneria and Roldan 
1987:14). This is due, in large measure, to the fact that the voices of non-standard employees 
have seldom been heard in the debates on employment ' flexibility '. These debates, as we noted 
above, are preoccupied with the concerns of management and exaggerate the homogeneity of 
employment outcomes occasioned by shifts in the supply of and demand for labour. Gallie et al 
(1998: 12) correctly note that "our detailed knowledge of the employment conditions of [non-
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standard employees 1 remains very imperfect". Many temporary and part-time workers in Nanlibia 
obtain work in the context of unspecified terms and conditions of employment. This regulatory 
'vacuum' grants employers an almost unbridled capacity to construct the detail ofNERs. The 
picture that emerges from the Young Christian Workers (YCW) survey of 173 casual workers 
is one of a workforce that has considerable continuity of employment and largely standard 
working hours, but is deprived of most of the other concomitants of the SER. 
Table 5.1 Key Indicators of Part-Time Employment in Namibia: 1999 
INDICATORS YES NO NO RESPONSE 
(%) (%) (%) 
Member of a Trade Union 9.8 64.2 26.0 
Work for Nine Hours and Less per Day 75.7 22.5 1.8 
Paid Overtime 34.1 37.6 28.3 
Work More than Three Days per Week 68.2 27.7 4.1 
Engaged in Shift Work 27.7 64.2 8.1 
More than Six Months Continuous Employment 66.5 28.9 4.6 
Work for More than One Employer 20.8 74.0 5.2 
Registered with Social Security 22.5 68.8 8.7 
Receive Regular Pay Increases 23.7 71.1 5.2 
Leave Entitlement 32.4 61.8 5.8 
Signed Contract of Employment 42.2 53.2 4.6 
Paid Treatment if Injured on the Job 26.0 66.5 7.5 
(Source: compiled from YCW 1999). 
The majority of casual workers are employed predominantly by the same employer, work on 
average nine hours per day and more than three days per week, and have been in continuous 
employment for more than six months (Table 5.1). This is a blatant contravention of section one 
of the Labour Act which defines a ' casual' employee as "a day worker who is employed by the 
same employer on not more than two days in any week". Most part-time workers are denied 
overtime pay, social security benefits, regular pay increases, vacational and sick leave, and 
compensation for occupational injuries and diseases. The overriding motives for the employment 
of casual workers therefore seem to be a reduction in employment costs a11d the evasion of 
statutory obligations rather than a putative search for greater 'flexibility'. In other words, there 
are few compelling reasons why these workers should be deprived of the benefits associated with 
permanent, full-time employment. A group HR manager in the retail sector admitted that "the 
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only difference between permanent and casual staff is that the casuals are not entitled to the 
benefits that the permanent staff get" (01107/2002). The overwhelming majority of casual 
workers were also not members of a trade union, depriving them of any collective agency to 
mediate in their employment relationship. Given the absence of minimum wage regulations and 
the lack of collective bargaining within the casualised segments of the labour market, there is 
little institutional brake on the downward pressure on employment conditions by employers. 
These initiatives add up to an emergent labour market strategy that places low-waged, poorly 
regulated labour at the forefront of attempts to improve competitiveness and reduce costs. The 
nature and incidence of non-standard employment are inclined to reflect the costs and constraints 
imposed on management by the prevailing systems of labour regulation. Terms and conditions 
of employment, the form of the employment contract, and other aspects of labour regulation will 
tend to reveal "the compromises between the distributional and production objectives of 
employers and the need to maintain an institutional framework necessary to sustain that 
compromise" (Rubery and Wilkinson 1994:30). There are, as we noted above, considerable 
pressures on and opportunities for employers in Namibia to cut costs by subverting aspects of the 
SER through the use of non-standard employees. For example, non-standard employment is 
widely utilised in an effort to undermine or evade the far-reaching statutory provisions on 
occupational health and safety. Many of the agency and part-time employees that were 
interviewed claimed that their work entailed health and safety risks: 
the working environment where casuals work is not good . If [the employers] say: ' here is a bad place that 
can hurt the permanent workers ' ; then they will bring in casual workers because they know that if you get 
hurt there, they will not be responsible for you (part-time worker - 07/07/2000). 
The employment conditions of less skilled agency temporaries bear many similarities with those 
of their casual or part-time counterparts. An important difference, however, lies in the manner 
in which the former ' s terms and conditions of employment are established and enforced. 
Acquiring labour through a temporary employment agency - as opposed to hiring casual workers 
directly - allows employers to shift some of the responsibility for management and employment 
benefits onto the labour broker. For instance, most employment agencies insist that their 
employees provide their own protective clothing, safety equipment, pensions, medical-aid and 
meals. These agencies ostensibly "negotiate with the client company on behalf of the workers" 
and allegedly have "the interests of our employees at heart" (manager, temporary employment 
agency - 05/07/2000). However, they are seldom in a position to dictate terms to the client-firm, 
survive largely on the basis of cost-competitiveness, and clearly have no interest in pricing their 
'product' out ofa cut-throat market. As the president of the Construction Industries Federation 
noted, 
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[clontrol over the subcontractors is written into the contracts. If they don't perform, then we don't perform. 
We have weekly meetings and the guys are monitored in terms of the programme that was agreed. 
Essentially, we are responsible and we must call the shots (18/07/2000). 
While the companies that supply cleaning, security and other subcontracted services do not 
regard themselves as temporary employment agencies and often provide their employees with 
some degree of employment security, they share many similarities with such agencies. Their 
workers lack job security and are deprived of most employment benefits, tend to be regarded as 
'outsiders' in the workplaces where they are employed, carry out many of the most menial tasks 
that require little or no training, and have minimal collective influence on their terms and 
conditions of employment. In addition, given the simple job ladder in the contracting firms, there 
are very few opportunities for promotion or advancement for their employees. Since contract 
agencies must ensure that the client-firm retains some of the returns to cost reductions generated 
by outsourcing service provision, they are under considerable pressure to offer their services at 
a lower cost than direct employment. These cost savings are largely attained at the expense of the 
subcontracted employees. 
Most subcontracted, temporary and part-time workers found themselves in non-standard jobs not 
because of their lifestyle or personality, as is often asserted by the proponents of 'flexibility', but 
because it was the only work available. The less skilled non-standard workers that were 
interviewed could not find any other jobs and regarded their employment as a last resort: "if you 
don't want to be a criminal or a beggar, you must take whatever job is available" (temporary 
employment agency worker - 12/07/2002). Hence, their 'subservience ' and 'compliance ' is 
founded on the pressures of wlemployment and poverty. As the manager of a temporary 
employment agency pointed out: "[t]here are hWldreds of [job] applications on my table and 
almost every day more people come in to apply for a job" (14/10/1998). The majority of agency 
temporaries were in a permanent job before they sought employment through a employment 
agency, while the rest moved from casual employment (LaRRl2000a: II). An informal network 
of friends and family members brought most of them in contact with a temporary employment 
agency. Part-time or casual workers are mostly residents in the urban areas, while many agency 
temporaries are migrants who left the rural areas in search of employment. Renting 
accommodation, buying food and sending remittances to family members in the rural areas 
account for the bulk of their income (LaRRl 2000a: 17). However, these workers remain 
dependent on food and clothing from their family, especially during periods when work is scarce. 
Likewise, casual workers tended to be young and depended on their parents or other family 
members for accommodation and other basic consumer goods. The income generated through 
employment is simply not sufficient to guarantee the autonomous social reproduction of non-
standard labour. At the bottom end of the labour market, as Deakin and Wilkinson (2000: 18) 
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argue, 
jobs tend to be classified as unskilled whatever their job content, trade unionism is weak or non-existent, 
and the law offers little, if any, protection. As a result, tenns and conditions of employment are poor, work 
is often casualised and non-standard forms of employment contracts are common ... At this level, jobs tend 
to be much more open to anyone, and therefore regular employees are thrown into competition with 
students and others who want temporary jobs to top up their income from other sources, and who are 
therefore prepared to accept wages below that necessary for self sufficiency. 
Not surprisingly, the most pressing concerns of non-standard employees are extremely low 
wages, considerable job and/or employment insecurity, and widespread abuse. Employment is 
very erratic leading to an unreliable flow of income and an inability to plan for the future, the 
wage-effort bargain is almost unilaterally determined by management and working conditions 
are extremely poor, leading to a pervasive sense of dissatisfaction and resentment. The less 
skilled part-time and temporary workers saw casualisation and outsourcing simply as the 
reintroduction of a despotic labour regime designed solely to increase the profits of employers. 
I get paid twenty five dollars for a day ' s work from seven in the morning to ten at night ... If you are sick 
on the day you are supposed to work, then you can just forget it. You wouldn't get paid for that day ... It 
is like slavery over there. We are treated like slaves ... The casuals can lose their jobs for anything. The 
bosses say that if you go, someone else will come in. And it is true ... They tell you: 'you are a casual and 
you must be satisfied with whatever money you get'. You don't get an increase. You stay just where you 
are (part-time worker - 15/07/2002). 
The work that we do is exhausting because the pennanent staff do all the easy jobs . Because of the long 
hours that we work, your body !eels like you are sixty [years' old] even though you are not yet thirty ... 
What do we have to show for all this work? Nothing. Only the bosses benefit from this labour hire 
(temporary agency employee - 02/07/2002). 
Subcontracted and temporary agency workers are employed to work in a workplace under a 
different employer from that of the employees around them. Research by Allen and Henry 
(1997: 189) shows that the "contract relationship gives the client's workforce the power to define 
itself as central and others as marginal, or subordinate, to [the firm's] activities". Non-standard 
employees are often deliberately kept separate from standard employees in the workplace. This 
social and physical separation is reflected in the lack of communication between non-standard 
employees and the permanent workforce; segregated canteen, changing and toilet facilities; and 
significant differences in the extent to which 'insiders' and ' outsiders' are able to influence 
relations in the workplace. In some cases, this led to tension and lateral conflict between these 
two groups of employees (see chapter 6). As a part-time employee noted: "[e]verybody is our 
boss at work, even the permanent workers" (06/07/2000). This bifurcation of the workplace is 
unlikely to change for as long as non-standard workers are too afraid to lodge complaints or get 
involved in industrial disputes: 
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[ylou don't negotiate with them. If you go to the manager to complain about something, they just tell you: 
' take your things and go'. That 's all. It is bener just to be quiet and to be satisfied with what you get 
(temporary agency employee - 19/10/ 1998). 
In contrast to the claims by the champions of the 'flexible firm' , non-standard workers in 
Namibia are a source of both numerical and functional flexibility. Casual and temporary workers 
are switched between jobs as and when the need arises. Most non-standard employees have little, 
if any, say in the type of work they are required to do. Managers are thus demanding an 
undifferentiated flexibility in which casual and temporary workers can be called on to carry out 
any tasks assigned to them. This is made relatively easy, as the mangers that were interviewed 
confirmed, by the fact that non-standard workers are not regarded as a part of the company's 
workforce and that their terms and conditions of employment are generally not open to 
negotiation. 
When non-standard employees are not working, they are not earning a living. Taking sick leave 
or having a holiday is therefore not only unpaid, but also fraught with risks in terms of regaining 
employment. In other words, non-standard work in Namibia is largely a no-frills-attached, take-
it-or-Ieave-it type of employment. 
There is no negotiation about how much money we wi ll get. I have never heard about salary increases for 
casual workers. They just stay the same ... You lose your job if you get sick. When you come back, they 
wi ll say: 'sorry, we've already taken someone else' ... We don't have to be treated different ly because we 
are doing different jobs. The bosses are just abusing casual workers (part-timeworker - 16/1 0/1 998). 
The way the managers are treating their casual workers is bad ... Sometimes we are harassed and threatened. 
But we cannot say anything because our wage is the only thing we are living on. The employers are taking 
advantage of that by saying: 'if you don't do what we tell you, then we will chase you away' ... As a casual 
worker, you don ' t even have the courage to talk if you see that something is wrong. If you talk and they take 
away your only bread, how will your family live? (part-time worker - 02/07/2002). 
The non-standard employees that were interviewed expressed an overwhelming desire for 
permanent employment and the benefits associated with it. This was confirmed by NAPWU's 
general secretary: "[w]hen you talk to these people, they tell you that casual workers want to be 
treated equally with the permanent workers" (12/07/2000) . A sizeable majority of agency 
temporaries, for example, have not received any wage increases, promotions or other 
improvements in their employment conditions. The overwhelming majority have also received 
no training. "We don 't provide any training and will only use a worker ifhe has the ability to do 
the job that the client wants" (manager, temporary employment agency - 05 /07/2000). Since there 
are few incentives for employers to invest in the training of these workers, they will become 
increasingly disadvantaged in the context of a growing demand for skilled labour. At best, they 
will remain in low-paid, dead-end jobs and, at worst, they will gradually drift into the ranks of 
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the long-term unemployed and marginalised. 
Perhaps the greatest abuse suffered by non-standard employees is the appallingly low rewards 
they receive for what is often extremely demanding work. The wages of agency temporaries, for 
instance, range from N$l. 79 to N$7.22 per hour for unskilled and manual labourers and about 
N$35 per hour for skilled workers (LaRRl2000a: 12-3). Between a third and three-quarters of this 
wage is retained by the temporary employment agency, depending largely on the skills of the 
worker and the terms of the contract with the client-firm. Non-standard workers in the service 
sector generally earned the lowest wages, indicating the impact of prevailing wage rates in 
different sectors. That employers can get away with paying such low wages reflects their almost 
unchecked power over non-standard employees in the lower reaches of the job market. This 
image of managerial autocracy is, however, limited to some extent. Workplace rules are applied 
in different ways to different workers. The more skilled, experienced and more strategically 
placed non-standard workers are not subjected to the same forms of discipline and control as their 
less skilled counterparts. 
5.3 THE OCCUPATIONAL DYNAMICS OF NON-STANDARD EMPLOYMENT: 
POWER, SKILL, AND AUTONOMY 
In the previous chapter, we showed how each industrial sector is confronted by a distinct set of 
opportunities and constraints in its markets, technology, organisation and forms of regulation. 
This led to a differentiated demand for non-standard employment between the various economic 
sectors. Shifts in the forms of employment have not only been uneven between industries, but 
have also been assimilated into pre-existing patterns of occupational segregation within industries 
(Elger 1987; Gallie et a11998; Spoonley et aI2002). Far from being uniform, the impact of 
changes in employment practices and the organisation of work is filtered through discrete 
occupational structures. Effort bargaining and supervision are also conducted in a differential 
manner across the occupational hierarchy. Hence, non-standard workers in different occupations 
face a diverse range of possibilities and liabilities that shape their levels and forms of 
participation in the labour market. The literature on the ' flexible' workforce tends to treat the 
various forms of non-standard employment as largely homogenous, thereby failing to account 
for the significant difference within and between them. Non-standard employment is unevenly 
distributed across the various skill categories and internally differentiated along two poles 
containing a number of variations: degrees of precariousness and degrees of externality (Rubery 
and Wilkinson 1981: 116-7). The different experiences of advantaged versus disadvantaged, 
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short-tenn versus long-tenn, skilled versus unskilled temporary and part-time workers highlight 
the heterogeneity of the' peripheral' workforce. Even where a single employer used different 
types of non-standard workers, 
it was rare for such workers to be doing the same sort of tasks for simi lar reasons. Employers did not switch 
between different sections of the periphery according to some calculus of changing relative advantage; 
instead, they were tapping different sorts of labour supply (with their characteristic advantages and 
disadvantages) to meet a range of distinct labour needs (Hunter ef a/1993:399). 
Like the study conducted by Gallie et al (1998), my research in Namibia shows that the different 
types of non-standard employment generate distinct types of flexibility, involve different 
implications for job security, and experience a differentiated degree and type of disadvantage. 
Occupational dynamics are particularly salient in this regard. An increasingly wide category of 
occupations has been opened up to casualisation with the expansion of the temporary 
employment industry. Non-standard employment is now an option for a wider range of employers 
across a broader range of occupations. The temporary employment industry is inserted into the 
economy in "complex, variegated and often locally contingent ways, 'colonizing' different 
segments of the labor market at differential rates and yielding not singular, but multiple and 
varied employment outcomes" (Peck and Theodore 2002: 154). This uneven penetration of non-
standard employment into occupational hierarchies and industrial sectors means that it performs 
a range of different functions across labour market segments and stages of the business cycle. 
Temporary, subcontracted and part-time employees are also subject to different productive and 
regulatory norms in different occupations. That is, the nature of the labour supply for each 
occupation is central to the forms of control management can exercise over it. 
The workers hired through a subcontracting agency and casual workers hired directly on a 
temporary or part-time basis are not readily interchangeable. Young, female employees with no 
experience of collective organisation are used mainly on part-time contracts; while slightly older 
males with little education or skills are more prominent in outsourced functions, with the 
exception of cleaning. Agency workers are found predominantly in manufacturing and mining. 
Casual or part-time workers, by contrast, are mostly concentrated in the service and tertiary 
sectors. Agency workers are often more costly than casual workers, but place less demands on 
the managers of the user firm. There is also less pressure to integrate agency workers into the 
permanent workforce than is the case with casual workers. As the HR manager of a beer and 
beverage manufacturer pointed out: "[tJhe unions want the casual workers to be employed 
permanently, but they have not raise the issue with regard to the labour-hire workers" 
(24/07/2000). 
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In contrast to the growing impOt1ance of numerical flexibility, few Namibian firms show any 
evidence of functional flexibility or multi-skilling. This is largely the product of a lack of 
commitment on the part of employers to develop the skills and participatory competencies 
necessary to establish a 'core' workforce as well as the significance attached to job demarcations 
by the trade unions (see chapter 6). As the general manager of a paint manufacturing plant noted, 
[c]ompanies have to be flexible if they want to survive. We would like to say that we are very flexible, but 
it is a learning curve for management as well. For example, we found that the unions are opposed to multi-
ski lling and want specific job descriptions for each worker. The low levels of expertise also make it 
extremely difficult to be flexible (0511111998). 
Numerically flexibility correlates strongly with the position of the job in an organisation's 
occupational hierarchy. The extent to which it is prudent for managers to rely on non-standard 
workers depends on the degree of specialisation and responsibility attached to the activities 
involved. Short-term, temporary workers are ideally suited to jobs that demand little skill, 
autonomy and experience. There are few, if any, incentives for employers to rely on non-standard 
workers in jobs that require considerable training and company-specific ski ll s. Employers have 
historically resorted to internal labour markets in an effort to retain the services of skilled and 
experienced staff. In Namibia, these measures are constrained by a context of historically low 
levels of investment in training and the resulting labour shortages in several skilled occupations. 
This has necessitated a reliance on external sources oflabour in some of the more skill-intensive 
occupations such as those associated with the installation, operation and maintenance of 
information technology (IT) systems. According to the general manager of an IT consultancy, 
[e]verything boi ls down to the lack of skills in Namibia ... Everybody is afraid that, as soon as they train 
a staff member, one of the big compan ies wi ll buy him ... Companies just don't have the people to serve 
their IT needs. That is why they subcontract us. We provide a quality service and remove the need for a 
company to search for emp loyees with the right skills. In a sense, we are their IT divis ion and we point out 
the direction in which they must go. The big corporates will still get a person to oversee the whole process, 
but you can count those with a self-sufficient IT department on your one hand. Even then, we can still get 
a maintenance contract out of them (14/07/2000). 
Insights into the distribution of non-standard employment shed light on the dynamics of labour 
regulation in the workplace. The internal labour market and the nature of employment conditions 
within a firm have a major bearing on the extent of and motivations behind the casualisation of 
labour. Equity considerations constrain the relative wages paid to employees within a single 
internal labour market. High-wage fimls cannot easily pay low wages to their own employees and 
low-wage firms cannot easily pay high wages to workers in selected occupation groups 
(Abrahams and Taylor \996) . Hence, the former are more likely to subcontract low-skill work 
while the latter are more likely to contract out high-skill services. While companies contract out 
low-skilled services as a way to reduce labour costs, they contract for more highly skilled tasks 
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in order to benefit from the economies of scale achieved by contract firms or the specialised 
expertise they offer. A striking feature of current restructuring, as we noted above, is that 
casualisation is penetrating ever deeper into the primary employment sectors. The survey on 
restructuring referred to above found that non-standard employees were spread across the 
occupational hierarchy: semi- and unskilled workers (59.4% of firms), skilled artisans (76.9%), 
clerical staff (71.4%) and professional staff (33.3%) (LaRRI 2001:65). MANWU' s general 
secretary confirmed this proliferation of non-standard employment across firms and occupations: 
[p]eople are losing their pennanentjobs across the country and then casual and labour-hire workers are 
brought in with no benefits, no job security and lower salaries. These workers are found in all the 
companies that we organise. They can also be found in any kind of job (27/06/2002). 
The growing collective strength of certain sectors of the labour market can be partly offset by 
tapping into labour sources lacking such power. Temporary employment agencies, casualisation 
and subcontracting in Namibia developed partly in response to the tighter controls on the SER 
imposed after independence. Faced with rising costs, most Namibian companies "don't cut into 
their profits, they cut their permanent employment" (director, economic research unit -
1111111998). The segmentation oflabour markets is clearly evident in situations where one sector 
of the workforce is spared some of the effects of rationalisation, which are then concentrated in 
other (socially-disadvantaged) sectors of the labour market. Raising one group of workers' 
income and lowering their work rates will, ceteris paribus, disadvantage another group of 
workers or fim1s by raising the prices of wage goods or raising taxes. That is, the ability to take 
advantage oflow-wage segments in the labour market "adjusts the terms of trade in favour of 
particular productive systems and the beneficiaries include workers in a strong bargaining 
position" (Wilkinson 1983:423). The trade-offs therefore operate not only between capital and 
labour or profits and wages, but also between different groups of workers and different firms. 
In most cases, you negotiate on behalf of the core members and the employer doesn ' t have a problem to 
give whatever increases you want because they only apply to a few people. Whatever you demand, you can 
reach an agreement with them because they know for a fact it is not going to affect them (general secretary, 
MANWU - 27/06/2002). 
If a manager has a problem with a casual or labour-hire worker, there is no procedure, sit down and talk. 
They just chase him away. They know that the union will not disturb them, so they can do just what they 
want to the casual workers. Because the managers cannot do these things to permanent workers, they are 
thinking that it is better to turn more pennanent jobs into casual jobs (regional organiser, NAFAU -
03/07/2002). 
The growing demand for skilled labour has raised salaries in the upper echelons of the labour 
market in line with South African levels, while trade union pressure has significantly increased 
the wages of many semi-skilled workers (Gaomab 1994:10) . The wages of unskilled workers, 
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by contrast, have remained largely static. As a result, those in the lower echelons of the job 
market are effectively excluded from the benefits of economic growth. These developments, as 
we can see in the table below, have reinforced the historically steep wage curve in the Namibian 
labour market. 
Table 5.2 Average Monthly Wages by Selected Occupation: 1992/93 
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY MONTHLY WAGES 
(N$) 
Managers and Professionals 4719 
Technicians 3403 
Craft and Related Workers 2211 
Plant and Machine Operators 1980 
Clerical Workers I 813 
Service Workers 1085 
Agricultural Workers 830 
Elementary Occupations 656 
(Source: adapted from MoL 1995:30). 
According to the Ministry of Labour (2002:51), legislators, senior officials and managers 
constitute 1.8% of the fomlal sector labour force; professionals account for 8.1 % of formal 
employment; technicians and associate professionals - 5.6%; clerical workers - 6.0%; services, 
shops and sales workers - 13.7%; agricultural and fishery workers - 24.7%; craft and trade 
workers - 14.1 %; machine operators and assemblers - 4.0%; and elementary occupations - 20.0%. 
The wages levels (Table 5.2) and occupational distribution (Table 5.3) of the workforce have a 
significant bearing on the spread of non-standard employment. The comparatively large numbers 
of professional and technical employees - most of whom are in permanent jobs - in the fishing, 
manufacturing, trade and hospitality industries means that cost savings need to be sought in other 
occupations. Employers in sectors such as fishing, mining, manufacturing, construction, retail 
and hospitality are increasingly recognising that the outsourcing andlor casualisation of some 
clerical and craft work can significantly reduce the overall costs of labour. The bulk of the trade 
unions' membership is comprised of semi-skilled, machine operators and assemblers . Besides 
the continuity and on-the-job experience required from workers in these occupations, organised 
opposition limits the extent to which these functions can be extemalised or casualised. With the 
exception of mining, there are significant numbers of workers in elementary occupations in all 
economic sectors. These occupational categories have borne the brunt of outsourcing and 
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casualisation. A part-time employee expressed a widely held opinion when she noted: " [ c ]asual 
workers are doing all the dirty and simple jobs" (06/07/2002). 
Table 5.3 Distribution of the Labour Force by Selected Occupations and Sectors: 2000 
OCCUPATION / Professionals Clerical Services, Craft and Machine Elem entary 
SECTOR and Workers Shops and Trade Operators Occupations 
Technicians Sales Workers and 
Workers Assemblers 
Agriculture 818 347 767 1571 806 2 1 094 
Fishing 780 691 450 266 385 I 505 
Mining and 44 1 289 146 1287 1219 176 
Quarrying 
Manufacturing I 075 876 2598 13751 I 142 I 871 
Construction 325 441 219 17178 596 2850 
Wholesale, Retail 1676 2724 24038 8087 805 7 164 
and Hospitality 
(Source: adapted from MoL 2002:53). 
The differentiation in employment relationships is generated by a series of industry- and 
occupation-specific recruitment policies that reflect and reinforce the hierarchical structuring of 
labour supplies. The impact of the wider technical and social divisions of labour on the 
occupational structure, according to Storper and Walker (1989 : 163), is revealed by the fact that 
the 
scope of the job depends both on the internal organ ization of work within the workplace and the external 
organization of production units into large OJ' small firm s, industries and territoria l clusters. Job 
specialization or generalization, variability or repetitiveness, depend on what role the worker, workplace, 
or firm is allocated in a larger production system. 
The occupational concentration of non-standard employees means that under certain conditions 
these workers neither supplement nor displace permanent employees. In parts of the 
manufacturing sector, for example, direct productive work remains relatively constant 
irrespective of the level of output. Uncertainty and variability are, however, centred in 
maintenance, storage, transport and despatch. Non-standard labour is used extensively in these 
functions. Some jobs are also less mechanised than others, leading to pockets of labour-intensive 
production. As a result, levels of demand in some occupations fluctuate more than others. 
Research by Michon (1987:47) shows that firms tend to retain those parts of the production 
process that are least sensitive to fluctuations and externalise the more variable and specialised 
functions. Outsourcing in Namibia is driven by similar considerations: 
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[b]y outsourcing functions such as despatch that fluctuate all the time, we have reduced our overheads and 
we can now look to the contractor when deliveries are not made on time ... All the functions that remain 
are a part of our continuous operations and have to be administered by us (HR manager, meat processing -
09/0712002). 
In the more technical processes of production, where it is difficult to monitor the amount of work 
done by each employee, employers are more dependent on the initiative and cooperation of the 
workforce. The routinised, transparent and low-skilled nature of routine service work, by 
contrast, is more readily amenable to simple monitoring, workers are more easily substituted, and 
their ability to resist the authority of the employer is reduced. In general, firms tend to 
"intemalize a limited range of activities central to their particular industry and to contract out less 
central tasks" (Anderson et aI1994 :515). Menial work with limited discretion and little, if any, 
career progression is concentrated in jobs such as cleaning, security and catering. 
We use a labour hire company to provide all our labourers. When I say 'labourer', I am talking about your 
cleaners, your packers and that type ofthing. We pay them a fixed amount and they supply us with labour 
when we need it (HR manager, beer and beverage manufacturer - 24/0712000). 
We hire our temps straight off the street. They don't do anything specialised, they are unskilled. All you 
need is someone who can respond to simple instructions (HR manager, meat processing - 04 /07/2002). 
The standardisation of routine support services has allowed some firms to specialise in supplying 
labour on multiple sites. The outsourcing of routine service work has led to the growth of large 
firms especially in the catering, cleaning and security functions (Rees and Fielder 1992; Allen 
and Henry 1996, 1997). The growth of this industry does not represent an increase in 
employment since much of it involves the transfer of jobs from one employer to another. In other 
words, outsourcing creates new lines of division in the workforce, rather than an expansion in 
employment. The transfer of employees and the related deepening of the social division oflabour 
lay the basis for the more precarious and less rewarding employment associated with 
subcontracting. Outsourcing allows employers to exploit differentials between minimum rates 
in the industry that covers the main business of the workplace and the rates in cleaning, catering 
and security. That is, the boundaries of the bargaining unit are shifted to exclude these workers 
from the prevailing in-house rates. The significance of these developments lies not in the actual 
number of jobs that are outsourced, but rather in the transfotmation of employment relationships 
occasioned by the externalisation of certain occupational categories and functions. For example, 
outsourcing arrangements allow managers to dispense with the need to negotiate job allocations 
and to ensure some job satisfaction. 
If you have an employee as a security guard, he may say: 'I'm afraid to stand at the gate and would much 
rather do something else'. With contract workers it is very different - they must go where they are sent. 
There is no negotiation with these worker and employers are not interested in gaining their loyalty (national 
organiser, NPSM - 02/1 III 998). 
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We bring in casuals to do specific jobs that would not be done in the nomlal course of events. For example, 
a huge truck arrives and has to be off-loaded or a cleaning job has to done. Instead of taking our guys off 
their jobs when they are very busy, we use the casuals for as long as the job takes. Besides, a machine 
operator will not off-load trucks. He will see that as beneath him. You really have to bring in casuals for 
any work that is not in the job description of your employees (general manager, paint manufacturer -
05/1 1/1998). 
The use of non-standard labour is differentiated not only in terms of sector and occupation, but 
also with regards to employment stability: from short-term contracts with agency workers in 
manufacturing to the semi-permanent status of part-time workers in retail and long-term 
subcontracting arrangements in basic services. In other words, a distinction must be made 
between full-time and part-time non-standard employees. "Some of them work for four or five 
years as a casual workers, while others are only hired for a few hours" (regional organiser, 
MANWU - 05/07/2002). While the former has some degree of job security and can be relatively 
sure of daily employment, the latter are employed strictly in accordance with demand. For 
example: 
[o]ur merchandisers are all temporary workers. Some ofthese people come in to do a specific job and then 
they go. Others are, you could say, permanently on a temporary basis. They work on three month contracts 
which are then usually renewed (HR manager, meat processing - 1011 1/1998). 
The job security of subcontracted workers is in principle limited to the duration of the 
outsourcing agreement, few of which last beyond three years . Although contracts are regularly 
renewed and new tenders are continuously received, there are no guarantees of employment 
security for individual workers. Subcontracted workers have no say in the renegotiation of 
contracts and may find a ' discount' agreed to with a client-firm has an impact on their wages. 
The employees of contract service agencies experience significantly greater security of 
employment when compared to agency temporary workers. Many of the former are also 
organised by a trade union, albeit usually from a different sector to that in which they are 
employed (see chapter 6). The quasi-permanent status of subcontracted workers generates 
employment relations that are both regular and insecure. When contracts are changed in cleaning 
and catering, for example, it is not unusual for the new service agency to take over the workers 
of the previous agency. This allows for considerable continuity and minimises training and 
induction costs. However, the client-firm and the contractor always reserve the right to exclude 
particular individuals from employment under a new contract. The dual dependency of these 
workers, as we noted above, means that they are subject to the dictates of both the client-firm and 
the contract service provider. 
Most of the larger firms in the economic sectors outlined above have outsourced some or all of 
the following services: catering, cleaning, maintenance, despatch and security. The low costs of 
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entry into the cleaning and security business in particular, has encourage the growth of service 
firms and the expansion of existing operators into these functions. As the manager of a temporary 
employment agency noted, 
[w]e are now taking over the security of the bigger firms to give them more room to manoeuvre ... I take 
the people to different branches. The security doesn' t get comfortable with one branch where they work 
every day. We move them regularly as we please. This prevents any familiarity with the permanent staff 
and stops them getting involved in any fraudulent activities (10107/2 002). 
These so-called ancillary services are inherently labour-intensive and provide few opportunities 
for increasing productivity by capital investment or innovation. Hence, it is essentially the 
intensification of labour and the degradation of tenns and conditions of employment that provide 
the cost savings from outsourcing these functions. Some contract service finns also enjoy 
economies of scale in the provision of specialised services that are not available to the client-
firm. The outsourcing of these services is therefore a strategy aimed more at cost reduction than 
at achieving greater 'flexibility' . This view is reinforced by the growing divide between the in-
house versus market price of labour to perfonn these services, especially in the larger firms. 
Although it is less widespread than the use of unskilled labourers in outsourced services such as 
cleaning, a reliance on skilled extemal services - ranging from engineering to IT and management 
consultancies - is fairly common among Namibian firms. 
Temporary and part-time employment should not be associated exclusively with work that is low 
in pay, skill, discretion, job satisfaction and security, readily monitored, easy to replace or 
peripheral to the establishment' s long-term success. l3 Temporary employment agencies offer a 
wh ole spectrum of skilled labour for employment on a subcontracted basis. Labour 
subcontracting reduces the costs management would have incurred in the training of 
directly-employed workers, by supplying labour that already possesses the necessary skills. The 
skills of a worker, and hence replaceability in the labour process, affect hislher leverage to extract 
greater rewards and autonomy from the employer. Michon (1987:33) shows how "relative 
negotiating powers ... always vary according to the type of job, whatever the firm under 
consideration". According to the proponents of labour market flexibility, the development of 
semi-pemlanent and lucrative relationships belie the connotations of insecurity and dependence 
associated with the term ' casual' labour. In practice, however, the much-vaunted benefits of 
' flexible' employment - namely, increased autonomy, greater job satisfaction, greater income, 
variety and so on - only apply to skilled, self-employed persons who voluntarily choose 
13 See: Holmes (1986); Lane (1989); Casey (1991 ); Klerck (1994); Gallie and White (1994); Jones (1996); 
Mhone (1998); Robinson (1999); MacKenzie (2000); and Crush el al (2001). 
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subcontracting or freelancing arrangements in preference to a SER, These benefits therefore 
derive almost entirely from the shortages of reliable and specialised skills, 
The casualisation of unskilled work draws on the labour of people with little other prospects of 
gaining full-time employment. As such, it represents the mobilisation of sources of labour that 
would otherwise not have been readily available for employment. Namibia' s colonial legacy 
ensured the availability of a pool of economically disenfranchised labour for employers to tap 
as and when demand dictates, Although there is no necessary association between non-standard 
work and work which is low paid, without entitlement to benefits and highly precarious, "the 
very fact of being so marginally attached to an organisation makes these conditions more likely 
to occur" (Dale and Bamford 1988: 192-3). As a regional organiser ofMUN noted, 
[aJs long as you have a pool of labour, ordinary labourers are in a hell of a problem. The only people that 
are currently safe are those in higher positions, like artisans, It is difficult to replace an artisan, but if you 
fire a labourer, the news will leak out and your office will be flooded the next day with people looking for 
ajob (02 /0712002), 
With skilled workers, labour subcontracting involves the exploitation of skill shortages rather 
than the exploitation of surplus labour supplies. The position of skilled (mainly white) 
subcontracted workers is very different from that of the less skilled (mainly black) labourers. 
There is a clear correlation between an employee's position within the occupational hierarchy and 
his/her levels of autonomy and control in the labour process. As Cappelli (\995) and Harley 
(1999) demonstrate, occupational differentials within firms are strongly related to the nature of 
the extemallabour market for each occupation, Notions of a craft identity and of difference were 
reinforced among the skilled subcontracted workers by the relatively high wages and degrees of 
independence and self-reliance they could demand and achieve. The wages of these workers are 
also far more open to bargaining than those of the unskilled and therefore more susceptible to 
regional and other variations, Firms are willing to pay high fees for specialist subcontractors 
since their use is based on need and not on costs, and contracts are strictly limited in duration. 
"Although it can be very expensive, we have to bring in specialists on a temporary basis when 
we don't have the necessary skills among our staff' (general manager, chocolate manufacturer -
041111\998). The relative scarcity of their expertise acts as a bulwark against more coercive 
forms of control and grants skilled subcontracted workers considerable leverage to shape their 
wage-effort bargain, Conversely, workplace rules for the less skilled non-standard employees are 
stricter, and penalties more frequent and severe. In fact, these workers were expected to be less 
reliable and less committed to the firm than their more skilled counterparts: 
[wJe bring in skilled contractors to do certain engineering and IT functions when it is necessary, These 
workers don ' t need a supervisor from the company to look over their shoulder to see if they are doing their 
309 
job. But the unskilled casual workers need someone to show them how the job must be done and to make 
sure everything is done correctly. You cannot just put them to work and hope that they wi ll do a good job 
(HR manager, beer and beverage manufacturer - 20107/2000). 
Most of the skilled agency workers were young and out to get experience, while older artisans 
were more inclined to be attracted to the security provided by a permanent job. In contrast to the 
relatively constant demand for unskilled labour, the need for skilled, subcontracted labour is 
subject to considerable variation. The labour brokers that were interviewed complained about 
acute fluctuations in the availability of certain skill categories. This reflects the highly uneven 
demand for particular artisans over time. The overall incidence of subcontracting in the skilled 
occupations, however, is comparatively low. "The level of temporary work for the more senior 
staff - that excludes labourers - is relatively low in Namibia and has remained the same over the 
years" (manager, temporary employment agency - 11107/2002). In part, this is a product of the 
eff0l1s by Namibian employers to retain the services of as many skilled employees as is necessary 
in the face of severe skill shortages. Several of the managerial respondents emphasised the 
importance of maintaining low levels oflabour tum-over in the higher rungs of the occupational 
hierarchy in their firms. 
The are important differences in the experiences of skilled and unskilled temporary workers with 
regard to job characteristics and demands, task and working hours variability, terms and 
conditions of employment, the nature and level of supervision, discretionary power and so on. 
In direct contrast to the unskilled labourers, the more skilled workers sometimes refused to do 
any work other than on a subcontract basis. According to the manager of a temporary 
employment agency, many of the skilled workers supplied by his agency are "not interested in 
working on the same job, in same company, day in and day out" (OSI07/2000). The skilled agency 
temporaries generally have the ability to obtain permanent employment if they so desired. In 
contrast, the unskilled temporary workers were largely confined to precarious jobs with few 
prospects for upward mobility. Whereas the focus of the labour broker is primarily on client 
satisfaction in the case of the less skilled workers, employee satisfaction becomes vitally 
important with the more skilled workers. For example, unlike the skilled workers, the less skilled 
have no claims to a particular type of work: 
[y]ou just wait for ajob to come up. If someone phones in, [the labour broker] just says: 'there is a job, get 
on the truck ' . You don' t know where you're going to, what type of job you will do, or anyth ing like that 
(temporary agency worker - 13/07/2002). 
The occupational dynamics of skilled temporary work are very similar to those of skilled 
permanent work. Skilled subcontracted workers are, for instance, more likely to get a fixed-term 
contract renewed, less prone to short-notice dismissals and less vulnerable to unemployment, less 
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likely to remain without work for extended periods, and are generally not regarded as 'outsiders' 
and are often firmly integrated into the permanent workforce. For those in low-paid, non-standard 
jobs at the bottom of the labour market, "employment risk is something which traps, whereas for 
those with tradeable skills higher up the income scale, risk may open up more opportunities than 
it closes down" (Allen and Henry 1997: 194). Skilled non-standard employees often enjoy a 
significant degree of autonomy and choice in the way that they conduct their working lives 
(Spoonley el al 2002). In other words, there are significant variations in the extent to which 
skilled and less skilled workers are made to carry the burdens of 'flexibility'. 
Skilled subcontracted workers are able to combine the 'freedom' of casual engagement with the 
'protection' of employment conditions that closely parallel or even exceed those associated with 
standard employment contracts. Their ability to shift between firms almost at wi ll compels 
management to gain their cooperation and to accord them high status in the workplace. There are 
much closer relations and greater significance attached to trust between skilled temporary 
workers and the agencies that supply their labour. These workers also have much greater input 
into decisions affecting their terms and conditions of employment. This implies that skilled and 
less skilled agency workers are differently flexible: "agency-client relations are conducted 
differently, allocation and reward systems are institutionalised differently, [and] labour control 
regimes are configured differently" (Peck and Theodore 1998:671). Tying numerical flexibility 
to all employment contracts other than full-time, pelmanent work does not allow for an adequate 
appreciation of these internal differentiations in non-standard employment. Moreover, there is 
very little evidence of a new approach to employment but rather more of "opportunism related 
to labour market advantage for some and lack of any other option for others" (McKeown 
2003:184). The opportunities available to, and the constraints imposed on, the individual through 
non-standard employment vary significantly depending on hislher skills and degree of autonomy 
and control in the workplace. 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
With a few notable exceptions, workers employed on non-standard employment contracts tend 
to eam the lowest wages, receive the most rudimentary employment benefits, and have to endure 
the worst employment conditions. The exclusion of non-standard workers from collective 
bargaining and statutory protective measures has allowed employers to subject them to a highly 
autocratic system of labour regulation, legitimised by the trappings of the law contract. The 
prominence of the common law contract of employment in the system of colonial despotism has 
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survived in the regulation of NERs after independence. As Deakin (2001 :24) points out, "the 
legacy of master and servant was the assimilation by the common law of a hierarchical, 
disciplinary model of service". The non-standard workers that were interviewed indicated that 
they have very few rights in the workplace and felt that the government and the trade unions had 
abandoned them. In other words, the casualisation of employment in Namibia is a product of 
managerial power rather than labour preference. Most workers on non-standard employment 
contracts are unable to develop the skills and work experience necessary to allow them access 
to higher-quality jobs. Hence, the labour market operates in such a way as to 'trap' many of these 
workers at the bottom end of the labour market where real wages are static or declining, labour 
regulati on is coercive and despotic, career ladders are non-existent or truncated, and employment 
insecurity is a pemlanent feature of the job. The lack of industry-wide regulation also means that 
there is no opportunity to spread the risks and costs of labour market adjustment beyond 
individual firms (e.g. multi-employer training). This clearly limits the extent to which labour 
market actors can pursue policies that are conducive to efficiency and equity. The prevailing 
legal and institutional framework in Namibia has clearly failed to prevent employers from using 
non-standard workers as a source of low-cost labour and employing them on markedly inferior 
terms. Not only is there a need for existing employment rights to be restructured, but a new 
approach to their enforcement and application needs to be found. 
The incidence and distribution of non-standard employment reflect the need of managers for 
employment practices aimed at decreasing the impact of uncertainty in the market, increasing the 
stabi lity of the permanent workforce, and enhancing their power over the use and deployment of 
labour in the lower reaches of the occupational hierarchy. Employers cannot, however, employ 
any fOffi1 oflabour with impunity and are restricted in their employment practices by prevailing 
social norms, labour laws and organised labour. Labour market segmentation is therefore the 
complex outcome of resistance and accommodation between the different fractions of both 
capital and labour. The vital role ofthejorm that an employment relationship assumes becomes 
patently evident when we compare the conditions of non-standard workers to those employed in 
full-time jobs doing similar work, in the same or similar institutions. The different rules in the 
labour market for standard and non-standard employees underpin the growing differentiation 
between the regulation ofSERs (law and collective bargaining) and NERs (contract and market). 
As Sayer (1995:142) points out, the tensions between strengthening labour and making firms 
more competitive need to be interpreted not only in terms of the 'vertical ' relations of class and 
class struggle, but also in terms of the 'horizontal' relations between different workers and 
different production systems. 
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An overriding concern with labour market 'flexibility' and 'rigidity' serves to obscure other, 
more important determinants of casualisation and outsourcing such as the exploitation of 
inconsistencies and silences in the prevailing patterns of statutory and collective regulation. 
Changes in the regulation of the labour market are shaped and reinforced by the balance of 
powers in the workplace, leading almost invariably to distinct winners and losers. A prominent, 
long-term effect of the proliferation of non-standard employment is a greater polarisation 
between the opportunities, wages and benefits of 'insiders' and 'outsiders' . A relatively durable 
mode of labour regulation endeavours to achieve a sustainable compromise between two 
conflicting demands: transforming industrial relations to enhance competitiveness and avoiding 
the excesses that stem from unconstrained competition. Labour market 'flexibility', however, 
rarely promotes economic efficiency in a way that is compatible with greater social equality. It 
is a largely defensive measure to cope with the uncertainties generated by the economic crisis 
rather than a means to overcome the crisis itself (Boyer 1991). As such, the search for a 
regulatory 'fix' in the form of employment flexibility is a symptom of, rather than a solution to, 
the crisis. This is clearly the case in Namibia where a central dynamic of workplace restructuring 
is the pursuit of numerical flexibility (i.e . a reduction in the costs of and obstacles to hiring and 
firing workers) rather that functional flexibility (i.e. multi-skilling through a reduction in job 
demarcations). The literature on managerial 'best practice' is a poor guide to and a negligible 
impetus for actual changes in work and employment. Given the varied and uneven distribution 
of non-standard employment across industries and occupations, for instance, 
changing patterns oflabour regulation cannot be conceptualised as either a process of 'progression towards 
best practice' or as 'random deviations from best practice' ". [AJ range of sector-specific factors (product 
market conditions, the composition of capital, levels of unionization, and traditions of representation) is 
the key 'determinants' of new and ever more varied patterns of management-labour relations (Barton and 
Turnbull 2002: 153). 
Changes in employment practices have been gradual and largely in response to external pressures 
and opportunities, rather than a coherent and integrated component of managerial strategy. The 
management of non-standard employment is shaped by a range of contingent factors that can only 
be revealed through an empirical investigation of its form and functions in different industrial 
and occupational settings. That is, we need to study the circumstances that allow distinct forms 
of workplace controls to emerge. Although a national system of labour regulation has an 
important contextual impact on workplace relations, the latter are still reflected in and mediated 
by product market, firm and plant characteristics. Different forms or sites of regulation do not 
only follow different logics, draw on different resources and cover differing aspects of the 
employment relationship; but also mobilise and rely on different tools of legitimation and 
structure the wage-effort bargain in distinctive ways across the occupational hierarchy. 
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6 
ORGANISING THE NON-STANDARD 
WORKFORCE: CLASS SOLIDARITY, TRADE 
UNION STRATEGIES, AND LABOUR MARKET 
SEGMENTATION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Internationally, the current conjuncture is one in which the labour movements of many countries 
are under attack, trade unionism is on the decline in its traditional strongholds, and management 
has seized the initiative in both the restructuring of production and the transformation of 
regulatory structures in the workplace. The rise of a so-called 'flexible' workforce marks the 
movement from a dominant pattern in which internal labour markets shielded workers from 
market forces, to employment relationships where pressures fTom product and labour markets are 
used to mediate the labour-management relationship. As just-in-time organisation of inventory 
and production has spread, so too has 'just-in-time' human resource (HR) management. The net 
result is a growing class of truly 'disposable' employees. In the words of Catalano (1999:36): 
"[I]abour relations today reveal a segmented world of labour, full of oppositions and exclusions". 
The anxieties and uncertainties generated by these changes have undermined the participatory 
impulses of new managerial strategies and made it increasingly difficult for employers to retain 
the commitment and cooperation of their workforce (Pollert 1988; Harrison 1994; Moody 1997). 
The track-record of policies geared towards increasing the 'flexibility' of the labour market also 
reveals that relatively little is achieved in terms of the alleviation of poverty, skill shortages or 
structural unemployment. 
An emergent pattern of non-standard work that is no longer location-specific, time-bound and 
male dominated, according to Gottfried (1994:103), "poses a challenge to the adequacy of labour 
process concepts ... [that] continue to assume a traditional work setting with a prototypical male 
worker". Social relations in the workplace are increasingly structured in a manner whereby 
advantage and disadvantage, control and autonomy, efficiency and equity are patterned by the 
regulatory distinction between standard and non-standard employment. The use of non-standard 
employees constitutes, in part, an attempt by employers to evade the statutory and collective 
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protective measures designed to stabilise the standard employment relationship (SER) by 
constructing new zones of 'flexibility'. In the words of Nolan and Walsh (1995 :60): 
[tlhe compelling equation [in labour regulation] which linked internal labour markets with increased 
employee commitment and greater production and transactions cost efficiency came under siege from New 
Right theorists committed to the law of contract, deregulation and employment flexibility. 
By defending the SER, as Miickenberger (1989:219) notes, the unions have come to focus 
exclusively on its positive or protective function, thereby neglecting its negative or exclusionary 
character. The multiplication of divisions among workers poses a grave challenge to the unions. 
As fault lines develop among workers, union capacities for effective action are severely tested 
as "established foundations for solidaristic social and political action are eroded" (Yates 
1998: 120). On the basis of a cross-national survey, Golden and Pontussen argue that "sectional 
and centrifugal conflicts among groups of workers and their organizational representatives .. . 
[are] driven by the material fragmentation of working-class interests and the more acute 
competition for wages and jobs" (cited in Hyman 1994c: 14). Despite some notable exceptions, 
union policies to combat the increasing differentiation in terms and conditions of employment 
have met with very little success. These divisions have become especially portentous in Namibia, 
where employers ' primary target for casualisation and outsourcing is those sectors of the 
occupational hierarchy that have historically been fruitful union recruiting grounds. Such 
employment practices amount to a drastic recasting of the balance between economic 
competitiveness and social equality in the lower reaches of the labour market. If the trade unions 
in Namibia are to expand their influence and consolidate their gains, an effective strategy to 
confront the casualisation of work needs to be sought. Such a strategy should address the causes 
and not merely the symptoms of casualisation. An effective response to the casualisation of work 
is premised as much on the strategic resources of the labour movement as it is on an adequate 
conception of the labour market processes that generate the supply of and demand for non-
standard labour. 
In contrast to the preoccupation with managerial concerns in much of the burgeoning literature 
on employment 'flexibility', not much has been written on trade union responses to casualisation 
and outsourcing. Employees and their organisations are not just passive victims. They can take 
action by anticipating or responding to managerial initiatives, propose counter-measures and 
develop strategies that limit management's capacity for strategic action or shift the substance of 
its policies. In this chapter, we highlight the challenges confronting the trade unions as a result 
of the growing proportion of workers falling outside the structures of collective regulation in the 
workplace. First, we consider the impact of the proliferation of non-standard employment and 
the increasing differentiation in employee interests on trade union solidarity. Second, we outline 
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some of the benefits of and limits to casualisation and outsourcing. Effective trade union 
responses to non-standard employment need to be informed by an understanding of the factors 
that reinforce or limit casualisation and outsourcing. Third, we outline the strategies developed 
by trade unions to deal with the growing presence of non-standard employees in the workplace. 
Here a basic distinction is drawn between strategies that aim to incorporate these workers and 
those that exclude them. Finally, we consider the relationship between the above-mentioned 
strategies and different ' types' of trade unionism. It is suggested that there are strong links 
between the various trade union 'identities' and the strategies of representation that they can and 
do pursue. 
6.2 TRADE UNIONS AND THE SEGMENTED WORKFORCE: SECTIONALISM 
OR SOLIDARITY? 
Several studies have identified a 'crisis of representation' stemming from the difficulties that the 
unions face in finding a common strategy for an increasingly heterogenous workforce, 
aggregating the growing diversity in employee values and interests, and representing workers in 
precarious jobs whose interests differ from or even confl ict with those of employees in stable 
jobs.' A characteristic shared by the various forms of non-standard employment is that they are 
invariably unorganised and commonly excluded from the structures of representation in the 
workplace. These employees are rarely in a job long enough "to earn entitlement to occupational 
welfare, social security, or even privatized benefits , let alone long enough to develop the 
confidence to join or form unions" (Standing 1993:433). An almost inevitable result of this lack 
of collective influence on terms and conditions of employment is that these workers tend to 
remain in non-standard employment. The people in non-standard jobs are widely dispersed across 
the labour market; concentrated in jobs and sectors that have historically proved difficult to 
organise; denied access to established industrial relations procedures; and less likely to perceive 
themselves as sharing common interests with organised employees, participate in trade union 
activities, and identify with the labour movement.' The heterogeneity of this workforce has also 
compounded the problems of interest representation faced by the unions. Despite some efforts 
at organising agency temporaries and casual workers in countries such as Germany, Canada, 
France, Korea, South Africa and Chile, no meaningful gains have yet been made in this regard. 
, See: Brown (1986); Fulcher (1991); Hyman (1992); Goss (1994); Heery and Kelly (1995); Legge (1995); 
Wrench and Virdee (1996); Catalano (1999); Fudge and Vasko (200 I); Richards (200 I); and ILO (2002). 
, See: Dickens (1988); Delsen (1990); Zeytinoglu (1994) ; Coll ing (1995); Campbell (1996); Wrench and 
Virdee (1996); Heery (1998); Heery and Abbott (2000); Richards (200 I); and Klerck (2002). 
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The fact that the standard versus non-standard employment divide is largely conterminous with 
that between organised and unorganised employees raises the question of trade union complicity 
in labour market segmentation. According to Hyman (200 I: 170-1), 
the type of solidarity underlying twentieth-century trade unionism reflected and replicated on the one hand 
the discip line and standardization imposed by 'Fordist' mass production, on the other the patterns of 
differentiation within the working class between those who were central to this production process and 
those who were more marginal. 
Non-standard workers represent a significant and growing proportion of the workforce in many 
countries and often find themselves in "conditions comparable to those of yesterday' s proletariat" 
(lLO 2002:355). In general, non-standard employees earn the lowest wages; are exposed to the 
greatest risk of injury or disease at the workplace; have the longest hours of work, shortest 
holidays and most unsociable hours; enjoy few if any non-wage benefits; and are confined to the 
most menial and routine tasks. They are also subject to a range of other regulations and 
conditions that reinforce their subordinate status: rigid time management, little formal autonomy 
and decision-making power, low levels of education and training, and relatively little political 
or cultural influence. Moreover, the social processes that relegate less ski lled non-standard 
employees to secondary jobs minimise their power in both the labour market and labour process, 
thereby constraining their participation in institutionalised labour conflict. Research shows that 
non-standard employees are unable to engage effectively in forms of struggle that presuppose 
detailed knowledge of company policies and procedures (such as work-to-rule), that depend on 
the ability to engage in non-productive activities (such as extended lunch breaks), and that rely 
on the solidarity offellow employees (such as work stoppages) (Gottfried 1994). The capacity 
for resistance and the form that it is likely to assume tend to vary between different forms of non-
standard employees. For example: the conflict of interests between the client-film and the 
temporary employment agency, among the agencies themselves, between capital and labour, and 
the contradictions embedded in dualistic control, grants agency temporaries some space for 
' informal' or 'hidden' resistance: 
[IJearning the score implicates workers in the regulation of production, but also contributes to a repository 
of knowledge which becomes the pragmatic grounds enabling worker resistance ... While everyday 
activities on the shopfloor generate counter-hegemonic practices, these practices may take less visible fonns 
. especially among contingent workers like temporary clericals. Labour process theorists have not 
conceptualized adequately the disruptive potential of these seemingly mundane and less visible practices 
that constitute everyday acts of resistance (Gottfried 1994: 121). 
It is now routinely argued that organised labour's historic role as a class-conscious and cohesive 
movement has been eclipsed as the working class is increasingly fragmented into competing 
groups with no common, objective class interests. Widening ideological divisions between and 
within trade union federations, as well as the growing fragmentation of social identities among 
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employees, are said to present insurmountable obstacles to the construction of an inclusive, class-
based solidarity. In addition, hostile economic and political conditions have encouraged a more 
inward-looking approach as organisational survival becomes a key union objective. New, 
employer-led initiatives in the management of human resources have also reconfigured the 
relationship between individualism and collectivism (Storey and Bacon 1993). As the workforce 
has become increasingly differentiated, workers' interests and demands seem less amenable to 
a collective approach. Throughout much of the twentieth century, 
unions, as the historical fonn of worker representation, have developed a variety of social functions. Such 
functions have varied from representing the aspirations and claims of a relatively homogeneous social group 
- creating its identity, framing its solidarity and integrating its members into a society which excluded them 
- to contributing to the system's social regulation by transforming individual interests into collective ones 
and the latter into su itable proposals for collective bargaining (Catalano 1999:27-8). 
Socio-economic and political changes over the last two decades in particular have drastically 
curtailed the efficacy of these functions. A failure to radically alter prevailing forms of interest 
representation will, in all likelihood, result in a widening rift between a large and diverse group 
of margin ali sed 'outsiders' and a trade union movement confined to a small and privileged group 
of' insiders'. This, in tum, will encourage a profound dislocation of trade unions from the needs 
and interests of the non-standard workforce. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, trade union practice 
seems primarily orientated to defending "the relative advantages of the stronger sections of the 
working class against possible encroachment by the weaker (whether unionized or not), rather 
than challenging the system on behalf of the class as a whole" (Hyman 1996:68). This is clearly 
evident in, anlong others, the extent to which the interests of outsiders do not have a bearing on 
the bargaining practices of insiders (Cousins 1999:114). As a result, the consequences of 
excessive wage demands (such as job losses) have to be accommodated by a buffer of 
disadvantaged (often non-standard) workers . Since independence, the trade unions in Namibia 
have not escaped similar condemnation. They are reproached, from various quarters, for 
intensifying rather than ameliorating the processes of social polarisation: 
[tlhese bureaucrats in the labour movement think increas ing salaries by fifteen percent is it. At the same 
time, they are prepared to see a hundred people retrenched to afford that. All they have learnt is to demand 
more money ... Then you ask yourself if that is not advocating the labour aristocracy concept of the past 
... At the end of the day, you have to ask the unions: ' who are you representing?' Our employment rate is 
decl ining and declining. We have thirty percent of people in employment represented by you as trade 
unions and the rest, the maj ority of the population, is marginalised (director, economic research unit -
1111 111998). 
The core-periphery distinction within the workplace has been generalised to the level of social 
stratification as a whole by the notion oflabour market 'dualism' (Fulcher 1991:256). This notion 
implies that class-based strategies by the unions are no longer an effective means of bridging the 
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divide between a shrinking organised workforce and a growing "disprivileged underclass of 
employees" (Lane 1989:605). The suggestion that the trade union movement is antiquated or 
obsolete because it represents the conflicts of a bygone era - whereas new social movements 
express the realities of a post-modern, post-industrial society - has come in for considerable 
criticism (Munck 1999; Van Gyes et ai2001; Neary 2002). The idea of the labour movement 
being irretrievably divided today as a result of the disaggregation of the working class is 
juxtaposed, as Hyman (l994b: 159) puts it, to "a golden age when workers were spontaneously 
collectivist, and labour organizations joined ranks behind a unifYIng class project". In reality, 
however, trade unions have never been monolithic entities in terms of political goals and 
ideological orientations. The solidarity-sectionalism dialectic suggests that the labour movement 
is neither intrinsically and irretrievably divided nor inherently and inevitably unified. 
The strategies and tactics of unions reflect the complex interaction between the two 'faces' of 
trade unionism (Flanders 1968). The "vested interest" face is characterised by a narrow, 
defensive preoccupation with the economic concerns of organised employees in the workplace; 
whereas the "sword of justice" face involves a broader, socio-political role normally pursued 
nationally to influence the government and public opinion on behalf of most if not all workers. 
Unions have historically demonstrated exclusive tendencies just as often as inclusive ones. Given 
the fact that many of the grievances workers have are local in origin and character, 'sectionalism' 
may be seen as "a normal and pervasive feature of trade unionism" (Kelly 1988: 146). Trade 
union representativeness concerns the balance between unity and division in the labour 
movement - i.e. the inter- and intra-union dynamics of solidarity and sectionalism (Hyman 
1994c: 11). Trade union solidarity has always been a contingent, contradictory and socially 
constructed phenomenon built on local foundations: "there are no short-cuts to the identification 
and (re )definition of interests in a solidaristic manner; it is always necessary to campaign and 
struggle for (relative) unity among workers and their organisations" (Hyman 1992: 166). By 
representing a pa11icular category of workers and, by extension, excluding others, each union 
gives institutional expression to a particular set of common interests and excludes others (Heery 
and Kelly 1995:163). In compartmentalising workers, as Hyman (2001: 170) argues, trade unions 
also compartmentalise solidarity. 
The negotiation of order in the workplace rests as much on the relations between organisations, 
occupations and industries as those within them (Fox and Flanders 1969: 164-5). This raises an 
issue muted in much of the industrial relations literature: the distribution of rewards and 
privileges within classes. The multiplicity of interest groups in the labour market will inevitably 
be neglected if attention is focused solely on the 'vertical' relations in the workplace between 
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capital and labour. The regulatory systems governing employment relationships have never 
determined only the distribution of rewards and privileges as between capital and labour, The 
distribution of power and resources necessarily impacts on the comparative fortunes of different 
groups of employees. Since employees are not a homogenous category, we cannot ignore the 
jostling for advantage that takes place between groups of workers, Advantages secured by 
powerful groups may be at the absolute or relative expense of weaker groups, The latter are 
therefore "in a sense victims ofthe successful collective organization of other (more powerful) 
groups of workers, their own organizational weakness being both cause and consequence of their 
marginal position in the labor market" (Peck 1996:68). Crouch also argues that "if unions 
primarily represent the secure work force, their co-operation in restructuring may be bought 
precisely by requiring insecure groups to bear the brunt of adjustment" (cited in Richards 
2001 :24), The contradictory effects of such exclusionary practices can be seen in the fact that 
they entail both costs (divides and weakens the workforce) and rewards (lessens the impact of 
the reserve army and market forces) for organised labour. 
Association in trade unions for the purpose of collective representation of interests reflects an 
attempt by wage labourers to overcome the power imbalances they experiences as individuals in 
the workplace. "Although trade unions can thus assume a certain protective function vis-a-vis 
their membership, their influence on industrial relations and the capitalist system in general is 
all too frequently overestimated" (Schienstock 1981 : 182). Despite the much vaunted power of 
the unions, the salience of sectoral and occupational variations in employment conditions 
suggests the ovelTiding influence of market forces, The organisation of workers in trade unions 
cannot fully overrule the law that the market price of a commodity reflects the relation between 
supply and demand. The material and ideological dominance deriving from the ownership and 
control of capital is such, Fox (1974:276) argues, that unions normally challenge the "real roots 
of ownership, inequality, hierarchy, and privilege" only at the margins. To be sure, negotiations 
with employees and trade unions are generally confined to the outcomes of managerial decisions, 
The fact that trade unionism has generally proved incapable of having a decisive influence on the 
power relationships governing the labour market and labour process must also be linked to the 
role of the state in institutional formation and mediation, It is only by restricting the wage 
demands oftrade unions and containing their socio-political demands within the parameters of 
a capitalist economy that the state can succeed in its regulatory functions - i,e, maintaining the 
stabi lity of the system. 'Legitimate' trade unions demands are limited to ones that can be 
accommodated within a 'free market' economy and the conflict oyer wage levels is prevented 
from escalating into a struggle for the abolition of the wage system itself. 
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There are two aspects to the power of a trade union that are dialectically related: internal and 
external strength (Fox and Flanders 1969: 155). The first is expressed in the power of a union's 
internal membership sanctions, its power as an organisation over its members, and its means of 
securing compliance with its decisions. The second lies in the external sanctions it can bring to 
bear on ernployers and the state in negotiations or to compel them to observe agreements. These 
two systems of sanctions develop in conjunction: a union that is internally weak is usually also 
externally weak and unions cannot be deprived of their external strength without weakening them 
internally as well. Since external influence and internal democracy are often at odds, a challenge 
confronting the unions is how intra-organisational relations can be made to strengthen inter-
organisational relations and vice versa. When union leaders are not strong enough to act 
effectively as the 'managers of discontent' , then "an essential part of the mechanism of social 
control, on which [the state and employers] rely for order in industry, breaks down" (Fox and 
Flanders 1969: 156). To extract concessions from external parties through a process of inter-
organisational exchange, the leadership of a trade union must have sufficient control over its own 
intra-organisational processes. It needs to bring the divergent and potentially conflicting interests 
of its members under an acceptable, common banner and be able to mobilise its members to 
support the collective demands. That is, the credibility of unions as bargaining partners depends 
on the extent to which they can compel their members to comply with the provisions of collective 
agreements. As Hyman (1975 :65) puts it, it is only through the power over its members that a 
trade union is able to exert power f or them. 
Richards (2001) argues that the 'crisis of representation' confronting the umons has two 
components: a crisis of identity stemming from changes in the internal composition of organised 
labour and a crisis of solidarity flowing from the difficulties faced by the unions in maintaining 
the unity of an increasingly disparate constituency and between unionised and non-unionised 
workers. ' The unions ' loss of power and legitimacy, according to Catalano (1999:39), has been 
"a loss of the capacity to communicate and construct common worlds among workers, society 
and system". This is not, however, a 'crisis of trade unionism' but rather "a crisis ofa specific, 
narrowly based type of trade unionism" (Hyman 1994b: 113). In Africa, as elsewhere, there have 
been numerous calls for new forms of trade unionism that articulate a wider set of interests 
(Mihyo and Schiphorst 1995). Addressing the needs and interests of an increasingly heterogenous 
workforce requires both more inclusive structures at the workplace and a more active role in 
policy issues beyond the workplace. As we noted in chapter 5, prevailing systems of labour 
, Similarly, MUller-Jentsch (! 988: 177-8) identifies three dimensions to the challenge confronting the labour 
movement: (a) a crisis of interest aggregation, (b) a crisis of workers' loyalty to the union, and (c) a crisis of union 
representation, 
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market regulation have a significant bearing on the types of 'flexibility' that employers may 
pursue. Consequently, the pursuit of 'flexible' labour market policies constrain the strategies and 
tactics of the labour movement tllat are rooted in established regulatory regimes. A militant and 
competitive type of 'job-control ' unionism is particularly under threat from these developments. 
A study of the interaction between the labour market and the restructuring of employment at the 
level of the firm will reveal that non-standard forms of work often involve a shift from areas of 
relative union strength to areas of relative union weakness in terms of trade union influence and 
density. As a result, growing sections of the workforce fall outside the protections offered by 
union membership and collective bargaining. An increasing gap between the in-house versus the 
market price of labour available to perform especially low-skill services has led to a growing 
reliance on external sources of labour. 
Working class fragmentation is not a new phenomenon. Although it may assume different forms, 
the perennial tension between unity and division within the union movement is rarely, if ever, 
resolved decisively in favour of an unremitting solidarity. Hyman (1992) outlines an inverted U-
curve of unionisation that reflects variations in employment status and labour market position. 
Employees with professional qualifications or high levels of technical expertise may perceive 
little need for trade union support; while the growing number of workers in precarious forms of 
employment lack the resources and cohesion for collective organisation. Unions have historically 
been strongest among intermediate categories of employment such as semi-skilled manufacturing 
workers. The labour movement is thus flanked by two significant groups of non-unionised 
employees: the rising middle layers of skilled, white-collar and semi-professional workers and 
the increasing number of people in non-standard employment. The latter can potentially form a 
bridge between the marginalised and unemployed members of the working class and the 
relatively more privileged workers in permanent, full-time employment. Despite the many 
seemingly insurmountable obstacles, successful organisation among non-standard workers is of 
great political significance, especially in a country like Namibia with its inherited divisions and 
social exclusions. 
6.2.1 Unity and Division in the Namibian Labour Movement 
The unifying tendencies of colonialism and racial oppression among black workers in Namibia 
were obstructed by the divisive labour market policies of the state and employers in the pre-
independence era. During this period, autonomous and militant trade unionism was actively 
suppressed by the colonial authorities. Employers were also openly hostile towards the trade 
unions, particularly those that supported SWAPO, and encouraged the proliferation of passive, 
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' non-political' workplace committees and staff associations. The Namibian labour movement is 
presently fragmented (largely along political lines) into about thirty different unions, with the 
National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW) as the country's largest and most influential 
trade union federation. 
Table 6.1 Trade Union Density by Industry and Gender: 2000 
INDUSTRY I SECTOR FEMALE MALE TOTAL 
(%) (%) (%) 
Agriculture 2.8 i2.2 8.0 
Fishing 47.5 41.1 43 .6 
Mining and Quarrying 57.5 66.3 64.7 
Manufacturing 13.3 31.0 22. i 
Eiectricity, Gas and Water 56.0 45.8 47.0 
Construction i3 .3 24.2 23.7 
Wholesaie, Reta il and Hospitaiity 25.3 38.8 31.0 
Transport, Storage and Co mmunication 22.4 46.8 43 .2 
Financial Services 34.0 33.8 33.9 
Public Administration, Defence and Social Services 52.8 55.5 54.3 
Other Community, Socia l and Personal Services 17.8 34.1 22.4 
(Source: adapted from MoL 2002:59). 
The NUNW-affiliates cover most of Namibia's m'\ior industries and account for almost 80% of 
all recognition agreements. In 1988, the total membership of the NUNW was estimated at 
between 50 000 and 60 000, accounting for more than a third of the black labour force legally 
eligible for participation in the industrial relations system (lLO 1989: 81). Agricultural, domestic 
and casual labour constituted an estimated 350 000 workers largely beyond the reach of the trade 
unions and formal collective bargaining. While the rate of unionisation has increased to almost 
36% after a decade of independence, there are significant variations in this regard (Table 6.1). 
For instance, trade union density is roughly twice as high in urban areas compared to nlral areas 
and the rate of union is at ion of men is about one-and-a-halftimes that of women. Most service 
sector, white-collar, agricultural and non-standard employees have also remained outside the 
structures of collective representation. 
Building on its close ties to SW APO, the NUNW consolidated its position as the leading trade 
union federation in Namibia and strengthened its relations with other federations across the 
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continent, notably the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). A ' living wage' 
campaign was launched by MUN and NAFAU in the late-1980s demanding the elimination of 
'starvation wages' and a 40-hour working week with no compulsory overtime. In June 1988, the 
fledgling trade union movement planned and carried out, at very short notice, a two day national 
stay-away in support of a schools boycott. Proceeding from the basic premise that workers are 
also parents, the unions joined the protest against the close proximity of military bases to schools 
in Ovamboland and the continued detention of student leaders. The period immediately before 
and after independence was characterised by militant and united action by the SW APO-aligned 
unions not only in terms of grievances in the workplace, but also with regard to broader social 
and political demands4 After the promulgation of the Labour Act in 1992, the NUNW-affiliates 
expanded both the scope and reach of their bargaining arrangements with most of the larger 
enterprises in Namibia. In contrast to these successes, however, the unions have failed to secure 
recognition agreements with employers in many of the smaller firms and to negotiate on behalf 
of the workers in the more vulnerable sectors of the labour market. This highlights the dual role 
of trade unions: in the processes of collective bargaining, they represent and further the interests 
of the insiders; in social and political matters, they campaign for the rights of all workers. 
The patterns of income distribution produced by collective bargaining tend to reflect and 
therefore reinforce the divisions between the more and less powerful in the labour market. Again 
this leads to increasing polarisation: the concessions extracted from capital by the organised 
labour movement have "exacerbated the social distance between unionized industrial workers 
and those involved in informal and unregulated activities" (Lawson 1992:16). While collective 
bargaining has certainly improved the lot of organised workers in Namibia's manufacturing and 
mining sectors, these gains were made largely at the expense of other (especially non-standard) 
workers rather than profits. Hence, the increasing polarisation between insiders and outsiders 
reflects, in part, the extent to which the risks of increasing economic uncertainty are borne by the 
weakest sectors at the bottom end of the labour market. The insider-outsider theory rightly 
focuses on the exclusionary consequences and resulting social marginalisation that inevitably 
flow from the privileges granted to the insiders (Esping-Anderson and Regini 2000b:3). 
Namibia's integration into the global economy will therefore most likely involve the increasing 
dislocation and exclusion of the least skilled and most economically vulnerable workers from the 
formal economy. 
4 A statement by SWAPO in 1988 confIrmed its support for a democratic, independent (yet affiliated) trade 
union movement and noted that "the workers' struggle for economic betterment and that of the nation to achieve 
independence" were interwoven (cited in ILO 1989:89). 
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The prevailing organisational and strategic framework of the trade union movement inhibits its 
capacity to mount an effective campaign against the spread of precarious and poorly-regulated 
forms of employment. The labour movement in Namibia is still wrestling with the challenges of 
unifying mUltiple associations into majority unions for each industrial sector and building its 
organisational capacity, particularly at the branch and regional levels. The NUNW-affiliated 
unions also lack a strategic vision, having experienced something of a leadership crisis since 
independence when many of its most dynamic leaders were integrated into the SW APO 
government. The historical allegiance to the SW APO leadership has underscored the NUNW's 
influence in the country, but also rendered it vulnerable to pressures from the government to 
moderate its demands and to tow the party line. The resulting lack of independence and 
autonomy from the ruling party has constrained the strategic options available to the NUNW-
affiliates. More than a decade after independence, the unions still find themselves struggling for 
recognition and the most basic employment conditions in many workplaces. The range of issues 
subject to negotiation in Namibia is relatively narrow and centred around wages and benefits. 
That is, issues with direct monetary implications for workers tend to dominate the bargaining 
agenda. While such distributional issues may be more prone to industrial action, a labour 
movement mindful of its capacity and eager to consolidate its organisational gains could easily 
succumb to pressure not to act against the' national interest'. In other words, regulatory regimes 
differ not only in terms of substantive provisions in labour legislation, but also in the degree of 
centralisation of unions and employers, their organisational resources, and their relationship to 
the state. 
Inter-union competition has also hampered efforts to expand the range and reach of collective 
regulation. The model of business unionism that prevails in the other major union federation -
named, paradoxically, the Namibian People's Social Movement (NPSM) - serves its members 
as 'customers' in the image of the vested interest face of trade unionism. The aim of this 
federation is to enlarge its share of union membership at the expense of the less conciliatory or 
more militant affiliates of the NUNW. A campaign to win over both management and workers 
is fraught with dangers and unlikely to gain significant returns in a climate of economic hardship 
and a deep-seated lack of trust between employers and employees. As a regional organiser from 
NAF AU noted: " [ilf the workers think you are a polite person and you are just begging the 
employer, they will not support your union" . The propensity of employers to develop preferential 
relationships with unions that they perceive to be more accommodating or less resistant to their 
change agendas has, however, led to some successes for the NPSM in certain sectors (e.g. retail). 
The strategic orientation of these rival unions have, in part, blunted the political focus of the 
NUNW -affiliates : 
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[tJhese other unions are bread-and-butter unions and are ve,y weak of policy issues generally. When they 
are in the public domain, it is workplace-based issues like a strike. They are strong in some workplaces over 
collective bargaining issues and not political issues. Like when the question of privatisation came, it was 
only the NUNW-unions that made any statement and noise about it. The other unions do not really tackle 
such policy issues ... We are seeing this kind of more workplace-based, bread-and-butter unions emerging 
rather the social movement, political unions that we had up to independence and a bit beyond. The NUNW 
unions are already taking less of a policy debate fo!Ward than they used to. This is partly a result of having 
to compete with these other unions, but it also has to do with their own capacity (director, labour research 
inst itute - 26/0612002 ). 
The 'free-market' policies promoted by government and business has created a hostile 
environment for improving the legal and social protection of non-standard workers . The uneasy 
co-existence of the neo-liberal economic policies pursued by the state and the neo-corporatist 
elements in labour legislation leaves little room for oppositional and confrontational trade 
unionism: "[wJhile trade unions are crucial as organised representatives of the labour force, it is 
important to have and ensure harmonious labour relations" (MTI 1999b:64). The Namibian 
government's industrial and monetary policies seem more concerned with managing the 
economic crisis by creating an investor-friendly climate than with a commitment to extensive 
regulation and structural change. "The whole reform process is driven by the question: how do 
we deal with conflicts in a way that they do not shatter investor confidence?" (director, labour 
research institute - 04/07/2000). When challenged, employer decisions and managerial 
prerogatives are routinely upheld, and where employees do succeed the available remedies are 
generally inadequate. An inevitable consequence of this emphasis on attracting foreign 
investment is a redistribution of the costs of economic uncertainty and instability to the detriment 
of weaker sectors in the labour market. The resulting reproduction of a third-class workforce not 
only undermines the foundations of collective industrial relations and attenuates the legitimacy 
of labour law, it also imposes a number of constraints on the unions' ability to defend the 
interests of non-standard workers. 
Vittually all NUNW-affiliates negotiate terms and conditions of employment on a decentralised 
basis, even in industries where they dominate in all companies. The highly decentralised nature 
of collective bargaining results in the unions spending the bulk of their time and meagre 
resources on a mnltitude of separate negotiations with predominantly small companies. The 
predominance of workplace industrial relations (and the corresponding lack of industry-wide 
regulation) also means that the broader processes of political exchange are heavily weighted 
against the unions. Crucially, decentralised bargaining tends to confine employees ' perspectives 
and actions within the enterprise. Such confinement, in the context of adverse economic 
conditions, reinforces the dominance of 'bread-and-butter' issues on the collective bargaining 
agenda and encourages employers to redefine the firm as the point of reference for workers ' 
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collective interests and loyalties.' Key decisions about employment policies are usually taken at 
corporate rather than workplace level. Decentralised bargaining is therefore vital in limiting trade 
union influence on the content of these policies. 
Weak central coordination and direction, combined with high levels of unemployment, compel 
workplace unions to adopt highly pragmatic positions in relation to employer demands for greater 
'flexibility' and to accept considerable variation in employment conditions. The lack of effective 
national organisations for employers means that industrial relations policies are often reduced 
to the lowest common denominator. The highly decentralised nature of collective bargaining in 
Namibia also means that the distribution of economic rewards between profits and wages will 
largely reflect the balance of powers in the workplace. As such, employees in the larger and 
better organised workplaces are likely to secure the highest gains through negotiation and 
collective action. In the process, some measure of industrial peace is secured but at the cost of 
increasing polarisation within the labour market. 
The impact of apartheid on the processes of collective bargaining in Namibia is most starkly 
revealed in the (almost) racially-exclusive bargaining units . Decades of legislated racial 
discrimination have produced a strong correlation between race and skill. Indeed, one of the 
greatest challenges facing the NUNW is to expand its bargaining units beyond the labour 
movement's historical support-base. This will require, above all , the incorporation of the more 
skilled (usually white) sectors of the working class within its sphere of interest representation. 
Racial divisions are, however, being prolonged by managers who refuse to adopt a majoritarian 
approach and encourages the proliferation of many, small unions. This is clearly in conflict with 
the spirit of the Labour Act which is committed to majoritarianism and even provides for 
exclusive bargaining agents . Adversarialism and distrust remain the hallmarks of industrial 
relations as managers appear reluctant to surrender unilateral control of the workplace, and 
continue to impose their narrow conceptions of the role and functions of a trade union: 
the unions started digging into th ings in a manner which shows that they now wanted to participate in 
bargaining over management philosophy, management structures. [ th ink it is completely wrong, it destroys 
the whole employer-employee relationship ... Only matters which directly affect the future of the employee-
for example, pension funds and the health and safety of the workers - should be negotiated . That is all ... 
The unions are led by opportunistic people who are unduly coloured by ideological factors. There is not 
5 The only instance of centralised bargaining· in the construction industry - was driven more by labour 
market and product market pressures than by a commitment to equity and co-determination by management. 
Industry-wide negotiations are primari ly a mechanism for removing labour costs from the competition between 
construction fums . The limited scope of the negotiations, the generalised character of the collective agreements that 
are reached, and a failure by the state to promulgate these agreements have all tended to undermine the efficacy of 
more centralised forms of employee interest representation. 
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enough recognition of the common interests. There should be a stronger inclination to see that the interests 
of employer and employee are the same '" The shop steward must have a better understanding of what 
management is all about. He should present his case in such a way that he improves management's 
performance. Instead of challenging management, he is a part of management (president, Namibian 
Employers ' Federation - 08/07/2000). 
A considerable number of employers sti ll refuses to recognise and negotiate with a trade union. 
As a human resource manager in the construction industry put it: "trade unions are like dogs -
they bite the hand that feeds them!" (05/1111998). The voluntarist nature of Namibia 's post-
independence labour dispensation means that there is little compelling employers to negotiate 
with workers. It has also left the negative perceptions of trade unionism unchallenged and 
reinforced the commitment to a laissez-faire philosophy among employers: 
[tlhe unions are not doing a good job at the moment, all they want is to take the employees' money to pay 
themselves. They have done absolutely nothing for our employees. We never see them ... The Ministry of 
Labour is most probably, at this stage, more of a voice for the workers than the unions are. In my eyes, that 
is wrong. The state should be neutra l, it should not get involved in industrial relations matters. The state 
should just set up the fi'amework and let business take care of itself (general manager, pasta and biscuit 
manufacturer - 17/07/2000). 
Before considering the strategies developed by trade UnIons to overcome the cnSlS III 
representation in detail, we need to outline some of the benefits and limits to casualisation and 
outsourcing. If they are to succeed, these strategies must be informed by an understanding of the 
factors that reinforce employers' reliance on non-standard employment as well as those that 
undermine it. The most common trade union approaches "try to regulate atypical employment 
selectively in its individual forms , rather than to treat it globally in a systematic way .. . [by] 
addressing its underlying causes" (Cordova 1986:656). To this end, the unions need to address 
the conditions that encourage employers to resort to casualisation and outsourcing, bolster those 
that limit the use of such strategies oflabour utilisation, and minimise the benefits to employers 
that stem from employing non-standard workers. For instance, trade union strategies that 
prioritise job and employment security could potentially undermine the expansion of precarious 
forms of non-standard employment and limit cost-based fomls of competition. From the 
perspective of the employer, as we shall see below, casualisation and outsourcing contain both 
an expansive and a limiting dynamic. 
6.3 THE BENEFITS OF CASUALISATION AND OUTSOURCING: A VIRTUOUS 
CIRCLE? 
' Flexibility' and competitive advantage are often mooted as the prime causal explanations of 
casualisation and outsourcing. These analyses carry a distinct danger of lapsing into a strong 
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functionalism as non-standard employment is simply reduced to the needs of capital (Holmes 
1986:88). The main advantages that management may derive from non-standard employment 
exist in four broad sets of conditions: technological, product markets, labour supply conditions, 
and control over the labour process. The reinforcing advantages behind the use of non-standard 
labour by a specific industry are contingent, but generally include an amalgam of factors. There 
is a tendency to underplay the interdependence of the considerations that encourage a reliance 
on outsourcing. Harrison and Kelley (1993 :228) show that the "rationales that managers offer to 
explain [subcontracting) are less distinct from one another than had previously been thought". 
Prevailing conditions in the workplace - including management practices and product market 
pressures - shape the nature and extent of the benefits that employers may derive from the use 
of non-standard employees. Different forms of non-standard employment may also yield different 
benefits for employers. Furthermore, non-standard labour can be employed either as a means to 
avoid drastic changes in the existing workload and composition of the labour force, or as an 
instrument to create new methods for organising and controlling the production process. 
Temporary and part-time labour is both (a) replacement labour, employed in jobs previously 
carried out by pelmanent employees; and (b) addilionallabour, responsible for an increase in the 
labour force. 
The use of non-standard employment contracts must be linked to existing strategies for the 
efficient procurement of labour. Determining the relative advantages of internal versus external 
solutions to the dilemmas of profitability and labour control rai ses problems of contingency and 
particularity. That is, the choice between contracting work out or performing it in-house is 
contingent on (among others) the specific configuration of costs and rewards for particular 
enterprises and jobs. While changes in the labour market may create gaps in the regulatory 
system, the mere existence of these gaps does not determine whether or how they will be 
exploited. This will depend on employers' cost-benefit calculations and choices, which in turn 
will be shaped by the specific advantages and disadvantages of non-standard employment in 
relation to the alternative options that are available. Decisions about employment contracts and 
staffing arrangements tend to rest on a weighting of the costs and benefits associated with (often 
stereotypical) views of different non-standard employment relationships (NERs) in the context 
of immediate organisational requirements (Legge 1995 : 170). The benefits of flexibility, increased 
control and cost reductions will, however, only be realised if non-standard employees are 
adequately managed. Employers must maintain "adequate controls on their numbers and length 
of time on the job, and they must provide work assignments that are appropriate for the workers' 
skills and their expected tenure" (Nollen and Axel 1998: 128). 
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Since employers have several reasons for outsourcing, the use of subcontracted and agency 
workers often affords them multiple benefits: labour costs can be kept lower and more variable; 
the risks and burdens of rapid adjustment to fluctuations in demand are transferred to the 
workers; the costs of recruitment are eliminated by a labour supply with varying skills available 
at very short notice; the responsibility for uniforms, safety equipment and so on can be placed 
on the shoulders of the temporary employment agency and its employees; the application of 
statutOlY regulations are more narrowly circumscribed; a reduction in the coverage of collective 
bargaining for whole occupational categories such as cleaners and security guards; areas of 
competitive advantage can be isolated and shielded from fluctuations in the market; a need to 
reorganise internal staffing practices can be delayed or obviated; functions that are often difficult 
to manage can be externalised; the costs associated with training, health and safety standards, 
retrenchment packages and supervision can be reduced; and internal procedures to administer 
discipline and grievances can be dispensed with by virtue of the lack of a direct relationship 
between the client-firm and the subcontracted worker. Hence, in addition to a reduction in labour 
costs, outsourcing allows for the externalisation of the labour adjustment process. What is 
specific to subcontracted labourers is that "they constitute an external solution to the problems 
of organisation and internal management and are used because the firm cannot, or will not, 
resolve them with internal resources" (Michon 1981 :87). The long-term employment of some 
subcontracted workers, with little or no comparative cost advantages, suggest that they are used 
mainly to avoid the risks and responsibilities associated with permanent employment. Former 
employees are commonly drawn into subcontracting arrangements since they already possess the 
necessary competencies and are familiar with the practices of the firm. The subcontracting of 
labour also delegates the responsibility for controlling unit labour costs to an employment agency 
or subcontractor and provides the opportunity to w1dermine worker organisation within the firm. 
As the HR manager of a fish processing factory noted: 
[I)abour-hire workers are not our employees. We agree on a rate with the labour-hire company, who is their 
employer, and it is not our concern what they pay their workers (1311111998). 
Subcontracted and agency workers (especially the less skilled) have little traditional standards 
for levels of work-effort and it is instituted almost unilaterally by management. Subject only to 
the approval of the labour broker, employers can specify the work to be carried out and the time 
allotted for its completion, thereby subverting any existing effort-norms. As we noted in the 
previous chapter, the client-firm exercises considerable control over how and when work is 
performed. By tying subcontracted and agency labour to fixed amounts of effort for a fixed 
monetary sum, employers themselves ensure that it is more efficient to hire these workers than 
to employ permanent employees. Management of the client-firm has the economic power to 
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impose strict contractual and punitive controls over the perfomlance oflabour brokers, allowing 
the firm to subcontract work out of highly unionised areas and away from the pressures of 
traditional effort norms. MUltiple sources oflabour supply and stringent contractual arrangements 
with labour brokers and subcontractors can therefore act as an effective buffer against a crisis in 
profitability. Moreover, insofar as it supplants collective regulation, the spread of non-standard 
employment has greatly increased employers ' freedom over the disposition of labour in the 
workplace. Strong trade union organisation creates "a differentiated wage structure and 
[establishes] property rights injobs ... [that tend to] reduce flexibility in the use of labour", which 
employers seek to evade by resorting to the subcontract system (Rubery and Wilkinson 
1981 : 123). Under these circumstances, the hiring and firing of employees is no longer an 
industrial relations issue: it is simply a matter of extending or revoking a service contract in 
accordance with prevailing labour demand. In terms of both recruitment and training, labour 
subcontracting makes for very brief replacement times for most types of labour. It is therefore 
a means of increasing management 's control over all the workers and reducing its dependence 
on any specific category of labour. 
The benefits that employers derive from the use of part-time employees include a combination 
of the following: a spreading of regulatory and financial risks; a reduction in personnel 
administration costs and management responsibility; increased control over the labour process; 
the elimination of conflict over working wlsocial hours; the evasion of certain statutory 
obligations; a greater disposability of employees; a buffer against cyclical downturns for 
permanent employees; a source of labour which can be readily deployed in jobs that lack 
promotion opportunities; the elimination of employment benefits and a reduction in the costs of 
training, promotion and annually negotiated wage increases; and the elasticity of employment is 
retained without recourse to hire-and-fire practices in a context where legislation and collective 
agreements are aimed at stabilising employment relationships. Part-time employees can be used 
in a range of jobs that require little skill due to the general absence of job descriptions. Their 
compensation is al so separated from the factors that shape the wages and conditions of 
permanent employees. Clearly, some benefits involve cost considerations while others do not. 
The latter fW1Ction more as a regulatory 'fix' to overcome difficulties associated with the 
requirements of statutory and collective regulations and the demands of HR management. 
Nevertheless, all of these potential benefits to companies 
have a common underlying cost component - management time - which translates into administration, 
supervision, and tra ining. Where these can be reduced, the organization is likely to gain an advantage 
(Nollen and Axel 1998: 132). 
Harvey (1999:24) shows that standard and non-standard forms of employment "are linked to 
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different economies of time through the way that they articulate relationships between the 
product of labour, the utilization of labour, money and time". Unlike non-standard workers, 
employees in standard employment contracts are paid for the duration of the employment 
relationship (employment time), rather than only for the duration of the actual performance of 
labour ( working time). The wages for standard employees, in contrast to their non-standard 
counterparts, are paid for working as well as non-working. That is, the exchange between the 
purchasers and sellers of non-standard labour is for working time alone rather than employment 
time, which entails both working and non-working time. Since paid non-working time is 
eliminated with non-standard employment, per hour work can be equated with per hour of 
employment. These employees receive no payment for lunch breaks, holidays, sick leave, 
retirement or interruptions and delays.6 To be sure, this is not an explanation of the differences 
in the price oflabour, but differences in the pricing mechanisms oflabour. As Harvey (1999:33) 
puts it: " [d]ifferent pricing mechanisms purchase different temporalities oflabour". By linking 
payment to the successful completion of designated tasks, a service contract places the risks of 
diligent work, unplanned obstacles, the unavailability of work or an unforeseen increase in the 
workload on the employment agency and its workers. The latter bear the brunt of these burdens. 
Systems of labour subcontracting shift "the costs of inactivity from the contractor to the 
employee but, to be effective, it is necessary that subcontract labour be readi ly available either 
because the whole industry is organized in this way or because there is a captive labour force 
available" (Rubery et 011984: I 09). 
Evidence of higher levels of outsourcing in firms with a volatile output demand suggests that 
subcontractors playa buffering role.' This role as a 'buffer' has reinforcing advantages for both 
management and the permanent labour force. Managers can evade the costs associated with 
regular employment and full-time workers are spared the risks of unstable employment. The 
employment of low-skill, vulnerable temporary workers constitutes an effective means by which 
managers can "fundamentally tip the balance of power in their favour, producing a relatively 
cowed and docile workforce" (GaBie et 011998: 12). Outsourcing functions such as cleaning and 
security also represents an extension of the social di vision of labour and further divides the 
workforce. Labour subcontracting agreements perpetuate the differentiation of the workforce by 
being continually changed, thereby making the conflict between new and established workers a 
permanent feature of shopfloor politics. Moreover, by continually changing labour brokers, 
6 Health and pension plans, in particular, form a considerable part of the costs associated with the regular 
workforce. 
, Where temporary and permanent workers carry out different tasks, however, this buffering role is more 
apparent than real (Hunter el at 1993:399; Drago 1998: 167). 
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management creates competition between them and in so doing ensures that 'competitive' wages 
are maintained. As the manager of a temporary employment agency noted: 
[eJvery company in this business goes through a high point and then a dip. [t is like a cycle. At one moment, 
you will see that some ftrms ftnd favour with the big corporates and the parastata ls. Then they rotate them. 
As soon as they get fed up with one person, they go to the next one, and so on. They try everybody and then 
the whole cycle starts again (11107/2002). 
Non-standard employment, with a few notable exceptions, is cheaper and more precarious 
because it is usually unorganised labour. Research shows that the use of temporary and part-time 
labour allows employers to reap all the benefits associated with lower levels of trade union 
organisation (Fevre 1991; Anderson et a11994; Burgess and Strachan 1999; Kenny and Webster 
1999). In contrast to their more skilled counterparts, less skilled non-standard workers have no 
recourse to "collectively established routines for regulating output" (Gottfried 1994: 116). High 
levels of unemployment, widespread poverty and the absence of social security increase the 
vulnerability of unskilled non-standard employees even further. It is on this basis that these 
workers are subjected to the harshest working conditions, the lowest pay and the most coercive 
forms of managerial control. In the words of a part-time employee: 
[pJermanent workers have their rights and if their rights are taken away, then the unions will ftght for their 
rights to be recognised. As a casual worker, if you don't even have the right to say something, how will you 
claim your rights? [f you don't have a union, how wi ll you ftght? (07/07/2000). 
The consent of full-time, permanent employees to the priorities of the fim1 is secured in part by 
retaining the more desirable jobs in-house, while ' outsiders' are employed on a temporary or 
part-time basis in the least-desirable and/or worst-paid jobs. This results in an increase in the 
vertical differentiation ofthe job structure and strengthens the tendency towards "a bipolarisation 
of the workforce" (Sengenberger 1981 :246). Standard and non-standard employment contracts 
vary in terms of the extent of the firm 's commitment to different workers and provide for 
differential access to the gains of collective bargaining. The dispensability of casual and 
temporary employees alleviates the effects of fluctuating and unfavourable market conditions on 
standard employees, thereby partly undermining the potential for militancy among the latter. The 
so-called 'core' workers are thus given a stake, albeit a contradictory one, in the reproduction of 
NERs. For employers, it is easier to treat casual and temporary labourers as individuals, whereas 
permanent workers have historically established their relationship with management collectively 
through struggle and accommodation. 
Temporary employment agencies alleviate the problems and costs management may face if it had 
to incorporate, allocate and control temporary labour unaided by external agencies. The structure 
and policies of management in an industry where less skilled, subcontracted labour is employed, 
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need not incorporate sufficient measures of direction and supervision to enforce the direct and 
coercive forms of control prevailing over these workers . Such a management system may come 
under stress if it also had to incorporate the sanctions and apparatuses associated with these forms 
of control. Time as well as resources can be concentrated on the hegemonic structures absorbing 
and directing permanent, full-time employees. Securing the consent of standard employees is of 
utmost importance since their wages are largely independent of the individual's expenditure of 
effort. The use of non-standard labour makes upward mobility possible for a key group of 
workers and bypasses the fact that some employers lack the financial incentives and 
organisational capacity to incorporate the whole workforce into bureaucratic arrangements. 
Outsourcing can therefore counteract the tendency for large, capital-intensive firms to develop 
a bloated bureaucracy. 
Part-time and temporary labourers have also been used effectively as a less disruptive alternative 
to installing costly, new machinery for the production of components with small volume and/or 
in jobs with uneven and fluctuating patterns of labour demand or of limited duration. The labour 
broker or subcontractor constitutes an agency of effort stabilisation and task allocation, often to 
integrate the various stages of production (Lawson 1992). For instance, the use of non-standard 
workers is commonly linked to an increased demand for labour in the less mechanised sections 
of production. The early stages of production are "generally subcontracted to other firms whilst 
the latter stages are more likely to be put out to particular labour groups, such as immigrants or 
married woman, who may be organized into gangs or subcontract individually" (Rubery et al 
1984: 109). The division between standard and non-standard workers therefore provides 
management with a degree of flexibility not possible in the context of a less differentiated labour 
force. 
The tacit skills and on-the-job experience acquired by temporary and part-time workers are very 
rarely rewarded with wage increases and promotion. Their only hope of career prospects lies in 
the off-chance that a member of management might recommend them for permanent 
employment. These workers can thus act as a supplement to the internal labour market from 
which management could recruit labour. The 'poaching of temps' is a further advantage that 
employers derives from the use of subcontracted and agency workers . Where a company is 
interested in expanding or replacing certain categories of its labour force , there seems to be a 
trend emerging whereby non-standard labour is used both on a trial-and-error basis for new 
projects and as a recruiting ground for the 'right type' of worker. According to the store manager 
of a large retail outlet, 
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[s]ome of the casuals do not feel that the are a part of [the company] and they will not walk the extra mile 
for you. However, many of them realise that once a permanent post becomes available, we will only appoint 
those who we know are the best workcrs. 1 am always telling them: 'don't be lazy, work hard, and you may 
get a pennanent post in the future ' ... Of course, you can ' t say the same thing to pennanent workers, but 
they know that we can replace them with casuals if they don't work hard (06 /0712002). 
Even where non-standard employees cost more than standard employees, the former may satisfy 
other requirements of a firm. The additional costs associated with (especially skilled) non-
standard employment is preferable to redundancies, overtime, missing deadlines or losing 
business during peak times, or paying for idle permanent workers during slack times. The use of 
labour brokers as an intermediary mechanisms to link the internal and external labour market 
addresses the twin problems of guaranteeing the supply of labour and exerting control over 
labour in production. That is, labour subcontracting involves both "the mediation of a 
relationship between two discrete units of capital and the regulation of a capital-labour 
relationship" (MacKenzie 2000:710). The temporary agency employee is legally bound to the 
employment agency, but socially and economically he/she is tied to the client-firm. This 
intermediary role of the temporary employment agency or labour broker has the effect of 
rendering indirect, temporary employment more precarious and dependent that direct, permanent 
employment in at least five ways: 
first, the objective of subordinating labour utilisation to short-tenn fluctuations in demand means that 
margins are tight, employment is at least potentially unstable and there is minimal tolerance of 'suboptimal' 
job performance; second, because agencies make it their business to engineer an excess labour supply, temp 
workers experience the threat of substirution as a daily reality of employment; third, the fact that the wages 
and benefit packages of temp workers are invariably less generous than those of ' regular ' employees means 
that there is an increased likelihood that changes in temps' personal circumstances ... will precipitate 
involuntary exit from employment; fourth, the truncated career ladders of temps restrict occupational 
mobility and expose workers to greater competition from internal (client) and external labour markets; and 
fifth, the subordinate position of temp workers in corporate hierarchies (individually and functionally) 
renders them particularly vulnerable to labour market risks such as downsizing, pay cuts, or redundancy 
(Peck and Theodore 1998:670). 
Employers therefore derive a multitude of benefits and advantages from the availability of a 
reservoir of cheap, temporary labourers who can be hired and fired in accordance with the 
dictates of demand and the seasonal or cyclical fluctuations in production. Less commonly 
countenanced, though no less real , are the costs and limits of a supposedly more 'flexible ' 
workforce. Many of the benefits of non-standard employment that accrue to employers are 
invari ably achieved to the detriment of temporary and part-time workers. Although temporary 
employment agencies structure their operations to maximise flexibility and minimise costs, "the 
source of these competitive advantages continues to lie with their floating and generally under-
employed labour force" (Peck and Theodore 1998:672). While the advantages outlined above 
account for much of the growth in non-standard employment, there are also numerous and 
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interlocking disadvantages to such forms of labour utilisation that limit their expansion. 
6.4 THE LIMITS TO CASUALISATION AND OUTSOURCING: A VICIOUS 
CIRCLE? 
An expansion in non-standard employment feeds off rising unemployment, mobilises new 
sources of labour supply, increases profits and managerial control, and lessens the impact of 
declining demand. In the long-term, however, an increasing reliance on non-standard labour can 
become a serious obstacle to economic recovery and may inhibit the introduction of more 
productive technologies and innovative work practices Crail by and Whitston 1989: 13). 
Widespread unemployment and overabundant supplies of low cost labour may encourage the 
revival of older, more labour-intensive techniques and more coercive forms of labour utilisation. 
The use of non-standard employment contracts also incurs its own penalties in the form of some 
loss of control, potential conflicts between temporary and permanent employees, and problems 
in maintaining quality and co-ordination.8 The capacity of employers to effectively deploy a non-
standard workforce as a bulwark against the growing uncertainty and instability in product 
markets must be conceptualised in the context of these constraints. Despite the possible 
advantages that managers may derive from a ' core-periphery' employment structure, its 
continued reproduction will invariably generate various regulatory dilemmas and obstacles to 
increased efficiency. 'Flexible' labour markets are particularly vulnerable to crises of labour 
control and reproduction, and hence vitally dependent on appropriate systems of labour 
regulation. As Peck (1996: 142) argues, 
[t]he nature of labor market flexibility is a product of the local social and regulatory milieu in which it is 
embedded. The contradictions oftlexible labor markets pose a host of regulatory di lemmas, med ium-term 
solutions for which must be found or happened upon if growth is to be sustained. 
While the rapid rise in non-standard labour's share of total employment may suggest a largely 
unconstrained capacity to casualise or outsource work, there are distinct limitations to the extent 
that employers and the state are able or willing to pursue the goals of labour market ' flexibility' . 
The proponents of such 'flexibility' tend to overlook the tensions between the consolidation of 
a ' core' and the expansion of a 'peripheral ' workforce (Pollert 1991 b). The demands of 
functional flexibility (such as greater job security) are often in direct conflict with the 
requirements of numerical flexibility. Many managers are aware that the maintenance of internal 
8 See: Bresnen el a1 (1985); Dawson and Webb ( 1989); Pollert (1991 b); Geary (1992); Sayer and Walker 
(1992); Hunter el a1 (1993); Valverde el a1 (1997); Allen (2000); Heery and Salmon (2000b); and McKeown (2003). 
336 
adaptability depends on a satisfactory degree of employment security. The management goals of 
employment flexibility , quality and commitment may conflict and trade-offs between them are 
therefore likely (Geary 1992:267-8; Hunter el at 1993:398). That is, these goals involve a 
"difficult balancing act to pursue high quality service standards while simultaneously deploying 
non-standard labour as a cost minimisation measure" (Allan 2000: 198). Since new technologies 
and the high quality standards now aimed for require a loyal and cooperative labour force, most 
employers would hesitate to go too far down the road towards a 'flexible ' workforce. An 
essential precondition for business strategies that emphasise quality improvement and innovation 
is a stable, secure and trained workforce. Wage policies designed to exploit conditions in the 
external labour market, as Grimshaw el at (2001 :51) point out, may "compromise internal 
consistency and fuel internal rigidities". 
Labour market institutions and policies playa central role in moderating the tendency for firms 
to adjust to competition by attacking labour costs. For example, competitive strategies based on 
crude reductions in labour costs of especially the less skilled are highly vulnerable to minimum 
wage legislation. In general, the limits to casualisation are found in: (a) the availability of suitable 
firms and groups of workers; (b) opposition from the unions and other organs of civil society; 
(c) the attempts of employers' associations to restrict ' unfair ' competition; and (d) pressures on 
the state to limit the extent of poorly regulated and precarious forms of employment. 
Outsourcing, as we argued above, does not entai l a simple shift to market forces or the absence 
of institutional mechanisms. However, the utilisation of labour from beyond the boundaries of 
the firm has "supplanted the direct employment relationship, thus precluding access to the 
associated mechanisms of regulation" (MacKenzie 2000:723). This has given rise to a whole host 
of regulatory dilemmas and the introduction of measures to cope with the effects of a reliance on 
less regulated supplies oflabour, which are themselves beset with contradictions. Outsourcing 
has therefore created a number of intractable problems associated with ensuring the productivity 
and stability of a labour supply (of the requisite quality) in the absence of direct control over an 
agency or subcontracted workforce. Moreover, the ' cash nexus' between the temporary worker 
and the employment agency may snap simply because it is only a monetary incentive and leaves 
nothing else to bind the worker to an acceptance of hislher situation. Research shows that "the 
inherent uncertainty associated with the operation of a flexible labour market has proved 
unacceptable, due to the potentially detrimental effect on operational capabilities" (MacKenzie 
2000:717). The client-firm is often compelled to fill the regulatory gaps in the employment 
relationship -left by the dismantling of the structures of the internal labour market - in an attempt 
to guarantee the supply of labour and the reproduction of skills . Crucially, the alternative 
337 
mechanisms of regulation that were developed 
were beyond the influence of co llectively bargaining structures and procedures, and therefore subject to 
unilateral management sovereignty ". [T]hrough the development of these altemative mechanisms, the firm 
essentially had sought to address the problems experienced in association with the processes of 
deregulation, by appropriating the role of regulation wrested from, or sUlTendered by, traditional 
instruments and agents associated with direct employment ,,' [T]he experience of deregulation was not the 
panacea it had been expected to be, and consequently provided the imperative for the partial reregulation 
of the capital-labour relationship (MacKenzie 2000:723). 
Cost savings, as we noted above, are not always the primary motivation for using agency 
temporaries . In fact, some employers noted that they could obtain cheaper labour by directly 
employing casual workers rather than relying on temporary employment agencies. The HR 
manager of a fish processing firm questioned the wisdom of becoming too reliant on the services 
of employment agencies over the longer term. He warned against creating a dependency on 
temporary employment agencies: "if you use labour-hire workers, the work should be put out to 
tender every year or second year, so that you don't completely come in the grip of [a single] 
labour-hire company" (1611111998). He also noted that, since his firm had no hold over the 
agency's workers, there were no benefits to enhancing their productivity through the provision 
of training. The amount of training required for effective work performance is, however, "a 
pivotal factor in determining the cost-effectiveness of contingent workers in any given situation" 
(Nollen and Axel 1998: 132). There is thus a tension between the reliance on vulnerable sources 
oflabour in the external labour market and the demands for a stable intemallabour market. The 
same institutions that set constraints or impose burdens on employers may also provide them 
with resources and opportunities. Extensive job security, for instance, is not only a constraint on 
management's capacity for strategic action, but also a resource enabling managers to hamess the 
commitment and malleability oflabour. 
The idea, which underlies some of the motivations for resorting to non-standard employment 
contracts, that the open-ended nature of an employment relationship can be closed by 
constructing detailed job descriptions is misleading. One reason why work tasks cannot be 
exhaustively defined by means of highly detailed job descriptions is that they involve a practical 
understanding of the ways of doing things, outputs that are not readily open to measurement, and 
the application of tacit knowledge (Marsden 1999). Moreover, with considerable variability of 
tasks between workplaces, their development over time, and the widespread importance of 
learning-by-doing, there is seldom if ever a fully standardised way of carrying out a particular set 
of tasks. The processes of 'making out' described by Burawoy (1979) presupposes a body of 
knowledge, possessed by workers and withheld from managers, that cannot be readily committed 
to a contract. An important part of designing work tasks lies in their adaptability to local 
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conditions, their capacity to prioritise, their evolution over time, and their capacity to respond to 
contingencies. In practice, initial job descriptions become increasingly irrelevant to the tasks 
actually undertaken (Marsden 1999: 14). Actual work content differs, sometimes considerably, 
from the formal job descriptions. Managerial planning is also done on the basis of actual 
practices and not in terms of formal procedures. 
A second reason is that, from a purely economic point of view, the benefits of a detailed 
description of the tasks constituting ajob are often superficial and of short duration. Apart from 
being costly to devise, ever more precise job specifications can be self-defeating in the sense of 
encouraging a focus on the wording of the contract, leading to rigidity and conflict around 
interpretation (Marsden 1999: 15). Great detail in task definition is also likely to be counter-
productive under conditions of uncertainty and/or volatil ity as these bring a higher probability 
of unanticipated demands and unforeseen problems. Such variation is more easily accommodated 
by broad job definitions than narrow ones. Thirdly, work measurement has generally not been 
about precise measurement of work tasks, but rather about negotiation with work groups over 
rates of work and rates of pay (Marsden 1999: 16). Since the employment relationship involves 
an exchange of labour services against pay, there is a strong quantitative dimension to any 
notions of equivalence among similarly classified jobs. In practice, management deals with the 
limited codifiability of job contents by employing agents who are themselves familiar with the 
tacit elements in jobs rather than relying on formal descriptions. This allows senior management 
to control line management and to attribute responsibility if something goes wrong. 
Low-wages, low-trust and high levels of labour turn-over rule out the development of the 
cooperative relations and multi-skilling necessary for the high-quality production and adaptability 
that global competitiveness demands. Reducing the number of non-standard workers would 
require firms to achieve the desired numerical flexibility by other means. Alternative forms of 
flexibility, however, require a greater commitment to training, cooperation, and trust from 
permanent staff members than most Nanlibian employers are presently willing to countenance. 
Moreover, the excessive use of non-standard employees in response to external pressures may 
"violate the implicit contract [with standard employees 1 around employment stability and firm-
specific training, and thus impede the long term capacity of the organisation to adapt to teclmical 
change" (Grimshaw et al200 1:51). Price-competitive employment practices tend to yield short-
term benefits at the cost of long-term disadvantages. In the retail sector, for example, 
dissatisfaction, labour turn-over and absenteeism are relatively high among casual and part-time 
workers. They also have very few opportunities to move to full-time, permanent employment and 
are therefore unlikely to display the same dedication and attention to detail as standard 
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employees. While price-based competition has played a prominent role in the marketing and 
operating strategies of most retailers, few would opt to compete solely on the basis of price. 
Managers remain dependent on their employees to use their initiative when interacting with 
customers or dealing with unforeseen problems, and hence cannot afford to rigidly pursue a cost-
based employment strategy which may generate low levels of motivation, reliability and 
commitment. 
Research has found that labour market 'flexibility' is generally associated with an erosion of job 
security; a decline in the scope of employment protection rights and social security; an increase 
in the discipline exercised by the market; a rise in underemployment; a weakening of the 
collective institutions of labour; and a reduction in those covered by collective agreements 
(Barker and Christensen 1998; Felstead and Jewson 1999a; Heery and Salmon 2000a). The use 
of non-standard employment contracts has also been widely identified with a drastic deterioration 
in temlS and conditions of employment for the workers involved. In general, workers and their 
representatives associate labour market 'flexibility' with insecurity and this constitutes the basis 
of employee and union opposition to non-standard employment. By concentrating non-standard 
workers in particular sections of production, managers also obstruct workplace-wide 
communication and undermine the development of trust and solidarity among employees. 
Organised, permanent workers may therefore react strongly to the use of temporary employment 
agencies and subcontractors because they are seen as the tools of management. In other words, 
outsourcing has increased insider-outsider problems by internalising such divisions within the 
workplace. A firm's treatment of non-standard workers may affect the trust, security and 
commitment of its standard workforce (Dickens 1988; Geary 1992). The presence of non-
standard employees in a workplace signals employment and job insecurity for all employees. 
Hence, the availability of part-time and temporary employees may impact on the solidarity and 
assertiveness of the permanent workforce, and lead to tensions between the two groups of 
workers. 
The job security of the permanent workers has also been threatened. If you are not performing, you wi ll 
defini tely be replaced by a cheaper, casual employee ... The employer is always telling the permanent 
workers: 'if I have trouble with you, I will retrench you and bring in more labour-hire workers on low 
wages'. Casual labour is going to increase in the future and threaten more and more permanent jobs. 
Even the position of some managers is not safe - all the jobs are being threatened now (general secretary, 
NAFAU - 2810612002). 
The workers see me, a black man, as part of management, and for as long as you are a manager, you are 
white. Because of the past, they have no reason to trust a white man ... The workers are suspicious and 
always think: 'what are they coming up with now?' That mistrust is always there because of the uncertainty 
that prevails in their minds due to retrenchment, outsourcing and fluctuating economic trends. People afe 
nervous and quite uncertain twenty four hours a day. They don't know what tomorrow will bring for them 
(HR manager, meat processing - 0410712002). 
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The savings that accrue to a firm by virtue of the lower wages and benefits of non-standard 
workers must be balanced against the cost-effectiveness and productivity of these workers. 
Casual and temporary workers tend to be younger, less experienced and less motivated. Non-
standard employees are unlikely to show high commitment if it is not reciprocated by the firm. 
Admittedly, commitment and cooperation is less important with less ski lled non-standard 
workers in jobs that are transparent, structured and/or machine paced. At best, employers are 
often only able to secure a sullen obedience and a contrived cooperation from non-standard 
workers. If non-standard employment is seen as providing opportunities for gaining standard 
employment, however, these workers may expand greater effort and show a greater willingness 
to cooperate in an attempt to improve their chances of movi ng into the permanent workforce. A 
group HR manager in the retail sector provided the following illustrative example: 
[o]ne of our competitors operates six stores in Windhoek with about 60 pennanen! staff, while we operate 
four stores with 260 pennanent staff members. [This company] had a big strike and dismissed most of their 
staff, and since then they have moved towards getting more casual emp loyees. Our position in this regard 
is quite simple: you do not get the commitment and loyalty that you wou ld get from a permanent staff 
member. The guy is just there for a few days a week and he doesn' t care much about their business. A 
further consequence for [this competitor] is that they don 't have opportunities for these guys. When we 
have vacancies, we firstly give preference to our casual employees. So these guys have something that 
keeps them going on. They know that they have to prove themselves to be afforded the opportunity to be 
appointed pennanently (0 1/0712002). 
There are numerous other, less tangible costs and disadvantages associated with the use of 
especially less skilled non-standard employees. Their exclusion from the internal labour market 
leads to insecurity and unreliability; a lack ofloyalty, commitment, motivation and continuity; 
and a deterioration of quality standards and customer service (Blyton 1996; Anderson et a11994; 
Gasteen and Sewell 1994; Allan 2000; McKeown 2003). An unwillingness to work 'beyond the 
contract' is almost inevitable when the short-term and long-term rewards for doing so are 
negligible: 
[m]ost of the casual workers feel that the bosses are just there to exploit us. They just want us to work hard 
for very little money. Many ofthe casuals think: 'to he ll with them, we are not going to work hard, we are 
just working at our pace' ... The casua l workers are not treated like employees, they are just treated like 
slaves. The bosses can chase you away at any time and there is nothing you can do. So, you just do what 
they tell you and try not to make any mistakes (part-time worker - 06/07/2000). 
As outsiders, temporary part-time or casual workers usually lack a detailed knowledge of 
company procedures and practices. Hence, they cannot be given complex tasks, are often more 
difficult to manage, and regularly need closer supervision than permanent staff. Under some 
dimensions of flexibility , therefore, non-standard employees are in fact less flexible than 
permanent employees. Hunter et al (1993) and Valverde el al (1997) show that non-standard 
employment generates rigidities and involves (often hidden) transaction costs associated with the 
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monitoring and enforcement of non-standard contracts that are not always £lIlly appreciated when 
the initial decision to seek employment flexibility is made. Contracts are often too vague with 
ill-defined levels of service, and managers regularly underestimate the time and skills required 
to successfully manage outsourcing contracts and contain costs: 
[o]utsourcing is one of the latest HR buzz-words. We have outsourced OUf catering, transport and security 
functions. But, I can tell you, it doesn' t always work. We have had major problems with the contractors 
doing these jobs. Obviously, we have a contract with the transport contractors, the caterer and with the 
security company. They handle everything and if there is a problem with their services, they must 
immediately rectify it. But we have to monitor them continuously ... Outsourcing only makes sense if it is 
managed correctly, but this takes time and costs money (HR manager, beer and beverage manufacturer-
20107/2000) . 
A lack of strategic planning and monitoring in the use of non-standard employees contributes to 
the rising costs and declining benefits of such employment. These problems of commitment, 
quality and performance have encouraged some firms to revert to more stable patterns of 
employment. As Nollen and Axel (1998:141-2) argue, 
[j]oint employer re lationships with a staffing company are determined by the amount of control an 
organization retains over its contingent workers. Practically speaking, almost all companies maintain some 
cono'ol over these workers since they typically provide the day-to-day supervision and detennine the work 
to be done ... As a ru le, the more a company chooses to control its contingent workers, the more likely it 
will be judged ajoint employer with the staffing company and the more likely it will be considered liable 
when a violation of the law occurs ... In the end, employers may find that contingent staffing relationships 
present more complications, and thus less of an advantage to the organization, than they anticipated. 
The problems and difficulties associated with casualisation and outsourcing are not, however, 
equally applicable to all fotms of non-standard employment. They are often much more intense 
where there is a highly tenuous relationship between the worker and the firm as with casual 
workers or agency temporaries. The more durable relations with permanent part-time workers 
are less likely to lead to severe problems since they are often more firmly integrated into the 
firm's employment structures and practices. In other words, different types of non-standard 
employment serve different needs and raise different challenges. For instance, as Allan 
(2000:! 89) points out, temporary part-time employment and its inherent high turn-over rates 
entail higher administration costs in terms of record maintenance, payroll calculation, induction, 
supervision and recruitment. 
All control strategies require some degree of integration of the workforce and hence the use of 
non-standard labour may not solve all management's ' problems' of control. Greater insecurity 
reinforces low-trust relations in the workplace, provides disincentives for employers to invest in 
training, and accentuates the trend towards cost reduction as the main route to competitive 
advantage. Where companies seek to minimise uncertainty and instability by reducing costs 
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rather than investing in · new productive capacity or new products, they tend to perpetuate 
outdated techniques and promote work intensification. Furthermore, non-standard employment 
not only imposes costs on the individual, but also on the society as a whole. For example, an 
influx of the least skilled and least experienced workers in the most high-risk jobs invariably 
leads to increased accidents and maladies in the workplace (yeW 1999). Given the fact that they 
normally have no access to a medical plan, occupational injuries and diseases involving non-
standard workers place an unnecessary burden on the public health system. The trade unions are 
increasingly highlighting the wider, social costs of casualisation and outsourcing such as a 
reduction in tax revenues, an overburdened social security system, and the limited impact of 
national skills development strategies. Several trade union respondents also indicated that some 
employers resort to non-standard employment contracts as a means to avoid the costs associated 
with permanent employees that have contracted HIV/AIDS 9 In the words ofNATAU's general 
secretary: 
[i] fyou have permanent employees who suffer from HIV/AIDS, production will go down and the company 
will have to inject a lot of money into the medical-aid . It will not be the company's respons ibility if they 
put labour-hire workers there and get rid of them when they get infected. They cannot just think about 
profits, they must also look at the well-being of the employees (12/07/2000). 
Unstable and insecure employment may discourage non-standard workers from making long-term 
investments in pensions, housing and the education of their children (Rubery 1996:34; Valverde 
et aI1997:599). This will not only render these workers a future liability on state revenues, but 
also condemn the next generation to low-skill, low-wage and precarious forms of employment. 
While the use of part-time and temporary employees can reduce the pressures on employers by 
absorbing demands for additional labour, reducing costs, and so on; it also serves to limit the 
growth of stable and secure employment, and creates the scope for a process of competitive 
downgrading of regulatory standards. Through its potential to induce a 'race to the bottom' in 
terms of labour market standards, the casualisation of employment poses a dire threat to social 
prosperity, stability and cohesion. As the only consistent voice of the impoverished and 
marginalised sectors of society, an enormous responsibility rests on the labour movement to 
combat the deepening of divisions in the labour market associated with the proliferation of non-
9 The spread of HIV/AIDS imposes costs on employers by: (a) reducing labour productivity, either on 
account of extensive sick-leave or because employees have to take care cffamily members infected with the virus; 
(b) increasing the costs oflabour and exacerbating skill shortages; (c) inducing a rise in training costs as terminally-
ill employees are replaced; and (d) increasing employers' contributions to medical-aid schemes as the number of 
claims mounts. Moreover, HIV/AIDS will reduce the demand for consumption goods because more money will be 
spent on health-care and the number of consumers will decline. Finally, it is estimated that the pandemic could 
reduce Namibia's workforce by up to 35%, affecting mainly more ski lled and experienced staff (MoL 1997; UNDP 
1998; Schade 2000). A code for HIV/AIDS at the workplace, which serves as a guideline for employers, was adopted 
by the National Assembly in 1998. 
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standard employment. 
6.5 TRADE UNION STRATEGIES AND THE NON-STANDARD WORKFORCE: 
INCORPORATION OR ISOLATION? 
Together with labour law, trade unions are the principal mechanisms for regulating the unfettered 
exercise of employer power in both market and authority relations. Union-negotiated employment 
conditions act as a system of protection against the un trammelled operation of the market, 
supplementing the more partial protections offered by statutory regulation. The collective 
regulation of work rules operates like high wages to raise labour costs, giving unionised 
employers a stronger incentive to outsource than otherwise similar non-union employers. By 
counteracting the homogenisation effects of labour law and collective bargaining, the 
mobilisation of cheap and disposable labour through non-standard employment contracts allows 
employers much greater individualism in the employment relationship. Trade union intervention 
in employment restructuring in Namibia has, on the whole, been limited and largely ineffective. 
The failed attempts at establishing acceptable ratios of temporary-permanent employees, for 
example, highlight the fact that prevailing trade union strategies are ill-suited to coping with the 
proliferation ofNERs. The role and character of a trade union movement are strongly influenced 
by the existing systems oflabour regulation (Muller-Jentsch 1988; Whitley 1997; Waddington 
1999). Consequently, trade union responses to employment flexibility are moulded and mediated 
by the regulatory structures of the labour market. iO Trade unions, as Ackers et al (1996:2-3) 
argue, "make and remake themselves in different historical settings in response to detailed 
changes in the character of the employment relationship". Although it is rarely, if ever, possible 
to draw a precise and predictable correspondence between patterns of work and forms of union 
organisation; the nature and levels of collective control over terms and conditions of employment 
are not without influence on the type of trade unionism that is likely to prevail at a particular time 
and place. Even when trade union movements face similar imperatives for action, "their 
responses are shaped by their different starting points and can involve a dynamic which is path-
dependent" (Hyman 200 I: 169). 
Unions are, in principle, able to negotiate agreements that prevent or severely restrict the ability 
of employers to casualise or outsource work. In practice, however, the provisions of the 
agreements with organised employees tend to closely follow legislated minima and common 
practices in a sector. The substantive provisions of collective agreements constitute a floor of 
10 For example, industrial relations scholars have long recognised that the centre of power in the labour 
movement is wherever collective bargaining takes place (Clegg 1979). 
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minimum labour standards and impose a standardisation that serves trade union interests in 
minimising competition between individual employees. These provisions are, however, largely 
couched in terms of permanent, full-time employment. Collective bargaining has historically 
been geared towards establishing minimum labour standards to support and protect workers in 
standard employment contracts: 
[cJollective bargaining is still largely concerned with wage and benefit issues. Reported disputes almost 
always centre around these issues. There have not been any negotiations, to my knowledge, around issues 
like outsourcing. Even training is secondary to wages and benefits (director, labour research institute -
04/0712000). 
Collective agreements often sanction differential treatment for full -time and part-time or 
temporary workers, to the detriment of the latter. Where they provide for non-standard 
employment, collective agreements typically also seek to limit its use (Campbell 1996). This can 
be achieved by specifYing proportional limits or quotas (calculating non-standard employees as 
a proportion of the workforce or non-standard hours as a proportion of total workforce hours) or 
by establishing restrictions on how, when, under what circumstances, and for how long non-
standard employees may be used. Some agreements also specifY a 'casual loading' on the hourly 
rate of pay, intended as compensation for the lack of standard entitlements and as an additional 
barrier against the reliance by employers on non-standard workers at the expense of permanent 
workers. The public sector unions in Namibia have been uniquely successful in limiting the 
spread of non-standard employment, if not in the parastatals, certainly in the public service: 
[tJhere are very few casual workers in the public service ... We do not allow casual workers to work for 
more than two days a week. We also encourage the government not to give a bad example to the private 
sector. We negotiate until the casual workers are made permanent employees. We have to represent and 
negotiate on their behalf, even if they are not our members. They must not be isolated or treated differently. 
Any benefit that is given to a permanent worker must also apply to casual and labour-hire workers (general 
secretary, NAPWU - 12/07/2000). 
The Namibian trade union movement concentrated most of its energy and resources on the 
organisation of (predominantly male and permanent) black unskilled and semi-skilled workers 
(Table 6.2). One unintended consequence of this organising strategy - despite its inherent logic 
and priority - was to cement the divisions between black and white, skilled and unskilled, and 
standard and non-standard workers. I I The most common forms of interest representation among 
skilled workers and professionals, for instance, include staff associations, craft unions and 
professional bodies. In sharp contrast to the successes of the industrial unions in organising semi-
II At its second National Congress, the NUNW (1998:26) noted that " [mJost of our recognition agreements 
confme us to bargaining within low categories", and resolved to launch a campaign "to seriously recruit across colour 
lines and workers in higher bands". 
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skilled employees in the manufacturing and mining sectors, union organisation in sectors (such 
as retail and construction) with a long-standing prevalence of non-standard labour has historically 
been inconsequential. 
Table 6.2 Trade Union Density by Gender and Selected Occupation: 2000 
OCCUPATION FEMALE MALE TOTAL 
(%) (%) (%) 
Professionals 62.3 63.3 62.8 
Technicians and Associate Professionals 44.0 37.8 41.1 
Clerical Workers 33.4 49.6 38.4 
Services, Shops and Sales Workers 16.9 29.6 21.8 
Skilled Agricultural and Fishery Workers 3.3 14.0 8.7 
Craft and Trade Workers 11.4 29 .6 24.8 
Machine Operators and Assemblers 20.5 43 .5 42 .5 
Elementary Occupations 19.3 23 .0 21.1 
(Source: adapted from MoL 2002:59). 
It is precisely in the sectors where the need fo r collective regulation is the greatest that the unions 
have the least influence and where they experience the most difficulties in recruiting and 
retaining members. Jobs are fast disappearing in sectors (such as mining) with a history of high 
union density, while new jobs are created mainly in sectors (such as services) where the unions 
have traditionally been relatively weak. The limited impact of the unions in the retail sector, for 
example, only serves to reinforce the differential employment conditions for standard and non-
standard employees: 
I think the unions must make the casual workers their members. We casuals don ' t have any rights. The 
casuals must have their rights protected just like the permanent workers .. . The unions just fight for the 
rights of the pelmanent workers and there is no-one that fights for the casual workers ... lfwe succeed with 
a casual worker union, then we can go to the bosses and teU them that casuals are also people like the 
penmanent workers (part-time worker - 07/07/2000). 
While collective bargaining has certainly improved the lot of organised workers in Namibia, it 
seems that these gains were made at the expense of other workers rather than profits. Moreover, 
as the view of non-standard employees as 'marginal' or 'peripheral' to the core activities of the 
enterprise takes hold, the social distance between these workers and full-time, organised 
employees is strengthened. Part of the problem facing the unions in recruiting and retaining non-
standard workers as members, resides in the fact that they have often reinforced this division by 
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pursuing a strategy of exclusion as a means of protecting the interests of permanent workers. 
The unions only care about the permanent workers. Sometimes they do not allow labour-hire workers to 
be their members because they know that if they have to recruit such a worker, maybe this month he is 
working, the next month he is not working. Then the union is losing fees because they are depending on 
the fees of their membership ... The union is a body for helping workers and they mustn't see everything 
[in terms of] money. They also have to see the situation of the workers (temporary agency employee -
1911 011998). 
In the absence of a broader strategy to stop the process of casualisation as a whole, the unions very often 
fall back onto a strategy of enforcing job descriptions. The dilemma then arises that the unions only 
concentrate on the workers who are their members and make very little inroads in recruiting casual workers. 
The very low union membership among those who come through labour hire or directly as casual workers 
leads to this defensive position (director, labour research institute - 26/06/2002). 
An important reason for this strategic orientation by the Namibian trade unions stems from the 
dilemma posed by the high expectations of their existing membership and their limited 
organisational and financial capacity. The structures of collective regulation, as we noted above, 
also constrain the ability of the unions to respond in a systematic and coherent manner to the 
plight of non-standard employees. In addition, the regular use of casual and temporary workers 
as strike-breakers has significantly reinforced trade union opposition to non-standard 
employment. 
The unions are trying to keep us out ofa strike situation because they can't put pressure on the client by 
saying: ' we are go ing to strike and you will not produce' ... I think it is right that companies should hire 
casuals during a strike. If you are my client and you phone me to say that your workers are striking, I will 
send workers because the country's economy suffers if you cannot produce. That is part of why we have 
so many clients. If [a client] has problems with his workers, then I am there to send people to him ... My 
people won't have problems with that, it is work for them (manager, temporary employment agency -
05/07/2000). 
An on-going problem is the question of scab labour during strikes. If your membership is largely semi-
sk illed, it is fairly easy for companies to break strikes all the time. We have seen relatively modest wage 
increases as a result. The strike weapon wasn't all that suceessful in terms of forcing employers to give 
substantial increases (director, labour research institute - 26/06/2002). 
Evidence of a deep-seated reluctance to organise non-standard workers is not hard to find. 
Unions on occasion also appear to share employers' conceptions of such workers as 'disposable' 
in an attempt to protect the jobs and conditions of their members. Despite some variation in the 
approaches adopted by individual unions to the difficulties posed by the recruitment of non-
standard workers, the main approach remains one of avoiding the challenge. Most unions have 
devoted very little time and resources to grappling with the challenges of organising non-standard 
employees. This has been reinforced by the belief (a) that a union's core commitment and main 
source of income and strength resides with full-time, permanent employees; (b) that non-standard 
employment is a threat to the job security and conditions of employees in a SER; and (c) that 
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there is a fundamental divergence of interests between full-time, permanent employees and non-
standard employees. As the general secretary of the NUNW noted with regard to temporary 
agency workers: 
[w]e have launched a campaign against these flexible labour policies. We call these labour-hire companies 
a 'slave trade ' because they are in fact selling people to do work for other people ... The unions have 
already decided that such labour policies will not be allowed anywhere in Namibia. In the companies that 
are organised by NUNW unions, we will definitely fi ght any such init iat ives (22/10/1998). 
Since different unions face different problems in relation to non-standard employment, there is 
some degree of diversity in the practices of individual unions. While some trade unions have 
started to devise tactics to deal with the threat of non-standard labour, unions in industries that 
are still dominated by full-time, permanent employment have been slow to respond. High levels 
of unemployment, fragmented bargaining structures, the selective functioning of labour 
legislation, and the exclusion of smaller firms from collective agreements have all reduced 
labour ' s ability to resist the casualisation of work. Crucially, the changing composition of the 
workforce poses serious challenges to the efficacy of the modes of organisation that have long 
served the labour movement. 
I think outsourcing makes life for the unions much more difficult. In the traditional way that unions are 
organised, how do you organise a very flex ible and liquid worker? I think the unions must also start 
adapting to that more flexible system ... and move away from the very rigid and well-dermed fields in which 
they have traditionally organised. Now all of a sudden you have a workers who is hired once in the public 
service, once he is in the fishing industry, the next day he is in the metal industry. How do you organise the 
guy? It is very difficult (pennanem secretary, Ministry of Labour - 04/0712000). 
It is very difficult to organise these workers because they arc easily divided. As soon as the workers want 
to join the union, you will find that the labour-hire companies move the workers to another company. Today 
he is in the food industry, tomorrow he is in the construction industry, and so on .. . It is very easy for them 
to move the contract workers from one job to another. If the worker doesn't want to go where he is told, 
tough luck, someone else will take over his job ... Besides saying that we want to get rid oflabour hire, to 
be honest with you comrade, we don't have any strategy. If you want to protect them, you are protecting 
a non-member. It is very difficult because you do not have any mandate from them (general secretary, 
MANWU - 23/ 10/1998). 
Union officials and shop stewards have considerable difficulty in articulating a mobilisation 
against casualisation and outsourcing with a drive to recruit non-standard employees. That is, 
they have struggled to strike a balance between representing non-standard workers and 
maintaining their principled opposition to these forms of employment Trade unions face at least 
three dilemmas in terms of their response to non-standard employment. The first is whether to 
resist casualisation and outsourcing or cooperate with it in an effort to influence policy and 
employment outcomes. The second is whether or not to include non-standard workers as trade 
union members once jobs have been casualised or outsourced. The third is whether special union 
policies are necessary once non-standard workers have been recruited. These dilemmas are 
348 
starkly revealed in the conflicting responses to temporary employment agencies. The mine 
workers' union recently entered into a recognition agreement with one of the larger agencies. 
According to the general secretary ofMUN, 
[t]his agreement only establishes a platfonn for defending these workers. Companies can use labour-hi re 
workers under our law, so the unions have to fmd other ways of dealing with them ... To fight casualisation 
from the outside means that you don't have much influence and power. If you fight from within, you wi ll 
manage to put some agreements in place, to influence legislation and to force them to come to the 
negotiating table. When we signed this recognition agreement, it didn 't mean that we really moved away 
from our principles: labour-h ire companies are nothing other than the application of a cheap labour system 
... Even though labour-hire companies provide poor benefits to their employees, they do provide them with 
some means of survival . If you say abolish labour hire without putting any alternative mechanisms in place, 
I think it will also create a problem ... If they arc not abolished, then the workers' employment conditions 
must be changed (28/06/2002). 
Other NUNW -affiliates reject this approach and maintain that the establishment of a bargaining 
relationship with these agencies is tantamount to legitimising the temporary employment industry 
and acknowledging its right to exist. 
Although some of our sister unions have signed an agreement with labour-hire companies, we are totally 
against this ... We have to discuss this through our federation so that we know what is the position if some 
affiliates recognise the labour-hire companies. We are defeating our own principles. We must define our 
position. We organise these workers to secure their well-be ing, but we do not have to organise them in a 
way that says we recognise that industry as a legitimate business. You just open the door so that if they have 
a problem you are able to assist them as members of the working class. But, in reality, you cannot organise 
the sector which is recruiting the people (general secretary, NATAU - 27/06/2002). 
Some people say we must organ ise these workers at the labour brokers' office. Our position is that once 
you have entered into negotiations with a labour broker, you are bound to recognise the labour broker. We 
reject that. This is a dilemma that we have to overcome ... We carmO! allow labour-hire compan ies in 
independent Namib ia. Before independence, we were preaching that contract labour must be stopped. 
Labour hire is the same system that SWAN LA used - it is a second colonial system. To take a big portion 
of the wages that someone earns through hard work, is slavery and exploitation (general secretary, NAFAU 
- 28/06/2002). 
The 'traditional' trade union policy towards non-standard employment is centred on the defence 
of full-time permanent employment and a hostility towards all non-standard forms of 
employment (Campbell 1996). The use of non-standard labour is viewed as a symptom of 
employer greed, a threat to the numbers and conditions of permanent workers, and as a veiled 
attempt at undermining the unions. Traditional trade union policy proved to be undiscriminating 
in its approach to the various forms of non-standard employment and tended to regard them as 
a homogenous category (Del sen 1990:263). All non-standard employment is rejected irrespective 
of its employment conditions, whether it is voluntary or not, and whether it is structured in terms 
of permanent or casual status. By refusing to organise non-standard workers and by concentrating 
their attention solely on protecting the job security of permanent workers, the unions themselves 
contribute to the segmentation of the labour market. In other words, the very policies pursued by 
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the unions may encourage the growth of insecure and poorly regulated employment. A simple 
prohibition of non-standard employment is likely to drive it ' underground' in the form of illegal 
or 'off-the-books' employment. 
Traditional trade union policy is valuable insofar as it sets out to defend some notion of 
'permanency' in the employment relationship. A defence of employment relations that are 
expected to be continuous signals that employees have certain rights in the workplace. But to 
defend standard employment at the expense of all forms of non-standard employment is 
problematic for at least two reasons (Campbell 1996:591). First, the traditional policy of seeking 
to limit or exclude non-standard employment has clearly failed. The best index of this failure is 
the rapid expansion of non-standard work in almost all sectors of the economy. Second, 
undiscriminating hostility and opposition to non-standard employment reduces it simply to an 
expression of employer preferences and ignores changing employee interests. For example, 
traditional union policy cannot account for employees who voluntarily enter into pali-time 
employment. This policy therefore prevents the unions from developing strategies to improve the 
conditions of part-time workers and to integrate pa11-time and full -time work. 
A 'blame-the-victim' attitude is slowing giving way to a perception that the interests of full-time, 
regular members may be served by measures designed to improve the position of non-standard 
workers. The numerical strength of the unions is bound to decline as casualisation targets the 
middle and lower ranks of the occupational hierarchy, the bulk of whom has traditionally 
constituted the union membership. To be sure, labour market 'flexibility' policies do not so much 
"raise the level of employability across the labour market as a whole as increase the rate of 
exploitation in its lower reaches" (Peck and Theodore 2000: 132). Increasing competition in low-
wage labour markets is thus likely to create a downward pull on both wages and regulatory 
norms. Since the emergence of a growing sub-stratum of employees who endure poor 
employment conditions and high levels of precariousness constitutes a serious threat to the 
conditions of the core membership, unions can only ignore them at their own peril. 
The membership has been declining quite drastically. The introduction of these labour-hire companies has 
severely increased job insecurity as businesses do away with penn anent jobs and hire casual labour to do 
the work. This has hampered union membership (general secretary, NUNW - 2211 011998). 
The companies are outsourcing more and more workers to labour brokers or labour-hire companies. They 
are no longer dealing with labour because they don't want to negotiate with the unions. So now they can 
just focus on running the company, while the labour brokers deal with the manpower. They call it 
'streamlining the operations' ... Casualisat ion is just there to weaken the strength of the union. The 
companies do not inform or negotiate with the unions when they decide to use casual workers. They say 
that it is a managerial decision and they disregard the union (education officer, NAFAU - 15/07/2000). 
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Recent organising initiatives have largely originated at the apex of the trade union movement 
within national federations and/or the full-time leadership of individual unions. Despite the top-
down character of organising initiatives, the style of organising which has been favoured in many 
cases has been mobilising and bottom-up (Heery and Abbott 2000). Local union leaders and 
rank-and-file members benefit from organising to the extent that it enhances bargaining strength 
and prevents undercutting of wages. They may therefore resist a sudden infusion of new members 
that threatens to shift the balance of powers or involves a transfer of resources away from 
servicing existing members. National union leaders, by contrast, may have greater freedom to 
prioritise organising because their accountability to existing members is less immediate and they 
may also be more acutely aware of the benefits of increasing membership in terms of expanding 
revenue, status and influence. There is a conspicuous lack of accurate membership figures for the 
various trade unions in Namibia. Of the approximately 129 000 union members, the NUNW 
accounts for about 70 000, the bulk of whom belong to NAPWU (± 20 000), NAF AU (± 15 000), 
MUN (± 13000), MANWU (± 7 000) and NATAU (± 7 000) (LaRRI 2002b:8). 
A successful and sustained campaign to regulate non-standard employment demands both an 
increased activism at the level of the workplace and more effective national coordination and 
strategic policy-making. The effective articulation of local and national levels of trade union 
organisation is a vital component of the struggle against casualisation. Leaving workplace union 
structures to their own devices and meagre resources, will invariably result in highly variable and 
potentially conflicting strategies that may intensify divisions between members by encouraging 
fragmentation and parochialism. Confining union responses to non-standard employment to the 
national level, will provide more generalised policies and reduce the isolation of workplace 
activities, but at the risk ofriding roughshod over the variations in union power and capacity at 
the local level. The lack of a coherent vision and long-term goals invariably leads to a tension 
within the unions between "pressures toward hierarchical accommodative forms of unionism and 
workplace-based union activity" (Fairbrother and Waddington 1990: 16). Consequently, a crucial 
test for the unions will be the extent to which they are able and willing "to reconfigure the current 
distribution of authority, skills and resources within their organisations" (Colling 1995: 132). To 
date, trade union responses to non-standard employment in Namibia have been largely 
uncoordinated, pragmatic, piecemeal and defensive. 
At the NUNW's second National Congress in 1998 a resolution was adopted calling for greater 
regulation of non-standard labour. It was noted that "many" firms employ non-standard workers 
as "a means of cheap labour", often in blatant violation ofthe country's labour legislation. "Some 
employees", the resolution continues, "have been employed as casual labourers for more than 
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five years, working five days a week, receiving monthly salaries, and [are 1 still being regarded 
as casual workers" (NUNW 1998 :22). In an attempt to alleviate the plight of non-standard 
workers, Congress stipulated that a person who works continuously over a cycle of twelve 
months or more should not be regarded as a casual worker. The Congress also resolved that a 
policy on the matter must be formulated and called for tripartite consultations on "this ugly 
scenario" (1998:23). This resolution has not, however, been translated into practice in any 
sustained or coherent fashion. 
Through a sheer force of numbers, some NUNW -affiliates were compelled to recruit non-
standard workers. NAFAU's paid-up membership varies by as much as 5 000 when seasonal 
workers in the fishing industry are without work (LaRRI 1999:6). This translates into a 
unionisation rate that varies between 25% and 45% depending on whether or not the measure is 
taken during the fishing season. The industries organised by MANWU - metal, construction, and 
the like - consist of many small firms with a large share of non-standard employees. Although 
it organises in sectors that have historically constituted the backbone of labour movements 
elsewhere, MANWU's unionisation rate stands at only 13.1 % (LaRRI 1999:7). In the first of its 
kind in Namibia, MANWU entered into centralised bargaining with the Construction Industries 
Federation in 1996. An agreement has recently been struck in this forum which seeks to regulate 
the employment conditions of casual and temporary workers. Even where non-standard 
employees have been organised, however, their interests are not necessarily well represented nor 
are their needs and conditions adequately understood. All too often, the actions of organised 
employees serve to perpetuate the subordinate status of non-standard workers . 
The casuals have to do what a permanent worker tells them to do. The permanent workers also see 
themselves as our bosses. There is no cooperation between us ... Because they are permanent and we are 
casual, they are also kind of using us ... Maybe they act like that because they are permanent workers. If 
they do something wrong, the union will come and fight for them. If a casual worker and a permanent 
worker have an argument, then the shop steward will come and help the permanent worker. They would 
not help the casual worker .... The problem is that we casuals have too many bosses (part-time worker -
06/0712000). 
A casual workers is sometimes working with a permanent worker and the permanent worker is afraid that, 
if this casual workers is doing a good job, the employer might take him as a permanent worker. In that way 
they are trying to look for small problems, for the casual worker to do something wrong, and then report 
him and get him dismissed ... Our people have to realise that any person, whether he is a permanent, a 
casual or a temporary, should be regarded as an employee and they should unite. It is a strategy by the 
employers to divide the workers. So, when the permanents exclude the casuals, they are doing what the 
employer wants (regional organiser, NAFAU - 02/07/2002). 
A 'new', emerging approach adopts a less hostile and more discriminating approach towards non-
standard employment (Can1pbell 1996). In particular, it distinguishes between forms of 
employment that are beneficial to those involved and forms that are detrimental. According to 
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a regional organiser from MANWU, 
[w]e don't have a problem with casuals that are hired directly off the street. You cannot eliminate casual 
labour that is just emp loyed for a few days because of the nature of industry and high unemployment. It is 
also easier for the unions to represent and negotiate the wages of these casual workers as compared to 
labour-hire workers. We only condemn it when the casual is working for two or three years in the same 
company (05107/2002). 
This approach seeks to move from opposing non-standard employment to upgrading it by 
adopting policies such as full pro-rata pay and benefits. Union policies on membership are often 
amended to reflect a commitment to recruiting new categories of employees more actively and 
to represent their interests more effectively. This commitment is underwritten by a call for 
'decasualisation' that aims to restrict non-standard employment to those cases where employment 
is necessarily short-term, seasonal or irregular, and to convert the remainder (majority) to a 
permanent status. To this end, collective agreements are geared towards establishing a clear ratio 
of non-standard and permanent jobs with a view to increasing casual loading as well as 
evaluating conventional restrictions on and incentives for casualised employment. The unions 
in Nanlibia have also sought to temper the dictates of increased economic competitiveness with 
the demands for greater social equality: 
[t]he outsourcing of non-core departments is a major challenge facing us ... The companies are increasingly 
saying that to be competitive in the global market, they have to get rid of (he non-core business and they 
want more labour market flexibility ... You cannot talk of 'flexibility' without addressing the imbalances 
in wages which were created by past discriminatory laws (general secretary, MUN - 2611011998). 
There are three broad limitations in the new trade union approach to the regulation of non-
standard employment and the associated principles of decasualisation (Campbell 1996:594-5). 
First, the new approach to regulation is too narrowly focused on redesigning the text of collective 
agreements. Management's unilateral control over recruitment, in particular, is seen as a vital 
area for union intervention: 
[w]e have to put a mechanism in the recognition agreements that we negotiate with the companies to deal 
with recruitment. Ifwe manage to convince the employers that their recruitment policy must become a part 
of the recognition agreement, then we will be able to control the inflow of casual workers. If you have a 
recruitment policy that states clearly that the company can only engage casual workers for a certain period, 
then those workers must be deemed to be full-time employees when the period expires (general secretary, 
NATAU - 27/06/2002). 
Non-standard labour flourishes not only in the spaces marked out by the text of agreements, but 
also emerges in the interstices left by limits in enforcement and reach of labour regulation. The 
negotiation of collective agreements is the channel into which most trade union activity has been 
directed. The narrow channel of single-employer bargaining appears increasingly inadequate as 
a mechanism for combatting the expansion of non-standard employment. As the director of a 
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labour research institute pointed out: " [y Jour recognition agreement basically doesn' t help you 
with the outsourcing of departments because you have no legal right through a collective 
agreement to say: 'you mustn' t outsource'" (04/07/2000). Second, the new approach to regulation 
is too narrowly focused on the distinction between casual and permanent status. While the 
conversion from casual to permanent status is an important part of any decasualisation policy, 
the decisive issue for the unions must be terms and conditions of employment. A focus on 
employment status rather than employment conditions is likely to miss or mask significant 
features of non-standard work. 
Third, the new approach has proved largely unsuccessful in practice. 12 Several studies show that, 
even where the unions seek to recruit and represent non-standard employees, they have largely 
failed to establish effective mechanisms to protect and to retain these workers as active members 
(Colling 1995; Campbell 1996; Wrench and Virdee 1996; Kenny and Webster 1999). The main 
direction of change has been towards a degradation in the conditions of non-standard 
employment. In Namibia, implicit labour market deregulation, neo-liberal economic policies, the 
promotion of small businesses, and employer restructuring at the workplace have significantly 
reduced the space for the implementation of trade union policies on casualisation. The latter is 
increasingly confined to islands of union strength. There is also a tension between attempts to 
enforce the limits on non-standard employment contained in labour legislation and the demands 
of non-standard employees. 
The law is saying that casual workers must not work more than two days per week. But you will see that 
in most of the companies they are working more than two days. One thing that I'm seeing [Tom casual 
workers is that they are happy to work more than rwo days because they are getting more money. They are 
also demanding to work more days (regional organiser, NAFAU - 02/07/20 02). 
The workers prefer to be given as many hours of work as poss ible. They are actually very unhappy if they 
only go to a cl ient for three hours. Almost all my clients know that they want work for eight hours a day. 
Then I don't have any problems and everyone is happy (manager, temporary employment agency -
1411 011 998). 
Too little debate has taken place within the ranks of organised labour on the design and 
implementation of strategies specifically geared towards the recruitment and retention of non-
standard employees. Recruiting workers who have no tradition of collective organisation and are 
subjected to individualistic and despotic forms of managerial control is fraught with difficulties. 
Different tactics are being used reflecting differences in recruitment problems, potential 
membership, and areas of organisation. The tradition of 'job-control' trade unionism, where 
12 For example, the Transport and General Workers ' Union in England stressed ' link' campaigns to win 
over the growing non-standard workforce, but achieved very limited success (Snape 1994). 
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union strategy "sought to regulate rather than transform work practices" (Locke 1995: 17) and to 
defend rather than subvert existing job demarcations, has experienced considerable difficulty in 
responding to the restructuring of work and employment. The lack of job descriptions is seen as 
both a root cause of the vulnerability of casual workers and a significant obstacle to the 
prevailing 'job-control' model of wlion organisation in the workplace. 
For casual workers to have a say, to say: 'this is my job, I'm only supposed to work here' ; they must have 
contracts with job descriptions. That is the only way we are going to protect them. If they don't have that, 
they can be chased anywhere like the bosses want. They can say: 'you work here, you work there, it is all 
the same' (regional organ iser, NAFAU - 02/0712002). 
Casual and labour-hire workers have no job descriptions. If there is a problem with these workers and if 
you want to protect them, you will have to start from scratch. There is no base from which you can attack 
the employer. You have no proof, the employer Can just say what he wants to ... Sometimes the employers 
draw up a contract after they have fIred the workers to protect themselves. But we ignore any contract that 
does not have the worker 's signature (general secretary, NAFAU - 26/ 10/ 1998) . 
Trade union recruitment strategies have made little impact, especially where non-standard 
workers are not seen to be in direct competition with full-time, permanent workers. Unionisation 
rates are markedly lower for non-standard workers in every size of workplace and industrial 
sector. Union policy cannot afford to be confined to the realm of the effectively regulated sectors 
of the labour market at the cost of policies to deal with problems outside this realm. Several 
formidable barriers impede the recruitment and retention of non-standard employees. The factors 
that contribute to making non-standard employees difficult, expensive and unattractive to 
organise include: (a) their varied, unsocial and limited hours of employment; (b) the distinctive, 
often unfamiliar problems associated with non-standard employment; (c) the extensive demands 
on the time of organisers make it is almost inevitable that collective issues will gain precedence 
over individual complaints; (d) the reluctance by some non-standard employees to become union 
members for fears of victimisation by employers; (e) the divergence in the needs and interests 
of standard and non-standard employees; (f) an ambivalence towards trade unionism due to their 
perceived reluctance to cater for the needs of non-standard workers; (g) union dues are often 
viewed as an excessive deduction from meagre wages; and (h) high labour turn-over undermines 
the continuity of union structures in the workplace. The triangular employment relationship of 
agency temporaries presents a distinct dilemma: 
[i]fyou go to the mine and say: 'we want to organise these casual workers' ; the bosses wi ll say: 'look, they 
are not our employees. They are employed by this subcontractor ' . When you go to the subcontractor, he 
says: ' they are my employees, but they work on the mine. You must go and speak to the mine management' 
(regional organiser, MUN - 29/ 10/1998). 
It is no surprise, therefore, that accommodating the interests of non-standard employees has 
assumed a nwnber offorms between and within different regions and industries. These vary from 
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attempts to regulate their employment conditions in an effort to prevent undercutting, and seeking 
to obtain pro-rata terms and conditions of employment through legislation and collective 
agreements, to making certain categories of non-standard employees (e.g. female part-time 
workers) a priority target for recruitment and organisation. Other areas of potential union action 
include issue-based campaigns such as the demand for a ' living wage '; reduced union 
membership fees to certain groups; and rule and policy changes to facilitate the recruitment of 
temporary staff. The Namibian trade unions have pursued many of these organising strategies -
albeit with varying degrees of commitment and proficiency - primarily in an attempt to limit the 
adverse effects of casualisation on the conditions of organised workers. However, the lack of 
success in workplace-based initiatives has highlighted the need for broader, systemic changes: 
[i)f you just organise and represent the casual workers, it won't solve the problem. The problem is the 
whole system itself ... The issue is the law. We must change the law so that casuals can also made to be a 
part of the bargaining unit (general secretary, NAFAU - 28/06/2002). 
While legislative changes are an important part of any attempt at halting or reducing the growth 
of non-standard employment, they are unlikely to be effective in the absence of a decisive shift 
in recruitment strategies at the local level. The success of these strategies hinges on their ability 
to sell the idea of trade unionism to non-standard employees. Bargaining issues that are of 
interest to the under-represented groups that the unions wish to attract must be prioritised. For 
example, shop steward structures in the workplace need to elevate the profile of working time 
and job security within shopfloor politics. Demonstrating the ability of the unions to 'deliver' on 
these issues is crucial in a context where non-standard workers view the unions at best as 
irrelevant, and at worst as a threat. 
When you want to approach these casual workers .. . and if you want to intervene, the bosses will retrench 
them. They will say: 'the guy was just helping us temporarily' ... Later on, the workers look at you and think 
that you want to take their jobs away fTom them. When you approach them to maybe organise them, they 
say: ' if the subcontractor comes here now, we will lose our jobs' (general secretary, MANWU -
2311 0/1998). 
If you want to organise casual and labour-hire workers, they say that if they join the union they will lose 
their jobs. Others say that they just work for a few days until the job is done, so why should they waste their 
money on a union ... Whenever the union approaches these people, the manager will warn them and say: 
' I will dismiss you and then you can get the union to find you another job'. He will tell them: ' the unions 
can do nothing for you. Since you are just a casual worker, you can be told to leave the job at any time ' 
(regional organiser, MANWU - 05/07/2002). 
The efficacy of new recruitment strategies is also vitally dependent on closer collaboration 
between the various unions and the organs of civil society. The 'representation gap' created by 
the influx of unorganised, non-standard labomers into the workplace has led to an active role by 
voluntary agencies (such as legal assistance centres, chmches and youth groups) in advising and 
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representing non-standard workers. The unions need to act in concert with these agencies. 
Broader fonns of action beyond economistic workplace demands are crucial if the unions are to 
incorporate non-standard employees and eradicate the excesses associated with casualisation and 
outsourcing. 13 Before independence, there were two conflicting conceptions of trade unionism 
and community activism in Namibia (Bauer 1997:69-71). First, a narrow, bureaucratic view -
modelled on trade union structures in the former Eastern Europe - that subordinated worker 
demands to the formal structures of the national liberation movement and suppressed the 
activities of autonomous community-based organisations. Second, a more inclusive and 
democratic view that draws on experiences in South Africa under apartheid, promotes worker 
control of the labour movement, and seeks active collaboration with community-based 
organisations. These tensions remained unresolved after independence and continue to plague 
relations between SW APO, the trade union movement and community-based organisations. 
A shift in the locus of union representation beyond the workplace towards more centralised fonns 
of organisation involving inter-union, cross-sectoral attempts to increase union membership and 
establish minimum employment standards is potentially the most effective response to the 
proliferation of non-standard employment. In tenns of inter-union co-operation, union resources 
must be utilised in a co-operative rather than competitive recruitment of workers who, in 
retention tenns, are 'high risk'. In the mining industry, for example, the sheer variety of jobs that 
are outsourced (e.g. cleaning, catering, security and engineering) has created recruitment 
problems associated with the sectoral demarcation of the industrial unions: 
[y]ou want to organise these workers, but management just says that we are in the mining industry and 
under our constitution we can only operate in this industry ... One of the impacts of outsourcing is the 
creation of more unions per industry. You fmd a cleaning company now which used to fall under the mine 
but has been outsourced, The cleaning workers' unions will claim those workers and come and organise 
them. Through this you create tension among the unions and you create room for unions to multiply. You 
might find unions changing their scope of operations to cater for all this outsourcing. This will result in 
many unions duplicating their scope of operations ... Instead of one agreement with the who le company, 
you could have two or three with the different outsourced units (general secretary, MUN - 28/06/2002). 
Since they are generally not well organised, non-standard workers do not know or enforce their 
rights as actively as standard employees. Resistance by less skilled non-standard workers is 
usually intennittent, infonnal, individualistic, defensive and accommodative. In other words, the 
manner in which their labour is regulated influences the extent to which employees are likely to 
become members of trade unions and take part in collective action. Workplace organisation 
\3 Standing (J 993) proposes an 'associational' unionism - grounded in the community rather than in a craft 
or industry - to represent workers who are not confined to the same trade or industry. Heery (1998) uses the term 
' network ' unionism to describe campaigns that seek to develop alliances with external groups and sympathetic 
organisations in an effort to defend the rights of non-standard employees. 
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among non-standard workers is weak and hence highly dependent on trade union organisers. 
Diverting resources from permanent to part-time and temporary employees poses a dilemma in 
terms of democratic practice within the trade unions: "whatever commitment unions may have 
to the protection of vulnerable workers, they are also required to promote and protect the interests 
of the majority of their members" (Dickens 1988: 151). If the interests of non-standard workers 
conflict, at least in part, with those of permanent, full-time employees, then the question arises 
as to how their separate interests can be effectively articulated within the unions. Heery and 
Abbott (2000: 170) argue that two developments are necessary if unions are to respond adequately 
to the needs of non-standard workers: (a) representing diversity by developing structures of 
representation within the unions which are designed to reflect the specific interests of non-
standard workers; and (b) centralising decision-making processes within the unions in order to 
redistribute resources from the core to peripheral groups of the labour movement. The gains in 
democratic representation that could potentially be achieved through the former may, however, 
be diluted by the tendencies towards oligarchy generated by the latter. 
The design and defence of more appropriate forms of labour regulation will pivot on the ability 
of the labour movement to resolve the weaknesses of existing efforts to implement policies of 
decasualisation; to actively promote a framework of centralised bargaining; and to adopt a dual 
appeal to social justice and economic competitiveness to inform its strategic interventions. The 
effective organisation and representation of non-standard employees raise a number of significant 
wider concerns: (a) the difficulties associated with the proper inspection of non-standard 
employment; (b) the creation of a second-class workforce undermines the foundations of 
collective industrial relations and dilutes the social values and legitimacy oflabour law; (c) unfair 
competition from non-standard employment threatens formal employment; (d) the individualised 
forms of conflict associated with non-standard labour are not readily amenable to established 
dispute-resolution procedures; (e) traditional forms of employee representation are often 
inadequate to meet the distinctive needs of non-standard workers; (f) the established mechanisms 
for employee participation are usually unsuited to non-standard employment; (g) the social 
security systems designed to cover the risks inherent in regular, full-time employment are ill-
suited to precarious and intermittent forms of employment; and (h) complications often arise in 
determining which employer is liable for the health and safety and other statutory entitlements 
of non-standard workers in cases involving a triangular employment relationship. 
To be effective, the struggle against the casualisation of labour must be an integral part of the 
broader challenge to consolidate and expand the power and influence of the labour movement. 
In particular, pressure needs to be brought to bear on the government to amend labour legislation 
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In a manner that limits the opportunities for evading minimum standards, ensures greater 
compliance with regulations, and makes the client-firm jointly liable for compliance. A more 
practical expression of trade union opposition to casualised employment, according to Wilson 
and Ewer (1996: 137-41), might include: (a) research and advocacy - give voice to workers' 
experiences of non-standard labour through a serious research programme; (b) alternative 
conceptions of efficiency - challenge productivity measures that are defined purely by technical 
and market imperatives by reasserting the social purpose of work; ( c) occupational health and 
safety - unions can reinforce their identity as collectives by highlighting the health and safety 
problems faced by non-standard employees; (d) career structures - mobilise union members to 
oppose the fragmentation of work and to develop strategies to ensure that workers are ab le to 
acquire training and experience and have career options; (e) staffing levels - since every job shed 
in the name of 'flexibility' is another source of division, unions need to redevelop their role as 
defenders of jobs through policies aimed at redistributing work, combatting unemployment, and 
strengthening the social regulation of the labour market; (f) industrial democracy - union 
campaigns against outsourcing, for example, would test the extent to which management's 
prerogative was genuinely open to joint regulation; and (g) union education and vocational 
training - through their own education work for members and through their involvement in 
training programmes unions need to campaign for a wider definition of knowledge that extends 
beyond narrow technical requirement to include a critical reflection on the nature of work in a 
capitalist society. 
There is clearly a need to move beyond the neat dichotomy of 'traditional' versus 'new' in 
accounting for the variety of trade union responses to the casualisation of work. Common to 
much of the literature on non-standard employment is the claim that unions can adopt one offour 
approaches towards non-standard workers: (a) ignore them; (b) exclude and oppose them; (c) 
limit their numbers and regulate them; and (d) recruit and integrate themI4 This customary 
classification of union responses fails to account for the interaction between different approaches 
and carrnot explain why a trade union adopts a particular strategic orientation. The implication 
that nnions simply 'choose ' a particular orientation or approach ignores the structural 
determination of viable options and downplays the contradictions that may arise between 
structure and strategy. As the director of a labour research institute noted, 
it is not a conscious choice or decision ... If you just make policy statements based on what head-office is 
14 For example : Colling (1995: 129-31) identifies four models of union responses to outsourcing: 'strained 
corporatist ', ' distanced opposition' , 'managed atrophy' and' resigned opposition'. Foster and Scott (1998: 142-3) 
distinguish between two 'defiance' strategies (non-invo lvement and industrial action), an 'incorporation' approach 
(negotiation), and a strategy of 'external appeal' Uudicial challenge). 
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thinking and ignore you members, then of cOllrse you will lose your base. It has more to do with 
organisational weaknesses than policy choices between bread-and-butter, workplace-based unionism or 
social movement unionism. It is not a choice, it comes out of a sheer lack of capacity to address policy 
issues that they start focussing on the more narrow issues (26/0612002). 
Identifying multiple responses to non-standard labour should not conceal the fact that choices are 
structurally determined and that tensions can ari se between different union strategies. Although 
they do not determine our performances, social structures impose limits on the acts we can 
prefOIm. An adequate account of the tendency for responses to labour market changes (such as 
casual isation) to vary between unions must therefore be grounded in the existence of different 
' types ' of unionism. Many of the prevailing typologies of trade unionism, however, cannot 
adequately account for the variety of responses to ' flexible' employment within a particular trade 
union or sector, let alone a national labour movement. 
6.6 EMBEDDED CHOICES; LABOUR MARKET SEGMENTATION, 
INTEREST AGGREGATION, AND TRADE UNION IDENTITIES 
A pivotal process in any analysis, as we noted in the previous chapter, is that of taxonomy: 
dividing things up and classifying them into things that are similar or different. Such 
classification allows us to impose some pattern and intelligibility on the complexity of the real 
world. Considerable theoretical and empirical work has been invested in the classification of the 
different fonns of trade unionism associated with specific historical conjunctures (Scipes 1992; 
Moody 1997; Mnnck and Waterman 1999; Frenkel 2002). Within the empiricist tradition, 
classification depends on the objectives ofthe research rather than the objects themselves. In this 
sense, one classification is very much as good as any other. Descriptive forms of classification 
commonly overlook the underlying structures of the objects in a group which possess distinctive 
causal powers and liabilities. Sayer (1984: 127) convincingly argues that classification should be 
by causal rather than empirical grouping. The latter leads to "chaotic conceptions" that combine 
non-causally or contingently-related phenomena. Empiricism directly encourages such 
conceptions since its basis for abstraction is confined to a single ontological plane, that of events. 
Classification by empirical characteristics simply results in categories that can be arbitrarily 
reclassified. As Harre points out, taxonomy only makes sense if classification by manifest 
characteristics is "under the control of the theory that there are real differences in the internal 
constitution of things ... from which their manifested characters and their difference spring" 
(cited in Pratt 1994:52). 
The concept of 'causal power' indicates what a given kind of thing can do, given the right 
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conditions. Social phenomena have just those powers that they do and not others, by virtue of 
their respective ilUler stTuctures (Bhaskar 1989). This allows us to recognise that some outcomes 
may be unlikely within a given social structure. An effective response to the challenges posed 
by casualisation, for example, is simply beyond the capability of a narrow workplace trade 
unionism. In a wide-ranging overview of international developments, the ILO (2002:357) notes 
that "trade union structures centred on the workplace, whether at the enterprise or industry level, 
are often not suited to new forms of work organization". In fact, trade unions have seldom 
succeeded in preserving jobs through collective action confined to the workplace. The more 
robust organisations of non-standard workers have mostly been formed around a single 
occupation such cleaners or security guards. However, these organisations are often restricted to 
providing advice and assistance, and have little bargaining power in the workplace or influence 
in the political arena. The ability to undermine the conditions that facilitate the trend towards 
casualisation and to bolster those that subvert this trend presupposes a more inclusive trade 
unionism akin to a social movement. As Richards (200 I :28) argues, "the particular organisational 
configuration of trade unionism has ... enormous implications for its ability to promote working-
class solidarity". In other words, the various types of trade unions possess different capacities and 
limitations. 
Trade union representation has historically been concentrated at the workplace, based on the 
development of a permanent workplace organisation. The defining characteri stic of non-standard 
employment, however, is that employees become detached from particular places of work or 
particular employers. Trade unionists in Namibia are increasingly acknowledging the inherent 
limitations of traditional workplace trade unionism. 
After independence the question emerged : what role do we play now? There was a lot of activity around 
the land question where the unions really played the role of a social movement. But after that it became 
more and more quiet. Even the li ving wage campaign was almost dropped and it was left to individual 
unions to address through collective bargaining ... We are in danger of allowing unions to be very much 
concentrated on their sectors and dealing with their companies ... The weakness of regional structures is 
a big problem. You have action taking place around the factory and policy debates and so on at head-office 
level. The link between the two is not always happening (director, labour research institute - 04 /07/2000). 
We are still negotiating from company to company which makes the matter worse. We will be in a better 
position if we can negotiate on a national level ... We will not win the battle against casualisation if we only 
fight at the level of the workplace. To fight the managers alone won't help because they cannot change the 
system. We need to fight the legiSlators as well. Casualisat ion is not only a union issue. We must make it 
a national issue. Then it wi ll carry more weight (regional organiser, MUN - 03/0712002). 
The concept of 'political' unionism is often applied to the Namibian labour movement given the 
NUNW's origins within SW APO, its role during the struggle for national liberation, and its 
continued affiliation to the ruling party. An inevitable consequence of political unionism is that 
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the divisions between unions tend to reflect political affiliations, raising the question whether 
such affiliation should gain precedence over worker unity. This strategic orientation has 
important consequences for the unions ' role in both the workplace and the wider society. As 
Bauer (1998: 136-7) notes: 
[w lhereas unions in Britain and America, and elsewhere in Africa, preceded the formation of labor or other 
major political parties, this was not the case in Namibia; nor have trade unions in Namibia taken the step 
that party-created unions in Germany eventua lly took, emphasizing their pol itical independence ... Given 
that trade unions in Namibia were largely organized from above and primarily with a political objective in 
mind, more attention to the shop floor would do much to improve the living and working conditions of a 
sizeable segment of the labor force - and by extension of many others. Ultimately a social movement 
unionism of the type emerging in other developing countries might prove the most efficacious in Namibia. 
Prior to independence, SW APO and the NUNW subordinated working class demands to the 
struggle for national liberation (Melber 1983; Pe1tola 1995; Bauer 1997). Since independence, 
the NUNW-affiliates have concentrated on 'bread-and-butter' issues through the consolidation 
and extension of workplace organisation. However, this increased shopfloor presence has not 
translated into any significant impact on the national policy-making arena. The Namibian labour 
movement has not yet developed a form of unionism that would allow it to mount a serious 
campaign for more radical social change. A national survey in 1996 revealed that most organised 
workers expect their trade unions to represent their interests inside as well as outside the 
workplace. However, the prominence attached to trade unions by rank-and-file members in 
taking up broader socio-economic and political issues "is not matched by the unions ' capacities 
and track records to date" (Murray and Wood 1997a:195). Namibian trade unions very rarely 
make meaningful contributions towards macro-economic and national development policies. " 
The labour movement's limited influence on economic and social planning has drastically 
curtailed its strategic options in the struggle against the casualisation and outsourcing of work. 
Of concern here is the extent to which attempts to promote the security of existing union 
members is compatible with attempts to organise non-standard employees. Hyman 's (1994b, 
1996, 1997) typology of trade union ' identities' outlines a number of different forms of union 
representation which derive from a particular conception of employee interests. ' 6 Unions are 
15 At its second National Congress, the NUNW adopted a resolution noting that "the government entered 
into an agreement with the IMF and World Sank in an un transparent manner" and denouncing the lack of 
involvement by the labour movement in policy formul ation (NUNW 1998:6-7). 
16 These identities are: (a) guild - the constituency is narrowly defined in terms of an elite occupation and 
the focus of representative effort is on preserving the relatively privileged position of a craft or profess ion; (b) 
friendly society - seeks to provide mutual insurance, reprcsentational and consumer services to individual employees; 
(c) company union - develops a productivity coalition with management and seeks, through cooperation, to enhance 
company perfOimance and the terms and conditions of members within a particular enterprise; (d) social partner -
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faced with a strategic choice between (a) focussing primarily on the workplace and conferring 
priority on the defence of their existing members; or (b) becoming more inclusive in the interests 
they represent and redirecting their activity beyond the workplace. The primary contrast is thus 
between approaches to employee representation that are based on exclusive or inclusive 
definitions of employee interests. Central to Hyman's argument is the claim that workers possess 
a wide range of diverse and often competing interests. Interest representation therefore involves 
a difficult process of aggregation and the selection of priorities, leaving room for strategic 
choices and internal conflict. Hence, unions can choose to be more or less inclusive in defining 
their constituency, more or less restrictive in the issues they pursue, and can adopt strategies of 
representation based on member mobilisation or passivity. This schema allows for a more 
nuanced account of union responses and faci litates an analysis of the underlying forces that 
constrain and/or enable different identities. 
Each of the identities outlined by Hyman will tend to preference a particular response to the 
casualisation of work (Heery and Abbott 2000). By linking the various responses to specific trade 
union identities and by highlighting the limiting factors that serve to constrain choice, this 
approach represents a significant advance over alternative interpretations. It allows us to proceed 
beyond superficial taxonomies of trade unionism and to explore their conditions of possibility, 
reproduction, and propensity for transformation. The five responses to insecurity that are likely 
to emerge from the separate identities are the following. First, a common reaction to employer-
led flexibility initiatives has been to exclude these workers from employment and U1iion 
membership. This reflects the social distance between standard and non-standard workers as well 
as the formal union policies and informal workplace rules which deny union membership and 
representation to outsiders. A strategy of exclusion is also sometimes justified in terms of the 
need to maintain the coherence of a profession and quality of service. The unions that have 
adopted this approach have generally failed in their attempts to prohibit the use of non-standard 
employment. 
Second, drawing non-standard workers into trade unions through the provision of individual 
services such as advisory services and reduced union subscriptions. Collective representation at 
the workplace may be difficult to achieve for subcontracted, casual or self-employed workers 
because they are dispersed and often highly mobile. A further constraint on this strategy is that 
many employees remain committed to a more collective conception of trade union purpose. 
defines broadly both its constituency and workers' interests and seeks to promote social welfare and economic 
growth through interaction with government; and (e) social movement - orientated towards a broad definition of its 
constituency and worker interests, but seeks to pursue these through mobilisation and campaigning. 
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Although some unions in Namibia have increased their numbers partly through the provision of 
individual services, the majority ofless skilled, black workers are not decisively attracted by such 
consumer, advisory and labour market services. 
The third approach targets the employer and seeks to furnish existing members with guarantees 
of future employment through a partnership between management and workers. A commitment 
to promote the competitiveness of the enterprise is underpinned by employee involvement, 
training and skills development, and profit-sharing. The degree of employment security afforded 
through partnership agreements varies, but generally falls short of an open-ended commitment. 
An essential feature of such partnerships is the externalisation of risks and costs: the union and 
management protect existing employees by passing off the costs of absorbing business cycles to 
outsiders. Long-term partnership arrangements are also undermined by systems of corporate 
financing and governance which place a premium on relatively short-term performance, and the 
spread of direct forms of employee involvement (such as quality circles) which exclude collective 
negotiations with trade unions . 
The fourth response to worker insecurity consists of attempts by unions to influence government 
policy and secure changes in employment law through a process of social dialogue. Political 
exchange of this kind is aimed at conserving the jobs of existing union members and at reducing 
the insecurity experienced by workers on non-standard contracts. The NUNW's approach to 
casualisation relies heavily on using its influence within the ruling party to secure legislative 
changes and policies for a more extensive social regulation of the labour market. Tn the political 
arena, as the labour movement has learnt to its cost, working class demands are inevitably diluted 
by the dictates of social stability and economic growth within the confines of a 'free market'. As 
one ofMANWU's education officers observed: 
[f1or us as a union, it is almost impossible to limit labour hire. We have asked our goverrunent to pass a law 
to limit them ... The Labour Act must be amended to close the loopho les that the employers are using to 
bring in casual and labour-hire workers ... The workers are the majority in the country and the government 
must listen to us or we will just go ahead in a hard way. The goverrunent must understand that we want this 
casualisation and labour hire stopped (1510712000). 
The fifth response identified by Heery and Abbott (2000) is the mobilisation of nnion members, 
other employees and wider public opinion against injustices at the workplace. Social movement 
unionism has two connected aspects. On the one hand, there are attempts to re-create trade unions 
as social movements such that their purpose is defined in terms of the mobilisation of members. 
This aspect can be seen most clearly in attempts to extend trade unionism to the non-standard 
workforce through militant organising campaigns aimed at recruiting new members as well as 
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mobilising them around grievances and developing effective workplace organisation. On the 
other hand, there are attempts to submerge trade unionism in a broader social movement such 
that the boundaries of the labour movement become blurred as it operates within a progressive 
alliance of organs in civil society. This aspect involves the development oflabour-community 
alliances which seek to draw on the resources of the community in the pursuit of union goals and 
to develop a broader vision of union purpose which embraces community and environmental 
objectives alongside improvement in terms and conditions of employment. A central 
characteristic of social movement unionism is the view that industrial relations is not a self-
contained fie ld of action: "success in collective bargaining was shaped by the macroeconomic 
context and by the legislative regulation of individual and collective employment rights, while 
the social wage broadly defined reflected the whole matrix of social policy" (Hyman 2001:55). 
There are significant constraints on the pursuit of union policy through mobilisation: the risk of 
counter-mobilisation by employers and/or the state; internal opposition within unions as 
resources are shifted towards community-based structures and campaigns; and the fact that the 
interests of union members do not always coincide with those of consumers, civic bodies or 
environmental groups. The prospects of demobilisation and quiescence loom large where 
employees perceive the costs of collective action to outweigh any real or potential benefits. 
Moreover, since they inevitably raise macro-economic issues, we can also expect some 
correlation between levels of economic growth and the willingness or ability of employers and 
the state to concede to the demands of social movement unionism. Some critics have also 
questioned the ontological premises and political strategies implicit in the prescriptions of this 
form of unionism: 
[tlhe working class disappears into a discursively plural constructed subject. The capital-labour relation 
is no longer the fundamental relationship on which society is constructed and, therefore, the working class, 
whose economic demands now need to be translated politically if they are to be successful, has no more 
interest in the abolition of exploitation than anyone else: class is only one collective identity among many 
... The transition from capitalism to socialism has been transfonned into a relatively non-antagonistic 
process of institutional reform (Neary 2002: 159-60). 
Hyman (1996:72) clearly acknowledges the schematic nature of his typology of trade union 
identities, based as it is on ideal types of the main representative choices available to unions. 
What is at issue is a question of priorities and strategic choices: actually existing unions tend to 
incline towards "an often contradictory admixture of ideal types" (Hyman 2001:4). The 
implication that individual trade unions or even national labour movements can fully assume any 
of the identities is contradicted by the fact that unions tend to develop complex strategies of 
representation which draw on several of these identities. For example, the development of new 
services and campaigns on behalf of part-time and temporary employees in Namibia operates 
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alongside a continued opposition to the use of non-standard labour. It would be "utopian to think 
that there is one model of worker representation and broader-based bargaining that can 
accommodate the proliferation and varied forms of non-standard employment" (Fudge and Vosko 
2001 :346). In practice, trade union identities are complex, multi-dimensional and fluid. 
The union responses outlined above are reinforcing and often amount to parallel initiatives with 
regard to employees (organising and servicing), employers (partnership), government ( dialogue) 
and civil society (mobilisation). To be sure, the increasing variability of employment 
relationships demands differentiated rather than unifonn responses from the trade unions. Models 
of trade unionism that draw on a variety of different identities are more likely to minimise the 
impact of the hierarchies generated by differentiation in the labour supply. The relative success 
of new recruitment strategies, however, will tend to vary between unions given a differential 
capacity to mobilise the necessary organisational resow'ces and affect the requisite refonnulation 
of strategic orientations. Moreover, as Ross and Martin (2002:278) note, "[a ]ttenuating 
traditional union identities, let alone changing them radically, is risky". 
The efficacy of social movement unionism depends in large part on its ability to respond to the 
socio-economic circumstances of all workers and not simply the employment conditions and 
workplace demands of its more skilled and better paid sections. In this regard, the trade union 
movement in Namibia is at a cross-road: 
[i]n Namibia it could go either way. It could go further into a trade union movement that looks more and 
more at bread-and-butter issues only, that is largely on the defensive, defending members' interests and 
fi ghting retrenchments. Enterprise unions could be the one danger. But then there is likewise the 
opportunity to revive social movement unionism because of the possible and almost natural links with 
communal farmers. Many workers have their fami lies in the rural areas ... But [such a revival] would need 
a specific decision to do it, and it would need a lot of effort in terms of binding your structures together, 
getting the debate going at local level again, and gening mandates from workers which can be transformed 
by the national leadership into campaigns (director, labour research institute - 04/07/2000). 
The necessary preconditions for an effective social movement unionism in Namibia are only 
weakly present in the current conjuncture. The high level of demobilisation among organs of civil 
society has been a striking feature of the post-independence period. As a result, employers and 
the state tend to dominate national policy debates . Perhaps the clearest indication of the NUNW's 
status as SW APO's junior partner is the negligible impact made by the labour movement on the 
macro-economic policies pursued by the state. As the president of the Namibian Employers' 
Federation observed: " [a] government as strong as ours should not worry about losing a couple 
percent of voters because it is not seen as going all out to promote the interests of workers against 
the interests of the economy" (08/07/2000). In particular, the Namibian government is not 
crucially dependent on union cooperation to regulate industrial conflict or moderate wage 
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inflation. Both are in large measure offset by the rise in non-standard labour, high levels of 
unemployment, divisions within the labour movement, the predominance of decentralised 
bargaining, and the declining significance of tripartite structures such as the Labour Advisory 
Council. 
The casualisation of labour serves to reinforce the market pressures that have widened the 
compensation gap between advantaged, high-skill and disadvantaged, low-skill workers. Since 
non-standard workers are more vulnerable to exploitation and often experience harsh forms of 
discipline and work intensification, their growing presence in the workplace may stimulate new 
demands for protection and representation through trade unions. Current labour market 
restructuring is creating the conditions for a renewed wave of worker mobilisation through trade 
unions (Kelly 1998:130). Increasingly, the choices available to unions are couched in terms of 
resistance to business through militant mobilisation or accommodation and a search for mutual 
gain within a rhetoric of partnership (Storey and Bacon 1993; Heery and Abbott 2000). For 
workers who do not perceive a serious conflict of interests with their employer, or alternatively 
are so fearful of losing their jobs that they dare not challenge management's authority, appeals 
to militancy are not likely to prove an effective recruitment tactic (Hyman 1996). In fact, 
unmitigated militancy is a recipe for defeat and exclusion, while unconditional collaboration 
invites rank-and-file alienation and rebellion. Any effective system of representation is therefore 
always a contradictory combination of conflict and accommodation. 
6.7 CONCLUSION 
A major challenge facing organised labour is how to reconcile the calls for 'flexibility', the 
demands of globalisation, the encouragement of small businesses and so on with a flattening of 
the wage curve. Ultimately, the use of non-standard labour is symptomatic of the struggle for 
control of production between capital and labour. The balance of intra-class forces (e.g. large 
versus small employers, ski lled versus unskilled) and the differentiation of the labour force (e.g. 
concentrated versus scattered, urban versus rural) will have a decisive influence on changes in 
bargaining structures and practices. Sectoral demarcations are thus important: if strong and weak 
sectors are kept separate, the latter will simply become weaker. Collective bargaining in Namibia 
is, in many respects, at a cross-roads. The choice confronting the state, employers and the trade 
union leadership is between a low-wage, low-skill, deregulated and fragmented framework which 
emphasises the need to attract foreign investment and reduce social spending; and a high-wage, 
high-skill, centralised and co-determinist framework in which employee participation and 
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training are seen as vital for increasing the productivity of the economy. The former route is 
likely to be adversarial in nature and divisive in its consequences; while the latter is likely to 
encourage investment in human resources and expand the terrain for tripartite decision-making. 
Present conditions in Namibia - the introduction of export processing zones, a governmental 
emphasis on production at the expense of consumption, S W APO' s neo-liberal economic policies, 
a fragmented and underdeveloped labour movement, a voluntarist framework of collective 
bargaining, and the like - favour the low-wage route to increased economic efficiency. To arrest 
these developments and embark on the high-skill route to economic restructuring would require 
a drastic shift in government policy, a dramatic change in managerial approaches to industrial 
relations and, above all, a radical expansion and empowerment of the labour movement. The low-
wage route, by contrast, wi ll place additional strains on the alliance between SW APO and the 
NUNW and wi II halt, if not reverse, the efforts to expand democracy and reduce social 
inequalities. 
A critical issue for debate is whether the labour movement has the power, influence and resources 
necessary to (a) obstruct the cheap-labour route, and (b) constitute the driving force behind a 
high-wage and high-skill route to increased competitiveness. A new embeddedness of market 
forces in social relations is necessary to defend the most vulnerable and precarious employees 
in the lower echelons of the labour market. The lack of centralised bargaining forums means that 
the cun'ent invo lvement of trade union leaders in policy-making is by and large divorced from 
active intervention by the membership. A labour movement consumed by disputes revolving 
around recognition, dismissals, wage increases, and the like would be hard pressed to sustain an 
informed and mandated presence in broader decision-making structures. The trade unions will 
have to consolidate and expand their presence in the workplace before they can engage 
successfully with broader decision-making forums . Strong, militant shop steward structures are 
the best insurance against both oligarchy in the union structure and subservience to the priorities 
of management or the state. If a balance cannot be found between seeking to influence the 
government and becoming the labour wing of SW APO, the ri sk of demobilisation or aimless 
rank-and-file militancy will be considerable. 
Black workers in Namibia still live with the collective memory of trade union suppression, 
apartheid wage levels, and racist and exploitative managerial practices. The prevailing 
institutional and normative landscape - which includes the racial, ethnic and gender divisions 
inherited from the past and the predominance of bread-and-butter issues on the bargaining table -
has significantly constrained the abi li ty of Namibian trade unions to develop an effective strategic 
vision to inform their interaction with employers and the state . As a result, the union movement 
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has been "unable to institutionalise the gains it has made at the shopfloor level, and has found 
itselfmarginalised from the national policy formulation arena" (Murray and Wood 1997a: 159). 
In other words, the structural and ideological framework of the labour movement has decisively 
qualified the form of trade unionism that is possible or feasible in Namibia. The present 
organisational matrix and strategic focus of the Namibian labour movement are not readily 
amenable to a systematic and effective response to the plight of non-standard employees. In 
particular, the NUNW and its affiliates need to counter the threats posed by a growing division 
between membership and leadership, a decline in worker control over decision-making processes, 
the marginalisation oflocal and regional structures, increasing bureaucracy and a corresponding 
decline in accountability, and a deteriorating organisational capacity. 
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CONCLUSION 
A comprehensive transformation agenda is urgently needed to halt the fragmentation and 
polarisation associated with the rising tide of casualisation in the labour market. Such an agenda 
will have to underwrite income and employment security; allocate work in favour of the 
disadvantaged and marginalised; redistribute incomes to impoverished areas; and promote 
sustainable, high-quality jobs rather than condemning the under- and unemployed to working 
poverty and dead-end jobs. A more equitable labour market needs institutions designed to 
increase its coherence, transparency and efficiency, and to decrease segmentation through the 
provision of universal standards and stable employment practices. Blanket opposition to non-
standard employment is not necessarily progressive or likely to be effective. Given the demand 
for non-standard labour, a prohibition on all forms of non-standard work may simply drive it 
'underground' and 'off-the-books', which would raise more serious problems than it would 
solve. The resources and political will to initiate a substantive restructuring of the Namibian 
labour market to overcome the legacies of apartheid-colonialism have not been forthcoming. This 
calls for more fundamental changes than simply widening the coverage of labour legislation. 
Attempts to increase the efficacy oflegal protections for individual employees and trade unions 
are bound to falter in the absence of a general extension in the social regulation of the labour 
market. Agencies of collective interest representation are often not able to protect workers from 
managerial offensives and the mere threat of casualisation or outsourcing can be a means to 
enforce lower pay and inferior conditions of employment. 
There is a pressing need to strengthen collective organisations and construct a collective 
consensus around what constitutes appropriate labour market institutions and standards. The most 
common proposals to counter the casualisation of employment include: (a) voluntary action by 
employers and trade unions to rebuild job security or promote employability; and (b) increasing 
the legal regulation of the labour market to constrain employers' use of non-standard workers 
through restrictions on the right to dismiss and retrench workers, and a harmonisation of the 
treatment of standard and non-standard employees. The increasing segmentation of employment 
systems means that it is not appropriate to seek changes solely through voluntary or collective 
actions. The latter would result in only partial coverage, creating incentives for employers to 
move into less regulated sectors, thereby destabilising the basis for collectively agreed standards. 
Conversely, labour standards simply imposed by law are unlikely to be effective unless they 
enjoy collective legitimacy or are enforced through collective mechanisms. Changes to statutory 
regulations alone are not sufficient to undermine the trends towards an expansion in non-standard 
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work, a decline in the security of employment, and a widening of managerial prerogatives in the 
labour process. Employment and job security are, however, more likely to be created and 
maintained through statutory obligation rather than corporate self-interest. In a 'free' market 
environment, employers know that any voluntary guarantee of employment security would place 
them at a competitive disadvantage compared to firms that do not care or cannot afford to extent 
such protections to their employees. 
The concrete links between class relations and political power set definite limits on the degree 
of transformation possible in the context of a 'free ' market economy. In other words, business 
confidence may prove a formidable obstacle to fundamental restructuring of the regulatory 
framework of the labour market. In a presentation to the Labour Advisory Counci l, the general 
secretary of the NUNW noted that 
[t]he continued casualisation of work raises serious questions about the future of Namibian workers. The 
lucky ones who are still employed are living in fear for their jobs. We wonder how much national 
sovereignty does Namibia have when we dare not enforce laws to protect our own citizens' trade union 
rights for fear that it will scare away investors (cited in LaRRI 2000a: 18-9). 
The Namibian government's neo-liberal economic agenda, with its accent on market-driven 
reforms, has inhibited the role of labour market institutions and patterned the distribution of 
economic rewards to the detriment of the poor and marginalised sectors of society. In other 
words, 'free' markets are "creatures of state power, and persist only so long as the state is able 
to prevent human needs for security and the control of economic risk from finding political 
expression" (Gray, cited in Hyman 2001: 12). Despite rhetoric to the contrary, national policies 
for reconstruction and development have consolidated distinct sets of winners and losers in the 
labour market. There are significant tensions between the government's stated goal of creating 
'good' jobs and the emphasis on attracting investment and developing an economic structure that 
is adaptable to rapid changes in highly competitive global markets. The Vision 2030 of the 
Ministry of Labour pivots on the notion of "decent work for all" and envisages 
the improvement ofthe 'conditions of labour' , whether organized or not, whether work might occur in the 
formal or the infonnal economy, whether at home, in the community or in the voluntary sector ... The 
Ministry seeks to enlarge the world of work, not just to benchmark it. It is, therefore, as much concerned 
with unemployment and underemployment, as it is with the promotion ofrights at work ... The goal is not 
just the creation of jobs, but jobs of acceptable quality (MoL 2003:6-7). 
Achieving these goals will require a decisive shift from the prevailing system of labour 
regulation. For a start, certain categories of temporary and part-time workers must be deemed to 
be employees for the purposes of labour legislation. This would require the importation of a 
rebuttable presllmption in favour of standard employment. The onlls should be on the employer 
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to prove that the job filled by a non-standard employee is inherently short-term or limited in 
duration. Provision should also be made for equal pay for equal work, through collective 
agreements pertaining to a particular workplace if necessary. Furthermore, temporary agency 
workers need to be protected at the place where they are employed, which is the site where they 
are most likely to require a collective say in their employment conditions. Ultimately, however, 
attempts to reconcile flexibi lity and security, economic efficiency and social equity are doomed 
to fail in the absence of a coherent alternative to neo-liberalism at the national and global levels. 
The resolution of these tensions are unlikely to arise from the 'bottom' (local initiative) and need 
action from ' above' (national and global coordination). As Peck and Tickell (1994:311) explain: 
[bJelow the nation state, local regulatory systems ... have been conferred responsibility without power: 
regulatory responsibilities have been handed ... down from the nation state level, but localit ies can wield 
little in the way of political-economic power in the context of globalizing accumulation and global 
deregulation. Above the nation state, supranational regulatory systems have inherited p ower without 
responsibility: remaining wedded to a neo-liberal agenda, they continue to fuel global econom ic instability 
with apparent disregard for its damaging effects on national and local economies and its pernicious 
ecological and social consequences. 
The SWAPO government is no doubt hard-pressed (by the World Bank, foreign business, and 
other agencies) to insist on compromises by union members on the grounds that high wages and 
extensive social welfare are inimical to sustained economic growth and hence not in the' national 
interest'. The dedication to economic 'flexibility' has co-existed uneasily with a commitment to 
neo-corporatist forms of labour market regulation. As a result, government policy has been a 
mixed one, combining elements of voluntarism and compulsion, autonomy and regulation. A 
durable and redistributive system of labour market coordination and mediation always seeks to 
"accommodate workers' need for income and economic security and firms ' desire for flexibility 
in deploying labour within a public policy commitment to equity" (Fudge and Vosko 2001 :332). 
The recurring problem of balancing the dictates of economic efficiency and competitiveness with 
those of social protection and equality is exacerbated by the primary concern of financial markets 
with projects that will deliver short-term returns and high profit rates. These considerations tend 
to discourage long-term investments in new technology and human resource development. Far 
from stimulating greater cooperation and participation, what we see unfolding in Namibia is a 
form of industrial restructuring largely at the expense of labour. More often than not labour 
market 'flexibility' simply means low wages, dangerous working conditions 'hidden ' from the 
public eye and official statistics, a lack of job and employment security, long working hours, and 
the almost total absence of trade union organisation and job controls. There is little evidence of 
the consensus-seeking and gain-sharing postulated by the proponents of 'flexible ' accumulation. 
To be sure, 
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[t)he notion of a consensual strategy to increase the quality of working life now seems manifestly utopian. 
Accordingly, trade union policy-makers are caught between the twin constraints of shaping an agenda which 
will attract, by reflecting the interests of, the changing constituencies which they seek to represent; yet 
which at the same time will be realistically attainable either by negotiations with cost-conscious employers 
or though political channels which are themselves conditioned by sensitivity to issues of national 
competitiveness (Hyman 1994: 126-7). 
While the formation of a cheap labour supply may be functional for capital, it cannot by itself 
provide an adequate explanation of why or how such a labour supply came into being and 
endures over time. Although the survival of some firms might be absolutely dependent on the 
existence of a disadvantaged group which they can use as a source of cheap and malleable labour, 
capital in general does not depend on such contingencies. There are other means by which firms 
can and do compete and survive. Hence, there is nothing necessary or inevitable about the spread 
of non-standard employment. It is a conjunctural feature which acts as a functional substitute for 
other modes of labour regulation. The question is how the differential capacities for resistance 
possessed by the different sections of the workforce determine their distinct forms of 
incorporation, allocation, organisation, and reproduction. The root causes of casualisation must 
be sought in the interaction between (a) the processes that govern the supply of and demand for 
labour, and (b) the configuration and impact of the prevailing mechanisms oflabour regulation. 
On the one hand, the nature of the products or services, the technology that is used, the 
fragmentation of tasks in the organisation of work and the like are vital in "determining the ways 
in which employers might seek to achieve flexible labour costs" (RubelY et aI1984:102). On the 
other hand, some employees may seek to "limit such flexibility through maintaining custom and 
practice in the workplace, influencing the level at which bargaining takes place and establishing 
differences in the supply oflabour available" (Rubery e/ a11984: 1 02). The various forms of non-
standard employment can therefore best be explained in terms of the differential degrees of 
protection and security afforded by the regulatory mechanisms in the labour market and the 
labour process. 
The institutional constraints on the flexibility of unit labour costs are associated with the 
processes of collective bargaining which set minimum conditions, staffing levels, number of 
working hours, demarcation between skills, and so on. The effect of these elements amounts to 
a restriction on capital's ability to reduce labour costs and extend the flexibility oflabour beyond 
certain limits. These restrictions do not, however, apply in an undifferentiated marmer to all 
sectors of the labour market due to variations in the level of skills and bargaining power, varying 
degrees of institutional protection, and so on. Collective agreements are fundamentally concerned 
with the distribution of income between profits and wages. Hence, the more effective the 
organisation of a particular fraction of the working class, the greater is the fixity of its labour 
costs and vice versa. Permanent, full-time, organised employees are also able to exert a greater 
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collective influence over the manner in which their labour is deployed and utilised in the 
workplace. The proliferation of non-standard employment is largely a reaction to the constraints 
imposed on employers by the protective elements in the regulation of the standard employment 
relationship. Non-standard employment is therefore a product of the search for a social 'fix' for 
the regulatory dilemmas generated by incorporation, allocation, control and reproduction of 
labour at a particular time and place. Only an explicit focus on the different forms that the 
employment relationship can assume, will reveal that 
whenever the balance of advantage tilts to the side of organised labour, capitalists move from seeking to 
subordinate labour to seeking subordinate labour ... [That is,] capitalists can apparently endlessly export 
or displace their contradictions on to the next wave of helots they alight upon, at home or abroad (Cohen 
1987:252-3). 
The social construction of skills implies that employers rank labour supplies and that this forms 
the basis for systematic discrimination injob allocation. Even controlling for factors such as firm 
size, significant wage premiums exist between occupations, between men and women, and so on. 
Contrary to the claims of human capital theory, 'secondary' employment conditions are 
associated more with the employment of disadvantaged and marginalised workers than with 
variations in the productivity of labour. If worker resistance and organisation generate different 
forms of employment, work organisation and levels of reward than those derived fTom the effects 
of human capital alone, then it follows that, "where disadvantaged workers are employed, firms 
may find it relatively easy to deskill, or to pay lower wages and provide more insecure 
employment than might be merited by a simple consideration of technical skills" (Rubery and 
Wilkinson 1994:7). That is, skills are part of a more complex set of social relationships in the 
labour market and labour process that shape terms and conditions of employment. The process 
of assessing a person for a job involves a consideration of inherently unpredictable factors such 
as reliability, trustworthiness, creativity and deference to authority. These traits, as well as their 
unpredictability, follow from the fact that labour power is not a commodity but "a set of 
capacities borne by people" (Peck 1996:34). The process of matching a worker to a job is 
therefore infinitely more complex than simply determining whether he/she possesses the 
technical skills or aptitude necessary to carry out the required task. 
As more and more workers find themselves located 'outside' the regulatory regime associated 
with the standard employment relationship, the strains and ruptures in the organisation and 
reproduction of the labour market are bound to intensify. The very same forces that historically 
formed the basis for generating the trust, commitment and protection of workers to achieve the 
dynamic efficiencies of a productive economy are now viewed as the source of disequilibriating 
rigidities. By the early-1980s, "the concerns about how to improve and extend the labour-market 
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regulation system to modifY the effects of dualism and segmentation had given way to a debate 
over the merits of regulation per se, and over the advantages and di sadvantages of a deregulatory 
strategy for industrial relations (Rubery and Wilkinson 1994:8). The increase in low-wage, 
gendered, racially-segregated, insecure and deskilled non-standard labour highlights the uneven 
nature of regulatory change in which earlier forms of discipline and control survive for 
considerable periods. As Streeck (1992:68) argues, it is not the ' free' labour market of neo-
liberalism that appears as the counter-pole to societal corporatism, but "a ' dualist' society whose 
highly heterogenous order is characterized by growing disparities between primary and 
secondary, internal and external, central and marginal labor markets". Of particular concern is 
the fact that the ' secondary' or 'marginal' labour market is now presented, not as a necessary 
outcome of discrimination and disadvantage, but as the source of renewal and the cure for 
employment ' rigidities '. 
From the viewpoint of personnel and organisational policy, the principal choice which 
management faces is that between competitiveness based on low costs and competitiveness based 
on criteria such as quality, product differentiation and ilIDovation. In other words, there is a 'high 
road' (innovative) and a ' low road' (adaptive) to increased productivity and greater 
competitiveness (Boyer 1988b; Sengenberger 1992; Sayer 1995; Deakin and Reed 2000). Low-
price and low-cost competition presupposes a downward adjustment of labour costs (e.g. 
redundancies or lower wages), a more intensive deployment of labour to improve performance 
(e.g. increasing the pace of work or introducing new techniques and techno logy), or a 
combination of both. This competitive strategy has a number of inherent limitations. First, the 
wages of organised employees in particular tend to demonstrate downward inflexibility, a product 
of institutionalised systems of wage determination. Second, cost-competitive production methods 
are incapable of sustaining a functionally integrated and decentrali sed organisation of work that 
depends on multi-skilled employees with broad generic competencies. Third, the incentives for 
employers to invest in skills development are reduced if the employment relationship is not long-
term. Providing a degree of labour market security is not simply a political imperative in a 
democratic society; it is also an effective economic strategy. Research by Barton and Turnbull 
(2002:133) shows that "institutionally saturated patterns oflabour regulation are more efficient 
than institutionally minimalist forms of organization". In a similar vein, Locke (1995 :24) argues 
that 
(cJost-based strategies may give firms a comparative advantage over value-added firm s in the short run. 
However, they exert a perverse externality on society as a whole by making it riskier for competing firms 
to make the long-term investments needed to upgrade skills and change their organizational practices to 
get the benefits of these investments. Thus to the extent that cost-based strategies dominate in a country, 
the nation risks getting caught in a low-wage/low-skill equil ibrium. Nations that lack strong institutions that 
constrain the choice of the low-wage option are particularly vulnerable to this problem. 
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Low-cost strategies are unlikely to yield the initiative, trust and cooperation necessary to sustain 
innovative and productive work practices. If a new growth path is to be found, both management 
and labour must acquire tangible and lasting benefits from workplace restructuring. The changes 
in working and employment practices that are now deemed necessary to raise productivity would 
be easier to implement and sustain in a climate of job security and employee participation. In a 
society where employers and the government demonstrate a commitment to ensuring 
employment security (e.g. protection against arbitrary loss of employment), workers are far more 
likely to accept a strong degree of work process and even wage flexibility. The success of many 
of the rapidly growing East Asian economies was predicated on just this sort of combination of 
security with flexibility, the one being used to purchase the other. A politically sustainable 
balance between economic flexibility and social security is best achieved through the mechanism 
of collective regulation - in particular, by means of bargained arrangements between strong, 
representative and well-informed organisations in the labour market. Part of the reason for 
creating stable internal labour markets is to afford some insulation from market pressures to 
allow long-term, major innovation. Where firms or industries are unwilling or unable to adopt 
the high road, they have few options other than cost-cutting to stay in business. The resulting 
low-wage, low-skill system of production - based on outdated techniques and work 
intensification - is more vulnerable to dislocation and crisis in the face of rising levels of 
competition. Cost-competitive strategies are also closely associated with the expanded use of 
market-mediated forms of employment and the concomitant lowering of labour standards. As a 
result, standard employment tends to constitute a shrinking zone of advantage and stability in the 
labour market. Moreover, the low wages and intermittent employment associated with most 
forms of non-standard work exacerbate the problems associated with low levels of consumption. 
Although these are not mutually exclusive strategies, in practice they rest on distinct approaches 
to labour regulation. Allocational efficiency and dynamic or innovative efficiency, for example, 
may work against one another (Sayer 1995: 139). While a reduction in the mobility of capital may 
inhibit allocational efficiency (by preventing the transfer of resources from less-needed to more-
needed activities) , it can create a more secure environment for planning and innovation and 
encourage more robust and accelerated development. Trade-offs between these strategies are 
therefore to be expected in the formulation and institutionalisation of competitive strategies. The 
particular blend of approaches that is likely to be favoured depends in large measure on the 
constraints and opportunities, as well as the distribution of risks and rewards, associated with the 
prevailing regime of labour regulation. That is, different kinds of ' rigidity' prompt demands for 
different kinds of 'flexibility'. 
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Under the emerging global trade regime, systems oflabour regulation are "assessed not in terms 
of their political, social, or even long-term economic value, but instead are represented as merely 
a variable cost" (Peck 1996:247). A 'race to the bottom' in labour standards is an inherent danger 
of the neo-liberal emphasis on market-driven restructuring and cost-cutting. While economic 
forces are becoming increasingly globalised, the institutions and norms of labour regulation are 
largely embedded at the national level. This has severely constrained the capacity of national 
governments to pursue progressive alternatives . Hence, the most likely prospect of a neo-liberal 
trade regime is "the creation of an ever larger marginalized section of the labor force alongside 
prospering islands of successful internationally competitive regions" (Notermans, cited in Peck 
1996:256). The effective use of a 'flexible' and non-unionised labour force is increasingly 
viewed as a necessary condition for survival in the no-holds-barred competition for investment 
between different regions. The growth of 'sweatshop economies' is therefore in part the outcome 
of a geographical hierarchy of exploitation and of an intricate relationship between social 
disadvantage, ethnicity and the sexual division of labour. 
In a semi-industrialised and middle-income country such as Namibia, the scourge of structural 
unemployment, low economic growth rates, and pervasive inequalities in wealth and power 
cannot be overcome by narrow techno-organisational imperatives. In the absence of a 
comprehensive reform agenda, the high-wage and high-productivity growth path suggested by 
post-Fordists is likely to exacerbate the trends towards social polarisation. Under prevailing 
circumstances, this growth path may improve productivity and enhance competitiveness in some 
firms and sectors, but it is likely to be achieved at the cost of job creation. That is, we are likely 
to witness wage rather than employment growth. Post-Fordist methods are only likely to develop 
(if at all) in a few strategic industries within the export-orientated sector, while the rest of the 
economy continues to be marked by hybrid and uneven development, alongside informal sector 
poverty and rural decline. New technologies and work practices are also likely to be implemented 
in a manner that intensifies the division skilled, high-wage 'core' workers and unskilled, low-
wage 'peripheral' workers. In a developing country such as Namibia, the economy is highly 
specialised with an 'enclave' type of export sector with limited internal backward and forward 
linkages; demand is met largely through imports; there is a lack of vertically integrated industrial 
structures (i.e. incomplete production chains); and export products frequently have low value-
added content. To build up a viable, self-reliant economy in these societies, a necessary condition 
is to generate a comprehensive industrialisation process and hence to restructure the international 
division oflabour. The wealth of a country's factor endowment; its communications network; 
its chances of domestic capital accumulation as opposed to direct foreign control of production; 
the capability to accelerate the domestic acquisition of technological capacities; the national 
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generation of linkages; and government policy are all decisive factors in paving the way for 
successful industrialisation. A vibrant and expanding capital goods industry is a key to technical 
progress, which in turn has a direct impact on labour productivity and investment. 
A diversified industrial structure that is capable of supplying a significant proportion of its own 
requirements for industrial inputs and capital goods is widely regarded as a necessary condition 
for a self-sustaining, long-run growth path. The more industrialised grouping of developing 
countries has managed to reduce its dependence on capital goods imports, accounts for the bulk 
of manufactured exports, and has moved into higher value commodities involving greater and 
more capital-intensive processing of raw materials. The newly industrialised countries are thus 
becoming ever more differentiated from the least developed countries in both industrial structure 
and performance. A dependence on manufactured imports, together with the lack of capital and 
skilled labour, constitute significant obstacles to industrial development in Namibia (Collet 1980; 
Jowell 1983; Curry and Stoneman 1993). The rise in machinery costs means that imports can 
rapidly outstrip the growth in overall export earnings. The growth of the Namibian economy 
remains vulnerable to external factors with recurring droughts, volatile markets for minerals, 
rising costs of imported inputs, and highly variable output from the fisheries sector. A managerial 
preoccupation with control and cost-cutting means that new management techniques are 
characterised by hierarchical, authoritarian, and adversarial industrial relations. These techniques 
also contribute to the implicit deregulation of the labour market. As a result, labour continues to 
be viewed as a burdensome cost rather than as a vital resource requiring continuous training and 
active involvement in decision-making processes. The local impact of globalisation in exposing 
domestic markets to more intense competition is highlighted by the ways in which increased 
competition encouraged a view of workers' rights as production costs. It is therefore the interplay 
of national and international forces that reproduces the links between low wages, low 
productivity, low skills and low investment in Namibia. 
Given the fact that capital and intermediary costs are considerably higher than labour costs for 
most sectors of the economy, employers' preoccupation with wage costs and labour utilisation 
overlooks the limited savings that can be achieved and assumes that cost is the primary 
determinant of competitive advantage. This forecloses attempts to enhance non-price 
determinants of competitiveness such as quality and innovation. Cost-cutting has generally been 
pursued in an opportunistic and non-strategic manner. The pressures for change are resolved in 
a manner that makes the high-wage, high-skill route to competitiveness more difficult to attain. 
In particular, there are significant obstacles to the cooperative and participatory features of post-
Fordism. First, organisations remain rigidly hierarchical, top-down decisions predominate, and 
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ordered chains of command are entrenched. Second, inadequate information sharing is 
widespread and little time and resources are made available for employee participation. Third, 
there is a general unwillingness among managers to drastically modify existing decision-making 
structures and employers' organisations currently sanction a highly limited form of worker 
participation. Fourth, structures of collective interest representation are often simply 'bolted' on 
to existing organisational forms and have done little to overcome low-trust industrial relations. 
Fifth, there is a serious lack of opportunities for workers to gain the participatory competence 
necessary to mount a serious challenge to the prevailing structures of authority in industry. 
Finally, the current emphasis on individualised fonns of employee 'involvement' and ' flexibility' 
pose significant challenges to the collective regulation of wage-effort norms. 
In the light of efficiency gains of about 1.5% per year and a population growth rate of more than 
3%, it is estimated that economic growth of at least 4% is required just to maintain the current 
level of employment in Namibia (Schade 2000). Given the steady depletion of mineral reserves 
and harsh climatic conditions, much of this growth will have to come from an expanding 
manufacturing sector. When we consider the types and patterns of industrial growth in southern 
Africa, according to Riddell (J 993), the following features stand out: (a) the predominant source 
of growth in manufacturing has been domestic demand rather than either import-substitution or 
export growth; (b) the pace of growth in manufacturing output seems to have been critically 
determined by the dynamics of the wider domestic economy; (c) manufacturing growth has been 
dependent on access to sufficient amounts offoreign exchange (to finance plant, equipment and 
inputs) which the sector itself has in large measure been unable to earn; (d) a substantial growth 
of manufacturing would be highly unlikely unless the leading productive sectors were also 
experiencing sustained growth and expansion; (e) the process of substituting for imports has 
tended to be rather haphazard - it has resulted in neither a very significant degree of linkages with 
other sectors of the economy nor to a significant fall in the importation of even simple consumer 
goods; (f) the dominance of consumer rather than intermediate or capital-goods manufacture 
suggests not only that manufacturing is relatively simple in technique, but also that there has been 
little structural change in the post-independence period; (g) there is plenty of scope for further 
import substitution, placing in better perspective the view that future manufacturing policy 
should be dominated and determined by an expansion of domestic demand; and (h) success in 
import-substituting industrialisation depended not so much on the dominance of one or other 
characteristic, but rather on the convergence of many supportive elements over a relatively long 
period of time. 
The tendency for finns to reduce the number of workers that enjoy employment security and to 
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increase the number of workers with a tenuous grip on employment have created different levels 
and types of security and vulnerability. It has proved to be extremely difficult to develop policies 
to deal effectively with these heterogenous forms of disadvantage. The proliferation of precarious 
and poorly regulated forms of employment, as we noted above, imposes numerous, often 
unsustainable costs on the family and the wider community. The question, then, is whether the 
state will sanction the measures necessary to fundamentally restructure the labour market and 
break the economic ties of neo-colonialism. Attempts to manage the effects of widespread 
poverty and inequality, low levels of economic growth, and dissatisfaction with the slow pace 
of transformation have intensified the authoritarian tendencies within the ruling party (Saul and 
Leys 1995; Dobelll998; Melber 2003). SWAPO has provided precious little space for the organs 
of civil society to articulate and pursue an alternative developmental agenda. Critical voices are 
too readily silenced or simply dismissed as 'unpatriotic ' and inspired by the 'agents of 
imperialism' . 
'Flexible' forms of employment and production have spread unevenly and constitute novel 
subjects and sites of struggle. The significance of these trends is essentially a theoretical question. 
The tentative nature of changes in a period of transition means that identifying the directions of 
change involves more than simply measuring the extent of empirical change. A wide range of 
potentially disparate changes, for example, do not add up to a shift in the overall direction of an 
economy. We need to identifY the types of change involved, determine the reach and pace of 
these changes, trace the connections between them, and then assess which of the changes (if any) 
are the more robust or decisive. Changes in the workplace are complex and depend on a range 
of contingencies such as the prevailing systems of labour regulation, the exposure of the economy 
to the vagaries of international competition, and so on. If we are to make sense of these changes, 
both an overly optimistic voluntarism and an unduly pessimistic structuralism should be avoided. 
According to Jessop (2001 b: 12), 
an adequate account of regulation must not only consider the material preconditions of, and constraints 
upon, reproduction ... but must also take account of the different modes of calculation and the orientations 
of the various socia l forces involved in economic and social regulation. An important theoretical 
development in this context would be a more explicit concern with the 'spatia-temporal fixes' within which 
capitalist reproduction and regularisation occur. 
Even when, over a restricted region of time and space, a structure tends to endure, it is always 
on the basis of intrinsically dynamic and always potentially trans formative, human practice. All 
social structures are thus only relatively enduring, being spatially and temporally situated or 
embedded (Bhaskar 1989). It follows from this transformational conception of social activity that 
if change, or the potential for change, is always present, the analysis of change per se is of no 
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lesser or greater significance to social explanation than the understanding of continuity and 
reproduction. While some structures can, with hindsight, be said to be more enduring than others, 
it does not follow that these structures as somehow more 'natural' or 'normal'. There is no 
ontological asymmetry between relative continuity and relative change (Collier 1994:96). It is 
simply wrong to regard any social structure or system as something that would somehow 
reproduce itself unless obstructed from doing so. Consequently, there is equally no epistemic or 
logical asymmetry between the explanation of relative continuity and relative change. Both are 
in principle open to, and require, social explanation. 
IfhistOlY was simply a succession of events, as the Humean notion of causality implies, the world 
would be much easier to change than it has proved to be in practice. Conversely, if social 
institutions have inner structures which simultaneously enable and constrain their powers, a far 
more complicated account of social transformation follows. Absent from the neo-liberal image 
of capitalism as a mass of individuals responding to one another through markets, is any notion 
of fundamental, enduring social structures that are unlikely to yield to piece-meal change (Sayer 
1995:77). According to Bhaskar (1989:4), the structures of social relations are "the explanatory 
key to understanding social events and trends" as well as "the focus of social activity aimed at 
the self-emancipation of the exploited and the oppressed". This conception enables him to make 
the contrast, which the actualist cannot make, between the transformation of structures and the 
amelioration of states of affairs as political goals. 'Emancipation' implies that there are 
objectively existing, effective, relatively enduring, but alterable structures constraining human 
possibilities. There is a real hiatus between reforms at the level of the actual that retain existing 
structures and changes at the level of the real that alter underlying structural determinations. One 
will never fundamentally change structures by the cumulative effect of reforms in accordance 
with those structures: wage increases, for example, will not abolish class exploitation. Moreover, 
the relational conception of social reality espoused by critical realists such as Bhaskar implies 
that one person's oppression always results from another's domination. 
Since there is no example of 'total' emancipation, it is more likely that emancipation will always 
occur as a multiplicity of partial emancipations. For instance, the bourgeois revolutions which 
emancipated Europe from feudalism, delivered it over to capitalism. Likewise, the national 
liberation movements that ousted colonial rule often replaced it with dictatorships or corrupt 
bureaucracies. If emancipatory politics means transforming structures, it must be based on 
knowledge of those structures. Such knowledge is necessary to transform the will to ameliorate 
states of affairs into a project for transforming the structures that generate the unwanted states 
of affairs. We do not need Marx to tell us that the rich rob the poor, but Capital highlights the 
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mechanisms by which this is done and they need to be understood if we are to transform them. 
To be sure, the amelioration of states of affairs is in no way disparaged or devalued. For it is 
precisely the aim of structural transformation to ameliorate states of affairs (Collier 1994: 1 0-1). 
The point is rather that certain states of affairs cannot be ameliorated within existing structures. 
For instance, it is highly improbable that permanent full employment or the sustainable utilisation 
of natural resources could be maintained and generalised within 'free' market economies. Which 
things can be made better without changing the dominant social structures and which cannot is 
ultimately an empirical question. While critical realism cannot by itself answer this question, the 
actualism that argues or presumes that there are no underlying structures, only states of affairs, 
is totally precluded from making the distinction between superficial reforms and radical change. 
The Namibian labour movement has not yet developed a form of unionism that would allow it 
to mount an effective campaign for more radical social change. A preponderance of workplace-
based trade unionism, labour' s limited influence on economic and social planning, and the low-
trust, low-skill and low-wage policies pursued by employers have drastically curtailed the unions' 
strategic options. Finding a more equitable trade-off between flexibility and security requires a 
struggle on many fronts. The specific form that the casualisation of employment assumes is a 
product of the complex interaction between segmented labour supplies, a differentiated demand 
for labour, and the various dilemmas generated by a particular regime of labour regulation. As 
a result, non-standard employees are distributed in a complex and uneven manner across 
industrial sectors and the occupational hierarchy, and face a diverse range of possibilities and 
liabilities that shape their levels and forms of participation in the labour market. The institutional 
legacy of apartheid-colonialism, high levels of unemployment and poverty, a growing 
polarisation of the labour force, the predominance of cost-competitive strategies in workplace 
restructuring, and the selective coverage of employment legislation and labour market institutions 
have all accentuated the pressures for casualisation in Namibia. This focus on the limitations of 
what can realistically be pursued within existing institutional and relational conditions does not 
sanction or suggest any specific political project with regard to the casualisation of labour. The 
latter can only be constructed in the context of the constraints and opportunities of prevailing 
institutions, and by mobilising available (theoretical and material) resources to overcome the 
fractured solidarities of increasingly segmented labour markets. 
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APPENDIX 1: 
MANAGEMENT INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
A. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
1. Products manufactured or services delivered. 
2. Describe the organisational structure of the firm. 
3. What are the most pressing local issues? 
4. How would you describe the current environment both within the firm and outside? 
5. How is the firm adapting to these conditions? 
6. How would you describe the product markets in which your firm competes? 
7. How would you describe the present state of the labour market and its impact on the 
management process? 
8. How would you characterise your firm's production or service delivery methods? 
9. How would you describe the values of the firm? 
10. What are the goals or strategic objectives of the firm? 
B. GLOBALISATION AND COMPETITIVENESS 
11. What strategies has your firm adopted to meet the challenges of increased international 
competition? 
12. What changes do you think would be most likely to improve the productivity of the 
economy? 
13. What changes do you think would be most likely to improve the productivity of your 
employees? 
14. Can productivity and market share be increased with existing organisational structures or is 
major restructuring necessary? 
15. What role does the customer/the state/trade unions play in management's strategies? 
16. What are workers' perceptions of quality? 
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17. What role does the union play in quality issues? 
18. How are your employees motivated and their performance monitored? 
19. Are workers made aware of the challenges facing the firm and its long-term goals in this 
regard? 
20. Describe the attitudes and behaviour of workers (technical, clerical, manual). 
21. Is restructuring at work a specific and short-term response or more long-term and strategic 
response to increased levels of competition? 
22. What is the typical time-horizon of managerial planning? 
23. Do you manufacture your products according to demand or do you produce a standard quota? 
24. What are the central principles that determine the way in which jobs are designed and 
allocated in your firm? 
25. Outline the extent of change in the following since 1990: 
(a) Organisational Structure: 
o Acquisition and sale 
o Expansion and contraction 
o Joint ventures and collaborative arrangements 
o Markets and competition 
o Centralisation and decentralisation 
(b) Production: 
o New technology 
o Machine lay-outs 
o Work-flow and the pace of production 
o Stocks and work-in-progress 
o Quality control 
o Output levels 
(c) Human Resources: 
o Retrenchments 
o Labour turn-over 
o Absenteeism 
o Working hours and overtime 
o Links between pay and productivity 
o Team work and employee involvement 
o Dispute resolution procedures 
o Discipline 
o Training and skills profile 
o Number and nature of grievances/disputes 
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26. What is the major driving force behind the changes that have occurred in the workplace? 
27. What are the main causes of idle-time and bottlenecks in production? How effective has 
management been in eliminating them? 
C. EMPLOYMENT 'FLEXIBILITY' 
28. Number of employees (weekly-paid and monthly-paid). 
29. What occupational shifts are associated with black workers? 
30. Is management committed to a blurring of job demarcations and therefore greater mobility 
between jobs within the firm? 
31. Has there been a significant change in the extent and content of non-standard labour or 
simply a continuation of long-established practices? 
32. What percentage of the workforce is constituted by temporary employees? 
o Gender and skill? 
o Increase or decrease in last ten years? 
o Job categories? 
o Reasons for employing these workers? 
33. What percentage of the workforce is constituted by part-time employees? 
o Gender and skill? 
o Increase or decrease in last ten years? 
o Job categories? 
o Reasons for employing these workers? 
34. What percentage of the workforce is constituted by subcontracted labour? 
o Gender and skill? 
o Increase or decrease in last ten years? 
o Job categories? 
o Reasons for employing these workers? 
35. What are the major advantages and disadvantages that stem from the use of non-standard 
workers? 
36. Does management have clear policies and goals in the use of non-standard labour? 
37. To what extent can management switch standard and non-standard workers between different 
jobs? 
38. To what extent do trade unions and work groups control the acquisition and allocation of 
labour? 
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39. What is the difference between the highest and lowest wages in your firm? Is it increasing 
or decreasing? 
40. Are non-standard workers cheaper/more pliable than permanent employees? 
41. What are the differences in the skills, promotion prospects, pay rises, age, gender and benefits 
of standard and non-standard labour? 
42 . What are the differences in productivity between standard and non-standard labour? 
43 . What is the turn-over rate of non-standard workers? 
44. Do you employ too few or too many non-standard workers? 
45 . How does the management of part-time and temporary labourers differ from that of 
permanent employees? 
46. Has job security increased or decreased? 
47. How do you deal with the tasks of absent employees? 
48. Do you encounter any difficulties in filling new or vacant posts? 
49. Do you employ different recruitment procedures for different categories of employees? 
50. What do you as management look for when hiring new employees? 
51. How would you divide or categorise the workforce in your firm? 
52. Would you say that the workforce can be divided into a 'core' and a 'periphery' (in terms of 
status, influence, job security, career prospects, ski lls, wages, benefits)? 
D. OUTSOURCING AND INDUSTRIAL NETWORKS 
53. What do you regard as the central advantages and disadvantages of subcontracting or 
outsourcing? 
54. Does management have a clearly-formulated strategy on outsourcing? 
55. What criteria do you use to establish which functions should be outsourced? 
56. Which functions in your firm are prime candidates for outsourcing? 
57. Which activities in your firm would be best retained 'in-house' and which would be best 
outsourced to suppliers? 
429 
58. Would you say that your firm has achieved the optimum balance between in-house and 
outsourced work? 
59. Do you anticipate an increase or decrease in the levels of outsourcing in the future? 
60. Do government policies and labour laws facilitate or obstruct the outsourcing process? 
61. Is the issue of outsourcing regulated through collective bargaining with the union or 
discussions with employees? If not, how are these decisions reached? 
62. How would you describe the union' s position on outsourcing? 
63. Would you say that a decision to outsource more of the firm's activities would harm the 
levels oftrust which exist between management and the union? 
64. How would you characterise the relations between your firm and its suppliers? 
65. Are long-term commitments made to certain suppliers? 
66. How do you control the quantity and quality of the materials and services supplied by outside 
contractors? 
E. MANAGEMENT STYLE 
67. What are the major constraints on management to run the firm as it sees fit? 
68. Would you describe your approach to human resource management as 'flexible' (i.e . able to 
adapt rapidly to changes in technology and market conditions)? 
69. In which areas of production and employment would flexibility be a worthwhile goal for 
management to pursue? 
70. Business consultants emphasise team-working, leaner management structures, just-in-time 
inventories, flexi-time, and total quality control. Have any of these strategies influenced 
management's thinking on productivity and competitiveness? Which, if any, of these strategies 
are pursued in your firm ? 
71. What is your response to the argument that increased productivity depends on a move away 
from uniform, standardised pay structures negotiated at a central level to more varied and 
individualised systems based on performance? 
72. How would you describe the tenus and conditions of employment for workers at your firm? 
73. What are the most significant changes in employment policies and production strategies that 
have occurred in the firm over the last ten years? 
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74. In general terms, how would you describe the nature and direction of the changes taking place 
in human resource management? 
75. In terms of decision-making power and its role in the formulation of company policies, how 
does the personnel department compare with other departments such as accounting, finance and 
production? 
76. Is the dominant management approach to avoid or engage the trade unions? 
77. Outline the impact oflabour laws on managerial practices. 
78. On which issues do you relate to the work force as a collective (through the union) and which 
matters are dealt with on an individual basis? 
79. How are the effort-levels of your employees determined and enforced? 
80. Describe the relationship between formal and informal rules in the workplace. 
81. Which channels of communication with the employees are most effective? Why? 
82. What is the company's policy on affirmative action? 
F. INDUSTRlAL RELATIONS 
83. What is management's primary objectives in terms of industrial relations? 
84. What are the major obstacles to achieving these objectives? 
85. Which model of industrial relations do you think should replace the present system? 
86. Which categories of the workforce are unionised? Name of the union/s? 
87. What are the major changes that have taken place in collective bargaining over the last ten 
years? 
88. To what extent do the unions bargain over wages as opposed to the organisation of work? 
89. What role does industrial relations considerations play in key business decisions and broader 
business strategies? 
90. What you think are the main reasons for changes in the importance of industrial relations 
matters over the last ten years? 
91. Describe the nature of the issues that are subject to negotiation with the trade unions. 
92. Explain the industrial relations situation regarding the different unionslbargaining units. 
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93. What levels of trust would you say exist in your workplace? 
94. What is the impact of head office on collective bargaining? 
95. Describe the means by which corporate head office influences decisions on industrial 
relations matters. 
96. Which decisions are shaped or taken by head office and which are left to the establishment? 
97. Is there an attempt to separate pay bargaining structures from the structures for strategic 
business decision-making? 
98. What kinds of trade union behaviour do you find most satisfactory? 
99. What kinds of trade union behaviour do you find most nnsatisfactory? 
100. To what extent does management control the agenda of negotiations with the trade 
union/employees? What issues dominate the union/employees' agenda? 
10 I. Which areas of decision-making would management be reluctant to open up to negotiations 
with the trade union? 
102. How is the work load or output of each worker determined? Which factors are central in 
determining the levels of effort that workers put into their jobs? 
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APPENDIX 2: \ 
TRADE UNION INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
A. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
I. Industries and categories of employees organised. 
2. Number of current paid-up members? Increase or decrease over the last ten years? 
3. How would you describe the CUlTent environment both within the union and outside? 
4. How is the union adapting to these conditions? 
5. How would you describe the terms and conditions of employment of your members? 
6. What are the most significant changes in employment policies and production strategies that 
have occulTed in the firms you have organised over the last ten years? 
7. In general terms, how would you describe the nature and direction of the changes taking place 
in industrial relations? 
8. How would you describe the goals and values of managers? 
9. What are the most pressing local issues? 
B. GLOBALISATION AND COMPETITIVENESS 
10. What changes do you think would be most likely to improve the productivity of the 
economy? 
11. How are firms responding to the challenges of increased international competition? 
12. Do employers make demands for greater employment ' flexibility'? 
13 . Are workers made aware of the challenges facing the firm and its long-term goals in this 
regard? 
14. Outline the extent of change in the following since 1990: 
(a) Production: 
o New technology 
o Machine lay-outs 
o Work-flow 
o Stocks and work-in-progress 
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o Quality control 
o Output levels 
(b) Human Resources: 
o Retrenchments 
o Labour tum-over 
o Absenteeism 
o Working hours and overtime 
o Links between pay and productivity 
o Devolved responsibility and employee involvement 
o Dispute resolution procedures 
o Discipline 
o Union recognition 
o Training and promotion 
o Number and nature of grievances/disputes 
c. EMPLOYMENT 'FLEXIBILITY' '-
15. What occupational shifts are associated with black workers? 
16. Is management committed to a blurring of job demarcations and therefore greater mobility 
between jobs within the firm? 
17. Describe the union's approach to non-standard workers. 
18. What strategies has the union devised to deal with non-standard workers? 
19. Has there been a significant change in the extent and content of non-standard labour or 
simply a continuation of long-established practices? 
20. To what extent can management switch part-time or temporary and permanent workers 
between different jobs? 
21. To what extent does the trade union and work groups control the acquisition and allocation 
of labour? 
22. What is the difference between the highest and lowest wages in your sector? Are these 
increasing or decreasing? 
23. Are non-standard workers cheaper/more pliable than standard employees? 
24. What are the differences in the skills, promotion prospects, pay rises, age, gender and benefits 
of standard and non-standard labour? 
25. What are the differences in productivity between permanent and part-time or temporary 
labour? 
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26. What is the turn-over rate of non-standard workers? 
27. Do you think companies employ too few or too many non-standard workers? 
28. Does management have clear policies and goals in the use of non-standard labour? How does 
the union intend to combat these policies? 
29. Hasjob security increased or decreased? 
30. What does management look for when hiring new employees? 
31. Would you say that the workforce can be divided into a 'core' and a 'periphery' (in terms of 
status, job security, career prospects, skills, wages, benefits)? 
32. Is management consciously implementing a core-periphery strategy? 
33. What effect does the removal of job security for non-standard workers have on other 
workers? 
34. What kind of jobs are most likely be casualised by employers? 
35. What percentage of the workforce is constituted by temporary employees? 
o Gender and skill? 
o Increase or decrease in last ten years? 
o Job categories? 
o Reasons for employing these workers? 
36. What percentage of the workforce is constituted by part-time employees? 
o Gender and skill? 
o Increase or decrease in last ten years? 
o Job categories? 
o Reasons for employing these workers? 
37. What percentage of the workforce is constituted by subcontracted or casual labour? 
o Gender and skill? 
o Increase or decrease in last ten years? 
o Job categories? 
o Reasons for employing these workers? 
38. How does the organisation of non-standard labourers differ from that of standard employees? 
D. OUTSOURCING AND INDUSTRIAL NETWORKS 
39. What do you regard as the central advantages and disadvantages of subcontracting or 
outsourcing? 
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40. Does union have a clearly-formulated strategy on outsourcing? 
41. What criteria do managers use to establish which functions should be outsourced? 
42. Which activities are retained ' in-house' and which are outsourced to suppliers? 
43. Do you anticipate an increase or decrease in the levels of outsourcing in the future? 
44. Have government policies and labour laws facilitated or hindered outsourcing? 
45. Is the issue of outsourcing regulated through collective bargaining with the umon or 
discussions with employees? If not, how are these decisions reached? 
46. How would you describe the union 's position on outsourcing? 
47. Would you say that a decision to outsource some of the firm's activities would halm the 
levels oftrust which exist between management and the union? 
E. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
48 . Is the dominant management approach to avoid or engage the trade unions? 
49. Which channels of communication with the employers are most effective? 
50. What are the major changes that have taken place in collective bargaining over the last ten 
years? 
51 . On which issues do employers relate to the workforce as a collective and which matters are 
dealt with on an individual basis? 
52. On which issues are employers open to negotiation with the trade unions and on which issues 
do they refuse to negotiate? 
53 . To what extent do the unions bargain over wages as opposed to the organisation of work? 
54. What role does industrial relations considerations play in key business decisions and broader 
business strategies? 
55. Has there been any major changes in the way management deals with the trade unions over 
the last ten years? 
56. What opportunities exist for workers to influence management's decisions? 
57. What levels of trust would you say exist in the workplace? 
58. Please give details and outcomes of industrial action in the last five years. 
436 
59. Which model of industrial relations do you think should replace the present system? 
60 . What is the impact of head office (NUNW) on collective bargaining strategies? 
61. To what extent are terms and conditions of employment and the organisational framework 
open to change? 
62. To what extent does management control the agenda of negotiations with the trade 
union/employees? What issues dominate the employers' agenda? 
63. What performance and appraisal criteria are used by employers? 
64. How is the workload of each worker determined? 
65. How committed are workers to the productivity and long-term survival of the firm? 
66. Would you say that employees have a career structure? 
67. Has any decentralisation or delegation of decision-making taken place in your union over the 
last ten years? 
68. Business consultants and academics have made much of the 'Japanese miracle'. They argue 
that, unlike the rigid mass production methods of the West, Japanese companies have adopted 
strategies that enhance employment and production 'flexibility'. This, it is argued, allows for 
effective cost control and a rapid response to changing market conditions. What are your views 
on these arguments? 
69. The proponents of ' flexibility' emphasize team-working, leaner management structures, just-
in-time inventories, flexitime, and total quality control. Have any of these strategies influenced 
management's thinking on productivity and competitiveness? Which, if any, of these strategies 
are pursued by the firms you have organised? 
70. What types of flexibility are sought by employers? 
71 . What is your response to the argument that increased productivity depends on a move away 
from uniform, standardised pay structures negotiated at a central level to more varied and 
individualised systems based on performance? 
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